SinoDefence Forum

Norfolk

Yesterday SampanViking made the observation in a post on the Rifle Squad/Section Thread that the PLA seems to reserve its best trained and equipped infantry for its mechanized infantry in order to be used as Shock Troops, while using most (excepting of course PLAAN Marines, PLAAF Paratroops, and PLA Special Forces and certain Light Infantry) of the rest of its lesser trained and more lightly equipped motorized and foot infantry in order to hold ground and infiltrate into the enemy's own ground in order to keep him off-balance while aforementioned elite mechanized infantry (as part of armoured forces) struck the decisive blow.

There has been a lot of controversy over the last 30 years about the usefulness or otherwise of light, medium, and heavy ground forces in general and foot, motorized, and armoured infantry in particular. Those of us old enough to remember the Energy Crisis in the 1970's and subsequent events in and around the Middle East will also remember the controversy (which rages to this day) over the then new "Light Infantry Divisions" that the US Army began to raise for the Rapid Deployment Force (now Central Command). The US Army even raised an experimental Motorised Infantry Division intended to fill a gap in between the Light Infantry and the Mechanized Infantry/Armoured Divisions.

Their proponents claimed that the Light Infantry could get anywhere they nedded to be fast enough to beat the enemy to the punch, easy to supply by airlift, and able to hold off the enemy (because of their training) until Heavy Forces (ie US Armoured and Mechanized Infantry Divisions) arrived in strength to deal the knock-out blow.

Alternatively, their opponents claimed that the Light Infantry Divisions were "too light to fight" as they lacked the necessary equipment and heavy weapons to beat off enemy armour, and that they required a great deal more airlift than their proponents admitted that they required in order to keep them sufficiently supplied until their relief-in-place by Heavy Forces.

While the US model differed from the PLA model mentioned at the beginning of this post in that US Light Infantry Division were supposed to feature better-trained and led foot infantry than the more heavily armed and equipped armoured infantry of the US Mechanized Infantry and Armoured Divisions, they both share the making off a real distinction in quality between light, medium, and heavy ground force units.

The Russians, on the other hand, favour the bulk of their army to consist of heavy ground force units (Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions, Unified Army Corps) with large numbers of armoured infantry to do most of the fighting, and a much smaller proportion of light and medium ground forces - Naval Infantry (also motorized), Airborne (with some light armour), Air Assault (helicopter-borne infantry), and Spetsnaz (commando infantry and special forces) - to operate in support of the heavy units.

Another distinction that has been made between light, medium, and heavy ground force units is the number of infantry that each possess, and for what purpose. Yesterday SampanViking even raised the question of was there a difference in the size and composition of Rifle Squads/Sections between light, medium, and heavy units - and the short answer is yes, no, sometimes, not necessarily. And, not to forget, mountaineers, marines, paratroops, commandos, and even special forces are involved here.

The broader issue originally raised by SampanViking and that is being presented for discussion in this thread is are such distinctions being made by many armies between light, medium, and heavy forces really necessary in that each has a viable role on the battlefield that complements the others, or are such distinctions largely illusory or mistaken, and say, heavy ground units with substantial proportions of armoured infantry should form the bulk of most armies, with a few light ground units made up of mainly of commando-trained light infantry (and even smaller numbers of special forces) for rapid-reaction and specialized climatic and terrain conditions operations, or to operate in support of heavy ground units at the operational level by raiding or seizing beachheads, airfields, enemy headquarters, depots, road junctions and critical terrain features, artillery emplacements, coastal and air defense sites, etc., as heavy ground units follow up to relieve them and carry on the rest of the campaign? Is the Russian approach more practical, or are the US and the PLA on to something - even if in different ways?

SampanViking

Thanks Norfolk for starting this thread, I think having somebody who can really examine Infantry structures and doctrine is going to be a real boon, especially if Bombardier Gollevainen can add his Artillery expertise as well.

I fail to see how you can have any serious discussion of the PLA without understanding how it uses its Infantry. They might be the least sexy of units, but Infantry remains; without a doubt the most vital for war winning. The PLA is always going to be an Infantry Army; especially its lighter Infantry, it is China’s main military resource and that is not going to change. Infantry means force and if force did not matter, then other countries would not treat force multipliers as so critical to their strategies.

Since GW1 in 1991 the emphasis of military adulation has been cantered on Advanced Aircraft, Heavy Armour and Smart, Stand Off munitions. Since 2003 however the cold light of day has filtered back through after the Mega Metal Fest and the lesson being learned today in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, is that light Infantry carries a punch that cannot be ignored.

Further, although the above are Irregular Insurgents, I think that only goes to prove the central point. Insurgents have a natural camouflage that Light Infantry would not enjoy, but Light Infantry enjoy greater numbers, better organisation and Intelligence, periodic support from Heavier Weapons, Air Cover and Occasional Air Support. In Addition they will know that somewhere, their own Heavy Divisions will be operating and so they are not isolated.

My very non professional take on the PLA Regular Infantry splits down into the following:

Professional A Division (Including Marines, Paratroopers etc)

Professional B Divisions

Reservists

Volunteers

Conscripts

No surprises in Professional A, in comprising your Heavy Mechanised and Elite Light Divisions

Professional B is more interesting. They are equipped with the older and legacy Armour and probably fit the Medium Infantry role, being able to follow up after an A Divison Assault, or simply provide stiffening to Light Infantry on the Lines.

Reservists – Former Professionals who could either be used to swell the ranks of A & B Divisions or (more likely I suspect, especially for older troops) to be used as instant NCO’s for Volunteers and Conscripts.

I doubt if China would need to draft in a major conflict straight away as I suspect calls for Volunteers would produce all the manpower in required for any early stages of a conflict which needed to draw on more than its Professionals.

As previously stated, I believe that China’s use of Light Infantry is crucial in any major conflict. They are easy and quick to train, relatively inexpensive to equip and likewise, quick and easy to deploy.

Large bodies of men equipped with modern Light Arms, Grenade Launchers, Mortars and Shoulder Pad Weapons, are by no means harmless and certainly cannot be ignored. China has the ability to open huge and multiple fronts and to simply exhaust the manpower and firepower of its enemies and prevent them from concentrating against the Critical Heavy Divisions.

In short the Light Infantryman does not need to do very much, he simply needs to be there and once there is capable of capitalising on soft targets of opportunity as and when they arise, causing mayhem in the flanks and rear and diverting enemy Ground units, Air Cover and Artillery Fire Missions from more critical parts of the Battlefield.

Maybe I should stop here and wait for the input of others.

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Norfolk

SampanViking - Quote:

Since GW1 in 1991 the emphasis of military adulation has been cantered on Advanced Aircraft, Heavy Armour and Smart, Stand Off munitions. Since 2003 however the cold light of day has filtered back through after the Mega Metal Fest and the lesson being learned today in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, is that light Infantry carries a punch that cannot be ignored.

