PLAN submarines Thread II

[Hendrik_2000]

the 094 has never made a deterrent patrol.

Sorry, but china can only hope for a 2nd-strike nuclear deterrent. For that it needs ICBM, at least a 200 of them. China really should look more into its nuclear forces

I don't know where you got the idea that China only have 40 ICBM. She never divulge her ICBM inventories . Maybe from reading toomuch Strategy page forum or what Here is a more professional assesment of China SLBM
China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation - The Jamestown Foundation

China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 12June 12, 2009 10:40 AM Age: 8 hrsCategory: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page By: Andrew S. Erickson, Michael S. Chase
Two Type-094 SSBNs docked at Huludao
China’s undersea deterrent is undergoing a generational change with the emergence of the Type-094, or Jin-class, which represents a substantial improvement over China’s first-generation Type-092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Launched in the early 1980s, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) single Xia-class SSBN (hereafter Xia) has never conducted a deterrent patrol and is equipped with relatively short-range (1,770 km) JL-1 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). In contrast, China may build five Type-094 SSBNs, which will enable the PLAN to conduct near-continuous deterrent patrols, and each of these second-generation SSBNs will be outfitted with 12 developmental JL-2 SLBMs that have an estimated range of at least 7,200 km and are equipped with penetration aids. Although the transition to the new SSBN is ongoing, recent Internet photos depicting at least two Jin-class SSBNs (hereafter Jin) suggest that the PLAN has reached an unprecedented level of confidence in the sea-based leg of its strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, China’s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is enhancing its “nuclear counterattack” capability [1]. With the anticipated introduction of the JL-2 missiles on the Jin and the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), China is on the verge of attaining a credible nuclear deterrent based on a 'survivable' second-strike capability.
Recent Developments

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assesses that China will build a “fleet of probably five Type-094 SSBNs . . . to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea presence” [2]. A variety of Chinese publications suggest that the SSBN forces of France and Britain—which have four vessels each, with one at sea at all times, two in refit, and one under maintenance—may serve as models for China and hence reinforce the aforementioned indications of its plans. One Chinese source, however, suggests that China will field six Type-094 SSBNs, divided into patrolling, deploying and refitting groups [3], with another assessment suggesting that these groups will comprise two SSBNs each [4].

It is clear that at least two different hulls have already been launched, based on unusually high-resolution internet and commercial satellite images that have emerged of one Jin in port at Xiaopingdao base, south of Dalian, two Jins in the water and perhaps one emerging from production at Huludao base east of Beijing, and one at a newly-constructed submarine facility at Yalong Bay near Sanya on Hainan Island. The images of the facility on Hainan Island provided some hints as to the PLAN’s SSBN basing plans. Indeed, the photo of the Jin at Yalong Bay suggests that the facility may be the base for China’s future SSBN forces.

Development Motives

Many Western analysts have focused on the 'survivability' issue to explain China’s decision to proceed with the development of the Jin and the JL-2. Given the potential vulnerability of Chinese SSBNs to detection by adversary attack submarines and the challenges of locating dispersed road-mobile missiles, however, it would certainly seem that Chinese decision-makers must also have been considering other factors, including missile defense, international prestige and inter-service politics.

Chinese strategists appear to calculate that a nuclear dyad, composed of land-based strategic missiles and SLBMs, or possibly a triad incorporating nuclear-armed PLAAF bombers as well, is required to enhance the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent in line with the requirements of the “effective counter-nuclear deterrence” posture discussed in recent Chinese publications. Chinese analysts assert that an SSBN is “the most survivable type of (nuclear) weapon” [5], and hint that it may allow China to deter third party intervention in a regional conflict. Citing the development of the Jin, one Chinese source states, “If a war erupts across the Taiwan Strait one day, facing the danger of China waging nuclear war, it will be very difficult for America to intervene in the cross-strait military crisis” [6]. The authors interpret the Chinese comments here to mean not that China would be likely to launch nuclear weapons first in response to U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict, but rather that Chinese analysts believe strong SSBN capabilities would enhance its deterrence posture by causing Washington to think twice about intervening in a conflict in which escalation control might be difficult.

Another potential explanation for the investment in the development of the Jin is that Chinese planners believe SLBMs launched from certain patrol areas might complicate U.S. missile-defense interception efforts. A Chinese analysis states that SSBNs “are more capable of penetrating [missile] defenses” [7].

