Local Wars and Integrated Joint Warfare Doctrine

Haven't given this much thought until now, but an Asia Times article has sparked some thought on my part.

Small wars loom large on China's horizon, by Jens Kastner, Asia Times, 6 April, 2012:

Broad hints have been coming out of China that the country might start small-scale military strikes over disputed waters that are believed to hold rich energy reserves. The consequences of such endeavors would be tolerable to Beijing, international experts say.

and:

When strategists speak of the "Malacca Dilemma", they mean that Beijing's sea lines of communications are highly vulnerable. In times of conflict between the US and China, the supply of crude and iron ore needed to keep the Chinese economy alive and kicking could be relatively easily cut off in the straits that connect the Indian Ocean with the Pacific.

As such, a move would force the Chinese leadership rather quickly to the negotiation tables on the enemy's terms - and as it becomes clearer that the western Pacific holds vast untapped reserves of oil and natural gas - Beijing naturally sees control over the areas as a way out of its precarious situation. (According to Chinese estimates, oil and gas reserves in the western Pacific could meet Chinese demand for more than 60 years.)

also:

In commentaries run in China's state media, most notably in the Global Times, the concept of "small-scale wars" has increasingly been propagated since 2011. In early March, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized that the PLA needed to be better prepared to fight "local wars".

Last month, Agence France-Presse reported on Premier Wen's remarks on the necessity of preparing for Local Wars;

China must increase ability to win "local wars," PM says, AFP, Bangkok Post, 5 March, 2012:

China must enhance the ability of its military to win "local wars", Premier Wen Jiabao said on Monday, as Beijing grows increasingly assertive about its territorial claims in Asia.

Beijing lays claim to large swathes of the South China Sea which are also claimed by its smaller neighbours, and must also secure supply routes and new sources of raw materials to fuel its booming economy.

Wen's made his comments at the opening of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's parliament, a day after the government announced military spending would top $100 billion in 2012 -- an 11.2 percent increase on last year.


"We will enhance the armed forces' capacity to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local wars under information age conditions," Wen said in his "state of the nation" speech.

First, the bluntly obvious. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate the threat, of a potential loss of critical raw materials in the event of serious conflict with another great power or powers - and indeed in order to avoid a direct military clash with another Great Power in the first place - China finds itself strategically committed to securing access to raw materials in areas adjacent to China, not least the South China Sea. Many of these areas and their resources are in some dispute, not least by China itself. And if other means fail to secure these resources for China, China has been essentially warning that it will be prepared to secure them by force, relying upon surprise and speed in order to conclude issues in China's favour before any serious or effective outside intervention may occur.

Consider these two pieces on Integrated Joint Warfare (IJW):

Integrated Joint Operations by the PLA: An Assessment, by Mandip Singh, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 11 December, 2011.

PLA: Thrust on Integrated Joint Warfighting, by Lieutenant-General Gautam Banerjee, Indian Defence Review, 26 December, 2011.

Now, the military doctrine that has apparently been designed for the purposes of securing China's strategic resources objectives is Integrated Joint Warfare. Over the last decade or so, the IJW concept has evolved from Joint Operations (JO), to Integrated Joint Operations (IJO), and now, Integrated Joint Warfare (IJW). At the highest level, IJW had involved the restructuring and integration of the Army, Navy, Air force, logistics, communications, reconnaissance, and information services and systems, defence industry, civil administration, all down the chain of command from the Central Military Commission (CMC), through the Military Regions. And all whilst engaging in broad-based modernization, particularly in the Navy and Air force. Within the Military Regions, some MR-level troops and equipment are being assigned as organic units or formations to individual Group Armies. This is the peacetime organization.

In wartime, a "War Zone Campaign Command" (don't know if this anything close to a valid comparison, but it conjures memories of the old Soviet "Theatres of Strategic Direction" TVD's) directly subordinated to the Central Military Commission itself, would be established as the operational campaign headquarters in a given Military Region, with all of its forces and resources at it direct disposal. Mandip Singh:

While the organisation tree for the conduct of IJO at the campaign level is not available in the open domain, the responsibility to frame and suggest structures was given to the Nanjing Army Command Academy in the aftermath of US operations in Iraq in 2003. The responsibility included preparation of a doctrine, modular groupings at each level, integrated logistics, joint training and exercises and a strategic project to develop talented personnel in information technology.6 The Jinan MAC was made responsible for establishing the `theatre joint training leading group` in 2009 as the test bed to conduct, monitor and evaluate the IJO concept. The first joint exercise held was the `Vanguard 2009` (Qianfeng 2009) in October 2009 in Henan Province. 7The main participants were the armoured brigade of the 20th Group Army, the 1st Army Aviation Regiment, an element of the 15th Airborne Corps, and aircraft from units in the Guangzhou and Jinan MR Air Forces.8 This exercise looked at joint operations at the brigade level in which a brigade commander was given resources from 11 different services at his disposal.

