SinoDefence Forum

Ambivalent

Wiki is wrong on several aspects of that engagement. The five inch guns on Merril and a Knox class FF Bagley who's Ops Boss briefed us on it could not hit the platform. The shells sailed harmlessly between the legs and various cross members on the platforms. Over 1000 rounds of five inch were expended. Eventually they did hit the oil storage on the platforms and set them on fire. Bagley's SH-2 pilots reported the heat from the fire could be felt in the cockpit ( with the doors slid open, pretty routine in the H-2 in that climate ) at three miles distance!
No Harpoons were used in the conflict. The USN looked at the weapons the Iranians could fire at them and determined none had a range greater than 25 nm. Rather than expend what were then a very expensive missile, Harpoon, they chose to depress the Mk-10 and Mk-13 launch arms and use much cheaper Standard missiles in their anti-surface mode against Iranian surface units, and this was successful. Regardless of what Wiki might say, our brief was that no Harpoons were shot at the Iranians.

bd popeye

Thanks for your enlightenment ambivalent. Once again wiki is proven to be full of holes.

I was stationed at NAS Miramar.(now MCAS Miramar) at the time and the only thing we heard about the encounter was on the news and the word was passed to all hands that "All went well"..

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Ambivalent

I think Wiki confused Maverick missiles, which the USN did fire at Iranian ships with Harpoons. Someone say a missile fired from an airplane at a ship and assumed it was a Harpoon, that's my best guess.

BRAVO JULIET

Popeye, how do you feel the US ASW is prepared for a sub conflict in the persian gulf? We dont have the S-3s anymore, and very few frigates.

bd popeye

The US does have assets in the Gulf region very capable of ASW.

1) P-3s
2) LA Class subs..The very best sub hunters around.
3) SH-60s deployed on all DDGs and many CGs.

The USN has conducted ASW training ops with the Swedish diesel boat(SSK) HMS Gotland from 2005 to 2007. And other ASW training in both the Atlantic and Pacific despite the protest of liberal activist and court ruling concerning the use of sonar.

Based on these facts I'm sure the USN has developed methods to combat any sub threat in Gulf region.

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Ambivalent

Back in the day, most destroyers and cruisers did not carry any ASW helo, and if they did it was a single SH-2F. In order to reliably cover the vast area a carrier strike group covers with ASW aircraft, they had to have S-2F's ( Stoofs ) and S-3's ( called "Hoovers" because of the obnoxious sound they made ) to fly out to the distant edges of the strike group to lay sonobuoys and look for subs. Today, every DDG and CG has helos, usually two and they are the much capable MH-60S with dipping sonar. In reality there is much better ASW coverage this way. There are more helos out there than a squadron of S-3's, they are closer to the action so their reaction times are better, they can stay on station longer since a bag of gas is much closer and the turn around time of a helo on a can is a heck of a lot quicker than that of an S-3 during cyclic ops of a carrier. Then there is the dipping sonar every MH-60S carries. It used to be only the six helos of the carrier's HS squadron had dipping sonar for what was called "inner zone" ASW. Now every helo in the strike group has it, and this is the most feared weapon in the strike group's ASW arsenal. Even the best skippered SSN cannot reliably get away from a pair of dipping sonar helos if the helo crews know their business.
The Straits of Hormuz and Arab ( or Persian ) Gulf have horrible acoustics. Warm water, shallow, full of all sorts of racket from the concentration of merchant traffic. That cuts both ways my friends. That Kilo class submarine will also struggle to find and track targets. A Kilo is actually a pretty old submarine too, not the cutting edge by any means, and the Russian sonars aren't up to the best western kit. I wouldn't assume they would be as effective in their home waters as they might be in the cold North Pacific or Barents, where the acoustics will be more to their favor.

Sea Dog

Hey Ambivalent. I served in DESRON 15 / Yokosuka in the 1990's aboard DDG-56. You're correct about the emphasis the USN has into making the ships of the fleet have helo capabilities. And for good reason. For us, the Flt. 1 version of DDG we operated did not carry a helo, (only had a landing pad and support equipment), but we were able to process sonobouy data from them for our own use in ASW tracking. We always had a helo available for ops despite our lack of a dedicated one.

Since all data is shared in ASW tracking between USN units in Surface Action Groups or larger battlegroups anyway, we generally used this data to define solutions using generated tracks from onboard sources we used in this process. So, what you describe in the larger use of modern day helo ops for ASW rings totally true. We normally conducted ASW ops in conjunction with other units that had helo's as part of their normal outfit. It always seemed like the quick and efficient way to get alot of airborne ASW units where you needed them, and the persistence was very high for this type of ops. The thing that the S-3's gave us was reach and payload for sustained high tempo ASW conflict. Something we really aren't faced with in todays environment. But of course I think the upcoming P-8 will address this capability very well. In your post above, you bring back some memories for me.