Yet another plausible explanation for the decision to deploy the Jin is that Chinese leaders may view the ships as symbols of China's emerging great-power status. The other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—France, Britain, Russia, and the United States—all have modern SSBNs in their fleets, and Beijing may see the deployment of its own as a way to enhance its international prestige. This certainly appears to be true of nuclear-powered submarines in general. Indeed, former PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing and others have stated that nuclear submarines represent one of China’s clearest claims to great power status [8].

Still another possible explanation is inter-service politics. Although the politics of China’s defense budget process are opaque to outsiders, it seems reasonable to speculate that the PLAN leadership may have pushed for the development of the Jin to ensure that the navy would have a role to play in the strategic nuclear-deterrence mission.

Operational Challenges

Notwithstanding the considerable progress reflected by the launching of at least two Jin SSBNs, the PLAN still faces at least three key challenges before it realizes a secure seaborne second-strike capability: reducing the probability of detection; at-sea training of commanders and crew members; and coping with the nuclear command-and-control issues associated with the operation of SSBNs.

Chinese observers are well aware of the challenges of avoiding detection, as reflected by their analysis of capabilities allegedly demonstrated during the Cold War vis-à-vis Soviet submarines. Subsequent-generation submarines are generally significantly quieter than those of earlier generations, so it may be expected that China has made progress in quieting its submarines as well. Nevertheless, the Jin is still a second generation SSBN, and those of other nations have faced significant acoustic difficulties.

Training is another potential challenge for China’s emerging SSBN force. Although digital training and simulations can be useful, the only way other nations have become proficient at submarine operations is by taking their boats to sea. Chinese naval exercises have increased in sophistication in recent years and currently encompass such categories as command and control, navigation, electronic countermeasures, and weapon testing. Moreover, Chinese submarine patrols have increased in recent years—the PLAN conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice as many as in 2007 [9]. This increase in patrols and the overall priority accorded to China’s submarine force development suggest that the PLAN’s submarines are now able to range farther afield on a more frequent basis. Indeed, the evolving missions and growing capabilities of the Chinese submarine force “create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence in the Western Pacific east of the Ryukyu Island chain” [10].

While the trajectory of training specifically relevant to deterrent patrols remains opaque, the PLAN is striving to improve the rigor and realism of education and training across the board. Within this context, submarines have clearly been an area of emphasis and the PLAN is using a variety of methods to prepare its sailors for future wars. Official Chinese publications note, for example, that various types of simulators have been used to improve submarine training.

Establishing and maintaining secure and reliable communications with SSBNs constitutes another major challenge for any country that desires a sea-based deterrent. Chinese military publications emphasize that the central leadership must maintain strict, highly-centralized command and control of nuclear forces. China’s submarine force has reportedly employed high-frequency (HF), low-frequency (LF), and very-low-frequency (VLF) communications, and researchers are working on a number of technologies that could be useful for secure communications with submarines, as reflected by recent publications discussing the prevention of enemy detection of transmissions between submarines and shore-based headquarters units. Ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an environment in which an adversary may attempt to disrupt its command and control system could be a critical challenge for the PLAN. It remains unclear, however, to what extent centralized SSBN command, control, and communication is possible for China across the range of conflict scenarios.

Beyond the problem of ensuring secure and reliable communications, the deployment of SSBNs also entails use-control challenges. Given the strong emphasis on centralized control of nuclear forces that is evident in official Chinese military and defense policy publications, it seems highly unlikely that the PLAN would conduct deterrent patrols without effective use controls. Presumably, China will strive not only to develop a communications capability that is robust enough to ensure at least one-way wartime connectivity between Beijing and the Jin-class SSBNs, but also to minimize the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch by implementing some combination of technical and procedural controls.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the recent series of revelations about China’s emerging SSBN force, at least four questions that have major implications for the future of China’s sea-based deterrent remain unanswered. First, there is the issue of how many SSBNs China will ultimately build, which will influence China’s ability to conduct continuous or near-continuous deterrent patrols. Second, it remains unclear whether China will attempt to create bastions for its SSBNs in areas close to the mainland or deploy them to more distant patrol areas—a decision which will no doubt be informed in part by the capabilities of the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development. Third, little is known about China’s plans for coping with the command and control challenges associated with the deployment of a sea-based deterrent force, which could influence crisis stability. Fourth, authoritative Chinese sources refer to “joint nuclear counter-attack campaigns” in which the Second Artillery’s nuclear missile force, PLAN SSBNs, and nuclear-capable Chinese air force bomber units would all participate, but it remains unclear to what extent China will actually integrate its emerging SSBN force into a joint strategic nuclear deterrence capability [11]. While these uncertainties remain, the investment already made in SSBN hulls and shore facilities indicates that the program represents a major effort to move beyond the ill-fated Xia and take China’s nuclear deterrent to sea. In addition, the emergence of photos showcasing at least two Type-094 submarines—which reflects Beijing's apparent willingness to allow Western analysts to see them—may signal a new level of confidence on Beijing’s part, and perhaps even a nascent recognition that modest increases in transparency could actually support rather than undermine China’s strategic interests.

