China's Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence

Translate this, please. It is english forum

Originally Posted by tres

Not sure if this was posted before.

ÖйúµÄºËÍþÉå¹Û

本文发表于：2009 年 12 月 10 日
空天力量杂志（ASPJ-Chinese） - 2009 年冬季刊

原文公布于：
美国内布拉斯加州奥马哈市，2009 年 7 月 29 日

中国的核威慑观
China's Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence

作者：姚云竹，中国人民解放军大校（Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, PLA）
　
编按：美军战略司令部于 2009 年 7 月底召开“2009 威慑研讨会”，邀请各国军事专家围绕“全球威慑视角”（International Perspective on Deterrence）表达看法。中国军科院研究员姚云竹大校应邀出席并发表演讲，受到广泛关注。

我发言的题目是“中国的核威慑观”。在讨论这个问题之前，我想简单说明，冷战时期很长的一段时间里，中国是 反对“核威慑”这个概念的。美国频繁地使用“核威慑”，使这个术语有了“核讹诈”、“核胁迫”、“核遏制” 和“核威胁”等贬义的含义。中国作为多次遭受核攻击威胁的国家，不愿意使用这样一个术语是可以 理解的。1 直到上个世纪的 80 年代后期和 90 年代初期，中国的国防现代化激发了一次学术大辩论，“威慑”作为一个重要的战略概念才摆脱了冷战时期的负面 涵义，被军事理论界重新接受。然而，尽管在冷战时期“威慑”作为一个术语曾经受到冷遇，但是威慑的逻辑却一 直在中国的核思维中发挥着重要的作用。为了便于理解，我将使用美国的威慑语汇来解释中国的核政策，并对中美 两国的威慑思维进行比较。
一、中国的“不首先使用”政策说明中国奉行的是“纯威慑”，或者“报复威慑”

中国核政策中最重要的内容是放弃了首先使用核武器的选择。中国奉行“不首先使用”政策，就必须以“报复”、 而不是“拒止”手段进行威慑。因此中国必须发展报复性的、用于第二次打击的能力，而不是发展在战场上使用的 核作战能力和作战理论。研究中国老一代领导人如毛泽东和邓小平的核思想，我们就会发现，他们都不相信核武器 可以象常规武器一样在战场上使用，他们也都不相信核战争可以用有节制和有控制的方式来实施并打赢。这一点与 美国的核战略家们很不一样，他们探讨了各种各样可能的核冲突方式，制定了复杂和成套的核作战理论，其中包括 有限核战争理论、战区核作战理论和升级控制理论等。
二、中国核政策的自卫防御性质说明中国奉行“中央威慑”，反对“扩展威慑”

中国保持核能力的目的仅仅是为了慑止有核武器国家对中国的国土发动核攻击，即使在冷战时期，中国没有接受过 别国的核保护伞，也没有向别国提供过核保护伞。中国反对所谓的“扩展威慑”（即有核武器国家向其无核武器的 盟国提供核保护伞）政策，表明了中国核政策的自卫性质。中国一直明确声明它将永远不会把核武器部署到别国领 土，也不会允许别国的核武器进入中国。相比之下，在冷战时期和今天，扩展威慑都是美国核战略和联盟政策的重 要组成部分。有一种观点认为，美国的扩展威慑有助于防止核扩散，因为盟国不再需要发展自己独立的核武库，从 而减少了核国家的数量。对此我不能苟同。我认为扩展威慑首先和主要是用来强化联盟关系的防务承诺，防扩散仅 是一个副产品，而不是事先设计的主要任务。当今美国的盟国中并没有什么国家面对着必须依靠美国扩展核威慑才 能解决的威胁，美国凭常规军事手段即可满足盟国的防务保障需求。此外，另一方面扩展威慑还会刺激扩散。美国 及其盟国的敌人和潜在敌人将会努力获取核武器以便拥有抗衡美国常规优势的非对称手段。如果象奥巴马总统建议 的那样，大家都要为实现无核武器世界创造条件的话，扩展核威慑应该是首先要摒弃的政策之一。
三、中国的核政策谋求大战略和战略层次的威慑，而不是战役和战术层次的威慑