BRAVO JULIET

Are the ASW capabilities close to that off what say the Spruance class could preform? do the Burkes carry ASROC?

Pointblank

Same ASW sensor systems on the Burke's that were found on the old Spruance's and they can also carry the vertical launch version of ASROC as well. With the Flight IIA ships, they added hangars for 2 SH-60's, so same helicopter capabilities.

Overall, very similar capabilities, but with much more AAW capability.

bladerunner

A Indepth look at how China's ASBM might work against a CSG, and the problems they may still have to solve. From the Jamestown Foundation.

Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13
June 24, 2009 04:44 PM Age: 12 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
By: Andrew S. Erickson

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, p. 21.
China wants to achieve the ability, or at minimum the appearance of the ability, to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group (CSG) from intervening in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis. China may be closer than ever to achieving this capability with land-based anti-ship homing ballistic missiles. There have been many Western reports that China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Increasingly, technical and operationally-focused discussions are found in a widening array of Chinese sources, some authoritative. These factors suggest that China may be close to fielding, testing, or employing an ASBM—a weapon that no other country possesses. According to U.S. Government sources, Beijing is pursuing an ASBM based on its CSS-5/DF-21D solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile. The CSS-5’s 1,500 km+ range could hold ships at risk in a large maritime area—far beyond the Taiwan theatre into the Western Pacific [1]. Yet there remain considerable unknowns about China's ASBM capability, which could profoundly affect U.S. deterrence, military operations and the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

Taiwan as the Catalyst

For the past several decades, the U.S. Navy has used aircraft carriers to project power around the world, including in and around the Taiwan Strait. The deployment of the USS Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups in response to China’s 1995-1996 missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait was a move that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could not counter. The impetus behind Chinese efforts to develop ASBMs may be to prevent similar U.S. carrier operations in the future.

Keystone of ‘Anti-Access’ Strategy?

If fielded, the ASBM would be just one of the many new platforms and weapons systems that China has been buying and building since the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. These systems, collectively, will allow China to assert unprecedented control over its contested maritime periphery, in part by attempting to deny U.S. forces ‘access’ to critical areas in times of crisis or conflict. They do so by matching Chinese strengths with U.S. weaknesses, thereby placing U.S. platforms on the ‘wrong end of physics.’ An ASBM, however, stands above the quiet submarines, lethal anti-ship cruise missiles, and copious sea mines that China has been adding to its arsenal in its potential strategic impact on regional allies of the United States and U.S. interests in maintaining regional peace and security.

Firstly, the development of an ASBM would draw on over half a century of Chinese experience with ballistic missiles. Secondly, it would be fired from mobile, highly concealable land-based platforms. Thirdly, it would have the range to strike targets hundreds of kilometers from China’s shores. These factors suggest that China is likely to succeed in achieving a capability that is extremely difficult to counter and could impose ‘access denial’ in strategically vital sea areas well beyond its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

U.S. Technological Influence?

The United States does not have an ASBM. It did have a distantly related capability, in the form of the Pershing II ground-to-ground theater-ballistic missile, but Washington relinquished this capability when it ratified the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Moscow in 1988. Interestingly, some Chinese sources state that previous advances in the now-abandoned Pershing II program inspired Chinese research and development relevant to an ASBM [2]. The Pershing II has adjustable second stage control fins for terminal maneuver. U.S. Government sources, and many Chinese sources, state that a Chinese ASBM would be based on the CSS-5. While positively identified photos of a CSS-5 outside its launch canister are not known to exist, at least one version of China’s related CSS-6/DF-15 missile has a reentry vehicle virtually identical in appearance to the Pershing II’s [3]. Based on this strong visual resemblance, it is possible that the CSS-6 employs terminal maneuvering technology similar to that of the Pershing II, and it is reasonable to assume that the CSS-5 does too. This is because the reentry vehicle that China obviously has could easily be mated with the CSS-5 booster, which might then produce an effective ASBM, assuming that its radar has the ability to track moving targets at sea.

Making an ASBM Work

Chinese schematic diagrams show an ASBM flight trajectory with mid-course and terminal guidance [4]. Second stage control fins would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fixed trajectory.

