Joint-Arms Combat Operation ability, is China up tio date ??

[rommel]

Since the begginning of our modern warfare, success of operation was granted most of the time when you got a good interarms cooperation. Since then, every country is trying to devellop their capabilites in this domain. Canada is developing the Iris communication sytems that will let the commander keep contact of every soldier and military under his command on the battlefied. The US Army with its Land Warrior programs, the Germans with the IDZ infantry squad is going this way either. Still, the US Army sometime have some communication problem with their Allied (think of the USAF pilot who accidently dropped a bomb and killed 4 Canadian Infantrymen in Afghanistan) and their Air Force counter-part (think of the few times when a A-10 accidently fire on US soldiers in Desert Storm 91), but their trying to improve that. Still, the sucess of a military operation depend also how you can coordinate air strike, artillery, armor and infantry. The German Blitzkrieg shown the efficiency, the early success of the Wehrmacht was mainly to this execptionnal ability to carry a task with multiple force.

But, China, who's trying at all cost to modernize her army, is giving lot of money on acquiring combat equipment. But, will her be able to coordinate her army ?? How many years do you think she will need to get to a western level (US or Canadian) level of cooperation ? Are the Chinese PLA highly equiped with communication equipement ?? Every US and Canadian Soldiers have a combat-radio to keep in touch, does PLA have this ??? What China need to improve this ?

[Norfolk]

China simply does not have significant experience in mechanized warfare, and I think that this is key to to its lagging behing, so far, in combined arms operations, never mind modern battlefield communications. The Germans demonstrated in the first year of the Second World War the both the potential and the realities of combined arms operations, and mechanization and radio communications were critical to this.

But it is most important to point out that the Germans already possessed a long standing and thoroughly thought-out and tested body of doctrine that was based upon real past war experience - especially the First World War and rigorous analysis of the lessons of that and other wars - combined with a professional military system that produced officers and soldiers of superb professional quality who also were very much inclined and trained to think about things, making them open to seeking both better ways of doing things and to innovation.

When mechanization and radio communications had sufficiently matured, the Germans were ready, willing, and able to exploit their potential to the full (though not without some internal resistance), whilst other countries were caught out in a state of flux. The early part of the Second World War is in many ways a story of how a professionally gifted German military was able to identify and formulate using technology and concepts already widely available a military machine that, until her enemies learned (partially at least) their lessons the hard way, was able to prevail with more or less ease over all other who were stilled bogged down in the problems of modern combined arms warfare.

The Chinese are open to such concepts and technology, but not only do they lack experience in them, particularly as they have had little history of mechanized warfare, but they also seem to lack both the level of professional military acumen and genius of the Wehrmacht (but so does almost everyone else, including those who learned hard lessons 60 years ago - and still haven't completely learned all those lessons - at the hands of the Germans, so that's hardly a slight to China) as well as the same culture of bold curiousity and the conditions that foster such a culture. There are built-in inhibitions and hindrances to the Chinese perfecting the art of combined arms warfare and these are at least as important as the possession of the requisite technologies for doing so. China, both for reasons of her own history and because of the type of regime that it is governed by, lack in somes way the sort of individual initiative that is found in the West and conditions of freedom of thought and information, amongst others, that can be exploited to the full by individual initiative (the German practice of mechanized warfare was also inherently decentralized, and required both great individual initiative from top to bottom, and great responsibility - little or no passing of the buck - which is one of the reasons German military leaders were almost universally respected, even admired, by their subordinates - unlike many of their Allied counterparts). Consequently, access to the same technology and even sources of doctrine does not necessarily yield the same results in different hands. After all, the Allies had the same (and in some cases, superior) technology as the Germans had in the early years of WWII (and the Germans had relied heavily upon foreign and especially British military thinkers in their own formulation of operational concepts and doctrine), but the Germans were able see how to put it all together and how to make it all work to advantage. It is one thing to develop and possess state-of-the art technology, is quite another to know how best to use it, and where.

The Chinese army has certainly made great strides in recent years, and it has come along way from the day when "fire and movement" in the Chinese Army meant that heavy weapons and/or artillery fired (that is, if they had any available), then human waves of infantry swarmed the enemy positions. But I do not think that more or less imitating English-speaking or European trends in equipment and especially communications is necessarily the way to go, especially if the Chinese lack a solid grasp of German-style combined arms doctrine and operations and the thinking professionals to make it all happen.

Giving every infantryman a portable radio set is not necessarily the best way (it could in fact simply overload the whole net with too much information and cause disruption and confusion without very well thought out priorities and executed procedures) to promote seamless command, control, and communications. This would almost certainly be these case if a solid grounding in the basics of mechanized warfare (whether or not the units in question are in fact mechanized or not) and subsequently combined arms operations is lacking, and given the seeming Chinese hesitance to routinely mix units of the different combat arms in operations at least with the same frequency of Western armies, this would appear at least, to be the case.

