The Rifle Squad/Section - What should it do and how should it be organized?

The Rifle Squad/Section - Part 2

The Background :

The modern Rifle Squad/Section was developed by the German Army after the First World War after the Reichswehr conducted a thorough investigation into, and analysis of, the lessons of that war. Between the two world wars, the Reichswehr, and its successor the Wehrmacht, developed a "Gruppe" or Rifle Squad led by a sergeant that consisted of 10-12 men organized around a single machine gun that could be carried and fired by one man. In advance/movement-to-contact, the squad would move in single file (squad column or "Indian File" as infantry learned to do in the first World War), and move into extended line for the assault.

In most circumstances, the squad leader led with the machine gun team (3-4 men) closest to him and the other 6-7 riflemen (including a corporal assistant squad leader) either behind the machine gun team or to one side of it. The squad leader commanded the machine gun team himself and controlled its fires, providing suppressive fire upon the enemy position, ideally at a right angle to the point from which the riflemen planned to launch their assault. The assistant squad leader led the riflemen using cover and concealment to reach a position from which to assault an enemy position from its flank. This use of fire-and-movement coupled with the use of cover and concealment maximized the chances of a successful attack and minimized the potential for losses. Indeed, the German Squad doctrinally was to take advantage of a lull in the enemy fire and assault en masse, firing as it went.

This organization of the rifle squad was made with the following tactical concepts in mind: firstly, that it would require at least an entire squad of riflmen, supported by their own machine gun, in order to successfully assault and destroy an enemy machine gun position; secondly, that that the squad's organic machine gun must be under the direct control of the squad leader who could control its fires in direct accordance with his plans, and that the nachine gun would have a crew sufficient in size to keep it supplied with ammunition and to provide local security (hence its size of 3-4 men); and thirdly, that the riflmen, under the control of the assistant squad leader folowing the squad leaders' plan for the attack, would control a sufficient number of men both to assault and hold the objective of the squad's attack (after sustaining losses in the assault), but also to provide sufficient covering fire just long enough for the squad leader and the machine gun team if tactical circumstances required that it change its base-of-fire position, thus interrupting its suppressive fires until it completed its relocation.

Most other armies around the world eventually adopted by the Second World War a more or less similar organization and tactical concept for their rifle squads/sections, though there were some variations between armies, and in the event, not all performed to the same standards in wartime as others (in part due to differences in leadership and training). The US Army and US Marine Corps were intially still equipped with automatic rifles (the BAR), not light machine guns with removable barrels to minimize overheating and high capacity magazines or belt-feed. Although US troops soon enjoyed the semi-automatic Garand rifle, the BAR simply did not approach the magazine-fed Bren light machine gun, let alone the belt-fed German MG 34 general purpose machine gun (able to be used by one man as a light machine gun in the light role, and as a heavy machine gun with tripod and optical sight in the sustained fire role) in ability to provide a base of fire for the riflemen.

In general, the rifle squad/section of 10-12 men organized into a machine gun team/gun group/automatic rifle team with 3-4 men crewing a machine gun or automatic rifle and a rifle team/rifle group of 5-8 riflemen worked well in the Second World War, and in most armies until the 1980's, this remained largely intact. The most notable exception to this general rule was the USMC, which in the later years of World War II had settled upon a novel rifle squad led by a sergeant who commanded three separate 4-man fire teams, each of which was organized aroung a BAR automatic rifle and commanded by a corporal. The 13 man marine rifle squad was a success, and in addition, enabled each fire team, not just the squad as a whole, to use fire-and-maneuver in alternation with one another. One fire team could provide a base of suppressive fire upon the enemy position while the other two assaulted, either together from the same, or separately from opposite, flanks. In effect, one fire team acted as a machine gun team, whilst the other two combined could act as a rifle team, or vice-versa. The only glaring limitation of this organization was the fact that it was equipped with automatic rifles instead of machine guns. In time, this deficiency was rectified and since then an underslung grenade launcher has been added to each fire team. This organization remains the standard one of the USMC to date.

The US Army took a different course, and since the 1950's has engaged in several changes both in the organization of the rifle squad and in its expectations of what that squad should do. This has had an effect upon the same in other armies, particularly in the English-speaking world, though the full effects were not felt until the 1980's.

During the Second World War, the German rifle squad, diminished in size by manpowers losses from 10-12 men to 9 and finally 8 men, acquired a second machine gun, which towards the end of the war was typically the MG 42 with its fantastic rate of fire. The Germans, in both the MG 42 and its predecessor the MG 34, favoured very high rates of fires in order to deal with fleeting targets of opportunity ("pop-up" sightings of the enemy), whereas the Allies possessed weapons of much more modest rates of fire. As the German capacity for offensive operations was bled away by progressively unsustainable manpower losses in defensive operations, the increase of available firepower had to make up for those losses. The addition of a second machine gun to the German rifle squad substantially increased its defensive strength even as it lost its offensive strength with fewer riflemen being available. A second machine allowed a rifle squad to use interlocking fires, not only covering the opposite machine gun's position, but also sweeping the enemy with fire from both flanks. Though the German army did not develop what would necessarily be called "fire-team tactics", and eschewed the Battle Drill of the Western Allies, the presence of that second machine gun had an influence upon the tactical thought of some other armies, the US Army especially.

This led to the problems that most Western Rifle Squads/Sections face today...To Be Continued in Part 3.

Very interesting. Please keep it up. I deeply look forward to Part 3 and subsequent chapters.