Further, although the above are Irregular Insurgents, I think that only goes to prove the central point. Insurgents have a natural camouflage that Light Infantry would not enjoy, but Light Infantry enjoy greater numbers, better organisation and Intelligence, periodic support from Heavier Weapons, Air Cover and Occasional Air Support. In Addition they will know that somewhere, their own Heavy Divisions will be operating and so they are not isolated.

-Unquote

Yes, mechanization encourages many to become fixated upon seeking high-tech solutions to strategic, operational, and even tactical problems, and in some cases this is good, and in others cases its wasteful and unnecessary. While many armies from WWII to the present have used standard foot infantry divisions (and since then motorized infantry divisions as well) to hold ground in while armoured divisions were (ideally at least) reserved for offensive operations or for counter-attacks in mobile defensive operations, many armies seem to resort to a segregration between the two.

The US Army, for example, since it has eliminated its standard foot infantry divisions in favour of light infantry (and if I may designate Stryker infantry units as motorized units) and motorized infantry (as well as airborne and air assault infantry), had, until the insurgency in Iraq gotten out of hand, appeared reluctant to mix light and medium divisions with heavy divisions. The US Army tended to view the light and medium divisions as being suitable for low and mid intensity warfare, while the heavy divisions werre intended for high intensity warfare. Only in the case of a large heavy division force arriving to relieve a previously-deployed rapid-reaction light or medium division force (such as in the Middle East oilfields, and as took place in GW1) were to two to mix. And in the event, GW1 featured the spectacle of I MEF and US VII Corps (including of course UK 1st ArmDiv) arriving to relieve XVIII Airborne Corps (curiously, none of the Light Infantry or Motorized Divisions [9th Motorized Infantry Division being disbanded] were present, although 24th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived as soon as possbile to bolster 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions) stealing the show while 101st Airborne Division used its helicopter infantry to establish forward operating bases and resupply points and 82nd Airborne Division rode on trucks behind the French Daquet Light Armoured Division deep into the Iraqi desert to act as a screening force. US Third Army (with the exception of the hard-driving 24th Division under Barry McCaffrey, chomping at the bit the whole way), subject to self-imposed delays, did not even attempt to take Basra or even the al-Hammar causeway over the Euphrates/Tigris river system in order to cut off the Iraqi Army retreating from Kuwait (in which the Airborne and Light Divisions could have proved their worth), and most of the Republican Guard and much of the Iraqi Army got away. If the US Army really thought their Airborne or Light Divisions were what they claimed they were, competent senior commanders would have used them to do just that. The US Army appeared to operate almost Soviet-style in the First Gulf War.

The PLA by contrast, appears to follow German practice in using Foot and Motorized Infantry Divisions to hold ground and tfor two purposes. The first is to use that ground as a pivot point from which to both canalize (ideally) the enemy into seeking routes of least resistance and subsequently to launch counter-attacks against attacking enemy forces using those routes by their Armoured and Mechanized Divisions during defensive operations. And the second is to use the Light and Medium Divisions to hold ground, and to "gnaw" so to speak at the enemy's defenses while holding ground to provide a base from which the Heavy Divisions may concentrate to launch a decisive attack during offensive operations. It would appear that the motorized divisions (Medium Divisions) at least, maybe foot infantry divisions as well, might follow in the wake of the Heavy Divisions to mop-up resistance and to hold newly-won ground. The Germans in WWII used Foot Infantry Divisions for these purposes while their Armoured and Motorized Divisions were (where possible) ideally reserved for offensives and counter-attacks. The foot infantry divisions themselves rarely engaged in large-scale offensive operations themselves.

Until recently, the Bundeswehr followed the Wehrmacht in this regard, with Armoured and Mechanized (and an Airborne) Divisions manned by full-time troops intended to be used for decisive operations while the Motorized Divisions of the, manned by part-time TA troops, held ground, engaged in dismounted operations in close country, and otherwise freed up the Armoured and Mechanized Divisions for decisive maneouvre. I see in the current PLA organization a similar concept of operations.

That said, one of the salient developments that have occurred in the Iraq War has been the striking success, from the first days of the invasion to the present, of Partisan warfare. Iraqi guerrillas proved troublesome even as USA 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division and USMC 1st Marine Division advanced to Baghdad. The partisans, the lightest of light infantry, have often successfully harassed US Forces (as well as others), often maintaining continuous close surveillance of US Forces whereever they are and go, striking them at will, disrupting US operations, and holding and controlling ground (and populations) until such time as the US has to withdraw troops from one area (thus leaving it vulnerable to Partisans recapturing it) in order to try to take (or re-take) that area now controlled by the Partisans. I see in the PLA Militia a similar potential. It leaves one to wonder what the former Iraqi Army could have accomplished (provided of course that it was professionally competent and adequately equipped) with its heavy and medium divisions viv-a-vis Coalition Forces with such Partisan support (bearing in mind though, that the Iraqi Militias in reality are more at war with each other than with the US; the ideal situtation I am speaking of envisions a united militia under a single command).

I suspect many countries have been watching the events and taking noted with care. It may appear that Light, Medium, and Heavy ground forces may complement each other quite well, but I have a monkey to throw in that wrench. Next time - I've written enough for now.

Gollevainen

Well my few cents to this discussion comes to point out that I think we are focusing too much here in Desert fighting, where heavy armour and tank units have their natural "Play ground" aviable and all pro/and con arguments rolls beguns from the difficulty to "choose" rigth troops when all can theorethically do the task.
As A finnish perspective, there is no guestion at all to wheter heavy or ligth units, as the natural conditions here dictates the most. Unlike in world's recent conflicts here armour and heavy units have really little optimal manouvring area. Most of our country outside of urban concentrations are covered by vast wilderness in wich countless of miles of wood-economy roads (small path like roads for tractors to travell in their log-collection trips) and large and open rural areas are also limited. In such enverioment, tank units seldomly can engage each other beyond the range where the enemy can be taken out before they even reach their firing range. In almoust everywhere, the armour units needs to operate in distances where even small and "ligth" AT weapons can deliver killing hit and in tank vs. tank combats, the one with better reflex wins, no matter if its old T-72 or brand new Leo2 in guestion.

So in ligth of that, its no suprise that in our army, there are only four brigades that could be descriped as "heavy" and 12 or so "ligth" mechanised infantry brigades, with no armour, and bulk of the forces, some 20 and odd brigades (plus countless ind. battalions) are ligth infantry in sense of foot and occasional truck or Bv-206 type of Tracked vhechile transport. This is not becouse we could not afford better, but becouse our army is solely mented to be used in defence of our own soil, by using Areal-defence doctrine, wich (in short) is something like centralised led gurrellia warfare with regular army units done by using the vast area in favor in order to force the enemy to split its troops into large difficoultly reached areas and with extended supply routes.
In some sense, one could say that all of our groud forces are "climate" units in larger worlds perspective.

Also In here, all units are manned by reservist or "militia" type of personel, so this type of composition supports the sociological factor of our army. Like myself in example, untill im 25 and if war should come, I will be part of the heavy mechanised infantry brigade with modern 155mm Gun/howitzer, then untill Im about 35 or so, I would be in ligth motorised brigade and after that, in some independent artillery battalion, in all with old 122mm howitzer.