[utelore]

I have heard the following from a ex-pilot about 3 years ago that when he flew ops out of japan that china had the following issues.
1. hated flying at night over open ocean
2. was frighted of its own Air defence even when "squawking IF" and this forced them to flying using "in and out" corridors near the straits of Taiwan.
3. does not like to use BVR missiles as it seems he had heard they had no faith in them but liked getting in close with heat seeking short range missiles and guns.
4. with out BVR the Chinese Jets would turn off radars which they think wrongly made them harder to ID by U.S,Japan and Tawian fighters. The minute they were painted at 50km they would turn tail back toward their "in and out corridor"

In closing he did say during the day and closer to the main land inside of a "corridor" they were very aggressive. would use Their J-8 and do a mach 2.3run right at you. coming down from 40,000 feet using no radar. heard rumors that PRC pilots would get vision correction from western doc which in some cases gave them 20/10 vision. but that's no help when a high quality BVR nails you at 50km.

But let me say he heard that the PRC AD was wicked and could pop you at 100km if you werent looking. They would fire dumb and go active at 80km. They think it was S-300 testing.

[Norfolk]

In closing he did say during the day and closer to the main land inside of a "corridor" they were very aggressive. would use Their J-8 and do a mach 2.3run right at you. coming down from 40,000 feet using no radar. heard rumors that PRC pilots would get vision correction from western doc which in some cases gave them 20/10 vision. but that's no help when a high quality BVR nails you at 50km.

But let me say he heard that the PRC AD was wicked and could pop you at 100km if you werent looking. They would fire dumb and go active at 80km. They think it was S-300 testing.

The Chinese would actually "paint" Western fighters with S-300 tracking radars, and not just search radar? And Chinese jets would actually attempt 12 o'clock high "Out of the Blue" dives at them? I'm not sure whether to consider this justing showing off or trying to compensate for the apparent inability to coordinate their own operations.

I mean, the Chinese weren't obviously intending to do any harm, and Western pilots at times haven't always been on their best behaviour (either in Asia or elsewhere), but these sorts of stunts seem to smack as much of an inferiority complex as simple flyboy exuberance. This is the sort of behaviour you would expect from amateurs, not professionals.

[crobato]

China, both for reasons of her own history and because of the type of regime that it is governed by, lack in somes way the sort of individual initiative that is found in the West and conditions of freedom of thought and information, amongst others, that can be exploited to the full by individual initiative (the German practice of mechanized warfare was also inherently decentralized, and required both great individual initiative from top to bottom, and great responsibility - little or no passing of the buck - which is one of the reasons German military leaders were almost universally respected, even admired, by their subordinates - unlike many of their Allied counterparts).

This is certainly not correct, and not correct by far. In fact what you are saying is the very opposite of Maoist warfare. The very principle of asymmetric or guerrilla warfare in land stresses a lot of individual and squad level initiative. A guerrilla army does not have the communication and radio resources conventional armies have, and for that reason, actually requires much greater autonomy on the troop and squad level compared to conventional armies. A good example is the guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. You think every Charlie there can afford to have a radio on his own?

Now for the so called German "decentralization" that's another myth. Look at North Africa. Once the command core of the Afrika Korps was broken, the Germans simply gave up and surrendered. In Europe the same thing. Once the central command is dismembered, the Germans simply gave up and surrendered. This is in contrast to the martial cultures of the East, where individually, even without a central command structure, they kept fighting to the death.

Individual initiative is always stressed in Mao's own doctrines, and in fact he goes on to even say that the individual would make the difference against a technologically superior enemy.

As for culture, this culture also invented the concept of squad formations in the first place in its ancient history.

[crobato]

I have heard the following from a ex-pilot about 3 years ago that when he flew ops out of japan that china had the following issues.
1. hated flying at night over open ocean
2. was frighted of its own Air defence even when "squawking IF" and this forced them to flying using "in and out" corridors near the straits of Taiwan.
3. does not like to use BVR missiles as it seems he had heard they had no faith in them but liked getting in close with heat seeking short range missiles and guns.
4. with out BVR the Chinese Jets would turn off radars which they think wrongly made them harder to ID by U.S,Japan and Tawian fighters. The minute they were painted at 50km they would turn tail back toward their "in and out corridor"

In closing he did say during the day and closer to the main land inside of a "corridor" they were very aggressive. would use Their J-8 and do a mach 2.3run right at you. coming down from 40,000 feet using no radar. heard rumors that PRC pilots would get vision correction from western doc which in some cases gave them 20/10 vision. but that's no help when a high quality BVR nails you at 50km.

But let me say he heard that the PRC AD was wicked and could pop you at 100km if you werent looking. They would fire dumb and go active at 80km. They think it was S-300 testing.