中国领导人认为核武器是在大战略层面使用的政治手段，而不是军事作战行动中的制胜工具。中国的核思维并没有 被所谓“胜者慑之”的逻辑左右，也没有将核行动划分为战略、战役和战术层次。对中国的核攻击，无论使用的核 弹头当量是高还是低，无论造成的损失是大还是小，都是足以引起中国实施核反击的核进攻。而美国则是把核作战 纳入战略、战役和战术作战行动之中的。例如，美国太平洋总部针对台湾海峡冲突制定的 5077 作战计划，据说就有关于使用核武器的附件。
四、中国保持所需的最低水平核武库，可以解释为保持最低限度的核威慑态势

我必须把“最低限度的核威慑”这个概念稍加改造，使其带有一些“中国特色”。中国的最低限度核威慑指核武器 在国家安全中的作用应尽可能降低，比如中国就仅把核武器用来慑止核进攻和实施核反击。与之相适应的是，核武 库也必须保持在所需要的最低水平上。在中国的官方文件中，常使用“精干”和“有效”这两个形容词来描述核力 量。为了保持“精干”，中国必须有节制地发展核力量；为了做到“有效”，中国要对核力量进行现代化，确保在 遭受核攻击后具有生存和反击能力。此外，中国的战略研究人员还认为最低限度的威慑是一个相对概念，不仅仅有 数量标准，还要有诸如武器系统的生存能力、核反击的可信性等质量标准。美国有些专家基于中国核现代化的情况 得出的研究结论是，中国正在从最低限度的核威慑态势向有限核威慑态势转变，而在采取了有限核威慑态势后，中 国将会用核武器慑止核与常规战争，甚至在常规冲突中把核武器用作控制升级的手段。然而，我们不能忘记，中国 核思维的基本逻辑规定了核武器将是一个针对核武器的威慑工具，而不是在所有冲突中的制胜工具。
五、中国的威慑比其它任何核武器国家都更加依靠“不确定性”

我谈这个问题针对的是中国在核力量结构和规模上不透明的质疑。对一个奉行“不首先使用”、同时又不打算在不 能使用的武器上花费过多资源的国家来说，依靠不透明来获取更大的威慑效果不失为一个明智的选择。威慑可以通 过不同的方式获得成功，一种是让对手明确地知道付出的代价将超过可能的收益；另一种是让对手在评估代价与收 益时狐疑满腹，从而放弃行动。让对手放弃原有企图可以使威慑奏效，让对手因情况不明而无法形成企图也可以使 威慑奏效。比较中国和美国的威慑方式，前者更注重通过不确定性达成威慑，后者则更注重通过显示力量达成威慑 。
六、中国的核政策始终如一

世界进入二十一世纪后，中国的核威慑观并没有太大的变化。对中国来说，上个世纪的 60 和 70 年代是危机迭起的年代。从那以后，中国的安全环境一直在稳定地改善。当然，中国的核评估也面对一些新的复杂 因素。首先，中国的核邻居比过去有所增加。其次，台湾海峡成为一个潜在的冲突爆发点，有可能将两个核武器国 家卷入其中。第三，美国部署的导弹防御系统对中国核威慑的可信性构成了挑战，也破坏了中美之间的战略稳定。 尽管有这些新变化，中国官方核政策却没有什么改变，也没有背离中国基本的威慑逻辑。有几个方面的原因可以解 释中国政策的始终如一。一是中国与所有核武器国家形成的多边威慑关系可以轻松地将周边的新核邻居纳入其中。 二是中国在战略层次实施的威慑，只要可信，就可以在平时和常规冲突时有效慑止对中国的核攻击。三是导弹防御 系统可能导致对所需兵力结构和规模的重新评估，但不会导致放弃一个长期奉行的政策，这个政策曾在过去近半个 世纪的时间里出色地维护了中国的国家利益。

因此，我的基本结论是，中国将坚持大战略层次的核威慑，奉行基于报复性第二次打击能力的纯威慑和中央威慑， 通过不确定性获取更佳威慑效果，通过提高生存能力、空防能力和安全性使核武库现代化。
　

[ 返回《空天力量杂志》中文版 | 读者留言电子邮箱 ]
　