Like its mentioned in this thread allready, US army currently experiences difficoulties with gurrelia/partisan opponent, So in my perspective, wich is purely for how to defend one's nation, infantry composition should be that most versitile and ligth units are to tie the enemy, and then the main bulk of the forces are the ones that engage the enemy pockets and destroys them, and the heavy units are to preserved for most crucial direction, or for counter attacks and to operate in the two or three major highways that travels from east to west near our coast and all the biggest cities.

I will return to the issue of "ligth/Heavy" from artillery's point of view later after I have had something to eat. (those who knows me, can prepare another tracked SP unit bashing and loathing meanwhile by reading some of my other post in this forum )

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Norfolk

Well, here's my monkey(s) in the wrench, and I guess Gollie might not be too happy about it(them) (despite my bashing of Western mechanization, I'm really just a Panzer-Grenadier at heart.) - Tactical Nukes, Fuel-Air Explosives (FAE), and mechanization (and this is what I think Gollie probably won't like in the first place, especially heavy armour and self-propelled artillery - if you hear screams (mine or his) while you read through this thread, ignore them - Gollie's a super-mod and you can't stop him anyway). Here goes:

1. Tactical Nukes -

Very, very, very bad - forces an infantry company on the defense to become mechanized so that it can disperse sufficiently to avoid being vapourized and/or irradiated/contaminated etc. and spread out over a defensive frontage of up to 4,400 metres (rather than an otherwise more normal, and sane half-mile or so, but since when do nukes and sanity go together...Oh yeah, MAD! - Sorry, I'm a child of the Cold War.) Being spread out over such a long frontage means you need a few (2-6) TOW Dets attached to each coy and at least a platoon of tanks, because with such a long frontage and gaps between platoons big enough to drive a Motor-Rifle Division through (almost), you've got to kill at a distance wherever you can.

Unfortunately, of course, if the enemy here knows that your side have tactical nukes too, and comes at you in wave after wave after wave of heavy armour and armoured infantry arranged in spaced-out echelons (they're mechanized too because it's the only way they have a chance of avoiding vapourization and/or irradiation/contamination by your sides' tactical nukes by allowing them to be spread out) and converging together when they're close enough to your positions so that if your side nukes them, you get it too. There are also the effects of EMP to consider, especially if your troops are heavily dependent upon electronics and wireless communications- if your equipment is not EMP hardened (or at least you're stilll using vaccuum tube technology - them Russkies were smarter than NATO sometimes made them out to be) all your solid-state electronics and communications are toast.

This time-honoured tactic that dates back at least to the Korean War is called "Hugging the Belt", and works just as well for mechanized troops (heavy armour and armoured infantry) against nukes as it did for NKPA, PLA, VC, and NVA foot infantry against superior Allied conventional firepower in Korea and Vietnam in situations where those troops had managed to get close enough to Allied positions such that the latter were either compelled to call down artillery and air strikes on their own positions, or to fight off the attackers with infantry weapons.

Entrenched Foot Infantry may be able to withstand a certain degree of conventional bombardment with minor effects, but tactical nukes can take out entire foot infantry units because of their necessary concentration along narrow frontages (perhaps 800-1000 metres or so for an infantry company). Without mechanization, they have a great deal of difficulty both dispersing far enough apart to avoid the total destruction of a unit by one tac nuke strike, and in holding their positions with just portable infantry weapons that just don't have the range (or usually firepower) to hit the enemy at long range to either their front or in the gaps between platoons or companies.

And unless Foot Infantry are also at least Motorized as well, they may not be able to withdraw quickly enough if their position becomes untenable without risking envelopment and subsequent destruction by enemy follow-on forces.
Motorized Infantry also risk relatively easy destruction by Armoured forces, as Motorized forces carry nothing like the heavy armour and weapons that Armoured forces do, and Armoured forces tend to possess superior cross-country mobility (though Motorized forces are much faster on roads.)

2. Fuel Air Explosives (FAE) -

I would say that FAE pose a similar, though on a smaller scale, problem to that of tactical nukes (minus the radiation and contamination). FAE can generate EMP, kill the best and deepest dug-in infantry, and can do so over a good-sized area. Dispersal, and therefore Mechanization is still the best antidote to this problem. The only problem with FAE is that it is very dependent upon weather conditions, and the windier or damper it is, the less complete the aerosol's ignition and detonation will be.

3. Mechanization -

As in the previous two points, I have asserted that dispersal is necessary in order for troops (especially infantry) to have a chance of success in the face of tactical atomic weapons and fuel air explosives, and that such dispersion necessarily requires mechanization in order to provide the speed, protection, and firepower necessary to avoid, survive, and defeat opponents with such weapons. Moreover, when one opponent is mechanized and another is not, the mechanized opponent (usually) has, with all other things being equal, the advantage of speed, protection, and firepower over the unmechanized opponent.

However, there is both a problem and an opportunity for mechanization. The problem for mechanization is this: heavy armour and armoured infantry are critically restricted and even prohibited by conditions of terrain or climate in certain areas from operating successfully or even at all. Very rugged mountains or hill country, swamps and river deltas, deep forest and jungle, and polar regions are such areas. Light infantry typically operate with advantage in such conditions, and due to the natural environment which in itself frequently restricts or prohibits large concentrations of troops on the scale possible in open country, also contributes to a certain level of dispersion as well.

But this is also mechanization's opportunity: As John Keegan has written in "A History of Warfare", most military operations occurr in the most open areas, and these tend also to be the areas that host the largest populations. Those areas that are by nature the most hostile to mechanized operations are also those that are both the least-populated and the most out-of-the-way, so to speak. Warfare tends to be concentrated in open country and populated areas. Not too many wars are fought over for the possession of the Alps, but a lot of wars have been over the North German Plain. And a lot more wars have been fought in the great plains and river valleys of India and China than in the Himalayas and the Altai. And these are the areas most conducive to mechanized warfare.

As such, I suggest that the Light, Medium, and Heavy Ground Force distinctions should be made more along former Soviet lines than current US/PLA or even German lines, the former holding that Heavy Divisions (Armour and Armoured Infantry) should form the bulk of one's Army with a relatively small proportion of Light and Medium Divisions (Commando infantry for Light, Motorized infantry for Medium) normally operating in support at the operational level, with Commandos (and with Special forces operating at the Strategic level) raiding or seizing vital points ahead of the main Heavy (Armoured/Armoured Infantry) forces, and Foot (Light) or Motorized (Medium) infantry in modest numbers to handle out-of-the-way areas that feature especially difficult terrain or climate.

There should be two qualifications to this however. The first is that, as argued above, Heavy ground units or of little or no use in areas that are "Out-of-the-Way" due to extremes of climate or terrain, and thus Light and /or Medium groud units should form the bulk of armies in such areas. The second, which I have deliberately ignored in this post until now, is Partisan warfare. Partisans, or Militias as they are properly called when organized and regulated, can in almost any conditions of climate, terrain, and population effectively operate, adjusting themselves to local conditions. They can be an effective threat even to Heavy ground units (though they can rarely,, if ever defeat them on the basttlefield per se), and in the absence of stronger enemy forces, can effectively control terrain and populations, operate in partial or complete secrecy, and observe the enemy without being observed, blending into the terrain or population and striking the enemy when the opportunity presents itself, and receding into the background when faced with greater force.