Turning off their radars means your plane cannot use its RWR to detect the other plane. If you have to paint the other guy to see the other guy, he would also be notified of your presence.

They may also be under instructions not to turn on their radars so that their signals would not be recorded. Actually it sounds its they were actually trying to bait fighters to paint them with radars so they can record the signals of your radars, all of ELINT value.

Last December, J-10s tried to "alarm" ROC AD assets for the same reason, to get the AD assets to paint the J-10s with their radars, and of course, record them. The ROC AD troops did not oblige however, at least this time around.

What you described is consistent with what I know about the J-8II, or at least the early ones. These ones have radars that are less than perfected, and have problems in their BVR. So they don't trust their radars and BVR quite frankly and prefer to use their guns and short ranged AAMs. And yes, the J-8II pilots are very aggressive. That's not a particularly easy bucket to fly and yet they push it to their limits like they know it like the back of their hands.

The radar situation is not going to be true of the J-8F variant however that is currently equipping units now which also has a credible BVR option.

On the other hand, the Su-27s and Su-30MKKs don't play this same game. They will try to paint and lock onto the fighter, like a Mirage 2000-5, and one incident that I heard of, the ROCAF fighter went into spiral in an attempt to shake that lock.

[Norfolk]

This is certainly not correct, and not correct by far. In fact what you are saying is the very opposite of Maoist warfare. The very principle of asymmetric or guerrilla warfare in land stresses a lot of individual and squad level initiative. A guerrilla army does not have the communication and radio resources conventional armies have, and for that reason, actually requires much greater autonomy on the troop and squad level compared to conventional armies. A good example is the guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. You think every Charlie there can afford to have a radio on his own?

Now for the so called German "decentralization" that's another myth. Look at North Africa. Once the command core of the Afrika Korps was broken, the Germans simply gave up and surrendered. In Europe the same thing. Once the central command is dismembered, the Germans simply gave up and surrendered. This is in contrast to the martial cultures of the East, where individually, even without a central command structure, they kept fighting to the death.

Individual initiative is always stressed in Mao's own doctrines, and in fact he goes on to even say that the individual would make the difference against a technologically superior enemy.

As for culture, this culture also invented the concept of squad formations in the first place in its ancient history.

Maoist doctrine never had to contend with mechanized warfare, which is a very different animal from straight-foot infantry, let alone guerilla, warfare. Command, control, and communications that relies upon face-to-face orders, visible signals, human couriers, and rigidly predetermined actions are not suited to mechanized warfare - the French and Soviets attempted much the same early in WWII and it didn't work out very well. It requires not only an understanding and anticipation of the problems of mechanization and combined arms operations (of which the Chinese have little practical wartime experience), but also a thorough grasp of command, control, and communications in high-speed, high-intensity conditions of often very imperfect, even critically flawed information about the enemy and simply having to get on the with job whilst operating in what sometimes amounts to an information-vaccuum so to speak.

As for Vietnam, the VC especially, and the NVA typically conducted extensive long-term reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering about the forces they faced and the objects they were assigned to attack. They then engaged in lengthy preparations for set-piece operations which featured much in the way of pre-planned fires (if available) and pre-determined "coordination" of units and support to the extent that operations were usually forced to either be cancelled outright, or to simply go ahead and take additional losses when conditions had substantially changed and there was no time to adapt plans to those changes. Few major VC and NVA operations were battlefield successes - the US may have suffered a great political defeat in Vietnam, but it is true that it never lost so much as a single major battle - and the VC were practically marginalized after the defeat of the Tet Offensive in 1968. The VC and NVA attacked in human waves, without fire-and-movement (in the Western sense) to really speak of, and despite their usual quantitative superiority over their intended victims, they almost invariably failed, not least because those victims had superior command and control and communications and could rapidly and easily coordinate their forces to defeat the relatively cumbersome VC and NVA.

Set-piece plans with more pre-determination standing in for more the more spontaneous coordination that mechanized warfare requires (and that said, many armies are still very much influenced or locked into mindsets and operational concepts that feature such things as phase lines even when conducting mechanized oeprations!) are suited to attrition warfare, not combined arms maneouver warfare (in most cirumstances).

Guerrilla, warfare tends to be even more reliant upon predetermined planning (and especially lengthy prior information and intelligence-gathering about targets and forces to be struck or avoided, luxuries that simply do exist most of the time for mechanized operations) that it is very difficult to rapidly changing situations (and rapidly increasing distances).

And in that same vein, a simple straight-foot infantry rifle company may find itself, for example operating on a frontage of perhaps a quarter-mile to half-a-mile; its mechanized equivalent may find itself doing so on a frontage of up to nearly 3 miles! (why I that is so , I won't get into right now) thus requiring not only each armoured vehicle to carry at least one radio, but even each rifle squad/section to carry at least two radios (and in some armies each man now carries some sort of radio).