Good read so far

Are losses really that high. I have never heard of a professionally trained force taking anything near that type of loss. Even after Kursk, Wermacht infantry strength never fell off that sharply.

personally I like the buddy system used in most combat formations from the lowly infantry to advanced fighters. As a tanker we used a base 2 so that a platoon of 4 tanks could sub divide on moves like the bounding over watch (2 mving, 2 covering).

One problem mechanized armies face is the size of the IFV/APC. To carry more men means it has to be bigger, which means it costs more which means you either have to increase defense outlays or have less of them. Bigger is not better because it draws fire and most modern ATGM's can wreck any infantry carrier available.

Smaller teams as a result of smaller carriers also means that each track hit and lost is not in itself a crippling blow to the platoon or company.

Modern western rifle teams with their excellent battle rifles, portable yet lethal AT weapons, grenade launchers, body armor, first rate training etc are also highly effective and surprisingly durable when dismounted and properly employed. One has only to look a the remarkably low US infantry losses in urban combat to see just how effective a good rifle team can be.

The real handicap of the modern infantry set up is numbers. Very few modern forces can afford the numbers of infantry they really need. A good infantryman is worth his weight in gold, but cost twice or three times his weight in gold to train, equip, and keep in uniform. Conscript infantry is cheaper, but not nearly so capable.

my point oh two

Thank-you, Crobato, I aim to please. I intend at least one, perhaps two more parts on the Rifle Squad/Section.

Unfortunately, zraver, the losses can be that high, and I intend to argue that not only don't they have to be, but that this is in large part due to newer organizations and concepts of tactical employment of the rifle squad/section, that have largely abandoned wartime experience in favour of innovations that have more to do with someone somewhere not having better things to do with their time and deciding to "fix things that ain't broke". And what is equally critical, is what you have pointed out zraver - that in the interests of economy, rifle squads'/sections' establishments are kept as small as possible (especially in peacetime), leading to a situation in which even modest losses destroy its capacity for offensive operations.

Mind you, as to those figures for losses, not only were they basesd upon a small, 8 man rifle section engaged in frontal attacks, but doing so straight into the guns of an "ideal" Soviet opponent. I suspect that you have probably encountered the OPFOR at some time or other, so you understand perfectly what I am talking about.

Hi Norfolk

Are the formations your discussing typical for Heavy or Light Infantry Divisons?

I ask as the impression I have for the PLA is that they use their modernised, Mechanised Infantry as the Stormtrooper like Shock Troops, whilst the Conscripts would be used as Light, Motorised or Leg Infantry whose main job is; to my mind, to make like Mud, by insinuating themselves into any gap or opening and to quagmire enemy units; especially high mobility units, to help define the battle lines, identify enemy units and to wait untill heavier Units can come to launch an Offensive Engagement.

My apologise if it seems to be rather basic stuff I am asking.

The Rifle Squad/Section - Part 3

The Present Problem and How it Came to Be:

As stated in the previous post, most armies (with the main exception of the USMC with its also successful yet unique rifle squad organization) ended WWII with a rifle squad/section composed of a 3 or 4 man machine gun team/group/automatic rifle team (the number of men being necessary to provide for continuous resulppy of ammunition and local security) and a 7 or 8man rifle team/group (that number necessary to sustain losses in the assault without breaking down). The former established a base of fire to suppress the enemy while the latter used cover and concealment to reach a position on the enemy flank from which to assault the enemy. This was considered to be almost universally satisfactory for infantry offensive operations. The Korean War subsequently was waged with much the same organization.

That said, the appearance of two machine guns in the German rifle squad in the closing years of WWII as the squad's strength fell from up to 12 down to 8 due to manpower losses and the emphasis on firepower to replace those losses whilst conducting defensive operations had an effect upon other armies. Granted, infantry tend to "acquire" rather more than their authorized establishment of machine guns in wartime (they'll strip everything from knocked-out tanks to supply vehicles carelessly left unattended by their crews of machine-guns, or anything else the infantry may find useful or amusing), and the rifle squad/section often adapted accordingly. However, infantry manpower losses in the Allied armies had become acute towards the end of the war, and in the US Army in particular, facing the Germans in Europe (whose own depleted rifle squads now possessed two machine guns), eventually began issuing an extra BAR to each rifle squad (later supplanted by the Browning M-1919A6 "Light" Machine Gun). After the end of the war, however, the US Army reverted to a 12, then 9 man rifle squad with one 3 man BAR team and a 6 man rifle team after the US Army Infantry School investigated and analyzed the lessons of the war.

The US Army entered the Korean War with this organization, but as the war dragged on and infantry losses mounted, and UN forces were largelyengaged in defensive operations, a second BAR was added to the rifle squad. The British Army entered the war with its WWII rifle section (one 3 man Bren LMG group, one 7 man rifle group), and the Canadian Army initially entered with the US Army-pattern 9 man rifle squad, then changed to the British organization, then switched to an 8 man rifle section with two Browning "Light" Machine Guns. Offensive operations were relatively rare and defensive frontages (with often considerable gaps between battalions, companies, and even platoons) wide. North Korean and Chinese "human wave" attacks were beaten off mainly with massed firepower, and relatively little maneouver was attempted in the difficult terrain. Mechanization, even by WWII standards, was sparse. When the war ended, the armies involved reverted to their pre-war rifle squad/section organizations. The USMC rifle squad remained essentially unchanged throughout the war and afterwards.

However, during the mid-1950's the concept of Battle Drill (pioneered by the British Army in WWII) and the experience of using (and facing) two automatic rifles or machine guns in each rifle squad/section led some in the US Army to consider and experiment with the Fire Team concept pioneered by the USMC in WWII. For the next 30 years the US Army would examine, tinker, and otherwise change this way and that, the standard rifle squad. Though the veterans of Korea were happy with the 9 man squad with one BAR (except for its vulnerability to losses compared to WWII's 12 man squad), its offensive potential was little needed, and as losses drained establishment strengths, the added firepower of another BAR increased its defensive power.

