Beijing Confronts Long-Standing Weakness in ASW

nice find Jeff, just one question, where is that picture taken, a Z9C with a Tico in the background? what was going on there

I always said the best way to fight submarine is to deploy your own killer attack submarine, everything else is just a aid

amd i think some people need to give China just a little bit of time, let them grow for heavens sake

anyhow MPA is in the works we have already seen the pics

Z15 medium lift helo is in the works which will bring advantage over Z9C

towed array sonars are also now evident but i am not sure about bigger and more advanced hull based sonars?

current Type 056 dont have hangers but may do in the future, even if they do they will only manage a Z9C sized helo, how they are geared for ASW i am not quite sure, have we seen TAS on them? they wont hold much of a hull based sonar because of their size, plus they will be used for close shore patrol not as escorts

when ex-Varyag is deployed hopefully it will have a carrier based AWACS, along with ASW Z8 air wing, in addition to Type 052C, Type 054A and a Type 095 SSN, what more anti-submarine warfare do they want?

i think the situtaion is far from ideal but not that critical, with long range armed Maritime patrol aircraft under development the situation will soon change

theres only one thing i think is of concern, lack of helos for the Navy, we will soon have more new ships than helos in PLAN, that is something they really need to addresss

I think China should put on high priority the development of a NH-90 or Merlin sized helo designed specifically for the Navy, then deploying them in large numbers

Originally Posted by asif iqbal

I think China should put on high priority the development of a NH-90 or Merlin sized helo designed specifically for the Navy, then deploying them in large numbers

If only they can domestically manufacture turbine engines of the same class and grade, with similar performance ratings, but they still unable to do so; in terms of helicopter models China has a class gap between the Z-9 and Z-8 (which those like the NH-90 or SH-60 would fit in): Z-9 is too small for an effective payload whereas Z-8 is too big for most PLAN surface combatants.

Is anyone able to find the reference section? Cannot seem to locate it for some reason...

Originally Posted by plawolf

Is anyone able to find the reference section? Cannot seem to locate it for some reason...

(Hi everyone.)

You can find the reference section at the end of the original article, which appeared in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief July 29 2011 issue; (available & googlable online).

Why has the PLAN neglected ASW? Submarines are nothing new to East Asia. I guess helicopters are in very short supply, but there's no excuse for having so few maritime patrol aircraft and submarine chasing patrol boats.

Originally Posted by Geographer

Why has the PLAN neglected ASW? Submarines are nothing new to East Asia. I guess helicopters are in very short supply, but there's no excuse for having so few maritime patrol aircraft and submarine chasing patrol boats.

Well, I think the article Jeff linked does a fairly good analysis of the historical and practical reasons for this, with the most important factors being:

- The vast gulf in capabilities between the PLA and potential adversaries until as late as a few years ago. It is only in the last 5 or so years that the PLAAF has grown strong enough to have a realistic chance of holding off enemy air power far enough out, and for long enough to allow things like AWACS and MPAs to operate with any degree of security. As the article pointed out, what is the point in investing vast sums and resources in a large MPA fleet if said fleet will get shot down as soon as they tried to do their job?

- The PLAN puts a great deal of emphasis on creative mine warfare, and they may well see that as sufficient to reducing enemy sub operations to a manageable level.

- The new evidence brought up by that article suggests that the PLAN may well have been following the odd adage that the best hunter of a sub is another sub.

I feel that the article does not examine this aspect in as much detail as maybe it should. This may well be because they were looking at it from a US stand point instead of truly putting themselves in China's shoes.

If a major conflict does break out, and the only likely example would be Taiwan, the PLAN would have a very specific mission in a relatively small area.

In addition, it needs to be stressed that for China, even today, it's best defense against attack from a superior force like the USN is the economic co-dependancy between America and China. If hostilities does break out, it will be in everyone's interest to try and keep it as localized, contained and short-lived as possible.

This means that initially at least, the Americans would not be looking at trying to cut off China's Sea Lines of Communication (SLC) by attacking merchant shipping, especially since the majority of that shipping will carrying manufactured goods destined for American and European shops, or the raw materials to make said goods.

The PLAN has no hope of keeping China's sea lines open if the USN really wants to cut them off, so they don't even try to develop that capacity and instead make it such that America will be hurting itself as much as China if it went down that road.

