SinoDefence Forum

SampanViking

Working on the basis of the old adage "never build a weapon that you cannot afford to lose" I do wonder if the growing sophistication and accuracy of anti ship missiles and long range targeting is making the larger offensive warships obsolete?

China's PLAN is the new and modern blue water navy of an emerging major economy and world power. The organisation lacks historical baggage is currently in middle of inventing itself, literally creating itself from scratch. When you look at where its energies and investment is being focused, you detect four distinct areas: Submarines, Frigates, FAC's and Landing/Docking Amphibious ships etc. Submarines express their own logic, so I only propose to look at surface combatants. Noticeably lacking are substantial numbers of larger ships, Destroyers, Cruisers even Carriers (although we keep being told at least one is currently being built).

Looking at the mix of ships that are being built, I am tempted to wonder if Chinese strategy is form Blue water Battlegroups of "Mother" Docking Ships which are protected by Frigates and within which the main Offensive Surface power is provided by Type 022 FAC's operating from the Motherships.

The advantages of such a strategy is that these FAC's are fast, quite stealthy, small and harder to target and hit, while getting the maximum number of AShM into the battle zone as possible (you no longer need big ships to carry the big guns). In addition these boats are cheap and quick to build and the loss of one only inflicts light casualties and does little to blunt the overall offensive potential of the attack group as a whole.

I would welcome some informed opinion.

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plawolf

I think the main reason the PLAN does not have a great many large surface combatants yet is more to do with the fact that they only recently developed the technology to make such large ships worthwhile.

We are already seeing what appears to be a large mass production effort being made with the 054As, and I feel the PLAN will do the same thing with its DDG force once they have settled on a final configuration.

The rumored new batch of destroyers ordered may shed some light on this, but ultimately, we are not likely to get anything concrete for some years yet.

As for using the 022s as long range strike assets. Well that is kinda like a more expensive but less effective version of aircraft carriers.

You need a huge mothership to carry even a modest number of these things any distance, yet they are a lot slower, have fewer numbers and are less self-sufficiency then modern naval strike fighters a similar sized carrier could carry.

022s are coastal defense FACs, which a secondary long range assault capability. But they are not suited to blue water operations, and any role you can think for them can be performed better or cheaper by naval aircraft or long range cruise/anti-ship missiles.

Scratch

In that case, the prime target I guess would be the mothership. And once destroyed, I imagine the FACs are pretty helpless on the open ocean.
These smaller ships are also not able to carry big/multiple sensors for area surveillance. There's less room for comms and flag rooms, impeding C3 of the group.

montyp165

Short-ranged armoured gunboats in the 19th century threatened the dominance of the traditional ship-of-the-line, as did later torpedo boats in the 20th century, but improving technology and power-projection requirements eventually led to the development of more powerful surface combatants able to face those challenges. The same thing I think will occur here also, as newer technologies appear.

crobato

Torpedo boats were the threat to the battleships and dreadnaughts at the turn of the 20th century. In the Battle of Tsushima, torpedo boats showed their worth against the Russian battle fleet and took their toll.

It was against the torpedo boat---ironically, a genus of ship the Czarist Russians themselves championed---that a ship called the Torpedo Boat Destroyer was conceived. Later on, the name was simply shorted to Destroyer.

FACs are not cost effective in the open sea. It does not mean they cannot be used in the open sea. They can. But for the trouble invested, the ratio of benefit is not good enough. You would need for example, a disproportionate number of replenishment ships, which themselves are vulnerable.

The 054As are complete blue water systems. Note, for frigates they are typically equipped with cloned radar systems that are associated with large Russian destroyers like the Mineral ME type radar or the larger Fregats. The Mineral ME itself allows for OTH scanning and surveillance.

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Londo Molari

You have to also consider that FAC cannot operate properly in deep ocean and rough sea states.

Also in terms of their offensive surface power, launching FACS from a mothership is much slower and has much more limited range compared to an aircraft carrier.

I think PLAN is just taking its time to build up to larger surface combatants. Given its geographical location, economic size and responsibilities, obviously its priorities will not be identical to USN. But I don't see an overall strategy that's profoundly different.

AssassinsMace

If China does have a working ASBM, why not a naval version? Most AShMs launched from ships and aircraft will be out of range. The only thing left is protecting it from subs. It's probably going to have to be a larger vessel to accomodate a number of these weapons.

Titanium

Well, Gary the "War nerd" certainly seems to agree, that the Big ships are just BIG targets for the Anti-Ship Missile"

I’ve been saying for a long time that aircraft carriers are just history’s most expensive floating targets, and that they were doomed.

The War Nerd: This Is How the Carriers Will Die (Updated Version) - Gary Brecher

yehe

well, aircraft carrier basicly means airdefence radius of the fleet are the airlaunched missle range + aircraft combat radius, short of submarine , there isnt much of any other threat to a aircraft carrier, SSN or navalized ASBM however could possibly end a carrier, but then again, niether SSN nor ASBM could ever have the same kind of striking power as a carrier, so carrier is also a formidable psycological weapon to put pressure on the opponent. Afterall a war is best won when its won without a fight.