Notes

1. “China’s National Defense in 2008” (Beijing: State Council Information Office, January 2009), merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/China_English2008.pdf.
2. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), “Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force,” 20 December 2006, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ONI2006.pdf.
3. Jian Jie, “The Legend of the Virtuous Twins,” World Outlook, no. 448 (August 2002), p. 23.
4. Lin Changsheng, “The Combat Power of China’s Nuclear Submarines,” World Aerospace Digest, no. 103 (September 2004), p. 33.
5. Zhang Feng, “Nuclear Submarines and China’s Navy,” Naval & Merchant Ships (March 2005), p. 12.
6. “China’s at Sea Deterrent,” Military Overview, no. 101, p. 53.
7. Wang Yifeng and Ye Jing, “What the Nuclear Submarine Incident Between China and Japan Tells Us About the Ability of China’s Nuclear Submarines to Penetrate Defenses, Part 1,” Shipborne Weapons (January 2005), pp. 27–31.
8. Liu Huaqing, The Memoirs of Liu Huaqing (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2004), p. 476.
9. Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008,” Strategic Security Blog, February 3, 2009, Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008 FAS Strategic Security Blog.
10. Office of Naval Intelligence, “Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force.”
11. Yu Jixun, chief ed. et al., People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 297-298.

[AssassinsMace]

Short of starting a war, what can an American carrier do when a Chinese sub shows up? Not a darn thing. You can track it and harass it with sonar, both of which were done often enough to Soviet subs, back in the day. For all we know it came up after a prolonged game under water. There were certainly enough occasions where Soviet subs showed up inside US carrier strike groups. One even struck the underside of the Kitty Hawk as it surfaced. None of that was ever taken to imply that in a hot war Soviet subs were going to have a free run at the carrier. No one aside from a limited number of people who were there knows the true story of the Chinese sub, and they aren't talking.

You just dug a deeper hole. Now it was wargames and by chance the sub surfaced in the middle of a carrier fleet? The US Navy couldn't now detect not just one sub but who knows how many other "noisy" Chinese subs that were there? I'm sure it was a coordinated effort among the PLAN but still no one detected anything with all those subs out there?

And at the time it was reported that China hardly sent out their submarines. Another one of those backwardness aspects of the Chinese navy. Wouldn't there be surface ships involved in this wargame? Did the Kitty Hawk detect these surface ships at least? And if it did wouldn't that alone at least have one person turn on and monitor their sensors?

So there's now a conspiracy to hide the truth... in coordination with the PLAN because how would the US Navy know that sub would surface unless there was collusion from both sides. And how would the PLAN benefit from this collusion? If the US Navy had a goal, that certainly wouldn't have benefitted China. So why would they trust and help the US Navy?

[Mashan]

This is from CNN news "a Chinese submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by ... The incident occurred near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines". Guess PLAN subs are venturing further and further out of the coastal water.

Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. Navy ship - CNN.com

[Finn McCool]

You just dug a deeper hole. Now it was wargames and by chance the sub surfaced in the middle of a carrier fleet? The US Navy couldn't now detect not just one sub but who knows how many other "noisy" Chinese subs that were there? I'm sure it was a coordinated effort among the PLAN but still no one detected anything with all those subs out there?

I think you're misunderstanding what Ambivalent was saying. He was trying to say that just because the Song surfaced inside the CBG doesn't mean its not detected because there isn't anything the USN could have done to prevent it from entering the area. If they detected it, what were they going to do? Sink it? They couldn't even communicate with it directly to send the usual "Change your course" messages. According to Ambivalent, the same thing happened several times in the Cold War (I haven't heard of the specific incident he mentioned where one surfaced and and hit the Kitty Hawk but the fact remains that these sort of cat and mouse games have been played for years and its obviously very believable that this sort of thing happened many times). So just because the sub got there doesn't mean it was undetected, we simply don't know the truth about the incident, like so much that happens on the high seas.

I have no idea what that bit about a conspiracy between the PLAN and the USN was about.

[Finn McCool]

the 094 has never made a deterrent patrol.
the recent incidents near china coast really implies that the USN are mapping the seabed so that their subs may operate and watch continously PLAN sub bases. What makes you believe that even one (one generation-tech behind) 094 can escape modern USN submarines ??
leaving port is already hard, imagine passing the USN ASW pacific network to get close to the US coast...