Yet how do Chinese experts envision the “kill chain”—the sequence of events that must occur for a missile to successfully engage and destroy or disable its target (e.g. an aircraft carrier)—beyond the five steps that they commonly list: 1) detection, 2) tracking, 3) penetration of target defenses, 4) hitting a moving target, and 5) causing sufficient damage? A single broken link would render an attack incomplete, and hence ineffective. What would work based on what is known about China's capabilities today, and in the future?

China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground-and-space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon (OTH) radars and electronic signals detection equipment, which can assist ASBM detection and targeting [5]. While locating an aircraft carrier has been likened to finding a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar cross section, emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Active radar is the most likely ASBM sensor, since its signals can penetrate through clouds. Simply looking for the biggest reflection will tend to locate the largest ship as a target, and the largest ship will usually be an aircraft carrier (if the pre-launch targeting was good).

And Proving that it is Workable

Critical questions remain with respect to missile sensors, however. Does China have multiple sensors that it is currently capable of applying to ASBM detection and targeting? Even in the absence of relevant space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), is there another way to cue the missile accurately enough so that the possible parameters of where the carrier could move in the missile’s brief flight time can be accounted for within the “window” of its seeker? As for the seeker, how would it work? How would it accomplish target discrimination? Is this a challenging issue? Does it hinge on the large size of a carrier? Could smaller ships also be targeted effectively?

What do Chinese experts fear could go wrong, and perhaps even render an ASBM unusable? Missile defense? Other things? Considerable Chinese research on irregular (“wavy”) ASBM/ballistic missile trajectories and penetration aids (PENAIDS) to defeat missile defense suggests that this is an area of ongoing concern.

With respect to testing, what would be the bare minimum necessary to make the PLA feel that it had some rudimentary operational capability—and hence, perhaps, some deterrence ability? Are there any testing/targeting plans? Demonstration plans? What is the target audience (domestic/foreign public vs. PLA/foreign military’s eyes only)? The U.S./Taiwan/Japanese military, public, or all of the above?

The Service in Charge

The Second Artillery, China’s strategic rocket force, already responsible for China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missiles (the latter since 1993), would likely control any ASBMs that China develops. Relatively small, technologically-focused and extremely secretive, the service is ideally suited to such a mission. It has been studying the ASBM issue for some time, having published what appears to be a conceptual feasibility study in 2003, and a major doctrinal publication the following year [6].

This still leaves critical questions of joint operations, and bureaucratic coordination, however. How are sensors prioritized and coordinated? Which organization(s) control which sensors (e.g. OTH radar), and how are they used? Is there a risk of seams between services (e.g. Second Artillery, Navy, etc.)? What about problems with bureaucratic “stovepipes,” particularly during general wartime crisis management? How to overlap areas of “uncertainty” from different sensors, and thereby accomplish data/sensor fusion? How to accomplish bureaucratic “data fusion”—a task beyond even the most competent engineers? Finally, which authorities would need to be in the decision-making loop, and what are the time-to-launch implications?

Doctrinal Guidance

How does the second artillery conceive of using ASBMs in operational scenarios? The service’s authoritative high-level handbook, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, describes in some detail the use of ASBMs against carriers. It in no way suggests that such an approach is merely aspirational or beset with insurmountable technical difficulties. In fact, in introducing the section describing their potential employment, it states that “conventional missile strike groups” should be used as an “assassin’s mace” (silver bullet), a term commonly used to describe weapons that match Chinese strengths against an enemy’s weaknesses.

According to its handbook, the Second Artillery is thinking seriously about at least five ways to use ASBMs against U.S. CSGs, at least at the conceptual level:

• “Firepower harassment [strikes]” (huoli xirao) involve hitting carrier strike groups.

• “Frontal firepower deterrence” (qianfang huoli shezu) involves firing intimidation salvos in front of a carrier strike group “to serve as a warning.”

• “Flank firepower expulsion” (yice huoli qugan) combines interception of a carrier strike group by Chinese naval forces with intimidation salvos designed to direct it away from the areas where China feels most threatened.

• “Concentrated fire assault” (jihuo tuji) involves striking the enemy’s core carrier as with a ‘heavy hammer.’

• “Information assault” (xinxi gongji) entails attacking the carrier strike group’s command and control system electromagnetically to disable it [7].
All this does not mean that China necessarily has an ASBM capability already, but it strongly suggests that related research and development has high-level approval from China’s military and civilian leadership.

Concept of Operations?