Battle Drill, as originally developed by the British Army in the early years of WWII for its Rifle Sections, functioned both as an instructional method to indoctrinate recruits in the basics of infantry combat before moving on to more advanced subjects and as sort of a set of Immediate Actions (IA) to be performed in the absence of orders. Some US Army units adopted Battle Drill in Europe, and some of the officers from those units would, over the following decades, introduce Battle Drill into the US Army Infantry overall. The German Army never adopted Battle Drill, nor even fire teams per se.

There were some critical differences though, in capabilites between British, American, and German rifle squads/sections, and these arose in part from differences in leadership as much as differences in doctrine. The British rifle section was led by a single NCO, a corporal, and asisted by a lance-corporal, whilst the US Army rifle squad was led by a staff sergeant and assisted by a sergeant or corporal. Nevertheless, the British section typically outperformed the American squad, because the British corporal received substantial formal NCO training in addition to the Battle Drill taught to all British and Commonwealth infantry, whereas neither the American staff sergeant nor his sergeant of corporal assistant received any NCO training, nor in most cases did American infantry receive Battle Drill training until late in WWII. Indeed, the main ctriticism of the WWII US Army 12 man rifle squad was the difficulty of controlling it in battle, and the Infantry School used this in its justification of reducing it to 9 men in 1946. In fairness, no-one, not even the squad's leaders actually had formal infantry leadership training, so it is not surprising that control was difficult.

Curiously, the German Rifle Squad, led by a sergeant assisted by a corporal typically outperformed the British rifle section, though the Germans did not use Battle Drill. However, in addition to the superb training that German infantry received until late in WWII, each NCO (corporal or sergeant)received six month's special training, and each private soldier was trained to function two ranks above his own - thus a private was trained to take command of a squad if necessary, and a sergeant was trained to command a platoon or even company if necessary. German infantry leaders (and soldiers) were trained to think quick on their feet and issue orders and lead actions according to the situation - no Battle Drill and no Fire-Teams necessary. Interestingly, the Wehrmacht's successor, the Bundeswehr still uses a (non-mechanized) rifle squad equipped with one MG 3 (MG 42 converted to NATO 7.62 mm) in a machine gun team supporting a rifle team.

The introduction of Battle Drill in US Army rifle squads starting from the mid-1950's, as WWII veterans who served in those units that had received it reached positions of command, rather than necessarily improving rifle squad performance, instead progressively degenerated over decades into a "one size fits all forumula" appraoch to infantry offensive tactics. In the absence of good leaders with extensive formal training, the potential of Battle Drill was often wasted as rather than serving as a teaching aid and guide to Rifle squad attacks, it ossified into a series of drills to be followed by rote. Formal NCO training, though attempted from the 1950's onwards, did not really take off in the US Army until the 1980's, and even then did not usually approach the standards set elsewhere in the English-speaking world.

Battle Drill, left in the hands of leaders who did not often did not know what to do with it, was joined in short order by the Fire Team concept. The USMC Rifle Squad, 13 men strong, composed of well-trained marines and schooled NCO's organized into 3 4 man fire team each with an automatic weapon and (ideally) and junior NCO, all commanded by a senior NCO, and proven again and again in war, first adopted Fire Teams late in the Second World War. But in the hands of US Army NCOs, with little or no formal leadership training and already shackled to Battle Drills they may not be able to use to full advantage as a result of the lack of that training, this led to whole that was rather less than than the sum of its parts.

Still, this conditions were imposed by senior officers who themselves seemed rather unaware of the problems that were creating. This was the time of the (spectacularly failed) Pentomic Division concept and the inroads into military thought (and doctine)of civilian "experts". As Colonel David Hackworth, an infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars in "About Face", recounted, the military in the 1950's and 1960's was overruled (with the blessing of its own senior officers) in its approaches to war by efficiency experts and systems analysts who engaged quantitative analysis as the means by which to determine solutions to military problems, even tactical ones. Colonel Hackworth attended one such conference in which the use and scale of issue of infantry machine guns was the topic; the military officers present meekly gave way to the civilians' analysis - until Hackworth himself grilled the civilians who admitted they didn't understand anything themselves about machine guns or their use, just that their quantitative models produced such and such a result - and subsequently, US Army infantry units were reorganized with machine guns issued on the basis of the civilians' quantitative analysis of battlefield tactics.

The end result of these experimentations and the new weapons developed and issued to that end was an 11 man rifle squad, led by a staff sergeant and composed of two 5 man fire teams, each based upon an automatic rifle (M-14 with bipod, later replaced by M-16 with bipod). The squad could be reinforced with one of its platoon's light machine guns (Browning M-1919A6, later M-60) to provide a supplement to the squad's own organic base of fire.
Typically, the rifle squad in the attack was expected (after winning the firefight) to provide a base of fire with one fire team while the other moved, alternating fire and movement between the fire teams as they assaulted the objective. The squad leader moved between fire teams as he saw fit, and controlled any attached weapons (especially machine guns) attached to the squad from the platoon. In the hands of highly trained professionals (or at least self-taught, experienced long service NCO even without formal training), this squad could be effective provided that it always had one of the platoon's two machine guns attached.

