PRC Improvment topic

Well i once promised a post in the Taiwan issue but it has fallen behind all other stuff...anyway my point in that topic would have been that PRC current Amph landing force and Airbrone units just aren't big and capaple enough to be able to do theyr task in the possiple Taiwan takeover.

This improvement need what Ute pointed out is exactly what i ment.

Soviets once chategorized amphibious landings in three category: First, small size tactical operations made by spetnazz units of the naval infantry, seccondly operational level landings wich were the highest that soviets themself could go and thirdly large strategic level landing operations wich only USMC was able. Soviets had usually two brigades per fleet (one was spetnazz brigade) in four fleets. Their naval infantry units where much larger than chinese current ones and still biggest task to them was opening bridge-ends to attack rear of advancing army units opponents. Taking over a large island whit twenty million people and significant army, USMC could hardly do it, not to mention soviets and most importantly the chinese naval infantry units.

Well China needs then boost its amphibious ship armanda and add more bigger landingships to effectively serve these 55,000 new marines.

Also, a battalion of Type 99 would be like 31-33 tanks, as chinese follows the holy trinity of Tsarist Russian unit cohesion, at least to my knowlidge. A regiment of 90+ tanks would be a minimium in my mind, thus dived in to all operational landing echelons or task groups of battalion size (the maxium unit size to be fileded whit LSD size ships sofar). Also the artillery must be up to date and ligth enough to be practical in fast pace missions.

But china still lacks true attack choppers, but i think this oncoming WZ-10 would be placed at least near major marine formations to be aviable in Taiwan landings (as it is the most potent next field for these marines to deploy)
But having dedicated airunits and so on would propaply require a semi-branch status among the Navy, air force and army, to avoid the byrocracy and staff proplems.

Look at the PLA's marine force, it is not really a seperated corp like the USMC. It still organic to Naval command. The training is more like a special force/seal team. The aim of this force is similar to US special ops. They are not designed to be the elite infantry. I think each military region has their own marine equivalents, under the title of of recon regiment/brigade.

The problem now with this structure is all these "elite" infantry force are disjointed with command structure/training/equipment. They can not perform as well as what USMC can. How ever.... the shear number of force will be a headache for any invading force.

Now, when it come to taiwan. G point out that PLAN just don't have enough projection power to deliver these troops over. Plus the politics (It is every where) and power struggle. I don't think we will see the "PLMC" any time sooner.

Lazzy digger

Originally Posted by lazzydigger

Look at the PLA's marine force, it is not really a seperated corp like the USMC. It still organic to Naval command. The training is more like a special force/seal team. The aim of this force is similar to US special ops.

Lazzydigger, I respectfully disagree. I believe the PRC Marines are trained and deployed much like the U.S marine corp. Just look at their force stucture. They have a large mech force with light tanks and APC. They are far from the operational skill set of the SEAL and special forces command. This is not taking away from the PRC marines as they are deployed for more of a high intensity conflict as opposed to more low ones of the SEAL or SF. I believe there are elements of the PRC marine force that is trained for LRRP, raids and force multiplyer but for the most part it is a truly high end conventional attack force.

Actually the PRC's amphibious forces reminds more of those in the soviet union. The Soviet naval infantry was roughly divided to similar size and capaple units as the chinese marine corps. There were some differences, like the soviets fond of fast hovercrafts, but in larger scale they remind each others considereply. One thing in soviet amphibious forces development was that they were expanding to end of soviet era. The Ivan Rogov class LSDs were clear indicator that soviets were moving towards far more bigger and effective force, propaply wishing to reach out the US marines lead....intresting to see wheter china is going to the same way and could it sucseed better than Soviets...?

Ute:
The Chinese Marine force do have the structure of a conventional force at the moment. How ever, when I looked at it, it is more like supporting element. The core units are still Highly traininged foot soldiers with special skill in different areas. The type of training that the PLA marine need to go through is much much tougher than what USMC need to go through. For the core units, it is some where in between of Seal and Elite marine units. Their mission is more on recon and penaltration.

That said, I found it is difficult to position the PLA marine properly. It is very young. It was not in the doctrine. PLA never had any experience in how to utilizing such a force. So, they put every thing in to it. It is more of an experimental unit. It will be improved as the topic of the thread.

There was this joke: an old school commander was facing strong resistence during an excercise, so he grandly annouced that he will send in "special force" to take the fortified postion. A lot of the command in PLA still think special force just the same is elite infantry. I expect year of doctrine change in commander's head before the position/usage of PLA marine can be properly defined.

Lazzy

I think the PLA marine corps has experienced some transformation during the past two decades. When the marine corps was re-formed in the 1980s, it was intended to be used to seize islands in the South China Sea. Therefore it consisted of mainly light infantry, with very little armour and artillery equipment. Their training was more close to special operations forces like SEAL.

Since the mid-1990s, the role of the marine corps became more focused on the potential amphibious assault on Taiwan. The existing infantry-oriented could hardly achieve this goal. So heavy armour element was added to it. The marine brigade stationed in Zhanjiang now has an armour regiment equipped with Type 63A tank, Type 89 122mm SP howitzer, and specailly modified APCs and IFVs.