The 094 is new, the PLAN does not publicize their deployments, we don't know for sure that they haven't made a deterrant patrol and if they haven't then they certainly will soon. The USN mapped the seabed in the Barents Sea, the GIUK gap and other areas where they Soviets deployed their submarines, did that eliminate the threat from Soviet SSBNs? Heck the USN was even able the penetrate the White Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, the areas from which the VMF's SSBNs would most likely have fired their missiles. The US STILL considered the Soviet Navy's SSBNs to be a huge threat and an effective deterrent.

Furthermore do you realize how large the Pacific Ocean is? If an 094 can make it beyond the Taiwan-Ryukyu-Phillipines Island Chain it is effectively gone, dissappeared into the vastness and depth. China is strategically better situatated than Russia for sub ops as well (less chokepoints).

I have to go now, there's more, but suffice to say you are overconfident in the USNs ability to sink all 094s in the event of a conflict.

[Mashan]

This is reported by CNN

"WASHINGTON (CNN) -- In what a U.S. military official calls an "inadvertent encounter," a Chinese submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by the destroyer USS John McCain on Thursday.

The array was damaged, but the sub and the ship did not collide, the official said. A sonar array is a radar towed behind a ship that listens and locates underwater sounds.

The incident occurred near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines.

The official, who declined to be named because the incident had not been made public, would not say whether the U.S. ship knew the submarine was that close to it.

However, the Navy does not believe this was a deliberate incident of Chinese harassment, as it would have been extremely dangerous had the array gotten caught in the submarine's propellers."

The part that said "would not say whether the U.S. ship knew the submarine was that close to it" was interesting.

[kroko]

The 094 is new, the PLAN does not publicize their deployments, we don't know for sure that they haven't made a deterrant patrol and if they haven't then they certainly will soon. The USN mapped the seabed in the Barents Sea, the GIUK gap and other areas where they Soviets deployed their submarines, did that eliminate the threat from Soviet SSBNs? Heck the USN was even able the penetrate the White Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, the areas from which the VMF's SSBNs would most likely have fired their missiles. The US STILL considered the Soviet Navy's SSBNs to be a huge threat and an effective deterrent.

Furthermore do you realize how large the Pacific Ocean is? If an 094 can make it beyond the Taiwan-Ryukyu-Phillipines Island Chain it is effectively gone, dissappeared into the vastness and depth. China is strategically better situatated than Russia for sub ops as well (less chokepoints).

I have to go now, there's more, but suffice to say you are overconfident in the USNs ability to sink all 094s in the event of a conflict.

You cant compare china to USSR. USSR was superior to china both qualitivity and most of all quantitivity. USSR had many dozens of SSBN, a very big air-naval arsenal to protect them. Oh and the USSR was strategically better situated then china (much larger coast the china, and much of that coast was ice covered, making it much more dificult to conduct ASW operations. How much ice-covered waters does PLAN have acess to?....


besides, PLAN´s acess to ocean pacific is entirely bottlenecked by japan, ryuku islands, taiwan and philipines, all allies of the USA, and you can believe that there are long range underwater sonars thoughout all over these island chain. And beyond that chain, the USA have more of it...

[Schumacher]

This is from CNN news "a Chinese submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by ... The incident occurred near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines". Guess PLAN subs are venturing further and further out of the coastal water.

Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. Navy ship - CNN.com

Would have been quite a feat for the PLAN sub if it's true that it got so close undetected to a destroyer towing a sonar.

[AssassinsMace]

I think you're misunderstanding what Ambivalent was saying. He was trying to say that just because the Song surfaced inside the CBG doesn't mean its not detected because there isn't anything the USN could have done to prevent it from entering the area. If they detected it, what were they going to do? Sink it? They couldn't even communicate with it directly to send the usual "Change your course" messages. According to Ambivalent, the same thing happened several times in the Cold War (I haven't heard of the specific incident he mentioned where one surfaced and and hit the Kitty Hawk but the fact remains that these sort of cat and mouse games have been played for years and its obviously very believable that this sort of thing happened many times). So just because the sub got there doesn't mean it was undetected, we simply don't know the truth about the incident, like so much that happens on the high seas.

I have no idea what that bit about a conspiracy between the PLAN and the USN was about.

That wasn't the story released to the press. It was reported that the Song surfaced and was only detected when a Kitty Hawk helicopter spotted it within torpedo range.