This ideal was not possible, however, as relatively untrained leaders tied to Battle Drill tended to engage in frontal assaults in peacetime training, simply alternating fire and movement between fire teams, who, with only automatic rifles (instead of even one full-fledged machine gun) for a base of fire lacked real suppressive fire capability and who alternatively lacked enough riflemen in either fire team (only 5, including the Automatic Rifleman, compared to 6 to 8 in the rifle team/group of WWII) to conduct a successful assault despite sustaining (practically inevitable) losses in that assault. A fire team depleted by losses in the assault could not be reasonably sure of even taking the enemy position, let alone providing enough men to hold off enemy counter-attacks while the rest of the squad joined it. Moreover, even with a platoon machine gun team attached, the two fire teams tended to be used in alternate fire and movement anyway, exposing themselves to the enemy throughout the assault, rather than using cover and concealment in order to approach the enemy and find a suitable position from which to assault as the old 6-8 man rifle teams/groups did.

Offensive infantry operations in the Vietnam War, which were frequent, soon revealed the 11 man rifle squad, as organized and intended to operate, to be a paper tiger. The only major initial change to the rifle squad was the very successful addition of the M-79 40 mm grenade launcher, one to each squad, relieving some of the presure to close within hand grenade range to engage fixed defenses or groups of enemy in the open. Even in close country as well as open country, the 11 man squad was found to quickly break down. The problems described in the previous paragraph were revealed and exacerbated by infantry manpower losses and especially a growing shortage of NCOs (especially those few with long experience or formal training). The rifle squad, in the heat of battle was found to require the fire suppressive capability of one of the rifle platoon's two M-60 machine guns (thus depriving the 3rd squad of direct fire support) as its own automatic rifles were completely inadequate to the task (by now the M-14 firing NATO 7.62mm, including the 2 in each squad issued with bipods had given way to the M-16 A1 firing 5.56mm, including the 2 in each squad issued with bipods), and as squad losses reduced its strength to 8 or fewer men, the fire teams were disbanded and the squad in effect reverted to a WWII or early Korean War organization and concept of offensive operations, with a de facto organization of a machine gun team (attached from platoon HQ) providing suppressive fires whilst the remaining riflemen effectively formed a rifle team that used cover and concealment inorder to reach a position from which it could assault the enemy position.

Meanwhile, other armies were watching. The Canadian Army moved a small distance towards the US Army, reorganizing its Rifle Section into a Light Automatic Rifle Group (3 man Bren Light Machine Gun Group with one LMG replaced by two FN FAL automatic rifles with heavy barrels, bipods, and high capacity magazines) and a Rifle Group (7 Lee-Enfield Mk 4 rifles replaced by 7 FN FAL battle rifles [British SLR]) that could be broken down into two 3-man rifle teams. Otherwise, the Candian section operated much as it had in WWII and for part of Korea. The British Army eschewed the US Army experiment with fire teams and automatic rifles, retaining its WWII and Korea rifle section mostly intact, replacing the Bren LMG with the FN MAG GPMG and its Lee-Enfields with FN FAL battle rifles (British SLR). This organization and the tactical concepts of offensive operations were used with success by the British Army well into the 1980's, notably in the Falklands War. In this last war, many British Army rifle sections received the M-79 40mm grenade launcher successfully used by the Americans in Vietnam, and one Royal Marine Commando even featured rifles sections bolstered by the additional of a Bren LMG to the rifle team. Otherwise the old WWII and Korean War organization and concept worked, and worked well.

Emerging from Vietnam, the US Army 11 man rifle squad was retained, although veterans insisted on the permanent inclusion of an M-60 machine gun in each rifle squad - something that, officially at least, was not to be.
The problems went largely unresolved until the 1980's when formal training of NCO's really began in earnest. Unfortunately, even as this improvement was made, two more strokes were delivered to the rifle squad. Firstly, the 11 man squad was reduced to 9 men due to Army manpower limitations, thus reducing its sustainability after suffering even minor losses even further (the number 8 and below having been found in Vietnam to be the level at which the squad could no longer conduct fire-and-movement).

And secondly was the baleful effects of mechanization, as the M-113 APC capable of carrying an entire 11 man rifle squad gave way to the M-2 Bradley IFV with its capacity for only 6 or 7 troops. Granted, size and weight restrictions (and MONEY) were factors in this regard, but so was peacetime innovation. The US Army looked at the Bundeswehr (whose motorized infantry rfile squads were largley similar to those in WWII, except that they rode around in wheeled APCs) whose armoured (mechanized) infantry rifle squads numbered only 7 riflemen composing a rifle team (with a Panzerfaust) dismounting from the powerful Marder MICV with crew of 3 (and with a 20mm automatic cannon) taking the place of the squad's machine gun team. The US Army reorganized its mechanized infantry along similar lines. There was a problem, though - IFVs could not always go where the infantry went, thus depriving them of their base of fire in such cases - but this was not as bad as another problem that arose. IFVs were supposed to allow armoured/mechanized infantry to fight from inside their vehicles, only getting out on the ground when they really needed to (and doctrine was fuzzy on when this was supposed to occur). The beating that Soviet-made BMPs of Arab armies took in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 went some way to demonstrating the futility of such tactics, but this lesson was not necessarily taken to heart elsewhere. Israel (though it had to make do for years with the M-113)ultimately decided to mount its mechanized infantry (full size rifle squads) in converted MBT hulls and designed the Merkava MBT to carry half a dozen infantrymen for short periods of time.