In conclusion, I first propose that Regular Armies that are largely not in the "out-of-the-way" areas that I have described should be composed in the main of Heavy ground units (Tanks, Armoured Infantry, Self-Propelled Artillery, Armoured Engineers, etc.), with relatively small proportions of Light and Medium ground units in the form of Commandos operating in support of Heavy forces at the operational level or for duty in those areas that are out of the way. In the face of Tactical Atomic weapons, FAE, and mechanization itself, dispersal is the best remedy. In areas that do not consists of exteremes of of terrain or climate, mechanization alone provides this dispersal. This should include most countries; for those countries on the other hand that are predominately in out of the way areas, their Regular Armies should consist in the main Light and/or Medium ground units suited to such extremes of terrain and climate, in which disperal is made possible by natural factors alone. Secondly, I propose that all Armies should maintain Militias, probably composed of Partisans, for direct self-defense of their own territory, and in addition to their own operations, to provide both a base of operations, and a pivot point for, Regular Armies (either Heavy in the main or Light or Medium in the main) to deal the decisive blow to the enemy when the opportunity arises.

zraver

I think people are reading to much into the effectiveness of modern partisans. The US's problems in Iraq are do to systemic problems within the Army itself not due to the partisans strength.

1- The US did not commit enough boots to the occupation and let order degenerate into civil war. Part of the reason was typical American over confidence "All ur base are belong to us" but part of it has to do with the fact that the US Army and USMC combined did not have enough infantry and MP's for the job.

2- The US was fixated on offensive operations and had neglected the study of how to control what is effectively a captive hostile population.

3- Bush inc, the presidents meddling cannot be overstated. He wanted a war that has proven impossible. He wanted to win without cost, but war costs blood and you either pay the piper up front or you pay him later with interest.

When those things are factored in the insurgents have not done well at all. the most effective weapons are IEDs and snipers and not once have the "light infantry" partisans been able to force the US from a piece of ground.

If we look at Lebanon we see a similar situation. A modern highly mechanized force committed without a clear understanding of the objectives, poorly trained for the mission at hand, and too few in numbers. Hezzbollah never showed an ability to maneuver or even an ability to take the fight to the IDF other than rocket attacks. Hezzbollah forces would be better described as fortress troops akin to the defenders at Verdun of IJA troops in the Pacific.

I think the danger is that in order to save money, think tanks are creating a mission that doesn't exist, knowing full well that when the brown stuff hits the spinning stuff these under equipped forces will be pressed into service. A prime example is the Stryker brigade concept. There is not a single significant military operation these units can do better than a heavy mech brigade. The missions they do excel at like convoy escort and raids on insurgent strong holds are more properly defined as police duties.

There is a reason that outside of a few very narrowly defined roles, the light infantry went the way of the Dodo in the US Military after 1941. Excepting airborne/air mobile roles, mountain/arctic warfare, commando missions etc anything a rifle team can do, a rifle team with a heavy IFV can do better.

I am not a PLA watcher per se, but I doubt the PLA plans to use its leg infantry other than mountain or naval troops in a war. China lacks a credible threat hat would require a large number of infantry other than its own population. It is my take that the CCP is copying the Soviet model and holding up the military as China. Thus the man in uniform becomes a sign of strength, a unifying influence, and the most visible picture of national pride. It is also a very visible reminder of the Iron fist every goverment posses under neath the velvet glove.

The lack of credible combat training or even modern weapons for these formations would seem to back this up. They are not so showy but none the less show troops. They also serve the PLA's political-industrial cantonments.

This model served the Soviets, and now Russia very well. This is one reason the USSR had such a preponderance of infantry formations. Empires need a unifying influence*. They made them heavy because they knew that anything a rifle team could do, a rifle team with a BTR could do better, and a rifle team with a BMP could even beat that. The massive losses of WW2 showed them just how fragile unsupported infantry attacks could be. Plus all that production kept people employed and served political purposes.

* China may be Han dominated, but it still has resistive populations making it an empire as well.

crobato

I don't see this Soviet model here. The PLA has evolved into a highly mechanized and now increasingly digitalized force. I think every country uses its soldiers as a kind of unifying image of solidarity and patriotism and the US is certainly no exception to that either. Lately the PLA, at least for its mechanized units, don't seem to lack any modern equipment either.

The PLA should not be confused with the PAP, which is a 1.5 million police army on its own that handles all internal security matters.

Resistive populations will that make you an empire? By the same token, these countries would also be empires because of resisting elements in their indigenous populations---the United States, Mexico, the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Iraq, Serbia, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the list goes on. Well, practically every country in the world, practically, all the African countries, all the South American countries, all the Middle East countries, all the South East Asian countries.

crobato

Partisans or insurgent warfare were never meant to hold ground and you can find that in every example of insurgent or partisan warfare for the last century or so. Rather their main purpose is to make you bleed. They don't intend to play fair (neither should you) and that means fighting up and facing odds where they will surely lose. I don't see the point of criticizing the Hezbollah for not taking the fight to the Israeli Army. They shouldn't. That would be stupid.

It is not because of the number of boots. Its what the US should have done in the first place. They should never have broken up the Iraqi Army. Once they have decapitated the heads of the government, they should have it made it clear to the Iraqi Army, they're not out to remove them but rather request that the Army should play a vital part in the reconstruction by keeping the peace.

zraver

Tito, Mao, Castro, Giap allhad to use irregular force vs conventional forces.


[quote]
Rather their main purpose is to make you bleed. They don't intend to play fair (neither should you) and that means fighting up and facing odds where they will surely lose. I don't see the point of criticizing the Hezbollah for not taking the fight to the Israeli Army. They shouldn't. That would be stupid. [quote]

You cannot liberate anything unless you can take it and hold it. I made my comments because all Hezzbollah did was fight in place, not a very original thing to do. If the IDF had been properly trained, motivated, and led the fight would have been far different.

That would have been the smart thing to do, but in the period right after the war, the Iraqi army could not be used. It was disorganized, shell shocked and infiltrated with Baathist. In the critical month after the fall of Baghdad the US and its allies did not have the manpower to secure the peace.


You misunderstood me, I was not referring to how the Infantry was equipped, but how it is employed internally. The bulk of the PLA's leg units are not true combat formations.

You know what I meant, but funny thing is most of the countries on your list are or were empires. China has populations that do not want to be Chinese inside of its borders whose union is only enforced by the power of the state. In these situations the army is often the homogenizer of society. In the US the last ghosts of the civil war died on Dec 7th 1941.

Gollevainen

Gnah, I like good heated discussion, expecially, when the participants actually knows what they are talking about

But here is few counter thougths for the points you raised.