Thus, the PLAN's ASW burden is massively reduced to where it only needs to be able to keep a relatively small section of the Chinese coast, namely the Taiwan Straits and it's immediate surrounding waters, free from enemy subs.

In this context, the PLAN's preferred tactic of mine warfare and using it's large SSK fleet as mobile screens to lay and wait would have a far greater chance of success.

The PLAN's subs were never intended to out to sweep all enemy subs away like their USN counterparts. As far as they are concerned, USN subs can go anywhere they like and do whatever they liked so long as they do not enter the Taiwan straits to threaten the PLA landing forces.

Something else to consider is that until the last decade or so, the PLAN actually did not really have many surface combatants worth sinking. Especially in the context of them operating in a heavily defended small stretch of water.

When the PLAN only have Jianweis and the few Luhus, I think they would have happily traded one or more of those for a USN LA/Virgina or Seawolf. As such, all the PLAN would need to do is set up a perimeter patrolled by their SSKs, use lots of small landing craft so none would make for a good target and escort them with Jianweis and Luhus to provide point defense against shore based AShMs.

Even if an enemy SSN does manage to slip past the SSK sentries, as soon as it opens fire it will expose it's position and be effectively bottled in and have very little chance of getting out again alive. Would a USN sub skipper give the order to sink one or two ships, when he knows it won't matter one bit on the grand scheme of things, and that doing so would almost certainly mean he and his ship gets sunk in return? There would be no doubt if this was an invasion fleet heading for America, but would he do it for Taiwan? I have my doubts. But the point is, even if he does fire, the trade off still favours the PLAN.

Now, that might seem cruel and callouss, and you would be right. But that is the price of fighting a technologically superior foe. That is something America has not had to do since WWII, and I really don't think Americans today can easily get into that mindset and think that way and make those kind of calls.

It is only recently, now that tensions with Taiwan has receded and the PLA is confident that they could take the island no matter what, that the PLAN has started to set it's sights beyond Taiwan. That is the main driving force behind the recent massive build up of it's surface fleet, the acquisition of LPDs and carriers and possible LHDs, and it is only with this extended scope that the PLAN is looking at ASW anew.

However, it should still be stressed that it is important to look at this build up in terms of what the PLAN plans to do with it's new fleet and who it is aimed at.

The hawks, defense contracts and military in America automatically assumes that the build up is aimed at challenging America, or tries to make it seem that way as a means to drum up a threat to justify America's frankly ridiculously over-sized defense budget. But they would be wrong.

The PLAN will not be in a position to challenge the USN for supremacy of the oceans for decades to come if ever, because China does not see the justification for such massive spending on the military. Even when China's GDP is the same as America's China's defense spending will still be smaller because China spends about half as much in terms of GDP as America on defense, and I do not see that as changing much any time soon.

China's new fleet is aimed at protecting China's interest in South East Asia and Africa. If the PLAN ever uses it's fleet in anger, it will be to protect Chinese interests on Africa, or to slap down land grabs in the South China Sea like the PLAN has done before. Against those kinds of foes, the PLAN's current and projected ASW assets are just about passable. It is still an area that needs major investment, and the PLAN does recognize this, and seems to be doing the right things to address this deficiency. But in the context of the kinds of foes the PLAN might realistically face, it's ASW is not as quite as inadequate as it would seem at first glance.

It looks a s though Plawolf has largely shot my fox on this one.

I still see China as a land power first and a maritime power only in the long term. Clearly the main maritime phase of China's military modernisation is only just starting to get going and the PLAN is nowhere near being realistically capable of going head to head against the USN far beyond territorial waters.

In that sense, spending money on something expensive like capable ASW systems would be premature and diverting resources away from where they can be better spent.
As others have noted, ASW is a capability to develop for the coming decades, once a navy is in place that warrants the protection.

i think a point is also being missed here

no doubt all this is for war, but like in the Cold War, world Navys do tit for tat all the time, they always play cat and mouse with each other and through these games in peacetime you make or break respect for ones opponents

China will very soon find itself playing these games with its foes and friends, and when it does it has to be prepared to make a impact, otherwise its drawsbacks and weaknesses will be descovered and that is something China cant afford

the last thing you want is to be building up ur capability and then when it comes to test time you are let down, US and China will never go to war, but Cold War style engagments will be something of teh future and China needs to be prepared for it

Originally Posted by plawolf

I feel that the article does not examine this aspect in as much detail as maybe it should.