As the 1980's progressed, the US Army replaced the 2 M-16's fitted with bipods in the rifle squad with 2 FN Minimi LMGs (US M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon), one for each fire team in non-mechanized units and mechanized units still mounted in the M-113 APC. The mechanized infantry squad (and platoon) underwent several dubious reorganizations and so on into the 1990's as it reequipped with 2 FN Minimi LMGs per squad and all rifle squads replaced the M-79 grenade launcher with the M-203 underslung the M-16 rifle with two per squad. Finally, in the 2000's the mechanized rifle squad organization was discarded and all US Army infantry rifle squads were composed of 9 men, led by a staff sergeant, and composed of two 4 man fire teams, each led by a sergeant (or corporal) and equipped with an LMG, one grenade launcher, and 3 automatic rifles. As before, Battle Drill remained and fire teams were in practice (even though doctrine theoretically allowed for flanking and envelopment) expected to alternate between fire and maneuver in full face of the enemy (though independent and enterprising NCOs might be expected to act otherwise on their own initiative). Mechanization, however, often required rifle squads/sections to operate in full view of the enemy regardless of preference, and to conduct rifle squad/section full frontal attacks with one part of the squad/section providing covering fire while the other moved, and alternating throughout until the objective had been taken and consolidated.

And it was under these conditions that the rifle squad/section could suffer catastophic losses, even if it had the leadership, training, and firepower to conduct a "perfect" attack. The Canadian Army, having come increasinlgy under the influence of the US Army since the 1970's, reorganized its rifle section in the 1980's into a configuration similar to its US Army counterpart. With 8 men commanded by a Sergeant (who also led one of its two assault groups), it was composed of two identical 4 man Assault Groups, each composed of two 2 man Fire Teams. Number 1 Assault Group comprised Alpha Team (Section commander with M-16 A2 rifle [Canadian C-7] and No.1 Rifleman with M-16 A2, later with IPM-203 40mm grenade launcher), and Bravo Team (No.2 Rifleman with M-16 A2 and No.1 Machine gunner with FN Minimi LMG [Caandian C-9]). Number 2 Assault Group comprised Charlie Team (which acted as a scout team on patrol and as a hand grenadier team in assault with No.3 Rifleman with M-16 A2 and No.4 Rifleman with M-16 A2 [later IPM-203]), and Delta Team (Section second in command, a Master-Corporal with M-16 A2, and No.2 Machine gunner with FN Minimi LMG). As with the 9 man US Army Rifle Squad, the Candian Army 8 man Rifle Section, upon winning the firefight, was to advance in the full view of the enemy in a frontal attack (though doctrine officially stated that flanking and envelopment attacks were possible, though this was rarely performed in peacetime training), alternating fire-and-movement between assault groups, and as the range close to the objective, fire teams within each assault group, upon order, would so alternate with one another, until finally the individual members of each fire team would alternate between firing and moving, with (ideally) one member of Charlie Team hand grenading the enemy position whilst covered by fire by his teamate, then spraying it with automatic rifle fire, bayoneting the enemy inside, changing magazines, securing the trench, and giving the thumb's up for his teammate and the rest of the section to join in and consolidate and reorganize to face an enemy counter-attack, or to continue the assault.

This is organziation and concept of offensive operations for the Rifle Squad/Section that my section commander told us would result in 60% losses within the first day of offensive operations. Not only do the US Army and the Canadian Army use this, but, inexplicably to me, so does the British Army now, which has gone so far as even to use the US term Fire Team in its rifle sections (the British Rifle Section is almost a carbon copy of the Canadian Rifle Section, though it uses the L-85 rifle instead of the M-16 A2 and 2 Light Support Weapons in addition to the Minimi LMG). Why the British Army abandoned the tried-and-true rifle section it had for one that is almost certain to result in unnecessary losses and even defeat I can only put down to peacetime experimentation and cost-cutting. The major English-speaking countries appear attached to this delusionary organization and concept of offensive operations for the Rifle Squad/Section, and mechanization has only contributed to its entrenchment.

By contrast, the USMC remains committed to its 13 man Rifle Squad, and infantry across the world look at that squad and drool, imagining what they could do with that kind of organization. It possesses unmatched ability to take losses, well-trained troops and leaders, and an organization that gives it the ability to operate much like the Rifle Squads/Sections of old, using tried and true methods. Its squad leader can move between fire teams and direct suppressive fires on the enemy and even do so with weapons attached to the squad by the platoon , though with its own organic light machine guns and grenade launchers, one each per fire team, it does not routinely need to do so, unlike the US Army Rifle Squad of Vietnam War vintage. Each Fire Team (with a LMG and grenade launcher, comparing handsomely to the machine gun teams/groups of old) possess sufficient firepower to provide adequate supressive fire for an assault while the other two fire teams, with a combined total of 8 men, easily match the rifle teams' groups of old in their ability to launch assaults even when sustaining losses. The USMC, admittedly, is not as directly affected by mechanization as the Army, but the need for infantry to close with an destroy the enemy is unchanged in any army. With USMC rifle squads frequently down to 6 men in operations in places like Fallujah, US Army rifle squads operating under similar conditions could at best be described as fire teams.

As in my first post on this subject, I identified one other Rifle Squad organization that possessed three, rather than two fire teams. The PLA organizes its Rifle Squads with 10 men and into 3 teams: the Squad Leader and 3 other men carry assault rifles and an RPG, while another 3 man team carries assault rifles and an RPG as well, with the third team also of three men with assault rifles but a light machine gun instead of an RPG. Some may see in this the same 3 man "Cell" organization that was used by the VC and NVA in the Vietnam War. While this squad does not have the same capacity to sustain losses as the USMC rifle squad, it does allow the squad leader to lay down suppressive fire with one light machine gun team while allowing the other two teams to assault. Quite how the Chinese carry out such an assault, I do not know, although their organization appears to allow for the possibility that the two teams (a total of 7 men) equipped with RPGs may use cover and concealment to maneouvre to a flank (or both flanks) for the assault while the team with the light machine gun (with 3 men) provides suppressive fire, thus avoiding frontal assault in full view of the enemy.