Unlike the USMC, which has the capability to combat independently in inland regions, the PLA marine corps only serves as a "spearhead". It's main role is to seize and secure the beachhead, and defend it against enemy counter-attack until the heavy Army troops arrive in the second and third wave. Once the landing zone is secured and manmade ports are built, the marine corps compeleted its mission and the combat role will be taken over by the Army units. Type 98/99 MBT wont do much good to the PLA marines as the tank is too heavy to swim.

Hi Dongfeng

Your description sounds like a more beefed up version of our own Royal Marines, ie a pure Amphibeous Assault force. The Royal Marines are primarily used to force landings, establish Beach heads and protect enginners whilst they build heavy landing facilites. The RM are also useful for moving fast over rough and inhospitable terrain, ie Falklands. They also provide Amphibeous patrol duties along Coastal regions and rivers as seen in Iraq.

Does this sound more like the Chinese Marines as opposed to the USMC?

Originally Posted by SampanViking

Does this sound more like the Chinese Marines as opposed to the USMC?

Yes, the PLA marines is somehow similar to the Royal Marines in tactics and organisations, particularly in its early years in the 80s. Of course the PLA Marines now has heavy armour equipment while the Royal Marines are pure commando units (like SEAL).

here is the strenth and equp holdings of some other marine forces.

ROYAL MARINES-7,000
1 cdo bde with 3 bat
1 cdo arty reg, special boat service
equipmet- milan , 81mm mor

RUSSIAN NAVAL INF-7,500
1 inf div(2,500) 3 indep bde, 3 fleet SF bde
equipment- 160 MBT(various T-55M, T-72, T-80
60 BRDM, 150 BMP-2, 750 BTR60/70/80
Arty 367 tubes various other ATGW

US MARINE CORP-175,000+
3 Div(much bigger than U.S army div) special ops forces incl 1 recce bat, 2 force rec coy
equipment-400+ M1A1 600+ LAV 1,300 AAV-7
3 airwings which include 190+ attack helo and 400 trans helo 216 F-18, 112
AV-8B

SPANISH MARINE FORCE-5,600
1 BDE, 5 garrison gp
equip-16 M-60A3 MBT 17 Scorpion LT tank 16 AAV-7 some arty

Now I wish to delve into the area of close airsuport. Based on my own personal exp I firmly believe after you gain control of the air battle space you NEED very good close airsupport. I think the dev of the new Attackhelo is a great start. I would also urge the PRC to field a new dedicated close support aircraft. THIS IS NEEDED VERY MUCH. The Fantan does not cut it in my opinion. I think the SU-25 base design is fine. I love the A-10. The ability to send in a aircraft low and heavily armed and ARMOURED is outstanding. I also think the fielding of a PRC version of the AC-130 gunship would also be good and well within the means of the PRC.

I think that is a sore spot for a lot of armed forces these days. A dedicated close support aircraft means the force can obtain air superioity and enough resource to keep an dedicated close support arm. Must country are using multirole fighter/Helo gunship to fill in for this role.

Chinese is developing a attack helo, which is good news. I doubt PLAAF still have enough resource to design/import a fixed winged solution. At the moment, The possible conflict is with taiwan or Japan. there are no platform to lunch helo in to middle of the strait, and Q5 is good enough to carry out groud attack with out fighter escort. It is not too bad in a dog fight.( I think it even managed to beat Pakistan's F16 once). Conflict with Japan.. that's navy's job. So a dedicated close support is not urgently needed but good to have one day. A lot of the M-17 Helo have weapon plyon's to handle machine gun pods and rockets, they can do some of the close support tasks too.

Notice that I didn't put U.S. in the picture. I thoughs are: U.S. should hold the upper hand in air after certain amount of loss. One they have the upper hand. PLAAF's close support will be a one way trip... long range artillery probably will be the better pick.

By the end of it, it is all about limited resource. Chinese force wil use the fund to improve their fighter arm and improve their multirole capability, but I won't see they developing a dedicate fixed wing close support aircraft. The WZ-10 project will be more towards tank hunt. There are 2 mil PLA standing army,all they need is rifle and grenades. U.S. will run out of money before they can kill every one of them. Who needs close air support.(only joking)

here are my thoughts on fighting war I think they are reasonable and sound

1.situational awarness is a must. knowing 70%+ of the OPFOR location and movement routs.

2. COMPLETE control of the air battle space and supressing OPFOR AD systems.

3. Through the Use of the above begin killing the OPFOR with the use of airpower.

4. KILL the command structure.....make it personal and cause fear in the leadership through the use of airpower.

5. an AGGRESIVE highly trained ground force that has "blood lust" and wants to kill the OPFOR combined with Hi-tech weapon platforms that make it easy and almost video game like to kill OPFOR

6.logistics....keep the above happening

I think the whole idea in war is to kill people. you have to have a military that understands this. the internet Video of the apache killing the insurgents with the SA-7 on the tractors is a good example..."roger that smoke him" this to the outside viewer looking into the world of the military seems harsh but is key in winning war.....cheers ute.