注释：

1. 中国曾多次遭受核攻击威胁，可能是这个世界上最接近遭受核打击的国家。在朝鲜战争期间，麦卡瑟将军敦促杜鲁 门政府批准向中国投放原子弹。在越法战争期间，美国总统杜鲁门和英国首相丘吉尔多次磋商达成共识，如果中国 介入并站在越军一侧，盟国将支持美国以原子弹攻击中国。在朝鲜战争期间，艾森豪威尔政府在 1953 年也曾威胁动用核武器打击中国关键地区（包括北京），如果中国发动新攻势的话。在 1958 年台海危机中，中国再一次处于美国的核武器威胁之下。在 1969 年中苏边界冲突中，苏联高级军事领导人曾考虑以“有限数量的核武器”先发制人打击中国。参看能源和环境研究 所网站 IEER: Energy & Security No. 6 / Science for Democratic Action V6N4 and V7N1: A Chronology of Nuclear Threats ，“核威胁年谱”（A Chronology of Nuclear Threats）。

　
作者简介：

Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, PLA 姚云竹，中国人民解放军大校（Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, PLA），姚云竹，现任中国人民解放军军事科学院世界军事研究部研究员，大校军衔。1970 年入伍，历任班长、参谋、翻译、教员、研究员、研究室副主任、主任等职。1988 年获解放军洛阳外国语学院英语语言文学硕士学位，1998 年获军事科学院军事学博士学位。曾在英国伦敦大学亚非研究院客座研究，作为美国艾森豪威尔基金会交流学者走 访美国。2003 年当选为第十届全国人大代表。2007 年当选中国共产党第十七届代表大会代表。多年来一直从事美国军事思想、军事战略与作战理论的研究，现主要从 事亚太地区安全形势、朝鲜半岛安全问题、中美军事关系和台海军事冲突等方面的研究。主要学术成果有：主编《 美国军事基本情况》，著作《战后美国威慑理论与政策》、合著有《亚太安全战略论》、《20世纪战略理论遗产 》，译著有《大失败》、《海湾战争》、《国家的命运》、《科索沃战争》、《恐怖的海峡》等，在国内外杂志上 发表论文和译文二百余篇。 　

Originally Posted by antiterror13

Translate this, please. It is english forum

Colonel Yao is a PLA military expert on international issues. In July 2009, colonel Yao was invited to speak on a seminar on 'International Perspective on Deterrence' hosted by Strategic Command of USA. He gave a speech titled 'China's perspective on nuclear deterrence', elaborating the difference of China and United States' nuclear deterrence doctrines.

The gist of his speech:
1. China persues a nuclear doctrine of retalitory deterrence and pledges not to use nuclear weapons first. China never opt to use nuclear weapons as an offensive capability.
2. China does not extend its own nuclear umbrella to any other nation or seek one from other country.
3. China's nuclear nuclear strike capability is regareded as a strategic instrument , not a tactical one. The sole purpose of China's nulear weapons is to prevent a nuclear war.
4.China's shift from a doctrine of minimum deterrence to limited nuclear deterrence doesn't change its long-held position on nuclear deterrence.
5 To cloak China's nuclear strike capabilities serves as part of China's deterrence doctrine as China only deploys limited numbers of nuclear weapons against US and Russia's vast nuclear arsenal.
6. China's nuclear doctrine has been consistent despite the change of geopolitcal landscape and technological advances such as NMD etc.
As a conclusion, China will continue to pursue a doctrine of limited nuclear deterrence by upgrading its nuclear strike capabilities and
improving the reliability and survivability of its second strike capability.

Thanks for the translation.
But to clarify, Col. Yao:

China's Second Artillery Force

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/20...nt_4184084.htm

"Senior PLA commander spells out defensive nature of China's nuclear arsenal
(Source: Xinhua) 2010-August-14 07:26

BEIJING, Aug.13 (Xinhua) -- China's nuclear weapons are for self-defense purposes, a top commander in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China strategic missile corps said.

"If no power presses for nuclear war with China, the Second Artillery Force will always keep silent," General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the PLA Second Artillery Force that controls China's nuclear weapons stockpile, said in an article published in the latest issue of China Armed Forces.