1. Tactical nukes.
The usage of Tactical nukes shouldn't be called automatically something that is as normal in the battle field as are normal artillery fire consentrations. There are huge political factors to be considered in use of them, so in any case, if tactical nukes are used, the targets would have to really be worth of the enveriomental/political/ and sociological effects of such strike. A small concentration of enemy units in some disperse woods aren't the first that comes to my mind. Like here in finland, only few such targets would exist, along with areas where I allready suggested that "heavy" units would operate.

Where as I offered ligth infantry to be used as partisan mode you have to remember that part of partisan warfare is dispersion of your own troops so that the large and heavy enemy cannot force them to figth on their way and therefore destroy such units in setpiece engagements. Using nukes directly against partisans would not in my mind suffice the use of such controversal weapons.

2. The FAE
There I have to admit that you are rigth. During our training, the emphasis of areal thread always conentrated on possiple use of such weapons and we had lots of training of how to operate under such attack, how to shut out the fires and give first aid to burned casualties. However as you pointed out the climatical conditions takes lots of effect out of them, I think finland's climatical and also geographical conditions are not most favorable to use of FAE, as there is always windy and rainy, along with deep winter periods with considerable moisture always present.

3. The mechanisation.
As you said mechanised units will come handicapped in special terrain or climatical conditions, but In my perspective, these are always present like I posted in my first reply. Also you mentioned that "battle" seeks itself into open terrains, wich I agree is true, but atleast here, in order to reach such areas, not to mention supply the troops operating there, needs to go trough areas where mechanisation isent the most flexible way to be.

But Im speaking of "out of the way" type of warfare, as In here, it is the only way to figth and we have to adjust ourselves to the conditions that we have.
Partisanwarfare, wich you said is the parade march of the ligth infantry (and I agree) should not be looked so easily as irregular's way of figthing but should be considered as good alternative to any nation that has the aviability to exploid it as main defence doctrine. When regular army figths in partisan way, they will bring command, control & communication networks, heavy fire-support in form of artillery and even airsupport (the swedish Base-60 concept) into the partisan warfare that allready poses difficoulties to heavy mechanised troops.

Thats why my point is that if your armed forces are fore defence, the emphasis should not be so blindly towards all heavy and only special ligth units.

__________________

crobato

The Hezbollah liberating? That would be some news. I never remember them being tagged as "freedom fighters". This is like a terrorist group, their purpose is to make you bleed and make statements about your vulnerability.

They should have secured the peace first, then gradually remove the Baathists later.

Well, if they don't want to be Chinese, why take a Chinese passport? China does not have internal insurgencies if that is what you mean, other than the Muslim insurgents in Xinjiang.

The army isn't any social homogenizer. It hardly plays a role in Chinese social life. In fact, the PLA's presence is almost never felt, just symbolic, like that garrison in Hong Kong. The dominance of Chinese culture itself has been the main homogenizer. The simple fact that people do not want to be left out, meant they, even as ethnic minorities, have to join in to enjoy the social progress and prosperity of the mainstream. I remember that's what my Chinese tour guide told me, as she later admits being a Mongolian.

If you look at past Chinese history, a lot of ethnic minorities became Chinese not because they have a gun holding against their head, but because they are simply swept by the culture whose norm of being "civilized" is to adopt Chinese customs and language. Its kind of like today, our norm of being educated and civilized is to wear a suit and talk English. And because in China, every minority is also Asian, eyes, skin and hair color, blending in and later absorbtion becomes very easy. You do not have the genetic differences that will continuously remind you that you are a different race.

Norfolk

zraver:

You are very right about the Iraqi Partisans - objectively speaking, most of them can't fight their way out of a paper bag - as not only cannot they take on mechanized troops one-on-one, but the only reason that they're even in the game is the lack of sufficient US troops (primarily infantry) in-country to occupy and control the ground from the beginning. That said, I think the continued existence of those Iraqi Partisans goes some way to proving the argument that their mere presence is enough, that is, in the absence of superior force, they naturally occupy (more in a physical than a tactical sense) and control the ground and its population. As long as the partisans exist and can avoid decisive defeat and annihilation, they are succeeding, more or less.

And I think that you are so right about Light and Medium Infantry in general (with certain exceptions) and especially the Stryker Brigades. As you say, anything that a rifle team can do, a rifle team with a Heavy IFV can do better (I would add the caveat that this is conditional on extremes of terrain and climate, otherwise it generally holds true). And the Stryker is just an example of fuzzy peacetime thinking and the Military-Industrial complex cooking up solutions to problems that have been handled just fine using more traditional methods (either commandos, marine/airborne infantry, regular foot infantry, and armour/armoured infantry). And it costs a lot of money while not being able to stand up to Heavy units (competently handled).

crobato:

As I said in my reply to zraver, and it appears that I erred in not making this clear, I do not consider Partisans to hold ground in a purely tactical sense, but rather in the sense that, by their presence in the area and amongst the population in the absense of a greater enemy force, they are by default in de facto occupation and control of that ground and its population. I apologize for this negligence.

Gollevainen:

I do not believe that atomic weapons of any kind should exist, let alone be used, but in the environment of the Cold War, tactical atomic weapons were a reality of life. And although the Cold War may be over, the weapons still exist, and armies must be able to deal with them in the event that their use may become a real possibility just as in the Cold War.

As for nuking Partisans, I am inclined to agree that that is a little excessive. I suspect that such an event would have more to do with some frustrated corps commander going a little off the deep end, and deciding to toss tac nukes at Partisan campfires while a few of the lads were brewing up some tea is not generally considered to constitute an operational decision in our profession; another profession would term that a "Nervous Break-Down".

I see this thread is taking off a little. I think SampanViking should give us another idea for a new topic to discuss.

Norfolk

On the issue of Light and Medium Ground Units especially, I am not entirely convinced but still rather doubtful that conventional Mountain, Marine, Airborne/Air Assault, and Motorized Divisions are necessary, or if so, only under even more limited circumstances than now. Many countries maintain substantial forces of Light and Medium Ground Units. Many of these units are intended to be more for power-projection than defence, even though they lack heavier armour and weapons as well as restricted supplies. Such units as these I suspect that they are rather more suited to the Second World War, in which many of them (especially Marine and Airborne Divisions) were formed, than now.

The US Army, for example, has 1 Airborne, 1 Air Assault, and 2 Light Infantry Divisions (basically even more lightly armed and equipped Airborne Divisions but not on jump status - one of which, the 10th Mountain Divisions, carries the Mountain title as a traditional, not actually operational, designation) in the Active Army, and 1 Light Infantry division in the Army National Guard. To complicate matters, many of the brigades of these specialized foot infantry divisions are in fact motorized using the LAV III Stryker armoured car. Until less than 20 years ago, the US Army included a Motorized Infantry division.

The US Marine Corps has 3 Active and 1 Reserve Marine Divisions (essentially the traditional Foot Infantry Divisions supported by medium artillery and small numbers of heavy tanks and IFVs as well as armoured cars (LAV-25 Piranha), but with specialized amphibious assault training and equipment).