Another thing, the infantry of the PLA in Mao's time did not typically use Western style fire-and-movement; if you have been in the infantry of a Western country or at least received some infantry familiariztion training you will know what I am talking about and how difficult it is to truly master; if you do not, it will require a great deal more time and space than can easily be accomodated on this forum. Even at present, Western type fire-and-manoeuver is a relatively recent innovation in China, and though it has probably had time to master it successfully by now, it remains unclear that it is now able to combine the separate combat arms with the experience, custom, and familiarity that is common to many Western armies. At present, the Chinese do not appear to combine the separate combat arms with the same frequency and familiarity that Western armies do.

If one may think that proper command, control, and communications or air operations is fraught with potential difficulty (and I refer you to Utelore's recent post on the PLAAF on same), accomplishing the same thing in mechanized warfare often breaks down into a vertiable nightmare on exercises, even for armies experienced in mechanized and combined arms operations.

And finally, as for the Germans giving up when their command structures broke down, well, this requires a little more qualification. Typically, most forces do give up when the command structure breaks down, because in most of those cases the physical damage that has been done that leads to command breakdown has also inflicted crippling losses upon the fighting forces. The Germans in most cases were no different, though they tended to continue fighting on longer than other countries troops in similar situations.

In WWII the Germans performed military feats under conditions of supreme adversity that remain unmatched, such as the moving-pockets, break-outs and the defenses of Courland, East Prussia and Silesia (where the German forces were physically and permanently cut off from overland routes to Germany itslef, and still fought on for months) - on the Eastern front in the face of overwhelming Soviet strength and partisan campaigns behind their own main lines, the extraction of the German armies from the Falaise Gap in Normandy and the rapid reorganization of the German defenses that not only halted the Allied drive into Germany and the Low Countries for several months, but also defeated the Market-Garden offensive despite considerable Allied quantitative superiority.

Yes, there were serious, even grave faults in German command, control, and communications during the Second World War, but even in the midst of mass surrenders, the German army never completely broke down, but only stopped fighting when its poltical leadership surrended - the military leadsership largely remained in control throughout - and rapidly re-established control whenever temporarily lost.

I am not sure that I can entirely contest your argument, and you make a good point at the beginning about Maoist guerrilla warfare emphasizing, inded requiring individual initiative at the lowest levels. Where I begin to contest this is when Maoist guerrilla warfare moves from partisan warfare and its attendent raids and constant close surveillance of enemy troop movements amidst the population and the attacking of minor units when they expose themselves, to combined arms mechanized warfare, which is fundamentally different in both its capabilities and its requirements.

[crobato]

Where I begin to contest this is when Maoist guerrilla warfare moves from partisan warfare and its attendent raids and constant close surveillance of enemy troop movements amidst the population and the attacking of minor units when they expose themselves, to combined arms mechanized warfare, which is fundamentally different in both its capabilities and its requirements.

And this is where it was tested in the latter phase of the Sino Civil War that led to the Communist takeover, the Korean War, Sino-Indian and Amur clashes. By the way Maoist doctrines does mention the escalation of peasant warfare into conventional warfare as necessary for the takeover of the country.

All your argumentation above is never about individual and local squad level initiative. I was never arguing about the experience of joint operations. I was pointing out that I have a disagreement about your idea that somehow because of culture, the Chinese armies do not have individual or local squad level initiative, when in fact, the historical circumstances would have sheerly relied on these.

What you are pointing out here, and what is necessary with joint operations is the opposite, and that is centralized command, which the Chinese for a long while didn't enjoy much of a modern equivalent of.

Actually the PLA shifted into the mechanized army concepts just about the seventies, but not after having its educated and trained officer corps getting decimated by the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, with Mao on the decline, and the Soviet Army massing in the northern borders, the PLA turned from a peasant army into a massive tank army. This is not to say they will gather the experience of joint operations overnight. But since the seventies till today, they should have picked up some considerable experience in paper with exercises, no differently from any Western army. In fact the PLA is backing this up with some fundamental changes in the way they operate.

There are lots of papers and posts on this in the CDF. We have seen many recent changes in the PLA, just for examples. The PLA is now organized more along the lines of brigades (smaller units) other than divisions. The War Zone campaign. Another is the much more rapid growth of mechanized infantry units and vehicles compared to tanks. Its a progressive story, never a finished one, as you can see articles that call for more command decentralization.

History shows that most modern armies never really contended with joint warfare other than the US, Russians, Israelis and the Germans. With regards to anyone else but these, how much is show and how much is go is something to be decided.


.

[IDonT]

You point out a very good question. I've always wonder how the separate services of the PLA operate. How severe is the inter-service rivalry between the airforce, army and navy? I've read undocumented reports that on occassion an army general, who never had experience in naval matters, may be given command of a naval fleet. It must be hard to be an airman or a seaman and be part of the People's Liberation ARMY navy/airforce.