Ageed. but not for the reasons you state. I think that they just did not have enough info on the real capabilities of the Yuan and new SSNs.

Originally Posted by plawolf

If a major conflict does break out, and the only likely example would be Taiwan, the PLAN would have a very specific mission in a relatively small area.

In addition, it needs to be stressed that for China, even today, it's best defense against attack from a superior force like the USN is the economic co-dependancy between America and China. If hostilities does break out, it will be in everyone's interest to try and keep it as localized, contained and short-lived as possible.

Thus, the PLAN's ASW burden is massively reduced to where it only needs to be able to keep a relatively small section of the Chinese coast, namely the Taiwan Straits and it's immediate surrounding waters, free from enemy subs.

Ageed.

Originally Posted by plawolf

Even if an enemy SSN does manage to slip past the SSK sentries, as soon as it opens fire it will expose it's position and be effectively bottled in and have very little chance of getting out again alive. Would a USN sub skipper give the order to sink one or two ships, when he knows it won't matter one bit on the grand scheme of things, and that doing so would almost certainly mean he and his ship gets sunk in return? There would be no doubt if this was an invasion fleet heading for America, but would he do it for Taiwan? I have my doubts. But the point is, even if he does fire, the trade off still favours the PLAN.

The America skipper will follow orders, and if those orders are to get pass the SS s and sink segments of the invasion fleet, he will pick the highest value targets and do so and then try to egress...thaat is, if he has to egress.

Originally Posted by plawolf

Now, that might seem cruel and callouss, and you would be right. But that is the price of fighting a technologically superior foe. That is something America has not had to do since WWII, and I really don't think Americans today can easily get into that mindset and think that way and make those kind of calls.

Technically superior in the sense that they have high quality and technologically advanced equipment...not in the sense that they are nesessarily superior to the US. And I will say again, the US Naval officer corps and carreer NCOs are very disciplined and very dedicated. They will follow orders.

The real question is, whether the US subs can get out of there once they inflict the maximum damage they can.

In all likelihood, they wont have to. Their strategy will be to deal with the undersea threat first.

The likely strategy for the US will be to respond with massive force using 20 or more nuclear attack subs to clear the straits of PLAN subs. With those types of numbers, with the types of training they already perform, regularly, and with the equipment and weapons they have...this will be the real challenge for the PLAN...to avoid this. I do not think at this moment they will be able to. No doubt it will be a visious fight under the waves...but the US simply has too many advanced, very quiet nuclear attack subs and the Straits are too small to effectively hide from a pincer the likes of which that the US will likely set up, using blocking forces of even more subs to prevent any PLAN reinforcements from coming to the aid of those that get trapped in the Straits.

The PLAN will have to build more and better AIP SSs and more quiet SSNs to be able to defend against those numbers.

Originally Posted by plawolf

The PLAN will not be in a position to challenge the USN for supremacy of the oceans for decades to come if ever, because China does not see the justification for such massive spending on the military. Even when China's GDP is the same as America's China's defense spending will still be smaller because China spends about half as much in terms of GDP as America on defense, and I do not see that as changing much any time soon.

China's new fleet is aimed at protecting China's interest in South East Asia and Africa. If the PLAN ever uses it's fleet in anger, it will be to protect Chinese interests on Africa, or to slap down land grabs in the South China Sea like the PLAN has done before. Against those kinds of foes, the PLAN's current and projected ASW assets are just about passable. But in the context of the kinds of foes the PLAN might realistically face, it's ASW is not as quite as inadequate as it would seem at first glance.

Agreed if it is not the US or pulls the US in. But with the numbers of SSNs and DDGs the US has (which will be near 60 or more of each), the PLAN still needs to progress in my opinion to be able to pull it off successfully aganist a determined US aministration. Now...outside of the military technology, a LOT will depend on who occupies the Whie House and the PRC knows this full well...just as Putin and other leaders do.

Originally Posted by SampanViking

It looks a s though Plawolf has largely shot my fox on this one.

I still see China as a land power first and a maritime power only in the long term. Clearly the main maritime phase of China's military modernisation is only just starting to get going and the PLAN is nowhere near being realistically capable of going head to head against the USN far beyond territorial waters.

In that sense, spending money on something expensive like capable ASW systems would be premature and diverting resources away from where they can be better spent.
As others have noted, ASW is a capability to develop for the coming decades, once a navy is in place that warrants the protection.