China's development of a nuclear arms capacity is limited to that of the lowest level necessary to safeguard national security, Jing said in the article in the quarterly magazine affiliated to the Xinhua News Agency.

"We will firmly pursue a defensive nuclear strategy and resolutely implement the 'no first use' policy," he said.

China has long insisted its military nuclear drive is purely defensive in nature.

At the Nuclear Security Summit in April this year, Chinese President Hu Jintao put forward a five-point proposal calling on all nuclear-armed countries to keep their nuclear weapons facilities safe.

Jing said China's nuclear military forces will carry out Hu's five proposals and actively support international efforts to enhance nuclear security.

"We, the Second Artillery Force, will always stick to the principle of limited development of nuclear weapons and we will not engage in a nuclear arms race," Jing wrote.

China began building its own nuclear arsenal after the country exploded its first atomic bomb in the deserts of northwestern China in 1964.

In 1971, the country became the fifth country in the world to launch a nuclear submarine.

China successfully tested a carrier rocket in 1980, shooting it from northwest China to the South Pacific to showcase its intercontinental strike capabilities.

It also conducted an underwater missile launch in 1982.

In 1996, China declared it would suspend nuclear testing to promote nuclear disarmament.

Editor: Ouyang Dongmei"

single - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=35846

"China's "Underground Great Wall" and Nuclear Deterrence
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 25
December 16, 2009 05:38 PM Age: 244 days
By: Russell Hsiao


China's "underground Great Wall"

In early December, the People’s Liberation Army's (PLA) publication, China Defense Daily (Zhongguo Guofang Bao), published a report that provided a rare glimpse into an underground tunnel that is being built by the Second Artillery Corps (SAC)—the PLA's strategic missile forces—in the mountainous regions of Hebei Province in northern China. The network of tunnels reportedly stretches for more than 3,107 miles (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). The revelation of the semi-underground tunnel highlights the strides being made by China's nuclear modernization efforts, and underscores a changing deterrent relationship between the United States and China.

The labyrinthine tunnel system, dubbed by the Chinese-media as the "Underground Great Wall” (Dixia Changcheng), was built for concealing, mobilizing and deploying China's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. According to military experts cited by various reports, the main purpose of the underground tunnel is to provide the SAC with a credible second-strike capability. The building of an underground tunnel for this purpose is consistent with China's evolving nuclear doctrine from its traditional posture of "minimum deterrence" to a doctrine of "limited deterrence," since the subterranean bunkers strengthen the survivability of China's nuclear forces and bolster its nuclear deterrence posture.

Analysts have long speculated that the SAC' most important underground missile positions were located in the mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 3,017 miles and can feed a web of underground launch silos. According to a military analyst cited by Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13; Xinhua News Agency, December 14).

The SAC arsenal of land-based nuclear warheads is believed to include the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5 (CSS-4), DF-21, DF-31 and the DF-31A. These land-based ballistic missiles have a range of 200 to 5,000 kilometers. According to one U.S.-estimate, "China has approximately 176 deployed warheads, plus an unknown number of stored warheads, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads" (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3).

This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995, according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a SAC project called the "Great Wall" was completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of army engineers. Furthermore, the Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese-state run television network CCTV on March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).

An article published in the Taiwan-based Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, entitled "A Destructive Projection Power: PLA Second Artillery Corps' Long-range Guided Missiles," by former Taiwanese Vice Admiral Lan Ning-li, included an analysis that also discussed underground installations of the Second Artillery Corps. According to Vice Admiral Lan's assessment: "The early version of China's mid-to long-range missiles had all been deployed above ground and were vulnerable to detection by spy satellites and attacks by interceptor missiles. That prompted the Chinese military to move all of their missiles hundreds of meters underground" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Chosun Ilbo, December 14). Moreover, a Hong Kong-based military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao suggested that the timing of the open declaration about China's nuclear modernization before negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may be meant to draw attention to China's nuclear stature (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).

Yet, while deterrence assumes that a more secure second-strike capability could enhance stability by causing adversaries to act more cautiously, some analysts have pointed out that strategic stability may not be the necessary outcome of China's deployment of a secure second-strike capability (See "The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy," China Brief, March 4). Since China continues to conceal details about the size and composition of its nuclear stockpile, this may lead to more concerns from China's regional neighbors over Beijing's nuclear modernization."