To give an idea of the potential of such a Rifle Squad, the example of a Rwandan Army Rifle Squad attacking a rebel position in a house in the civil war of the 1990's will be given. A Canadian Army officer attached to the UN witnessed a Rwandan Rifle Squad of 10 men organized into one team with a light machine gun and an RPG provided supressive fire on the house while two other identical teams armed with assault rifles assaulted the rebel position in the house from both flanks. The rebels, pinned down and suffering losses in the house as a result of light machine gun and RPG fire from the one team, could not effectively react as the other two teams closed in on them from either side. Needless to say the rebel position was hopeless, as they were pinned down, under assault, and cut off from retreat or relief. The rebels were wiped out completely with few losses to the Rwandan rifle squad (it's been a decade since I read this, and I don't remember the figures). The Canadian officer, writing in the Infantry Journal about what he had witnessed, proceeded to question the make up and effectiveness of the Candian Army's rifle section. Since the Canadian Rifle Section remains effectively unchanged, his plea evidently fell upon deaf ears.

Conclusion:

The English-speaking countries, in the main, possess Rifle Squads/Sections whose composition and offensive tactics ignore wartime experience and are tied by Battle Drill, the inappropriate use of the Fire Team concept successfully pioneered by the USMC, and the perceived demands of economy to establish the smallest possible Rifle Sections/Squads to charge, pepperpotting all the way, straight into the teeth of the enemy defenses, attacking their strongest points, and exposing themselves to such casualty rates of up to 60% in the first 24 hours of offensive operations. Their wartime predecessors, by contrast, sought to supress the enemy with fire from one position, whilst maneouvring to assault from another position using cover and concealment, and taking the enemy from an unexpected direction, thus maximizing the possbility of success and minimizing the potential for losses. Mechanization, which is heavily influential in Western and especially English-speaking countries further aggravates this situation, with limited space for troops available in armoured vehicles and the fact that mechanized infantry often must engage in frontal assaults whether they want to or not, as they operate in open country where concealment is difficult or even impossible.

By contrast the USMC, though it is less affected by mechanization, possesses a Rifle Squad that other armies only dream of. It has consistently proven itself in wartime for 60 years, and has remained largely unchanged in its essentials. The PLA likewise, has a three-team rifle squad that is larger than those of Western armies, though smaller and less heavily armed than that of the USMC. As the PLA mechanizes, it would do well to bear in mind the problems that have arisen in Western armies Rifle Squads/Sections, and, if possible, proceed in the direction of the USMC.

Originally Posted by SampanViking

Hi Norfolk

Are the formations your discussing typical for Heavy or Light Infantry Divisons?

I ask as the impression I have for the PLA is that they use their modernised, Mechanised Infantry as the Stormtrooper like Shock Troops, whilst the Conscripts would be used as Light, Motorised or Leg Infantry whose main job is; to my mind, to make like Mud, by insinuating themselves into any gap or opening and to quagmire enemy units; especially high mobility units, to help define the battle lines, identify enemy units and to wait untill heavier Units can come to launch an Offensive Engagement.

My apologise if it seems to be rather basic stuff I am asking.

Both, in fact, and don't apologize old boy, you raise a vital question. This can be dealt with in a further discussion. I have to make supper. Talk to you later SampanViking. Mind you, the Bundeswehr has a similar organization in that way to the PLA.

1- all rifle section attacks are by thier nature movement to contact. Even 13 men only posses limited ability to flank.

2- How big is the areas or frontage assigned to a USMC squad as compared to a smaller squad. If the frontage is bigger the numbers advantage disappears.

3- The PLA 3 man base is a handicap not a benefit. 2 unit base element has proven to be the most effective way to structure the basic combat model.

Just throwing some stuff out there, you have a nearly publishable article even if I don't agree with parts of it. Good work.

Originally Posted by zraver

1- all rifle section attacks are by thier nature movement to contact. Even 13 men only posses limited ability to flank.

2- How big is the areas or frontage assigned to a USMC squad as compared to a smaller squad. If the frontage is bigger the numbers advantage disappears.

3- The PLA 3 man base is a handicap not a benefit. 2 unit base element has proven to be the most effective way to structure the basic combat model.

Just throwing some stuff out there, you have a nearly publishable article even if I don't agree with parts of it. Good work.

Thanks, zraver.

Yes, Rifle Sections don't have a lot of leeway a lot of the time, and must expose themselves during attacks. The point is though, when they have a chance to minimize that exposure, they should take it, until the actual assault where (obviously) that is simply not possible. For many armies, full frontal attacks are the automatic practice even when there is opportunity to use cover and concealment. This is what I object to strenuously, for obvious reasons, and the old Rifle Sections allowed the infantry to use cover and concealment prior to the assault until the last possible moment (ideally).

As for your argument that a Two-Team Section is proven by wartime experience to be superior to a three team, I won't really argue with you there. I proposed at the end of my first post on this thread either a 13 man Rifle Section composed of a Section Commander and three 4 man Rifle Squads (virtually identical to the USMC Rifle Squad), and a 13 man Rifle Section composed of a Section commander and two 6 man Rifle Squads (each with an LMG, 5 assault rifles, and an underslung grenade launcher). In my argument for Part 3, I didn't have a real world example of that latter Rifle Section organization, so I used the USMC Rifle Squad instead to make my points in comparison to those of other armies. The USMC Rifle Squad has a weakness that the second Rifle Section that I propose may remedy, in that with 1 machine gunner and one 1 grenadier in each Fire Team, the rifle squad only has 6 riflemen to close with and destroy the enemy - less than half its 13man strength. The 3 Team Section (and USMC squad) has greater defensive staying power with its extra LMG and grenade launcher, but less offensive assaulting power than the 2 Team Rifle Section with one less each LMG and grenade launcher, but 2 more (for a total of 8) riflemen to close with and destroy the enemy, and absorb losses while doing so yet still remaining capable of further offensive operations (at least for a while).

