SinoDefence Forum

sandyj

read the next three posts carefully as to how this movie applies to the named subject. plus the implications for its applications and future uses. sj
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Defense Focus: Iron Man lessons -- Part 1

Published: May 21, 2008 at 11:35 AM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst
WASHINGTON, May 21 (UPI) -- The hit movie "Iron Man" teaches low-tech as well as high-tech lessons about preparing armies for modern war.

"Iron Man" was the most popular movie across the United States and the world in its first two weeks of circulation, and it is still going strong. The movie starring Robert Downey Jr. as genius, playboy inventor and arms manufacturer Tony Stark made $100 million at U.S. domestic box offices its first weekend out. It is already the first and so far only movie to break the $200 million mark in the U.S. domestic market. By the end of last weekend, it had gathered in $225.5 million in revenues, and with ticket revenues over the movie's third weekend declining by only 39 percent from its second weekend, it looks set to easily break the $300 million mark within the United States.

From Tokyo to Toronto, toy stores are already bulging with Iron Man toys and video games. But Iron Man's lessons for modern war go far beyond the obvious one of how nice it would be to have an invulnerable steel alloy high-tech suit that could fire repulsor rays and let you fly at thousands of miles per hour.

The first and by far the most important lesson of "Iron Man," in both the movie and the comic, is that in war, armored protection is essential, and you can't get enough of it.

This is a lesson that has gone out of fashion through a half-century during which the only wars the United States and its main allies have had to fight have been either against low-tech guerrilla movements or small nations like North Korea, North Vietnam or Iraq.

Even when China launched a full-scale land attack with hundreds of thousands of soldiers against the U.S. 8th Army in North Korea in 1950, China was in no state to match the firepower or advanced weapons systems of the outnumbered U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese were killed in their futile tidal wave charges against entrenched U.S positions.

The Iraqi army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War took an even heavier toll on the hundreds of thousands of young, often just teenage, Iranian soldiers who were hurled at them with equally futile results. No "Iron Man" protection for them.

However, World War II on the Eastern Front, the longest, bloodiest and largest land war so far recorded in the history of the world, was decided by a clash of men in modern "iron" chariots. That was the Battle of Kursk, in which around 2 million men in all were directly involved.

Ilya Kramnik, writing for RIA Novosti on May 9, noted that the German offensive on both sides of the Kursk salient in July 1943, Operation Citadel, was carried out by more than 800,000 men. The number of Soviet troops opposing them was even larger -- 1.3 million men.

In the climactic Kursk engagement on July 12, 1943, at Prokhorovka Field, 1,200 armored vehicles on both sides took part. British historian Norman Davies calculates German tank losses at Kursk at 3,000 and Soviet ones as even higher, but the Soviets had far more they could afford to lose.

Kramnik noted that the total "Soviet losses during the battle's defensive and offensive stages reached 600,000, including 180,000 killed in action. Germans lost about a half-million officers and men." No individual "Iron Man" armor for them.

Tank for tank, as William Manchester noted in his classic history "The Arms of Krupp," the most modern German Tiger heavy main battle tanks at Kursk were more than a match one for one against most of the Soviet ones deployed including the small, fast and skillfully armored T-34s. But the Soviets had succeeded in producing tanks in overwhelming numbers, and their communist quantity far outswamped Nazi quality.

The ultimate decision at Kursk, the military pivot and turning point of the entire land war in the east, was therefore decided not by one, or a few, superb pieces of ultra-high-tech armor -- the "Iron Man" concept -- but by scores of thousands of pieces of well-engineered but relatively low-tech armor -- the mass-production concept.

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Next: From tank armor to personal armor


© 2008 United Press International

sandyj

Defense Focus: Iron Man lessons -- Part 2

Published: May 22, 2008 at 11:09 AM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst
WASHINGTON, May 22 (UPI) -- The "Iron Man" movie is in one key respect already a documentary reflection of reality: In Iraq, tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers over the past five years owe their lives to their Kevlar armor and ceramic implants.

Modern high-tech individual defensive armor for combat soldiers and police unfortunately is certainly not remotely as invulnerable as inventive genius Tony Stark's amazing alloy armor in the movie hit movie "Iron Man." But it serves the same purpose, and it looks like it will be a staple of the combat gear of major nations in 21st century industrialized/high-tech war.

In World War I, combat soldiers, especially on the Western Front, had no protective personal armor at all. Yet those young soldiers were thrown, especially by British and Russian commanders, in endless futile, tactical blunt and exceptionally incompetently directed frontal charges against German Wehrmacht -- at the time, certainly the most proficient and tactically best army in the world. Millions of young men hardly out of boyhood died as a result for no discernible gains.

It was to break the deadlock on the Western Front dominated by the fixed-site machine gun -- although the largest number of combat casualties on the Western Front was in fact caused by massed artillery -- that Britain's Royal Navy -- prodded on by its visionary First Lord of the Admiralty, the young Winston Churchill -- pioneered the heavy tank.

The colossal tanks of the British army on the Western Front in 1917-1918 were vastly larger than their World War II or 21st century successors. Their armored protection, in fact, was very thin; they moved at a snail's pace; they had a very limited operational range; and they broke down early and often.