Lying at the north foot of Taibai Mountain (the peak of Qinling Mountain), Taibai Mountain National Forest Park, is located in Meixian County, Shaanxi Province. Covering an area of 7,287 acres, 94.3% of which is covered with forest, it contains 10 scenic districts and over 180 attractions. Since its height above the sea level varies from 0.39 miles to 2.18 miles, Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is the highest national forest park of China. It was officially established in 1991 and has been formally open to the public since July, 1992.


Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is a fantastic place for visitors to find relaxation and refreshment. With respect to its climate, it is better to travel here in July and August, but do not forget to bring a cotton coat and rain gear. Traveling by ropeway (with a length of 0.68 mile) gives visitors the chance to appreciate the marvelous spectacle of glacier relics and sea of clouds.

Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance

"Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance
By WALTER PINCUS
Tuesday, March 16, 2010

While public attention is focused on a new arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States, the slow, dull work of keeping nuclear warheads and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium protected from terrorists goes on almost unnoticed.

But two new reports have shed light on the subject. A fascinating study on China's system of securing its nuclear weapons was published last week. Two days earlier, an update on the multiyear U.S. effort to secure Russian nuclear sites, and those of other countries, was presented to the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water, which has jurisdiction over funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

Mark A. Stokes's study of Beijing's nuclear weapons for the Project 2049 Institute, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization focused on Asia, describes where the Chinese are storing their warheads and how they are protecting them. Stokes, who served 20 years in the Air Force, also worked in the Defense Department's office of international security affairs, where he handled China, Taiwan and Mongolia.

Stokes writes that "under its declaratory no-first-use policy, the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] nuclear deterrent has relied upon quantitative and geographic ambiguity," while the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission "maintains strict control over China's operational nuclear warheads." In peacetime its warheads stock is managed "through a system that is separate and distinct" from the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery missile bases. This includes warheads for use by the air force and the navy but separate from China's civilian-controlled fissile materials.

Stokes identifies an independent organization called 22 Base as the prime group "responsible for storing and managing most of the Second Artillery's warhead stockpile." The storage complex is in central China near Taibai Mountain, one of the highest peaks in the country. Tunnels have been dug deep into the mountain, and rail lines enable constant movement of nuclear weapons in and out of the 22 Base complex. "China's warhead and handling system is designed to survive a first strike and retain sufficient operational capability for retaliation," Stokes writes.

Stokes concludes that "22 Base's physical protection system appears to be founded upon more than 'guns, gates, and guards,' " which often mark the U.S. system. While a dedicated security battalion and a cavalry company patrol the 400-square-kilometer security zone, a technical support battalion works on safekeeping warhead components. The report points out, however, that China's warheads are "most vulnerable" during their constant transport between storage and launch sites -- the movement that Beijing counts on to make itself less vulnerable to a first strike."

The old projections may have to be revised in the face of new information. Well-known analyst Richard Fisher, Jr. states: "While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020."


DF-31As camouflaged

FISHER: China and START - Washington Times

"FISHER: China and START
Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize
By Richard D. Fisher Jr. - The Washington Times 5:56 p.m., Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Might China someday have more nuclear warheads than the United States? Than Russia? Inconceivable as it may sound, this could come to pass, because China may just be starting a period of double- or triple-digit annual growth in its warhead numbers as the Obama administration sets its sights on further U.S. warhead reductions, with little hope that China will join a regime of negotiated nuclear stability. But even if it did, would nuclear "parity" with China be in America's interest?

The new START Treaty signed in May commits the United States and Russia to a "parity" that reduces deployed nuclear warheads from 2,200 to 1,550 and reduces to 700 the number of deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. However, President Obama has made clear his intention to seek further reductions; late 2009 leaks to the press suggested further goals of 1,000 warheads or even fewer.

