China simply does not have significant experience in mechanized warfare, and I think that this is key to to its lagging behing, so far, in combined arms operations, never mind modern battlefield communications. The Germans demonstrated in the first year of the Second World War the both the potential and the realities of combined arms operations, and mechanization and radio communications were critical to this.
But it is most important to point out that the Germans already possessed a long standing and thoroughly thought-out and tested body of doctrine that was based upon real past war experience - especially the First World War and rigorous analysis of the lessons of that and other wars - combined with a professional military system that produced officers and soldiers of superb professional quality who also were very much inclined and trained to think about things, making them open to seeking both better ways of doing things and to innovation.
When mechanization and radio communications had sufficiently matured, the Germans were ready, willing, and able to exploit their potential to the full (though not without some internal resistance), whilst other countries were caught out in a state of flux. The early part of the Second World War is in many ways a story of how a professionally gifted German military was able to identify and formulate using technology and concepts already widely available a military machine that, until her enemies learned (partially at least) their lessons the hard way, was able to prevail with more or less ease over all other who were stilled bogged down in the problems of modern combined arms warfare.
The Chinese are open to such concepts and technology, but not only do they lack experience in them, particularly as they have had little history of mechanized warfare, but they also seem to lack both the level of professional military acumen and genius of the Wehrmacht (but so does almost everyone else, including those who learned hard lessons 60 years ago - and still haven't completely learned all those lessons - at the hands of the Germans, so that's hardly a slight to China) as well as the same culture of bold curiousity and the conditions that foster such a culture. There are built-in inhibitions and hindrances to the Chinese perfecting the art of combined arms warfare and these are at least as important as the possession of the requisite technologies for doing so. China, both for reasons of her own history and because of the type of regime that it is governed by, lack in somes way the sort of individual initiative that is found in the West and conditions of freedom of thought and information, amongst others, that can be exploited to the full by individual initiative (the German practice of mechanized warfare was also inherently decentralized, and required both great individual initiative from top to bottom, and great responsibility - little or no passing of the buck - which is one of the reasons German military leaders were almost universally respected, even admired, by their subordinates - unlike many of their Allied counterparts). Consequently, access to the same technology and even sources of doctrine does not necessarily yield the same results in different hands. After all, the Allies had the same (and in some cases, superior) technology as the Germans had in the early years of WWII (and the Germans had relied heavily upon foreign and especially British military thinkers in their own formulation of operational concepts and doctrine), but the Germans were able see how to put it all together and how to make it all work to advantage. It is one thing to develop and possess state-of-the art technology, is quite another to know how best to use it, and where.
The Chinese army has certainly made great strides in recent years, and it has come along way from the day when "fire and movement" in the Chinese Army meant that heavy weapons and/or artillery fired (that is, if they had any available), then human waves of infantry swarmed the enemy positions. But I do not think that more or less imitating English-speaking or European trends in equipment and especially communications is necessarily the way to go, especially if the Chinese lack a solid grasp of German-style combined arms doctrine and operations and the thinking professionals to make it all happen.
Giving every infantryman a portable radio set is not necessarily the best way (it could in fact simply overload the whole net with too much information and cause disruption and confusion without very well thought out priorities and executed procedures) to promote seamless command, control, and communications. This would almost certainly be these case if a solid grounding in the basics of mechanized warfare (whether or not the units in question are in fact mechanized or not) and subsequently combined arms operations is lacking, and given the seeming Chinese hesitance to routinely mix units of the different combat arms in operations at least with the same frequency of Western armies, this would appear at least, to be the case.