The above document offers general insights into the Second Artillery’s conception of conventional deterrence. It adds that the Second Artillery will work with the PLAN to “execute focused naval blockades” and “achieve command of the seas.” Approaching enemy CSGs are envisioned to be the principal maritime targets, but “large vessels or large ship formations” more broadly are mentioned as well. Coordination and precision are seen as essential for “deterring and blocking enemy carrier strike groups”; such “operational activities need to be coordinated without the slightest difference in time.” Coordination with the PLAN is also emphasized in the location of sea targets, as well as with regard to the notification and demarcation of blockade areas: “the naval intelligence department should 'relay promptly' the information obtained by its reconnaissance about enemy ship activities to the Second Artillery campaign large formation.” In particular, “information regarding carrier battle groups … should be gathered on a real time basis.” Potential sources of “real-time target intelligence” include “military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and foreign remote sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image information processing systems.”

Still, this leaves critical questions unanswered concerning how the PLA might envision the basing location, number, employment, and strategic effects of any ASBMs:

• Base of operations. Where would the ASBMs themselves be based? What would be the expected range from the target?

• Nature of arsenal. What would be the relative size of the ASBM inventory? Size might have implications for operational possibilities and willingness to expend ASBMs in conflict.
• Concept of operations. It is one thing to call for ASBM capabilities, but how would they be realized in practice? What would an ASBM firing doctrine look like, and what would be the objective? Target destruction or mission kill (the equivalent of ‘slashing the tires’ on carrier aircraft)? What to shoot at, and when? Would the PLA fire on a carrier if it knew the planes were off of it? Would it rely on a first strike? Would the PLA plan to fire one ASBM, several, or a large salvo? If a salvo, then some combination of saturation (many shots in the same space, to overload missile defense), precision (firing many shots in a pattern to compensate for locating error on the target and to get the CSG in the seeker window of at least one of the missiles), or both? What type of warhead: unitary, EMP, or sub-munitions? How might salvo attacks, or multi-axis attack coordination, be envisioned? Do Chinese planners think that the Second Artillery could handle the mission by itself, or would it be part of a high-low, time-on-target attack with both ASBMs and cruise missiles?

• Concept of deterrence. Deterrence would seem to be a clear purpose of any ASBM development, but what does one have to show to deter? PLA doctrinal publications mention firing ‘warning shots’ in front of carriers—how does the Second Artillery think the United States would respond? How would the United States know it was a warning shot and not just a miss? What if the United States did know and called China’s bluff? Finally, from a technical perspective, how to actually fire a warning shot and miss by an intentional margin (versus having the seeker home in on the actual target)?
Conclusion

From Chinese sources, it can be inferred that Chinese leaders seek not to attack the United States, but to deter it. They want to defend what they perceive to be their state’s core territorial interests and to ensure a stable environment for domestic economic development. If they develop an ASBM, they would likely hope that it could prevent U.S. projection of military power in ways that are inimical to China’s security interests, which appear to be expanding beyond the First Island Chain. Yet the strength of Chinese equities, combined with vital U.S. interests in East Asia, make ASBM development for this purpose a complex and risky proposition. Should Beijing pursue such a course to its logical conclusion—a demonstrated ASBM capability—only robust strategic dialogue could hope to alleviate the substantial tensions that are certain to ensue. Until Beijing is willing to discuss in detail its progress and intentions in this area, however, it will be essential to search for answers to the questions outlined above—not just for a select group of government bureaucrats and the leaders they advise, but also for the publics in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States, who fund military development and who must ultimately live with its consequences. Regional peace and stability, and mutual strategic trust, demand no less.

Notes

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, pp. 21, 48.
2. Qiu Zhenwei, “A Discussion of China’s Development of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” blog.huanqiu.com; “Special Dispatch: ‘Aces’ in ‘Dongfeng’ Family—Miniaturization, Solidification, and Mobility,” Ta Kung Pao, 2 October 1999, p. A11, OSC FTS19991114000862.
3. See DongFeng 15 (CSS-6, M-9) Short-Range Ballistic Missile - SinoDefence.com. This could be a case of covergent evolution; it is possible that the RVs look alike because they solve similar problems.
4. Tan Shoulin and Zhang Daqiao, Second Artillery Engineering College, Diao Guoxiu, PLA Unit 96311, Huaihua; “Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance for a Ballistic Missile Attacking an Aircraft Carrier,” Command Control & Simulation, Vol. 28, No. 4 (August 2006), p. 6.
5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, pp. 21, 48; Sean O’Connor, “OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat,” Information Dissemination, geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-radar-and-asbm-threat.html.
6. Huang Hongfu, “Conception of Using Conventional Ballistic Missiles to Strike Aircraft Carrier Formation,” Scientific and Technological Research, Scientific and Technological Committee of the Second Artillery Corps, 2003, No. 1, pp. 6-8; Yu Jixun, chief editor, People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
7. Yu Jixun, chief editor, People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 401-402.