Since it started deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1980s, China has refused to join in nuclear weapons negotiations. This did not matter as long as China deployed a small number, about 20 liquid-fueled 13,000-kilometer-range DF-5s with single warheads, until early this decade. Furthermore, China had lulled many analysts by regularly suggesting that it adheres to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" that abjures U.S.- or Russian-level warhead numbers. But China has also rejected U.S. and Soviet levels of nuclear "transparency" as part of its deterrence calculus, with the result that nobody knows its nuclear force goals.

China began modernizing its nuclear missile forces by mid-decade, replacing early DF-5s with a similar number of improved DF-5A missiles based in stationary silos and deploying the new 7,000-to-8,000-kilometer-range, solid-fueled and mobile DF-31 and the larger 11,200-plus-kilometer-range DF-31A. In its latest report to the Congress on China's military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year's report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.

In addition, China may be close to fielding two more long-range nuclear missiles. First is the new 7,200-plus-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Though reported to be experiencing developmental challenges, when completed, 12 each will go on the new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarine, which the Pentagon estimates will number at least five, for a potential total of 60 missiles. Then there is a new yet-unidentified larger ground-mobile ICBM which has been revealed in Chinese Internet-source images since 2007, but which the Pentagon did not publicly acknowledge until its latest China report. The distinguishing feature of the "DF-XX" is its use of a large 16-wheel Russian-style transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), likely derived from Russian-Belarus technology imported in the late 1990s.

But here is where the real danger begins: The Pentagon also notes this new ICBM is "possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)." Starting in 2002, the Pentagon's China report noted the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) interest in developing multiple warheads, with more explicit language being used in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Might some PLA ICBMs already have multiple warheads? This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new "DF-XX" may carry a similar number of warheads.

While it is not possible to confirm these disclosures from open sources, they point to an alarming possibility: China has crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon and, with the possibility that it can build one brigade of DF-31A and DF-XX ICBMs a year, could be capable of annual double- or triple-digit increases in its deployed nuclear warheads. Chinese sources also suggest interest in developing longer-range versions of the JL-2, which could also be MIRV-capable. While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020.

In addition, China may also be on its way to fielding a national missile-defense system by the 2020s. Its recent, successful Jan. 11 missile warhead interception test marks the culmination of China's second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program; the first was ordered started by Mao Zedong in 1963 and was pursued until 1980. This stands in contrast with years of howling complaints by Chinese diplomats against American missile-defense programs and their fervent campaigning to ban outer-space weapons. Was this merely deception designed to limit American defensive programs while China gathered the capacity to pursue its own ABM and space-warfare programs?

These potential trends would logically cause one to ask: Why not talk to the Chinese about their nuclear strategic plans? Indeed, the administration's April Nuclear Posture Review calls for "strategic assurance dialogues" with China. However, not only has China traditionally rejected any "negotiations" regarding its nuclear forces, it won't even send its main nuclear missile forces commander on a courtesy visit to the United States. Normal military-to-military dialogue is regularly held hostage to Washington ending arms sales to democratic Taiwan.

But there is a deeper basic conflict: China wants to displace U.S. strategic leadership in Asia and is building military forces capable of defending its global interests, even if that means challenging the United States well beyond Asia. So until China achieves its desired level of global power, which may not include concepts of "parity," China may have no interest in "negotiations" that limit or even inform others about its nuclear weapons plans.

But even if the United States and China could agree on nuclear parity, that may come at the cost of America's Asian alliances. A larger and defended Chinese nuclear arsenal could greatly undermine the U.S. ability to extend its nuclear deterrent, accelerating the process of decoupling the United States from key allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia. America's ability to deter China will decline further when the administration implements its Nuclear Posture Review decision to retire U.S. nuclear-armed TLAM-N cruise missiles carried by secure U.S. submarines, replacing them with tactical nuclear bombs carried by more vulnerable U.S. jet fighters. And then one must consider Russia and its increasing political-military cooperation with China. Might Russia someday "tilt" its nuclear forces with China's to dissuade the United States from defending a future vital interest?

Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India are today facing increased Chinese military pressures. They and the United States are also increasingly pressed to fund conventional military forces needed to deter China. It is indeed legitimate to ask if the current START Treaty gives the United States the ability to deter both Russia and a China just starting its strategic nuclear buildup. Furthermore, might START and intended follow-on agreements bring Asia closer to an era of nuclear proliferation and unforeseen instability?