If it wasn't a big deal, then why was this released to the public? Since the PLAN has been pretty muted on the incident, it means they don't see anything to contest with the info that was released. Was this a stunt by the Pentagon to get Congress scared into budgeting more money into the military? That would mean the PLAN was a willing participant in this fiction since how would the US navy get that sub to surface. Which also begs the question why would the Chinese help the Pentagon scare Congress into more money for the military against them? What do they get out of it? The whole point of the story was that it wasn't detected. If it was so easily detectable, you really can't alarm Congress.

Reading forums likes these... I thought the rules say if an unknown sub is detected, especially around military vessels, and it does not surface to identify itself, that navy has the right to take action against it. Couldn't communicate with the sub? Wouldn't aquiring it with active sonar send that message? But then the excuse goes that the Kitty hawk didn't have her sensors on to which why it wasn't detected. The Song surfaced. If the US Navy forced it to surface because it was detected, why peddle a lie? The Chinese would've contested such a fabrication especially if it were being used to scare Congress into an action that wasn't in their interests.

[Pointblank]

Would have been quite a feat for the PLAN sub if it's true that it got so close undetected to a destroyer towing a sonar.

The Americans probably knew that it was a Chinese submarine beforehand, but it appears that the Chinese skipper was just a little too close to be safe.

Mind you, the end for a towed sonar array can be hundreds of metres away from the ship... pretty easy for a ship not being careful following behind or crossing to become ensnared.

[crobato]

You cant compare china to USSR. USSR was superior to china both qualitivity and most of all quantitivity. USSR had many dozens of SSBN, a very big air-naval arsenal to protect them. Oh and the USSR was strategically better situated then china (much larger coast the china, and much of that coast was ice covered, making it much more dificult to conduct ASW operations. How much ice-covered waters does PLAN have acess to?....


besides, PLAN´s acess to ocean pacific is entirely bottlenecked by japan, ryuku islands, taiwan and philipines, all allies of the USA, and you can believe that there are long range underwater sonars thoughout all over these island chain. And beyond that chain, the USA have more of it...

Having said that, the PLAN is literally surrounded by littoral waters, and littoral waters favor subs a lot more, because its far easier to hide your noise signature within the background. These littoral waters are made worst by heavy merchant traffic conditions that add to the ambient noise, drastic changes in temperature, acidity and salinity, all sorts of water currents that distort sound. Add to that are the unique ecosystems of biologics and so on. Just because you can hear a sound it doesn't end there, you need to differentiate the sound from thousands of other sounds in the environment.

The best analogy to this is listening to the sound of a Toyota Prius and identifying its location in the middle of a busy New York intersection.

Please note that ASW is very environmentally oriented. Like a jungle, the only way to master it is sheer experience. You cannot take the experience of ASW in the cold North Atlantic and suddenly apply it in the tropical South China seas overnight and expect to be good at it without a serious time investment.

[Geographer]

I'm not sure littoral waters favor submarines in a head-to-head match against surface warships as much as you say. As hard as it is for surface ships to detect subs against the large and diverse noise background, it's doubly hard for subs to identify military surface ships which are quieter than merchant marine. Sure they have periscopes but they have are very limited in range. To be effective they would receive regular updates on the position of an enemy warship, or be following it after it leaves port or passes through a chokepoint like the Straits of Malacca. As slow as subs are, especially SSKs, compared to surface warships, if they're out of position when the shooting starts it may be all over before they get there. Their slowness also makes it hard to track faster ships.

[crobato]

the task at hand is that surface ships, no matter what, are going to be noisier than background ocean noise. Thus the job is concentrated telling military ships from the merchant ones. That kind of burden is less compared to differentiating a sub from background ambient noise. No matter what, there are magnitudes more biologics in the sea than there are merchant ships.

[Hendrik_2000]

besides, PLAN´s acess to ocean pacific is entirely bottlenecked by japan, ryuku islands, taiwan and philipines, all allies of the USA, and you can believe that there are long range underwater sonars thoughout all over these island chain. And beyond that chain, the USA have more of it...

Nothing is so straight forward I recall duing the cold war russian sub regularly avoid detection by tail gating merchant ship and as Crobato said south china sea is busy trade route with thousand of ships come and go. Plus it is relatively shallow and noisy with complicated thermal layer

Given a skill skipper I don't think detection is foregone conclusion!

[Roger604]

The Americans probably knew that it was a Chinese submarine beforehand, but it appears that the Chinese skipper was just a little too close to be safe.

Mind you, the end for a towed sonar array can be hundreds of metres away from the ship... pretty easy for a ship not being careful following behind or crossing to become ensnared.

That's impressive. The sub must have been following the destroyer all the way to subic bay. It would have been a perfect mission had it not gotten caught up in the towed array sonar.