Inter-service rivalry kills. In 1982, a US army commander had to call his wife, who called his base, who called the Pentagon, who called the Navy, who called the circling naval fighter where to bomb his target. Its humorous but it is true.

In world war II, the Japanese navy and army refused to worked together that they had separate set up on their airplanes. One, I think it was the Army, had you pushing on the throttle to increase power and one had you pulling back on the throttle to decrease power. Imagine the surprise of an army pilot in a navy plane.

[Norfolk]

All your argumentation above is never about individual and local squad level initiative. I was never arguing about the experience of joint operations. I was pointing out that I have a disagreement about your idea that somehow because of culture, the Chinese armies do not have individual or local squad level initiative, when in fact, the historical circumstances would have sheerly relied on these.

I apologize Crobato, I misunderstood and thought you were applying this directly to mechanized operations. I certainly have no argument with individual- and minor-unit initiative and decentralization. I do maintain doubts though, about initiative being allowed in a broader sense in China, particularly both in military-intellectual thought and innovation (and operational concepts) and in the ability of junior and field grade officers to make decisions on their own that deviate (especially substantially) from their superior's plans or orders when circumstances justify such personal inititative.

[Norfolk]

Inter-service rivalry kills. In 1982, a US army commander had to call his wife, who called his base, who called the Pentagon, who called the Navy, who called the circling naval fighter where to bomb his target. Its humorous but it is true.

I seem to recall that this individual had to use a local telephone and his credit card to do so. American Express, don't go to war without it!

Grenada wasn't exactly a glowing model of joint operations success. It seemed everyone except the Marines spent as much time chasing their own tails so to speak (or ducking for cover and calling in air support) as actually getting anywhere. It seemed that whenever it finally became clear that the Army wasn't getting anywhere fast, the Marines would be given the order to advance; eventually, the Marines ended advancing over most of the island, even though they had only one battalion compared to around half a dozen for the Army.

[SampanViking]

Practice is going to make perfect, so I think it safe to assume that if the PRC Political and PLA military leadership appreciate the importance of this that a lot of time and money is being spent in developing these skills.

I would also guess that much of the exercises conducted with its SCO partners are about bolstering these abilities too.

The other side of the coin of this issue is surely professionalism and again we have seen a process in the last 20 years where the PLA has moved from being a conscript to Volunteer Army. Each year we hear that more money is being spent improving pay and conditions. These surely are the very preconditions that you would expect to see in order to build on the above complex military capabilities.

[Norfolk]

Practice is going to make perfect, so I think it safe to assume that if the PRC Political and PLA military leadership appreciate the importance of this that a lot of time and money is being spent in developing these skills.

I would also guess that much of the exercises conducted with its SCO partners are about bolstering these abilities too.

The other side of the coin of this issue is surely professionalism and again we have seen a process in the last 20 years where the PLA has moved from being a conscript to Volunteer Army. Each year we hear that more money is being spent improving pay and conditions. These surely are the very preconditions that you would expect to see in order to build on the above complex military capabilities.

Agreed SampanViking,

Provided China has been diligent in developing such capabilities in tandem with providing sufficient opportunity for the professional development of its officer and NCO corps (and also to shed Soviet-style centralization of command at the tactical and even operational levels and move to a German-style decentralization system allowing for individual initiative to exploit battlefield opportunities), then something equivalent to what the West has may emerge in the near future. I doubt though, that it is there yet.

Even in the West, there are serious lapses at times in this regard. In GW1, the U.S. Third Army was caught unprepared by the success of 1 MEF's offensive into Kuwait, thus forcing 3rd Army to launch its flanking attacking sooner than it had planned to do. Some of the blame for this, however, lay with the command echelon above 3rd Army, and it didn't help that 3rd Army's commander had just had gall bladder surgery only a few weeks before the Coalition attack. He was a very ill man, and should not have had to carry on the way he did.

To add to this, the US VII Corps operated in a manner suited to more positional-type warfare with a high centralization of command and holding troops back in order to form nice clean lines more suited to phased, methodical straight-foot infantry attacks than dynamic, spontaneous, take-advantage-of-opportunities mechanized warfare. After 1st Infantry Division breached the Iraqi front lines, VII Corps proceeded to hold back to draw its armoured divisions into an extended line before proceeding to exploit the break-through. Ironically, in doing so, VII Corps exposed its right flank and possibly its logistics trains to a potentially disabling counter-attack by Iraqi armour stationed behind the front line. It's a good thing that the Iraqis were more incompetent than the Americans, and failed themselves to take advantage of the opportunity offered them.