King_Comm

The "War nerd" failed to realise that "Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack" is only the first half of a sentence, the second half of that sentence is omitted by the Naval Institute, which is "therefore, congress should give more funding to the development of shipborne missile defence."

Titanium

That is infact, agreeing to the what is been said, "Ships as of now are vulnerable to ASM."


Chinese Navy rightly or just by pure coincidence, does not have big ships compared to US.

*

Nuclear aircraft carriers (CVN)
U.S. = 11 China = 0
*

VSTOL/helicopter carriers (LHA/LHD)
U.S. = 11 China = 0
*

Guided missile cruisers (CG)
U.S. = 22 China = 0
*

Destroyers (DDG/DD)
U.S. = 60 China = 27
*

Frigates (FF/FFG)
U.S. = 30 China = 48
*

Ballistic missile submarines (nuclear)(SSBN)
U.S. = 14 China = 3
*

Attack/cruiser missile submarines (nuclear)
(SSN/SSGN)
U.S. = 57 China = 6
*

Attack submarine (non-nuclear) (SS/SSK)
U.S. = 0 China = 55

duskylim

Dear Sirs:

The PLAN's continued focus on FAC's belies the fact that up to now, China's maritime strategy is basically one of SHORE and COAST defense.

Small vessels with little or no endurance, with limited ability to operate in heavy seas far away from shore and supply, and far away from shore-based air cover at that, merely serve to confirm this.

Only now is the PLAN even attempting long-range operations, the anti-piracy escort missions of the Gulf of Aden come to mind.

And thus only now is the PLAN learning to operate her larger, blue-water naval assets, the new DDG's, FFG,'s, SSK's, SSN's, etc.

Still her naval strategy remains defensive and limited (suiting her limited priorities and resources), the so-called operations up to the 1st chain of islands.

Even as her fledgling navy learns the ropes, it has found that modern naval open-ocean operations require sophisticated vessels and systems.

Immediately the first thing that comes to mind is the provision of sufficient fuel and supplies for the fleet, which meant the creation of underway refueling, replenishment and resupply vessels.

Next comes air-cover for the fleet, which of course implies carriers. Then there is anti-submarine warfare, anti-mine warfare, and of course the need for hospital care.

After assembling all of this, the need to physically take or secure marine areas and islands, means using marines, with landing vessels etc.

As you can see, nothing demonstrates power projection like a maritime task force.

plawolf

Every requirement you have meantioned, the PLAN has addressed to a greater or lesser degree, with maybe the sole exception being fleet naval fixed wing air support, but it appears the PLAN are taking steps to address that shortcoming as well. But the lack of a carrier does not disqualify a navy from being blue water.

the PLAN is still predominately a defensive force, but it has rapidly built up a very sizeable and apparently capable blue water fleet that can rival most western navies.

It is still puny compared to the USN, but it is far from the 'fledgling' coastal defense force you seem to think it is.

Finn McCool

I have been thinking some of the same things for a long time. Very few of the systems that protect large surface combatants (pretty much every naval SAM and CIWS system out there) have not been tested in actual combat or if they have it was only once or twice. We simply do not know what would REALLY happen in an actual large exchange of missles between two modern fleets. What if it's all built on a lie so to speak? What if these large expensive surface ships really are just sitting ducks? We can feel pretty safe in assuming that they aren't totally, but still, the possibility is there, and it has to be in the back of your mind.

I think in the future we will see many of the world's navies start move away from large combatants, for the reasons listed above. For a smaller nation that needs a primarily defensive force, FACs in large numbers are an excellent asset. Combined with SSKs and shore launched mobile AShM launchers and other assets, FACs can be a major part of an asymmetrical fleet that can defend sea and land territory against conventional fleets that are much stronger at least on paper. I have been hoping that Taiwan would take such a course for some time now.

However FACs and other such asymmetical assets still are not capable of true power projection. They cannot fight far from home, they cannot support much a campaign on land and they cannot have the sort of global presence a nation like China or the US needs.

Also, some of the threats against large surface combatants are in my opinion exaggerated, particularly ballistic missles. I would like to see a ballistic missle that is capable of hitting a relatively small moving target at sea. I seriously doubt that any nation has the capability to do that reliably. I've never seen one publically acknowledged and in frontline service. Possibly damaging ships with submuntions released from a BM, but not a direct hit.

Also, I believe that laser and DEW technology will in coming years create a more viable solution to the problem of missle interception than SAMs and cannons. That just might ensure that large surface combatants will be around to stay for some time.

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Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.
-Winston Churchill

crobato

I tend to think we maybe trending towards bigger missile "destroyers"---AEGIS destroyers should be considered "cruisers" now. The reason for this is simply the bigger ship can pack more powerful radars, more powerful missiles and more missiles. You have to consider the cost of one ship with 64 missiles vs. two ships with 32 missiles each, and on a cost per deployment ratio on missiles, the one ship would cost cheaper.

Keeping a large fleet of smaller vessels end up having its own cost, compared to a smaller fleet with larger vessels.

The Somali pirate affair is a wake up call for the PLAN to stop playing around with toys.

Its time to think global not local defense.

__________________
"Lets do a thermal sweep."