Nevertheless, they had shown the way, and by World War II, armored cars, self-deployed guns, armored personnel carriers and battle tank weapons systems had developed to the state of being mature technologies.

The Germans and the Soviets developed and deployed by far the best, the Italians by far the worst, the British and Japanese tanks were almost as bad as the Italian ones, and the Americans were in the middle, far ahead of the British, Italians and the Japanese, but tank for tank, far behind the Germans and the Soviets.

The concept of individual armored protection for soldiers remained a science fiction pipe dream through both world wars and through the Korean and Vietnam wars as well. However, in the following decades, Kevlar protection was developed and became increasingly effective in its use by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

In Iraq, U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicles have proven dangerously vulnerable to improvised explosive devices, and Sunni insurgents have been able to upgrade the shaped-charge, directed-blast potency of their IEDs to even disable and destroy a number of huge U.S. Abrams M1A2 Main Battle Tanks.

It should, however, be noted that the U.S. Army has not been negligent or complacent about this development, and major programs have been in operation for years now to upgrade Abrams MBT armored protection.

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Next: Copying Iron Man in the air


© 2008 United Press International

sandyj

Defense Focus: Iron Man lessons -- Part 3

Published: May 23, 2008 at 5:59 PM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst
WASHINGTON, May 23 (UPI) -- The first reaction of millions of American kids -- and American dads who are still kids at heart -- on seeing the super-hit movie "Iron Man" is that top gun ace fighter pilots of the U.S. Air Force must have almost the same weapons systems and cool speed and powers of genius arms designer Tony Stark and his amazing armor.

Obviously, U.S. combat aircraft and those of other nations can fly as fast, be as maneuverable and carry far more powerful weapons than even Iron Man in his amazing armor. Their electronics are just as cool, too.

But fighters and fighter-bombers of the U.S. Air Force and of advanced nations are different from Iron Man's armor in two fundamental respects: They are vastly bigger and they don't have armor -- or at least not remotely as much.

The sobering fact is that modern weapons designers around the world, in the air, at sea and even when it comes to the design of modern infantry transport vehicles, most notably the dire U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle, have consistently neglected the issue of armored protection for decades.

In the air, there is a very simple reason for this: Air Force generals in the United States and most other nations loathe putting heavy steel or modern alloy armor on combat aircraft to protect them and their crews because then the speed and range figures are not remotely as impressive.

Also, one of the most important roles of air power is as tactical close ground support to the operations of land forces. The Nazi Luftwaffe with its precision Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers demonstrated this in the blitzkrieg conquest of the European continent from September 1939 to September 1942, when the Nazi tide of conquest finally reached its eastern limit in the Soviet Caucasus region and at Stalingrad.

However, close ground support aircraft are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. The United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan suffered very heavy attrition in their close support combat helicopters, and deaths from helicopter crashes are the third-largest cause of U.S. deaths in the current conflict in Iraq. They are the leading cause of deaths in Afghanistan. It should be added that in Iraq and Afghanistan, those casualty figures include crashes not caused by hostile action.

The outstanding ground support aircraft of all time was the legendary Soviet Ilyushin Il-3 Sturmovik. More than 35,000 of them were built. Yet even the Sturmovik suffered thousands of losses from ground fire during its first years in action. Losses were greatly reduced once the underside of the aircraft's fuselage was armored in alternate versions. The tradeoff in speed turned out to be well worth it.

Armor is obviously by no means a panacea for everything. The British Avro Lancaster four-engine strategic heavy bomber had no armor protection at all and therefore could be used only in night bombing raids over Germany through World War II: Even then, its losses were very heavy.

The legendary U.S. Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress was exceptionally heavily armored for any aircraft of its generation, but this didn't prevent very high losses from German fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft defenses during the daylight air battles over Europe.

However, for close ground tactical support, nothing beats a relatively slow, armored and heavily armed flying workhorse. The classic example of this in modern U.S. combat history has been the Fairchild-Republic A10 Thunderbolt, or Warthog. But the Air Force never had any love for the A10, and just looking at it explains why. The A10 is slow moving, ugly and ungainly. Flying it is like riding to war on a tough old carthorse rather than on a prancing Thoroughbred stallion.

Now, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is being designed to supersede the A10 in its tactical ground-support role. But, as we have noted in previous columns, the F-35 has not been designed for the dangerous, difficult and complex ground superiority mission. The armaments it will carry are conventional air-to-air weapons.

The F-35 will not carry the A10's formidable GAU-8 cannon. It cannot carry the armored protection of the A10 either and therefore will be much more vulnerable even to ground-directed small-arms fire. And most important of all, the F-35 is going to be just too fast to accurately target the ground forces and dug-in fortifications it will have to hit in its tactical support role.

The "Iron Man" movie inadvertently teaches this lesson, too; Iron Man is most lethal not when he is soaring through the skies at thousands of miles per hour, but when he has landed on the ground, he is looking for bad guys and he is in a bad mood.

Popular movies and comic book superheroes are not supposed to teach real lessons in procurement and combat tactics. But wherever it comes from, wisdom is still wisdom.

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Next: Iron Man's lessons at sea


© 2008 United Press International