The PLA now maintains 3 Airborne Divisions (1 still forming) and is plans to form 3 more, supported it seems by some Air Assault units. The PLA also maintains several Light Infantry Divisions as well as many Foot Infantry Divisions supported by medium artillery and large numbers of MBTs and possibly some limited APCs. The PLAN maintains 2 Marine Brigades, motorized infantry with artillery and tank support.

The Russian Army maintains a few Airborne Divisions (with some light armour)as well as a few Air Assault Brigades. The Russian Navy maintains at least 2, maybe more Naval Infantry Brigades, motorized infantry with artillery and tank support.

The British Army maintains (a somewhat imperfectly parachute-capable) Air Assault/Airborne Brigade, while the Royal Marines maintain a Commando Brigade (including Army troops) specializing in amphibious warfare. Army Motorized ("Mechanized") Brigades exist.

The French Army maintains small Airborne, Airmobile, Alpine, Motorized, and Marine Divisions (the size of brigades elsewhere), although the Navy maintains a battalion of Marine Commandos.

Many other countries maintain modest forces of the types such as these great powers possess.

As I stated at the beginning of this post, many of these units were formed for the Second World War, particularly the Marine and Airborne Divisions. Mountain/Alpine Divisions have existed since at least the First World War, and with the exception of a few units such as the Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade, are unmatched in their field. Motorized Divisions were formed for the Second World War, to secure ground that had been won by Armoured Divisions which (theoretically at least) were free to pursue the defeated enemy. Air Assault/Airmobile Divisions have only been around since the Vietnam War (although both the USMC and the French Army were important and successfull pioneers in this field prior to the US Army's first Airmobile division, the 11th Air Assault Division (renamed the 1st Cavaly Division [Airmobile] was formed and sent to Vietnam. As for Light Infantry Divisions, many that exist have been formed for the territorial defence of regions that possess extremes of terrain or climate and that preclude most or all use of Heavy ground units. Others, however, have been formed since the Vietnam War with a power-projection role in mind.

In general, such Light and Medium ground units have performed, and performed well, the roles assigned to them. That said, there are some problems and inconsistencies with many of them. I will deal with these by type:

1. Mountain/Alpine Divisions - Perhaps the oldest and most proven type of modern Light or Medium ground unit apart from the regular Foot Infantry Division itself, the Mountain Division (in competent hands) is probably unsurpassed in the role of teritorial defence of mountainous terrain. In the role of power-projection in mountainous terrain, it is also hard to beat. Only a few Commando units (albeit with additional and extensive mountain and also arctic warfare training and experience) such as the Royal Marines, may match or surpass this. Otherwise, the Mountain division seems secure in its role.

2. Marine/Amphibious Divisions - At present, only the USMC maintains Marines at a true Divisional level. That said, many countries possess nominal Marine Divisions (and more did so during the Cold War) as well as smaller formations, especially brigades. Marine units have typically performed quite well in the roles assigned to them. However, many of these Marine units are in fact something else.

The Royal Marines, while most certainly capable of amphibious assault, are in fact Commando Forces, as do appear the Russian Naval Infantry, the PLAN Marines, and a number of smaller Marine forces. While Marine Commando Forces tend to be more lightly equipped, organized, and supplied than regular Marines, their more extensive and advanced training suits them to conduct much more specialized and demanding tasks.

After all, regular Marine units are conventional infantry who possess additional training and equipement for amphibious assaults. Both US Army and US Marine Divisions conducted amphibious assaults in the Pacific during WWII (as well as some Commonwealth formations), and of course, in the largest amphibious assault of WWII, all eight of the divisions involved were drawn from the British, Canadian, and US Armies (with the first two armies reinforcing their divisions with full Tank Brigades, whereas US Army and US Marine Corps Divisions were typically reinfoced with only a Tank Battalion). Amphibious warfare training and equipment are certainly necessary, but as normandy proved, separate Marine Divisions are not necessary.

3. Airborne/Air Assault/Airmobile Divisions -

Soviet and German Airborne Divisions were formed for power-projection roles, not defensive purposes, and subsequently the British and US Armies followed suit. In the British Army, however, the Airborne Forces were initially intended to be fulled-fledged Commando Forces instead. Just as much of the amphibious role had fallen to the Army Commandos (and the Royal Marines were eventually converted en masse to the Commando role), so much of the airborne role had originally been intended to be taken on also by the Commandos.

However, the number of troops require for the Airborne role was judged to exceed the number of troops deemed likely to pass Commando training. In a survey of infantry battalion commanders, the British Army discovered that two-thirds of regular infantrymen would be capable of passing paratroop training; this, however, did not guarantee that the same men would pass the more rigorous and specialized commando training. The British Army, even with commonwealth and foreign volunteers to draw upon, never exceeded much more than around a dozen battalion-sized Commando units in existence at any one time. Clearly, even giving the entire Commando force parachute training would not suffice to supply entire divisions of paratroops.

No.2 Army Commando, the first commando fully trained in parachuting, was used as a cadre for the training and formation of the Airborne Forces, which recruited regular infantry for the Airborne role, raising 2 Airborne Divisions. The US Army created separate Ranger (Commando) Battalions (only about 6 at any time) and Airborne Divisions (5 in total). Although the Airborne Divisions performed well in their roles, the Commandos were all parachute-trained and fully Airborne-capable by 1944, and, formed into Brigades, spearheaded the Allied crossing of the Rhine River(the US Army 13th Airborne Division, which was scheduled to participate in the crossing by parachuting on the other side of the Rhine, never did so; its jump was cancelled, resulting in the unique distinction of its being the only US Army division of the war to never see battle). There has been no full-scale Airborne Division combat jump since 1945.

The Air Assault/Airmobile Divisions have had more mixed success. The first full-scale Airmobile Division to see combat was the 1st Cavalry Division in the Vietnam War. Helicopters gave the division great operational mobility, though once the infantry had disembarked from its helicopters, it reverted to regular Foot Infantry. Regular Foot Infantry Divisions also enjoyed, at times, some scale of helicopter support in the Airmobile role, though the cost and expense of the helicopters limited even the US Army to just two Airmobile Divisions (the 101st Airborne Division converting from the Airborne to the Airmobile/Air Assault role during the Vietnam War), and even then reducing to just one when the war wound down.

When applied to regions in which Heavy ground units, such as Armoured and Armoured Infantry forces typically operated, the Air Assault Division proved to be a poor performer. Exercises in southern Germany several years after the end of the Vietnam War demonstrated the unsuitability and vulnerability of Air Assault forces (specifically the 101st Airborne Division [Air Assault])to Heavy formations, particularly when one of its Air Assault Brigades was caught not once, not twice, but three times in the midst of landing its battalions by the same mechanized infantry brigade posing as a break-through enemy force that the 101st Airborne Division had to block and contain using its attack helicopters and helicopter-borne infantry. Although the attack helicopters ultimately halted the mechanized brigade (which lacked organic air-defenses at the time), the Air Assault infantry battalions were mowed down by the mechanized troops before they had a chance to react. Air Assault Divisions were thereupon excluded from use by the US Army in areas in which they would face Heavy ground units.