That, and the "small" issue of control, makes a two-team unit usually preferable to a three-team unit. The PLA rifle squad, for example, possesses just enough men to do the job right - provided that its two teams with RPGs (7 men total) operate as one while the 3 man machine gun team provides cover fire. But for some reason they prefer their 3-"Cell" structure, and so it goes.

As for the frontage the USMC rifle squad occupies in the attack, I'm not sure, but I have seen that they prefer a single fire team wedge in lead of the squad with the other two fire teams following in single file on opposite ends of the lead fire team's wedge - so say 40or 50 metres until effective enemy fire is encountered. As to whether or not the trail fire teams come into extended line during the firefight - increasing frontage up to a possible 120 or so metres - or the lead fire team lays down fire while the other fire teams flank, we need a US Marine to really tell us what their tactics are here and what discretion the squad leader has, or if he is tied Army-style to "up-the-middle" doctrine.

Oh yeah, the Canadian Rifle Section with 8 men typically advanced on an 80-100 metre front with the entire section in wedge ("arrowhead") formation. I imagine that is much the same for British Army, while US Army like to advance with a lead four man fire team wedge until contact, then bound the two fire teams in fire and movement past each other.

By the way zraver, thanks for critiquing my posts; I'd forgotten some of the implications of what I was writing, and you reminded me of them, especially the 2 Team Rifle Section.

SampanViking:

As to your question whether the PLA Rifle Squad organization was applicable to all types of infantry (light, motorized, arnmoured, etc.) I'm afraid I erred. I found (sitting right beneath my nose, well, where else would it be but staring me straight in the face?) on our own site that the PLA mechanized infantry Rifle Squad consists of a Western-style 8 man Squad mounted in an APC or IFV with a 3 man crew. It seems that they caught our bug too.

No problem your writing a very good read.

A couple more points, as former US Army I know a bit about why small unit use an up the middle approach. If you've ever seen a large scale offensive op plan you'll notice that there isn't a lot of room given to each maneuver element. This adds both weight to the attack (less frontage covered by more men), and reduces fratricide. The real weight/power of the attack is carried in the power kept in reserve at every level.

The standard Army plan calls for developing the enemies MLR and then pinning it in place while other units use maneuver, fire, and shock to defeat it. We called this the recon/ counter recon fight. US Army Frontal attacks are almost never the real attack.

I can not speak from the rifleman's perspective but as a tanker. But what I can say is the find-develop-reduce method has kept force on force losses in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Panama, Iraq 91 and other battles very very low compared to historical equivalents.

Originally Posted by zraver

No problem your writing a very good read.

A couple more points, as former US Army I know a bit about why small unit use an up the middle approach. If you've ever seen a large scale offensive op plan you'll notice that there isn't a lot of room given to each maneuver element. This adds both weight to the attack (less frontage covered by more men), and reduces fratricide. The real weight/power of the attack is carried in the power kept in reserve at every level.

The standard Army plan calls for developing the enemies MLR and then pinning it in place while other units use maneuver, fire, and shock to defeat it. We called this the recon/ counter recon fight. US Army Frontal attacks are almost never the real attack.

I can not speak from the rifleman's perspective but as a tanker. But what I can say is the find-develop-reduce method has kept force on force losses in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Panama, Iraq 91 and other battles very very low compared to historical equivalents.

To be honest zraver, there is often a tendency in the infantry to revert to a slow, methodical, by the numbers formula that emphasizes attrition appraoch to operations, both offensive and defensive. This is not universal, of course, and there are some very aggressive, and very bold infantry and infantry leaders out there, but they tend to be in the minority, especially in peacetime. This tilts the playing field in favour of the more cautious, less imaginative, frankly duller remainder resulting in mediocrity tending to prevail in peacetime doctine and training. Although this is a problem that crosses combat arms in most peacetime armies, its consequences are very swift and direct in wartime, particularly for infantry due to their direct exposure to the enemy.

Originally Posted by Norfolk

To be honest zraver, there is often a tendency in the infantry to revert to a slow, methodical, by the numbers formula that emphasizes attrition appraoch to operations, both offensive and defensive. This is not universal, of course, and there are some very aggressive, and very bold infantry and infantry leaders out there, but they tend to be in the minority, especially in peacetime. This tilts the playing field in favour of the more cautious, less imaginative, frankly duller remainder resulting in mediocrity tending to prevail in peacetime doctine and training. Although this is a problem that crosses combat arms in most peacetime armies, its consequences are very swift and direct in wartime, particularly for infantry due to their direct exposure to the enemy.

The inverse is true in mechanized formations where speed gets over emphasized.

The PLA's Rifle Squads and how they compare to an "Ideal" Rifle Squad/Section:

At present, the PLA uses at least 3 or 4 standard types of Rifle Squad, each for a different part of the Infantry.