The result of the Iraqi failure to attack the VII Corps' right flank when it was inadvertently offered them of course was their subsequent destruction later as the VII Corps formed up and then attacked the Iraqis in their own positions. The result of the American failure to properly coordinate I MEF and US Third Army (especially due to the latter's and higher command's failure to make any provisions for deviation from the set plan) was the escape of substantial portions of the Iraqi Army ahead of the Third Army and especially the bulk of the Republican Guard, with which the Iraqi Government soon used to put down revolts and re-establish its control over most of the country, thus perpetuating the regime in power. The VII Corps' performance, whilst it met with battlefield success vis-a-vis the Iraqi units that it encountered,was nevertheless a failure, as its orders were to destroy the Republican Guard, which, of course mostly got away. VII Corps formed up in a manner worthy of the First World War, could not adjust quickly enough to take advantage of changes to the battle plan (even cancelling a night attack because it had never trained for passage-of-lines at night) and generally gave the Iraqi's the day or two's head start they needed to mostly get away.

This is just a more recent and better-known example of even experienced powers flubbing mechanized combined arms warfare.

[crobato]

I apologize Crobato, I misunderstood and thought you were applying this directly to mechanized operations. I certainly have no argument with individual- and minor-unit initiative and decentralization. I do maintain doubts though, about initiative being allowed in a broader sense in China, particularly both in military-intellectual thought and innovation (and operational concepts) and in the ability of junior and field grade officers to make decisions on their own that deviate (especially substantially) from their superior's plans or orders when circumstances justify such personal inititative.

Actually there is plenty of initiative. I won't go to that in detail. There are many writings from junior officers themselves and there certainly plenty of fervent discussion. Don't mistake that the Soviet system still applies here at least with modern PLA. In order to understand the modern operations of the PLA, its advisable to study these writings, many not available in public but the US Army and Navy colleges should have some of them, as well as some of the broader underlying concepts that stretches from Sun Tzu, the Seven Military Classics all the way to Mao.

Right from the ancient history from Sun Tze to Mao, Chinese military doctrine had always emphasized mobility and coordination. They are tied with Alexander the Great in forming the ancient world's first joint armies. The modern junior PLA officer is well steeped studying these traditions.

In the Korean War for example, the PVA units had their own local initiative to always try to outflank enemy positions, raid and attack at the most inconvenient times for the enemy, use terrain judiciously and fade when faced with superior opposition. The phrase described by one scholar to them is "strategy bred to the bone".

[crobato]

You point out a very good question. I've always wonder how the separate services of the PLA operate. How severe is the inter-service rivalry between the airforce, army and navy? I've read undocumented reports that on occassion an army general, who never had experience in naval matters, may be given command of a naval fleet. It must be hard to be an airman or a seaman and be part of the People's Liberation ARMY navy/airforce.

Inter-service rivalry kills. In 1982, a US army commander had to call his wife, who called his base, who called the Pentagon, who called the Navy, who called the circling naval fighter where to bomb his target. Its humorous but it is true.

In world war II, the Japanese navy and army refused to worked together that they had separate set up on their airplanes. One, I think it was the Army, had you pushing on the throttle to increase power and one had you pulling back on the throttle to decrease power. Imagine the surprise of an army pilot in a navy plane.

Traditionally, there is not much interservice rivalry. Rivalry is moot, when the Army dominates things. Circumstances then, when the Soviets appeared to be the main enemy, with no less than 17 divisions poised at the northern borders ready to run down to Beijing. So there is much emphasis on the Army, especially building a huge mechanized tank army. South of China is difficult for tank operations, but the north, with flat plains and deserts, is going to be tank territory.

When the shift moves to the east, towards retaking Taiwan and confronting the US and Japan, the Navy and the Air Force also finally began their serious rise as autonomous players with obvious and noticeable results. The Army on the other hand, took some steps back. The first is the elimination of corruption. Not that its still there, but a major move against it began in 1997 when PLA owned businesses were disallowed. Then the Army is reduced in size, and the policing duties moved to a new branch, a civil militia or national police called the PAP. With that, it reduced the Army's political and potential coercive power over the government and the population.

Since then, the top officials often visit the Navy and the Air Force bases, giving speech about the Navy and Air Force being the vanguard, the spearhead and the first line of defense. The Navy and the Air Force's rise is capped in 2004, when each finally gets their own seat on the Central Military Commission.

And this year, instead of the usual Army marching down Tianammen Square in Beijing, the 80th Anniversary of the PLA is conducted in a naval base.

As for joint operations with the Army, Navy and Airforce, the PLA are seriously learning to grip on that, but being late on this issue, there are many things that have to be polished like recently banning the use of celphones during exercises. There are writings, self criticisms, and quotes from their own officers that stresses the need to still improve on this issue.

[zraver]

Crobato,

I think you might be in error. Effective hit and fade partisan tactics do not equate with initive in and of themselves. Certainly the PLA and CVA showed themselves masters of infiltration with the experience of the Civil War But China itself does not lend itself to easy innovation. The traditional Chinese mindset towards family, obedience, and caste has only recently begun to be shed, and this after being re-inforced by flawed communist collectivism.