Similarly, the 101st Airborne Division was not committed to directly facing the Heavy ground units of the Iraqi Army during the first Gulf War, being used instead to establish forward operating bases and resupply points for the Heavy ground units of the US and British Armies which were used to deal with their Iraqi counterparts. Meanwhile, the 82nd Airborne Division was carried in trucks behind a French light armoured division to occupy an airbase in the deep desert and to take up a screening role on Third US Army's left flank. In the second Gulf War, the Iraq War, the US 3rd Mechanized Infantry Divisions and the reinforced US 1st Marine Division advanced on and took Baghdad, destroying the Heavy ground units of the Iraqi Army (those that showed up for the war, that is), while the UK 1st Armoured Division invested Basra. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions engaged in mopping-up and occupation operations.

Airborne and Air Assault/Airmobile Divisions have seen only modest use since the Second World War, and indeed, in many armies regular infantry typically perform the Air Assault/Airmobile role (where and when suffcient helicopters are available), and Commando Forces have performed much of the Airborne role since late in the Second World War. The US Army Rangers, Belgian ParaCommando Regiment, 4th Battalion (Commando), Royal Australian Regiment (even though a paratroop battalion already exists in 3 RAR), and the German Army Special Operations Division (the regular paratroopers of 1st Airborne Division having given way to commando forces) are not only all parachute-trained, but are all Commando Forces, with training that goes well beyong that of regular Airborne troops. The Ranger Battalions, for one, have conducted as many combat airborne jumps since their creation in 1974 as have the rest of the regular US Army Airborne since the end of WWII. And as for The Parachute Regiment, their standards of training approach those of (and in a few areas, though not most, even exceed) those of the Royal Marine Commandos. If the roles of Airborne and Air Assault Divisions can be performed by Commando Forces even better (and in the case of Air Assault divisions even by regular infantry), it makes little sense to maintain them.

4. Motorized Divisions -

Motorized Divisions were designed for offensive purposes, specifically, to secure and hold ground that had been taken by Armoured Divisions. The Germans used Motorized/Panzergrenadier Divisions with great success for much of WWII. Once dug in, they had a fighting chance against enemy Heavy ground units; however, in the conduct of the mobile defence that the Germany Army was compelled to resort to later in the war, Motorized/Panzergrenadier Divisions suffered greatly at the hands of enemy Heavy units. Given both the shortage of, and the depleted condition of, the Armoured/Panzer Divisions that could take on enemy Heavy units, Motorized/Panzergrenadier Divisions were forced to enagage enemy Heavy units in mobile actions in lieu of proper Heavy units. Foot Infantry divisions that provided the base of the German defences were, given their near-total lack of armour or even motorized transport, completely unsuitable for enagaging in mobile operations to try to stop the very mobile enemy Armoured/Tank divisions.

Since the Second World War, the Motorized Division has seen relatively little action, and Motorized units have principally engaged in aid to the civil power type operations and counter-insurgency operations. Despite the conversion from trucks/lorries to armoured cars/wheeled APCs, Motorized Divisions remain vulnerable to even infantry anti-tank weapons, not to mention Heavy units. The utter lack of their use (despite their continued existence) since the Second World War in anything more serious than low-intensity warfare as well as their progressive replacement by tracked armoured vehicles in the guerrilla war in Afghanistan (where both their vulnerability to RPGs hampers their support to infantry and their wheeled suspension cannot bear the difficult terrain for extended periods of time, leading to cracks in the vehicles' hulls) testifies to their very limited utility.

Conclusion:

Of the Light and Medium Ground Units that are presented here, it has been shown that only the Mountain Division, given its consistently satisfactory historical performance coupled with the unique and very specialized conditions of its mission, should probably be retained, although Commando Forces with proper training and equipment should also be capable of such a mission as well.

The roles of Marine/Amphibious Division, while quite historically have been quite satisfactorily performed by Marines, have also been so with regular Army Divisions, who moreover (in the case of British and Canadian Infantry Divisions that were each reinforced with a Tank Brigade for the amphibious assaults in Normandy, and again conducted amphibious assaults in the Netherlands) were throughout the following campaign. Marine Divisions, by contrast, when their operations are over, may or may not be withdrawn. As such, separate Marine Divisions are not necessary as regular infantry can do the same things with the proper training and equipment, and much of the more specialized amphibious missions are performed by Commando Forces such as the US Army Ranger and the Royal Marines anyway.

Airborne and Air Assault Divisions are similarly superfluous, as not only have Airborne Divisions not performed divisonal level combat drops since WWII, but the number of Airborne Divisions that existed in the US Army in WWII (5, of which 1 never saw combat) out of a total of 89 - a ratio of 1 AbnDiv to 18 other divs, as opposed to the 1 out of 10 now, demonstrates just how excessive even 1 parachute division is for the size of Army that even the US has. The PLA, with 3 Airborne Divisions and 3 more on the way, has never used even one in a combat parachute drop. Surely the US Army Rangers, suitably heavied-up a little (like the Royal Marines) could perform the US Army Airborne role even better. In Britain, the Paras are so close to the Royal Marines in many areas in terms of quality that it would be comparatively easy (strictly hypothetically speaking, setting aside all considerations of training staff availability and logistics, unit readiness, etc.) to fully convert them to Commando forces, with the substantial added edge that gives to infantry. This applies even more so to Air Assault/Airmobile Divisions, since their mission can be performed well enough by regular infantry provided they have the requisite helicopter support, given the sheer expense of such machines, and their limited quantity, it would make sense for the Air Assault mission to be performed by Commando forces. Again, it the US Army Rangers and commando-trained Paras would be much superior in this role to the 101st Airborne and their foreign counterparts.

Motorized Divisions are, in some ways, the most superfuous of all the Light and Medium groung units. Originally designed to follow-up behind Armoured Divisions, not only did they suffer badly at the hands of enemy Armoured Divisions, but as Armoured Divisions have acquired more Armoured Infantry themselves (late WWII German Panzer Divisions typically featured 2 infantry companies for every 1 tank company, as both offensive and defensive operations proved the utter necessity for Armoured Divisions to have much more Armoured Infantry than Armour itself), the Motorized Divisions have been relegated in the main to internal security operations. And even in those situations, when internal security operations give way to guerrilla war, Motorized Infantry may well find themselves replaced by Armoured Infantry, due to the latter's greater ability to cross difficult terrain and resist infantry anti-tank weapons.

Light Infantry Divisions have been left for last, and the verdict regarding them is split. Indeed, they have not even been treated with in the main body of this post, as this seems unnecessary given what shall follow here. As originally envisaged, Light Infantry Divisions, like mountain divisions, were designed for territorial defence in specific conditions of extreme climate or terrain which effectively restricted or even prohibited the use of Heavy ground units. They have traditionally (in competent hands) performed well in that role, even when heavily outnumbered and outgunned. The performance of the Finnish Army against the Soviet Army in 1940, which stunned the world, is the classic example of this. The subsequent performance of the Finnish Army during the Second World War, its ultimate outcome notwithstanding, proved that the performance of 1940 was not an anomaly, even if WWII provided much less opportunity for world admiration.