Richard D. Fisher Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center and author of "China's Military Modernization, Building for Regional and Global Reach" (Praeger, 2008)."

Nuclear Warhead Modernization

"In September 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle: two satellites were delivered in the nose cone and one was delivered during stage separation. This event may have been China's first foray into the area of MRV/MIRV development.
...
A September 1999 National Intelligence Council document called "Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015" concluded that China has had the technical capability for MRVs for over two decades but apparently chose not to develop and deploy them. The report noted, however, that by leveraging current technologies China could develop a basic MRV or MIRV capability for its current missile force "in a few years." Specifically, the report said:

"China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for twenty years. If China needed a multiple RV capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31 type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or MIRV for the DF-5 in a few years. MIRVing a future mobile missile would be years away." [Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, The National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC, September 1999, p. 11.]"

China has possessed dual-use multiple-satellite release/MIRV technology for 30 years. Why did China wait 30 years to deploy MIRVs? The most likely explanation is that China is serious about their "no first-use" policy. In delaying the deployment of MIRVs for 30 years, China has shown that its nuclear arsenal is strictly defensive in nature.

In reaction to military developments in the United States, China has started to deploy MIRVs. The first concern is stealth attack aircraft. China has a robust overlapping and interconnected air defense system, but the stealth attack jets may penetrate the current defenses. This places silo-based Chinese ICBMs and other retaliatory nuclear weapons at risk. The second problem is the relentless development and improvement of the American missile defense shield. China is no longer confident that it can inflict a sufficiently-painful retaliatory strike on the United States.

To address the problems of American stealth attack jets and missile defense system, China has built more mobile ICBM launchers (e.g. they are harder to find) and deployed MIRVs to overwhelm American missile defense. China's goal is to preserve its capability to inflict sufficient damage in a retaliatory strike to deter an American nuclear first-strike.

Here is an exciting video from Northrop Grumman on the ICBM Flight of a Minuteman III:


If you have never seen a real video of incoming MIRVs, then you must watch this:

No thread on China's nuclear weapons would be complete without the history-setting first thermonuclear explosion.

"On June 17 1967, China revealed its true military power.

At 00:19, a Chinese H-6 bomber dropped the first Chinese hydrogen bomb. It exploded with a force of 3.3 megatons. It marked the date when China entered the thermonuclear era."

[QUOTE=Martian;132339]No thread on China's nuclear weapons would be complete without the history-setting first thermonuclear explosion.

"On June 17 1967, China revealed its true military power.

At 00:19, a Chinese H-6 bomber dropped the first Chinese hydrogen bomb. It exploded with a force of 3.3 megatons. It marked the date when China entered the thermonuclear era."


In terms of hydrogen bombs (versus say the uranium fission atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan) there is no theoretical upper limit to the max yield correct? (I mean after all our own SUN and every other star out there in the universe is really just a huge perpetually exploding weapon of mass destruction), so in theory couldn't the Chinese (or any other nation such as Russia, etc) build a "doomsday" weapon that would go of in case of a first strike by the USA? And since its relatively easy to build a huge underground doomsday hydrogen bomb (given China already has thermonuclear capabilities, just need to increase the hydrogen yield) could not potentially China create a weapon capable of blowing up the whole earth if the US attacked China in a nuclear first strike?

While your statement is indeed correct - that there is no theoretical limit to the yield of a hydrogen (fusion) bomb, that simple statement is clouded by many facts.

1st - there are definitely practical limits to the size of any weapon, nuclear or otherwise.

2nd - the greatest portion of the yield in modern multistage designs comes from the last fission stage of uranium and not from the fusion stage.

3rd - the thermonuclear reactions that take place in the sun are of a completely different kind to that used in bombs.

The sun derives its energy from fusion of the lightest isotope of hydrogen - protium rather than the fusion of deuterium and tritium used in hydrogen bombs.

This is significant for several reasons - the sun's process requires the intervention of many other materials to catalyze the reaction and the time scale of the solar reaction is in the order of hundreds of thousands to millions of years!

Both the Russians and the Chinese probably considered the creation of a doomsday device and rejected it as too impractical - after all, as a deterrent, how would you know it would work until you tested it - with all that entails.