Lt. Gen. Banerjee describes Four Stages in the operational (but not tactical) conduct of IJW in order to achieve the strategic objectives of a "Local War Under Conditions of Informationization":

Indeed, proposition of the PLA’s concepts of war-fighting in what it terms as the “New Period” is well tuned towards conduct of IJW. It is indicative of the rich strategic wisdom of China. It may, therefore, be in order to briefly mention certain important prospects of such a preposition – the connection with IJW is quite obvious :-


Stage 1. A confrontation may begin with “Domination, Deterrence and Posturing” with missile forces, SOF actions, military buildup and politico-economic impositions. The purpose would be to make the adversary see ‘reason’ and back out from military confrontation.


Stage 2. The next step could be “Gaining Initiative by Striking First” by means of pre-emptive missile strikes and long range air and naval attacks. Such recourses are to be sustained with surprise, deception and asymmetric initiatives. Besides, what is termed as ‘SOF Action’ – that actually implies trailer-like pre-emptive attack of limited scope, but hurtful nevertheless - will form part of this scheme. The purpose at this stage would be to give to the adversary a taste of the ‘medicine’ and motivate him to come to terms – China’s terms, of course.


Stage 3. At this stage, a still defiant adversary would be subjected to the next step in the escalatory ladder by fighting a “Quick Battle to Force a Quick Resolution”. Rapid concentration of POE forces would be achieved by ‘Exterior (intra-MR) or Leap Forward (inter-MR) Mobility’ in ground, air or sea modes and deployment of RRFs to overwhelm the adversary’s frontline forces.


Stage 4. In case favourable resolution of the conflict is still not forthcoming, “In-depth Strike” would follow in near-simultaneity with Stage 3, wherein gains made by the preceding echelons would be consolidated and expanded by regular ground, air or sea formations, by recourse to the concept of ‘Active Defence’ and ‘Localised War’ till the desired point of culmination is reached.


Besides the aforesaid, efforts towards development of cyber-war, space-war, and what is termed as the “Three Warfares” capabilities – psychological, media and ‘legal’ warfare – point towards a very focused and conjoined view of war among the Chinese strategists. Accordingly, China’s military strategy stands to be reinforced with various quasi-military efforts, wherein interference with the adversary’s data-information network, fact-manipulating propaganda and even recourse to imposition of her unilateral interpretation of international laws and norms would form part of her grand strategy.

General Banerjee assesses that China will not be fully capable of conducting IJW until around 2025. He also qualifies the use of the term "Local", saying that it sould not be taken to refer to merely "small" wars, but rather, wars of whatever size in areas adjacent to China itself. Mandip Singh considers that:

From the inputs available it appears that the PLA has made fair progress in the planning and conduct of IJO at brigade and divisional levels. However, certain key elements of successful conduct of a joint campaign require stitching up at the higher level. Greater clarity is required on key issues of centralised command; the change of command from the MR commander, who is in location, to a WZC commander who descends from outside the theatre of operations; the changeover of a peacetime MR HQs to a WZ HQs; and, the integration of various services at the War Zone level. The need for equality of all the services, a key ingredient of joint operations, does not appear to have been fully implemented. PLAAF and PLAN Commanders continue to remain at the Deputy level at the War Zone HQs and under the War Zone Commander, who is invariably from the ground forces. More importantly, there is little confirmation of integration of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets at the War Zone HQs level. ISR assets are the key to decision making at the War Zone level.

This represents a very cursory (and admittedly somewhat sloppy) examination of the Local War and IJW doctrines on my part, and I'm curious to pick the brains of those who have been paying rather more attention to this than I. Is Gen. Banerjee more or less on target with his assessment that the PLA will achieve more or less full IJW capability around 2025? Does China possess a sufficent IJW capability now in order to guarantee its access to strategic external resources (such as in the South China Sea, Kyrgystan)? And is the whole Local Wars/IJW doctrine/concept even realistically capable of achieving its strategic objectives in the first place, namely that of securely strategic raw materials in areas adjacent to China without drawing another Great Power into a major war?