Western units, or pre-WW2 Heer units are trained to be adaptable and to accept command. And this is the critical difference. I don't think a PLA company commander finding himself as the senior battalion or brigade officer after a battlefield incident can cope, nor do I think small unit commanders have the discretion to act as they see fit to achieve the wider rather than the unit objective. A good example of this was the actions of the commander of the 2nd ACR at 73 Eastings. His own tactical acumen and a military culture that allowed deviation if it brought victory set the stage for a huge victory over the IRG.

Not only did he disregard higher directives, but when he did so the rest of the VII corps was able to conform to his actions on the fly at night deep behind enemy lines resulting in the destruction of 5 divisions in just a few hours.

[crobato]

Flawed collectivism? Are you still subscribing to pre-fed stereotypes? Chinese mindset towards family and traditions are actually quite very similar to Jewish, Eastern European, and Latin American cultures, and there are no lack of initiative there either.

Somehow, you have a country that is the most aggressively capitalistic in the world, and entrepreneurship is one of the main products of self initiative. With Chinese entrepreneurs striking out on their own to become the economic elite of Southeast Asia and everywhere around the world, there is certainly no lack of initiative with the Li Ka Shings of this world.

Communism as a whole is a failed experiment in China. It may have been thought, but it was never absorbed. I have never seen or met a mainland Chinese that actually remembers what Mao said. Once they got rid of Mao, note how fast the country shifted to an aggressive capitalistic mode. Even the PLA went capitalistic. What can be said about a military arm that actually owns businesses? Is that a reflection of a collectivist mindset? Sheer greed itself is a completely selfish act, and being selfish is a trait of being individualistic because you are concerned with yourself and not as a whole. It became so bad that one of the major reforms on the PLA was to get rid of its businesses.

The Chinese never had a caste system by the way.

[zraver]

The Chinese never had a caste system by the way.

it's late and I am off to give my pillow some head but..

All societies have castes. The only difference is the amount of social mobility between the upper and lower echelons of soceity.

[bd popeye]

You gents know the rules..stay on topic and no politics!:nono: No need to start a;

http://www.dezh.de/imghosting/e943ec9adcd5ba5d51beac9d1c661083.jpg

[Norfolk]

The reorganization of at least two Group Armies along Soviet Unified Army Corps (Operational Maneouvre Group) lines with 2 Armoured Brigades and 2 Mechanized Brigades (themselves organized along US Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team lines) each and a brigade each of artilley, and engineers along with an air defence battalion, etc., indicates a very deliberate and concerted attempt by the PLA to reorganize for Combined Arms operations par excellence. The two Group Armies concerned would in effect each be the equivalent of a reinforced Western Armoured Division, potentially very powerful.

There are at least two questions that remain to be answered, however. The first is whether the PLA has achieved a basic maturity in combined arms operations at least the tactical and preferably, the operational level, as well. If not, and what information is coming out seems to suggest that the PLA is still shaky in combined arms warfare even at the tactical level (while these photos are probably just for show, what photos of Combined Arms exercises that do come out of China seem to show an unfamiliarity between the combat arms with each other), let alone the operational level, then the new Group Army structure may at least encourage greater Combined Arms training and familiarity.

Granted, many of these photos may just be for show, and tell us relatively little about the true capabilities of the PLA. But I tell you, if these photos do show, more or less, what the PLA is presently capable of in the realm of Combined Arms warfare, then someone ought to tell the Central Military Commission and the General Staff Department that whatever they are doing, this isn't the way to do it.:confused:If what the PLA is doing is copying foreign (and especially Western) and disparate concepts and then jumbling them together into a made-in-China whole, then it seems to be showing in the photos we're getting.

The second question is what models of Combined Arms operations is the PLA following? As the new Group Army concept seems to show, the PLA seems to be cobbling together different concepts from different sources into a new synthesis. The two most obvious models appear to be the Soviet Unified Army Corps concept and the US Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team concept.

The Soviet UAC (or Operational Manoeuvre Group as NATO called it) was purely offensive, designed to exploit (or even make if necessary, then exploit) a penetration of the enemy front lines and proceed to tear up the enemy's rear areas (headquarters, fire support, logistics trains, bases, lines-of-communication, etc.).

The US Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team epitomizes the "Netcentric Warfare" concept that has started in the US Army and been enthusiastically adopted by the PLA - the basic idea being that one can do more with less provided the proper digital informations systems, links, and procedures are in place - and thus discard traditional formation structures and reduce force sizes.

To the extent that I can perceive any other major foreign concept here, I discern a (sort of) return to an "ideal" WWII German Army Panzerkorps (rarely if ever achieved by the Germans themselves) with 2 Armoured formations and 2 Mechanized/Motorized Formations. In this concept, the Armoured Brigades (presumably) would spearhead the offensive and the Mechanized Brigades would follow in their wake to mop up bypassed centres of resistance, freeing up the Armoured Brigades for exploitation and pursuit.