1. The regular Foot Infantry units use a 10 man Rifle Squad organized into 3 cells; the first cell, of 4 men consists of the Squad Leader (who, like all PLA and PLAN Infantry NCOs is a former enlisted man who, upon completing his intial two year contract and follwing his selection for NCO training, has 1 to 3 months training at either an NCO Academy or in a training unit) and 3 riflemen, one of whom carries a Rocket Launcher; the second cell consists of 3 men, on of whom also carries a Rocket Launcher; and the third cell similarly consists of 3 men, one of whom carries a Light Machine Gun. This 3-cell structure of the Rifle Squad is the traditional basic infantry structure of the PLA.

The 3-cell organization of the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry allows it to conduct frontal, flank, and double envelopment attacks in offensive operations; with the Light Machine Gun cell providing a base of suppressive fire, the other two cells (one with 4 men, the other with 3, and both carrying Rocket Launchers) can assault either together, or separately (or allow one cell to deal with a secondary threat), or to conduct a frontal attack with all three cells if necessary. In defensive operations, its single Light Machine Gun provides a basic, if modest, defensive fire capability against enemy attacks. The 10 man Rifle Squad has a limited capacity to sustain losses.

2. The Light Infantry units have reduced from a 12 man Rifle Squad organized into three 4 man cells to a 9 man Squad with three 3 man cells. Otherwise, the Light Infantry Rifle Squad may be similar to the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry with the two following differences: first, that the 9 man Rifle Squad of the Light Infantry can afford the loss of perhaps a single man at most before it loses its capacity for internal fire-and-movement, whereas the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry can afford perhaps two men lost; and second, that the Light Infantry may find itself motorised, and thus possibly more likely to be committed to costly frontal attacks.

3. The Mechanized Infantry units have Western-style 8 man Rifle Squads. It would appear that they are too small to accomodate the traditional 3 man cell structure of the PLA. As such, they would require organization into two 4man fire teams, each equipped with a Light Machine Gun in order to possess any real internal fire-and-movement capability. The 8 man Rifle Squad, which may also be used by the PLAN Marines (or alternatively, the 9 man Rifle Squad of motorized units of the PLA Light Infantry - this is dependent upon the capacity of the amphibious IFV that the Marines finally settle on) has no ability to sustain losses; even the loss of a single man practically forces the squad to reorganize itself into a fire team capable of either fire or movement, but not both. This is particularly serious, as being Mechanized Infantry, with the concommitant likelihood of having to engage in frequent frontal assaults during offensive operations, the utter inability of the 8 man Rifle Squad to sustain losses is a critical flaw. However, if the 8 man Squad possess 2 Light Machine Guns, it is at least adequate for defensive operations (in the short term at least). It is capable of flanking, however, though if it carries two LMGs, then at most 5 men will be available for the assault - pretty marginal.

As has been shown, PLA Rifle Squads in general suffer from a lack of ability to sustain losses while maintaining any capacity for internal fire-and-movement. Ironically, those units' Rifle Squads (Mechanized [Light and Amphibious Mechanized as well] and perhaps PLAN Marines also) that are intended for offensive operations are those least suited to them, while those least suited to defensive operations (Light and Foot) have Rifle Squads that may be best suited for offensive operations (relatively speaking). The 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry (with 1 LMG) is better suited for offensive operations than the 8 man Rifle Squad of the Mechanized Infantry (with 2 LMG), whereas the converse is true for defensive operations, with the reduced 9 man Rifle Squad of the Light Infantry situated uncomfortably in between.

Furthermore, the basic building block of the PLA Infantry, the 3 man Cell, has had to be abandoned for the 8 man Squads of the Mechanized Infantry (and perhaps the Marines as well). Curiously, the 3 man Cell, 3 Cell Rifle Squad of the PLA inspired two US Marine Corps officers to experiment with a similar structure, ultimately leading to the 13 man Rifle Squad organized into 3 4 man Fire Teams of the USMC in 1944, and used with success ever since. It is ironic that the PLA is tampering with something that it invented and that has worked so well for so long.


By comparison, the 13 man Rifle Section proposed as an ideal (alongside the USMC Rifle Squad) in the 1st and 10th Posts of this thread is capable of both the full of basic tactics in offensive operations and great staying power in defensive operations, all the while capable of sustaining the loss of up to 4 or 5 men while still retaining full capacity for internal fire-and-movement. The 13man Rifle Section, as described in earlier posts, is led by a Sergeant who commands two 6 man Rifle Squads, each commanded by a Corporal and comprising the following: the Corporal Squad Commander, armed with an assault rifle with an underslung light grenade launcher, both for taking out point and area targets at range as well as marking and designating targets, a Light Machine Gunner, and 4 Riflemen (with assault rifles, one of whom may have an underslung shotgun).

With two 6 man Rifle Squads, the 13 man Rifle Section is capable of frontal attacks as well as flank attacks. For double envelopments, the Section Commander may draw one or two men from each of the two Rifle Squads and lead them himself in an ad hoc Rifle Squad of 4 men. Alternatively, the Section Commander may take both of the Section's LMGs under his command along with the underslung LGL's to create an exceptional base of fire, and leave 8 riflemen to conduct the assault under the two Rifle Squad Commanders. Having 8 rifleman as opposed to only 6 in the USMC Rifle Squad gives the 13 man Rifle Section superior offensive power, while retaining quite sufficient defensive power afforded by the mutually supporting, interlocking fires of the Sections's 2 LMGs. And given the unsurpassed ability of such a Rifle Section to sustain battle losses, the 13 man Rifle Section of two 6 man Rifle Squads (each based upon an LMG and an LGL), such a Section is easy to control while possessing full capacity for both offensive and defensive operations. Compared to the 13 man Rifle Section, all of the PLA's Rifle Squads 8-,9-, and 10- man) are found wanting, for all the various reasons previously pointed out.