The reason ASW has been 'neglected' is not because you see China as a land power BUT because most Chinese see China as a land power. That may be true for the past 2000 years of Chinese civilizations but it is less true today. Everyone here knows the might of the Chinese naval forces 3, 4 500, years ago.. naval historians even believe they are mightier than the European powers BUT unlike the European naval powers the Chinese ones never really got into any big or at least historically significant naval battles.
I think that plays a role in the 'psychii' of China today concentrating mainly on air and land... they are obviously ramping up their naval capabilities BUT ASW remains the red headed step child. The keyword is SLOCs and trade routes which is obviously vital to China's economic intereast and that is probably one of the reasons for the significant expansion in PLAN

I think part of it is ASW is one of those areas of defense that only matters when it comes to actual total war. Unless Somali pirates or other 'rogue' nations is arming themselves with sophisticated boats, I think China realizes that at this time in history no nation who has any significant submarine fleet is planning on sinking any PLAN or cargo ships in peacetime or even in time of tension short of full scale war and that's why it has been neglected until now.

Originally Posted by Jeff Head

The America skipper will follow orders, and if those orders are to get pass the SS s and sink segments of the invasion fleet, he will pick the highest value targets and do so and then try to egress...thaat is, if he has to egress.

Technically superior in the sense that they have high quality and technologically advanced equipment...not in the sense that they are nesessarily superior to the US. And I will say again, the US Naval officer corps and carreer NCOs are very disciplined and very dedicated. They will follow orders.

Well, as I understand it, and iirc, as well-informed sources such as yourself and Popeye has pointed out in the past, American commanders have a great deal of leeway in terms of making operational decisions.

As I stressed, if this was an invasion fleet heading towards American soil, American politicians and commanders would absolutely not hesitate to do what needs to be done even if it means them laying their lives on the line.

However, when Americans go to the aid of others out of choice, I somehow do not see the politicians issuing the kind of 'stop them at all costs' orders that would massively constrain the operational decision making of it's individual commanders, or American commanders interpreting their orders in such a way as to put the destruction of enemy elements as a higher priority than the safety of his ship and crew.

It was never meant to be a suggestion that USN personnel would act in an unprofessional or unbecoming way, just a deduction based on basic human nature.

Now, can you honestly tell me that if you were a USN SSN skipper, given orders to try and cause maximum disruption to a PLAN landing, you would be so aggressive in trying to attack the enemy that you would put your boat and crew in a position where it is very likely or even almost a certainty that you will not survive the attack? When you are fighting someone else's battle?

The real question is, whether the US subs can get out of there once they inflict the maximum damage they can.

In all likelihood, they wont have to. Their strategy will be to deal with the undersea threat first.

The likely strategy for the US will be to respond with massive force using 20 or more nuclear attack subs to clear the straits of PLAN subs. With those types of numbers, with the types of training they already perform, regularly, and with the equipment and weapons they have...this will be the real challenge for the PLAN...to avoid this. I do not think at this moment they will be able to. No doubt it will be a visious fight under the waves...but the US simply has too many advanced, very quiet nuclear attack subs and the Straits are too small to effectively hide from a pincer the likes of which that the US will likely set up, using blocking forces of even more subs to prevent any PLAN reinforcements from coming to the aid of those that get trapped in the Straits.

I don't want this great debate to turn into a verses contest, so please don't take this the wrong way, but have you considered the logistics of what you are suggesting?

How long would it take the USN to deploy 20 of it's SSNs to the Taiwan straits?

I don't need specifics, but would you say it would take more or less time for the PLAN to mobilize as much of the sub and surface fleets as they can and set them up in the Taiwan straits and surrounding waters?

Against the kind of numbers of SSKs, surface ships and helos that the PLAN can muster (which would pretty much be their entire deployable fleets), 20 SSNs doesn't really seem like that many. Especially when all these assets would be concentrated in a very small body of water, where the PLAN has the advantage of home turf by knowing the underwater topography and conditions better than anyone else including the USN; in shallow waters that would massively reduce the effectiveness of SSNs; in addition to all that, you can expect extensive PLAN mine fields be to laid and waiting by the time USN SSNs get on scene, where the mine fields are so close to the Chinese coast that there is simply no way USN mine clearing ships could get close enough to clear a path; and in a position where the PLAN is purely on the defensive and not out to actively hunt USN subs?