The other side of Light Infantry Division use is in the power-projection role. In this role, they have been largely unproven, except in "colonial" type small wars. The US Army's Light Infantry Divisions were intended to face enemy Heavy ground units, including Armoured divisions, in places such as the Middle East while buying time for US Heavy ground units to arrive. That they were never used in that role (even in the lead-up to the First Gulf War, for which they had in fact been intended), seems to indicate that even the US Army entertained real doubts as to their supposed capabilities. Critics who considered them to be "too light to fight" and much more difficult to supply entirely by airlift than their supporters maintained, seem vindicated. Only one Light Infantry Division remains in the active US Army (where there had been 4), the 10th Mountain Division, while the 25th Infantry Division is now half-Motorized. Given this, Light Infantry Divisions should only be used in the territorial defence role, in conditions of extreme climate or terrain, as they were intended to, and have been proven able to do.

In sum, except in conditions of extreme climate or terrain, most roles can be assumed by Heavy Ground Units (Armour/Armoured Infantry) or by Commando Forces. Only under the aforementioned conditions, should specialized Mountain, Light Infantry, Jungle Divisions be formed. Marine, Airborne/Air Assault, and Motorized Divisions are superfluous, and their roles can be performed just as well by a combination of Heavy Ground Units and Commando Forces.

zraver

Airmobile-

Iraqi resistance or lack there of aside, the coalition's rapid drives into Iraqi in 91 and 2003 owe much of their success to fuel bladders ferried in and guarded by the 101st. This strategic use of assets most definitely achieved its goal. Light infantry even airborne or air mobile is after all a supporting tool to the main attack. These fuel bladders and forward screening helped the US Army reach the Karbala gap faster than anyone though possible in what has turned out to be the fastest military advance since the Mongols, and totally unhinged any chance of an Iraqi last stand outside of Baghdad itself.

These forces also would have forced Iraq into into a tactically deadly situation via their screening if their C4SRI had not already been shattered. If they moved to attack the light units they would have telegraphed their intentions and committed their reserves. often knowing where an enemy isn't (because he is telling you where he is) is as important as knowing where he is.

Airmobile forces also have a great deal of mobility in low intensity conflicts where vertical envelope takes on another aspect. In Indo-China France had to use paratroops and once the airfield was over run those troops were doomed. Heliborne troops are much harder to pin down in a siege situation and can thus deny defeat, and also give the higher level command an asset for raids and demonstrations that other units lack.

During the Cold War Soviet airmobile and airborne units were almost of a separate type- a true air assault capability. Designed to support the deep battle theory by instilling friction via cut transportation links, shock, and at least for a short time real firepower. their employment behind NATO's lines on the North German plain was a serious enough threat that I believe that if we ever see detailed war plans emerge we will see certain front line combat units units tasked with rear area security effectively lessening the weight available to oppose the feared Soviet tank thrust.

The Airmobile and also airborne as well as marine units also have one other task, intervention.

Marine/naval infantry, Norfolk I agree that in a full scale war Army troops can conduct amphib assaults. However marines along with paratroopers and to a lesser extent heliborne can conduct interventionist missions heavier units cannot. When the brown stuff hits the whirling blades on the far side of the globe you only have a limited amount of time to get on scene and clamp down. As visible and breathing reminders of the national might behind them these troops can often restore a situation to normalcy. One can only wonder about Rawanda if the Us and French had gone and put boots on the ground and bullets in the air to stop the genocide. On a more common level, these troops are ideal peace keepers being low cost and easy to transport making them suited to UN missions in remote locations. Non of this is classic war fighting and might not be power projection per se, but it is a part of the world we live in and is definitely not a role for a heavy division although heavy units should be sent along quickly to support as shown by Mogadishu.

I have very little use for medium or motorized infantry. If you really have to fight go heavy or go home. If it carries infantry and it doesn't go whop whop whop through the air it should also carry cannons, machine guns, and ATGM's.

An old BMP-1 with a low velocity 73mm gun, AT-2, and 7.62mm MMG is of more immediate use to a pinned down rifle team facing an entrenched enemy than a high tech Stryker armed with only a 50 cal. The stryker's utility lies in its comm gear which can be put in any platform. However in a Tet style situation where the arty and air is being over worked radios are not nearly as valuable as more direct fire capability.

Norfolk

zraver:

I do agree that the 101st Airborne Division's in operational support of Third Army's offensive was not only necessary, but indeed sustained VII Corps' (once its Armoured Divisions had formed up after passing through 1st Infantry Division's breech) and 24th Infantry Division's rapid advance-to-contact with the Republican Guard and other Iraqi Armour held in operational reserve.

But with this and the other points I tried to make, I attempted to demonstrate that almost anything a Light ground unit can do, Commando Forces (a la Royal Marines, 75th Ranger Regiment, Belgian Para-Commando Regiment, Russian Naval Infantry Brigades, Army Commando Brigades of WWII, etc.) can do better, especially when very costly equipment (necessarily in limited supply) such as helicopters (or for that matter hovercraft) are involved. Commando training gives Light units a significant edge over their conventional Light unit counterparts (I don't think a US Airborne battalion or British Army infantry battalion would enjoy the prospect of facing an opponent the calibre of a US Ranger Battalion or a British Commando (granted, Ranger battalions are not organized, equipped or even intended for sustained operations, but their British Commando counterparts certainly are).

I was also struck that when the opportunity for the 101st to at least occupy blocking positions on one or both sides of the al-Hammar Causeway west of Basra over the Euphrates presented itself, it was not so used. As the al-Hammar causeway was the chief route by which the Republican Guard and the bulk of the surviving Iraqi Army made their escape, I have taken this to at least indicate, and perhaps even confirm, doubts in the minds of US commanders as to the ability of the 101st to deal with Heavy ground units. As I stated in my last post, when the 101st was introduced to conditions in Germany, it fared badly during exercises with Heavy ground units, even when used in a blocking role. I strongly believe that when Light (Airborne, Air Assault, etc.) units are to be used in operational support of Heavy units, they must have Commando training to give them the best possible chance of success in an otherwise very hostile environment. Conventional Light (or Medium) Infantry have little or no place on the Mechanized battlefield.

I agree with you that Medium (especially Motorized) ground units are of no practical use on the battlefield. I do believe however, as I held in the case of Airborne and Air Assault operations, that short of a general war situation in which Heavy ground units (with Commando Forces in operational support) are required for major Amphibious Assaults that open large-scale campaigns, Commando Forces (such as the Royal Marines, Russian Navy Infantry, PLAN Marine Corps, etc.) are the way to go, not conventional Marines.

I think that where Airborne/Air Assault and Marine/Amphibious operations are concerned, conventional Airborne, Air Assault, and Marine infantry are either unnecessary (Heavy units can peform just as well as Marines in major Amphibious Landings), Commando Forces bring a level of skill, fitness, and discipline that their conventional Light Infantry counterparts cannot match. Where extra money needs to be spent on specialized equipment and troops for such operations, those troops should be Commandos, not regular infantry.