Ambivalent

Well, the Pershing did have a MARV warhead, but it was not ever intended to use this against a moving target. A ballistic missile warhead in a pure ballistic trajectory has a certain CEP, that diameter inside which the warhead has a 50% probability of landing inside. That is what CEP means. There is a 50% chance the warhead might land outside the diameter of that CEP. You want a warhead to have a blast radius equal to it's CEP to have a reasonable chance for a hit within the CEP to score a hard kill. If the blast radius is smaller than the CEP, like it is for many iron bombs, you will need more than one warhead to assure a kill.
The use of a maneuvering warhead on Pershing II meant the warhead could make some pretty limited manuevers to reduce it's CEP to an acceptable figure. It used an active radar seeker to find the target and then could manuever to a very limited degree to improve accuracy against a fixed target. For this to work, the ballistic trajectory had to be pretty accurate already, or the warhead would be deployed too far off course for it's limited maneuverability to overcome.
This points out one of the questions I have regarding these so called ASBM's. So far, no one has demonstrated any ballistic missile that can hit a moving target, much less a ship at sea. Nothing remotely close to this capability has ever been demonstrated. So far, the ASBM is an imaginary threat. What China could do would be to launch hundreds of nuclear armed ballistic missiles at the region of the ocean where US forces were concentrated, but that would guarantee a nuclear response from the US. I consider this possibility to be in the realm of fantasy for certain advocates of a Sino/US showdown.
I also challenge the notion that the US Navy is helpless in it's face. SM-3 is designed precisely to counter such missiles, and SM-2 Block IV has upgrades that permit it to engage individual warheads in the atmosphere during their end game. THAAD is land based but can hit such missiles outside the atmosphere before the deployment of the warhead or any countermeasures.
I also question the ability of China to reliability find a CSG and bring it down to targeting criteria. It is one thing to have a rough idea that a CSG is out there in a general direction, but these ASBM must hit a single ship maneuvering at sea, implying it must find this ship from at least 160,000 meters altitude on re-entry. As a warhead falls, it's maneuvering footprint on the Earth's surface narrows quickly. The USN routinely hid from Soviet recce satellites, using weather fronts, night and electronic countermeasures to spoof them successfully, yet we are supposed to believe Chinese forces can find and target maneuvering surface ships at will hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast. Lets say that until this ability is demonstrated I remain doubtful.

kalim2010

The days of carrier battle groups has passed, people just don't know it, just like the days of the battleship were already past as WW2 came on. A single nuclear ASBM after satellite detection of a lurking carrier group and all that asset is lost in one fell swoop.

Wolverine

Don't be so dismissive. While a nuclear missile (it doesn't even have to be an ASBM) could destroy a carrer, it certainly could not destroy any of its escorts, which would be spread out dozens of km away. This action would also escalate the war to a tactical nuclear level, in which the US has the advantage hands down, and if escalated further into a total war, the US has a massive overwhelming advantage against any nation except Russia. You think after having one of its carriers nuked the US is going to scratch its head and say "Oh okay, then. Bye!" Good grief.

kalim2010

yes. if you think the US public is going to see casualties in the millions (and even of civilians) over taiwan, then you're kidding yourself. they can't even stand casualties in the low thousands over several years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

the problem is that china will be continually warning that task force not to come closer (just like they did in Korea as the UN/US troops rushed to the Yalu), and if they do come closer over the continued warnings, then the belligerent party would be the carrier group.

after the nuking of that carrier, i very highly doubt it would escalate. this is no surprise "pearl harbor". all the politicians will rein in the military at the risk of escalating to large scale nuclear..

Wolverine

Yes, go ahead and console yourself with this belief if you wish. Unfortunately it's almost certainly wrong. 5,000 unavenged dead sailors and pilots will be the death knell of any 1st term president and a permanent stain on the legacy of any 2nd term president. No, the US military will have all the excuse it needs to sink every surface combatant in all three fleets with conventional weapons or tactical nukes. Then it will see how willing China is to escalate. If China goes on to nuke nearby US bases, the US will nuke every military base on China's east coast. It's an escalation that is orders of magnitude more painful for China than it is for the US. Do not delude yourself with the fantasy that China could ever get away with nuking any American forces without severe retaliation.