The USN has unparalleled training and experience in hunting for enemy subs and ships in the wide open expanse of the world's oceans, but have they ever trained to try and breach an underwater fortress set up like this?

The whole point to the PLA's doctrine of unconventional warfare can be perfectly expressed with this example, whereby the PLAN refuse to fight on terms the enemy knows and are obviously superior at. Instead, the PLAN seek to use technologies available and unconventional tactics to re-define the game whereby they maximize their own advantages while neutralizing the enemy's greatest strengths.

The PLAN knows they would have a hard time trying to detect enemy subs far enough to intercept them before they are in a position to fire, so they won't try to. They will instead present themselves in massive numbers with built in redundancy to take a hit and then strike back after the enemy has given up their greatest advantage of stealth by revealing themselves.

USN subs can be completely undetectable to passive sonar, but as soon as they open fire, the PLAN would know where to ping with their active sonars, and then it won't matter how quiet your boat is.

In such a scenario, the USN SSN's superior quieting technologies and mobility of SSNs would count for very little because the PLAN fully expects to get punched hard in the face. Instead of tying themselves in nots trying to avoid the blow as conventional wisdom suggests, and allowing the USN to out-dance them and wear them down through attrition and outmaneuvering (as the USN has trained to fight), the PLAN instead presents their face to the enemy and gets ready to seize the hand after the blow lands and break the enemy's arm.

It's not pretty or sporting or honourable, but this is war, not a show fight, and you beat the enemy in any way you can.

The USN can try to gradually punch a hole through all that by methodically taking out the outer layers of the defenses, but that takes time, and the PLAN can still re-deploy and re-enforce to prolong the fighting as much as possible. The USN would be fighting against the clock remember, as the longer they take, the more time the PLAAF has to clear the beaches and the PLAN to actually launch the invasion.

The PLAN does not need to defeat the USN, merely keep them at arms length long enough to launch the invasion. After that, it's a win for the PLAN even if the USN kills dozens of ships and SSKs for no loss, and the PLAN would be ok with that.

While you can considering all this, you need to remember that this is not America's fight. They will be in it by choice, and that means there is only so high a price the US would be prepared to pay.

Even if you think the USN's sub fleet could technically punch through such a set up in time to stop an invasion, you have already acknowledged that it won't be an easy fight by any means. That means heavy casualties and losses, so it could easily become a case whereby even though the USN has the numbers and capability to force a breach, they do not have the stomach to pay the butcher's bill necessary to win such a fight.

The threshold has never been about the PLAN being able to outright defeat the USN if they intervened, it is about the PLAN being able to make the price of intervention so high that America will choose not to intervene in an ideal scenario, or holding the USN off long enough to take Taiwan and render their intervention meaningless.

That was what I meant when I said the PLA has already reached the point where they feel confident that they could take Taiwan no matter what, in hindsight, I should have picked my words more carefully. But I feel the PLA has developed to a point whereby the can achieve those objectives already, and now they are setting their sights on broader goals beyond merely reclaiming Taiwan.

Agreed if it is not the US or pulls the US in. But with the numbers of SSNs and DDGs the US has (which will be near 60 or more of each), the PLAN still needs to progress in my opinion to be able to pull it off successfully aganist a determined US aministration. Now...outside of the military technology, a LOT will depend on who occupies the Whie House and the PRC knows this full well...just as Putin and other leaders do.

Yes, I think we both agree on the bigger issues, it is just a few details that we differ on. But hopefully, as I have made my position more clear, you will feel that my views are more realistic and reasonable.

Plawolf, the US commanders will simply follow orders and within their ROE and discreation. They certainly will not committ suicide...but they will conduct operations meant to maximize their survival and, as I stated, cleanse the straits before hand if possible, and in any event inflict as much damage as possible. They will not feel like they are committing suicide if they get through to the shipping and sink several of them. They will feel that their training and knowledge will allow them to get away cleanly. And they will have a number of advantages in doing so.

Do not doubt that the US Navy knows the underwater topography and terrain as good as if not better then the PLAN. The US has been plying and mapping those waters with much more modern equipment for decades longer than the PLAN has. It is only realtively recently, in terms of modern sub operations, that the PLAN has had the boats and the mapping capabilities associated with them to do so.