For me the Russian system of deterrence is the most effective - simply threaten your opponent with annihilation.

Originally Posted by defcon54321

Originally Posted by Martian

No thread on China's nuclear weapons would be complete without the history-setting first thermonuclear explosion.

"On June 17 1967, China revealed its true military power.

At 00:19, a Chinese H-6 bomber dropped the first Chinese hydrogen bomb. It exploded with a force of 3.3 megatons. It marked the date when China entered the thermonuclear era."

In terms of hydrogen bombs (versus say the uranium fission atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan) there is no theoretical upper limit to the max yield correct? (I mean after all our own SUN and every other star out there in the universe is really just a huge perpetually exploding weapon of mass destruction), so in theory couldn't the Chinese (or any other nation such as Russia, etc) build a "doomsday" weapon that would go of in case of a first strike by the USA? And since its relatively easy to build a huge underground doomsday hydrogen bomb (given China already has thermonuclear capabilities, just need to increase the hydrogen yield) could not potentially China create a weapon capable of blowing up the whole earth if the US attacked China in a nuclear first strike?

I think the Chinese would rather drop "doomsday" nuclear weapons on the United States in retaliation, instead of creating a giant crater in their own country. The idea is to retaliate against your adversary's population centers. The military should have already built massive underground facilities and cities to survive a global thermonuclear war. After a few years of nuclear winter, the survivors emerge to finish the grudge match.

The Earth is too large to blow up. An unimaginable 10,000,000 megaton weapon would only leave a tiny crater 60 miles across.

Impact event - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Based on crater formation rates determined from the Earth's closest celestial partner, the Moon, astrogeologists have determined that during the last 600 million years, the Earth has been struck by 60 objects of a diameter of 5 km (3 mi) or more. The smallest of these impactors would release the equivalent of ten million megatons of TNT and leave a crater 95 km (60 mi) across. For comparison, the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated, the Tsar Bomba, had a yield of 50 megatons."

I think there are more than one way to actually destroy Earth and the entire population on Earth than simply blow up Earth.

Yes, 10000000 megaton nuclear bomb could only create a crater and destroying life surrounding it. However you fail to see the final effect of a nuclear explosion and that is radiation, plus massive outlet of ashes that will cover the 'sky'... causing an effective nuclear winter, that will ultimately destroy all life, irregardless of where the nuclear bomb are detonated.

(Range of China's defensive thermonuclear missiles)

No nuclear limit: China

"No nuclear limit: China
Philip Dorling
February 28, 2011

HIGH-RANKING Chinese officials have declared that there can be no limit to the expansion of Beijing's nuclear arsenal, amid growing regional fears that it will eventually equal that of the United States, with profound consequences for the strategic balance in Asia.

Records of secret defence consultations between the US and China reveal that US diplomats have repeatedly failed to persuade the rising superpower to be more transparent about its nuclear forces and that Chinese officials privately admit that a desire for military advantage underpins continuing secrecy.

According to US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and provided exclusively to The Age, the deputy chief of China's People's Liberation Army General Staff, Ma Xiaotian, told US Defence and State Department officials in June 2008 that the growth of China's nuclear forces was an ''imperative reality'' and there could be "no limit on technical progress''.

Rejecting American calls for China to reveal the size of its nuclear capabilities, Lieutenant-General Ma bluntly declared: ''It is impossible for [China] to change its decades-old way of doing business to become transparent using the US model.''

While claiming in a further July 2009 discussion that Beijing's nuclear posture has "always been defensive'' and that China would "never enter into a nuclear arms race", General Ma acknowledged that, "frankly speaking, there are areas of China's nuclear program that are not very transparent''.

China's assistant foreign minister He Yafei similarly told US officials in June 2008 that there will be an ''inevitable and natural extension'' of Chinese military power and that China ''cannot accept others setting limits on our capabilities''.
...
The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates China has up to 90 intercontinental ballistic missiles (66 land-based and 24 submarine-launched) and more than 400 intermediate range missiles targeting Taiwan and Japan. The US intelligence community predicts that by the mid-2020s, China could double the number of warheads on missiles capable of threatening the US."