You can bet that the US also knows and understands the signatures and capabilities of all the newer (and older) PLAN SSs and SSNs better too. They have simply been at this a lot longer and have been tracking and collecting data on each new PLAN sub as it has left port and ventured out anywhere in the China or South China Sea where US subs have been lurking for decades now. The only way to avoid it is to keep them very, very close to shore or in port...but that's not what they are built for, and that would mean no operational experience. So they must venture out.

And the US will have seaded sensors even along the shore and in the ports, not to mention the sat capabilities of the yards and ports themselves.

So, it is very likely that the US will know about any buildup or movement of PLAN submaries as soon as they begin.

The US has the numbers, without stretching things much at all, to put 20 SSNs into the Taiwan Straits area very quickly if necessay...starting with 6-8 boats within a day or two to restrict the PLAN buildup and hamper it significantly if conflict breaks out, and then the others following in a week after that to scour the area. The surge into the Pacific, for the sub force, began a good while before things were more officially announced lately...back in the Bush years.

As to whether the US has the stomach...do not underestimate US resolve. Even in these times the US has spent over 10 years in a couple of strategic and necesssary (military wise) wars that have lately become more unpopular. The US spent 10 years in Vietnam in an even more unpopular confrontation.

So, a naval confrontation, even one that costs US lives, is much more likely to be one that is carried out on a time scale measured in years if necessary rather than months...and, though it sounds callous, the types of casualties we are talking about here with the silent services, are not as verifiable or as clear cut as they are in land or air warfare...or even navy surface warfare for that matter. It's always been that way and takes longer to officially state or list sub crews as lost when they miss comms. They become "missing" for significant lengths of times, and after that the word comes out slowly. Again, it's always been that way and US personnel in those services are warned and schooled in that reality coming in.

So, though there would be a fight...and though it would certainly be more difficult than it would have been say 10, or even 5 years ago...I still believe for another 5-10 years until the PLAN sub force matures and expands s lot more...and until they PLAN develops very good ASW capabilities with ASW vessels, helos, and aircraft along its own coasts...I believe the US would relatively quickly gain an underwater "dominance" effect like one would talk about in terms of air dominance, which, quite frankly would be harder to achieve and maintain in the air because the PLAAF is advancing more rapidly and with greater numbers.

But if the US and ROC only gain air superiority or even air parity, it will not make any difference to the invasion if they do not have clear superiority or dominance in the air. The invasion will fail if the US gains any superiority at all under the waves.

...and at the present time, and for several years to come, unless the PLAN begins pumping out even better SSs with very fine AIP and quieting along the lines of some of the best modern European designs (which the US has leased for years at a time and honed not only their surface ASW abilities against, but also their submarine ASW capabilites) and similarly improved SSNs, I do not expect the PLAN to be able to prevent it...all that said even though the PLAN is far better now than they were a few years ago and continuing to improve.

Sorry about the delay in response, but I wrote a very detailed reply a couple day back but the internet browser eat it and I have been too busy to make a proper attempt till now.

Well, Jeff old buddy, I have already said I do not want to make this a verses discussion. We generally agree with each other, and the main sticking points are of personal opinion, and I really do not see either of us being able to present the kind of water-tight case that could convince the other.

You have absolute faith in the abilities if the USN sub service, and I am sure you have very good reasons to be so confident with your connections. However, as I am sure you are well aware, too much exposure and familiarity could easily affect one's objectivity. This is particularly true in this case, because on the one hand, the US has perfected the art of using military muscle flexing to inspire their own troops and cow opponents, yet on the other, the Chinese are the true masters at hiding their true capabilities.

The USN has undisputed superior equipment, training and experience to play cat and mouse in the deep oceans, but any war over Taiwan will take them out of their comfort zone and into the PLAN's domain.

You have already touched on the experience the USN gained training with the Dutch, but I think you kinda skipped over the part where for all the USN's equipment, training and skills, they were still subject to plenty of unpleasant surprises when they first entertained the Dutch. And that was with the Dutch playing in America's back yard, I dare say the results might have been worse for the USN had they held those exercises in the home waters of the Dutch, where their skippers had superior knowledge about the underwater conditions and topography that he could have exploited to his advantage.

That just goes to show that no-one has a perfect playbook for ASW. For sure, the USN has massively improved for the experiences gained with the Dutch and are far better prepared to deal with SSKs as a result. However, one must remember that the PLAN use very different equipment and tactics compared to the Dutch, and having experience 'fighting' against one is no guarantee of being able to effectively counter the other. In addition, the USN will not be fighting one SSK, but dozens, with surface ships, airborne ASW and sea mines just to name a few others to contend with.

You think the USN could still sweep all before them for all that, I have my doubts. Let's just leave it at that and hope we never get to find out for real which one of us is right.

Originally Posted by plawolf

We generally agree with each other, and the main sticking points are of personal opinion, and I really do not see either of us being able to present the kind of water-tight case that could convince the other.

You have absolute faith in the abilities if the USN sub service, and I am sure you have very good reasons to be so confident with your connections. However, as I am sure you are well aware, too much exposure and familiarity could easily affect one's objectivity. This is particularly true in this case, because on the one hand, the US has perfected the art of using military muscle flexing to inspire their own troops and cow opponents, yet on the other, the Chinese are the true masters at hiding their true capabilities.

The USN has undisputed superior equipment, training and experience to play cat and mouse in the deep oceans, but any war over Taiwan will take them out of their comfort zone and into the PLAN's domain.

You have already touched on the experience the USN gained training with the Dutch, but I think you kinda skipped over the part where for all the USN's equipment, training and skills, they were still subject to plenty of unpleasant surprises when they first entertained the Dutch.

You think the USN could still sweep all before them for all that, I have my doubts. Let's just leave it at that and hope we never get to find out for real which one of us is right.

Some people may base their opinions and open talk on conjecture and subjective reasoning because of over-familiarity, emotions, or just plain arrogance...and sadly, as in all nations and peoples, we have ample individuals, some of them within the military, who are beset by that last quality. It took a year in Word War II (as my Dad who fought in that conflict related to me) to glean such out of the US Navy...and it occurred either through it being apparent beforehand and those individuals being removed from forward areas, or, too many times when their feelings about a particular foe led them to underestimate, to presume, and then to establish planning based on that only to have it result in the death and injury of too many personnel, oft times including themselves..

But I do not think ore presume in that way. Mine are based on things I know to be true and have gained from my own experience or from people who I trust unequivocally...and then throw in a very large measure of cution and respect for the foe into that mix.

Even if you have a significant "edge" you can never underestimate a determined adversary...ever.

Now, the US Navy has the best maps of the underwater topography in that region (and I am not talking about the bloue water...I am talking about the Straits and all of the littoral areas around them on bothe sides) that can be found and the experience using them operationally...and not just in training execises...which they have improved upon and updated over the years when anything changed.

As I said, this does not mean any operation like this would be a cake walk...nor does it mean there would not be difficulties or surprises...if pitted against any modern foe who has strong capabilitie and steely determination. It does mean that there is, at the present, becasue of the inequities in all of the areas you mentioned, a very strong chance, if the US takes careful advantage of those inequities or advantages, and does not underestimate what an adversary may be able to do to try and level the playing field, that in any true conflict they would then be abe to use those very things to gain dominance.

Now, in a few more years if the trends continue they way they are now, that margin and that type of surety can certainly narrow.

As to the Dutch, the US was involved in training exercises when these things happened. And they were a surprise...but they also occurred where the parameters were set and things allowed to occur in a certaian manner so that the objectives of the exercise could be met...for example, knowing there was a "red team" AIP sub in the area and having the carrier battle group itself try to penetrate that area in any case. In a real life scenario, no US carrier will venture into any circumstance where an AIP vessel could have a shot at it, nor do they need to. Those vessels cannot keep up with the carrier and have little hope of intercepting them in the open sea where they would work in such a scenrio as this.

Until the adversary vessels were accounted for, the carriers would lend their air support from long distyance and a direction best likely to assure no interception by the slower DE. The attack subs I speak of would be the ones dealing with those threats and it would not be in a manner that has been scripted for training.

Having said that, the US Navy has spent the time and resources necessary...and not just with the Dutch now...to learn fropm them how to work in those environs against precisely those types of platforms...and from people who are very good at it and have been using that level of technology for about as long as anyone has had it available.

You are correct, it was not the PLAN, and that has to be thrown into the mix I spke of before, with great respect for its capabilities and intentions to acquire and get the golden shot.

In the end, like you, I just hope and pray we never have to find out...now or later. That the differences can be workled out amiably.