Either the PLA does not recognize the incompatibilities, never mind the weaknesses, inherent in its amalgamation of these disparate concepts, or it is convinced that by copying and combining the most advanced Combined Arms concepts of other practitioners of Combined Arms warfare together with the adoption of the technologies that these require, it can both mitigate its own relative lack of experience in this area as well as get in on the cutting edge of Combined Arms warfare by doing so.

Aside from the photos that have been released by the PLA, and these seem to show a shaky mastery of Combined Arms warfare at the tactical level, there is another source of evidence that suggests that the PLA may not grasp the full import of problems at either the tactical or the operational levels. And that is from the organization of the Group Armies themselves. Unless the PLA intends to use them just as the Soviets intended to use their UAC's (that is, as specialized exploitation forces designed to wreak havoc in the enemy rear, rather than to physically destroy the enemy's main forces) in which case a proportion of several Group Armies structured in a more traditional configuration to each UAC-type Group Army would be required. As is, and especially with the Mechanized Brigades being reorganized somewhat along US Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team lines (thus lacking much of the sheer infantry manpower to mop up bypassed enemy centres of resistence and to hold ground won by the Armoured Brigades - A WWII German Panzerkorps concept), it would be doubly difficult to clear and hold ground given the overall organization of the Group Army along UAC lines.

As the Germans discovered in WWII (and their opponents later in the war as well), Heavy ground units must have a proportion of infantry units to armour units of 2 to 1, no more, no less, under almost any circumstances - fighting in open or close country, on steppes or in cities, on offense or defense - and Heavy units must not only be able to win ground in order to destroy the enemy, but also to hold it - and this proved to be the fly in the ointment for German Panzerdivisionen and Panzergrenadierdivisionen, the former could not hold the ground it had taken, and the latter could not be present in sufficient quantity due to the competition for resources between the two types of divisions, and subsequently much of the Soviet Army, even though defeated and surrounded, was still able to escape to fight another day. The Germans also discovered that the Panzergreandierdivisionen were incapable of mobile defensive operations (in order to free up the Panzerdivisionen for counter-attacks, in theory at least) withpout suffering crippling losses in the face of enemy armoured formations.

The German solution (and it worked to the extent that such divisions were available, and failed to the extent that there weren't enough of them) was to restructure the Armoured Division (Panzerdivision) with a ration of 2 Infantry Companies for each Armoured Company. 2 regiments of panzergrenadiers and 1 regiment of panzers, properly structured into ad hoc Battle Groups (Kampfgruppen) according to the tactical situation gave an almost perfectly balanced division fully capable of offensive and defensive operations in almost any terrain. The Mechanized/Motorized Divisions (Panzergrenadierdivision) that had been created to complement the Panzer Divisions were left in practice to wither away.

The PLA is in danger of making the same initial mistakes as the Germans, and adding to that errors or misunderstood or -applied concepts from other quarters to them. The PLA does not (so far as I can tell) seem to recognize this so far.

[King_Comm]

At a tactical and operational level, Soviet doctrine does not call for the taking and holding of ground in offensive operations except for the purpose of facilitating movement and logistics.

Deep battle, as Tukhachevsky originally envisioned, a commander is to impose his will upon his enemy, constantly forcing the enemy to react to him, and if he's good enough, he will give the enemy very limited choices on how to react, forcing them to react in manners that can be easily predicted, thus creating an artificial ability see ahead.

And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept

The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.

[Norfolk]

At a tactical and operational level, Soviet doctrine does not call for the taking and holding of ground in offensive operations except for the purpose of facilitating movement and logistics.

And, that's the idea behind the operational maneouvre group (OMG), it is unsuitable for close combat, it's job is to penetrate deep in to the enemy rear, and that's all it does, it forces the enemy to react to its presence, and one of the most common thing to do when one's rear is compromised is to retreat, the enemy defence is thus unhinged, then the infantry heavy force facing the enemy will apply frontal pressure, while the OMG will continue to advance beside the the enemy's route of retreat, forming a combined pursuit, the commander will be able to control the direction and the pace of the enemy retreat. This is only a small part of an extremely watered down version of Soviet armoured warfare concept, if you want more details, you can refer to Richard E Simpkin's Red Armour: An Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept

The point is, if the PLA indeed intend to follow this path, then the new motor-rifle brigades resemblance to Stryker brigades might be superficial--the Chinese are merely using the netcentric concept to enhance the capability of units that perform very different roles to the Stryker brigades.

If the PLA has indeed converted at least two army corps/Group Armies from traditional armoured/mechanized corps into Unified Army Corps/OMGs, why do they think that they need them, given that such formations are purely offensive? It is one thing to form Soviet-style ad hoc Forward Detachments based upon a battalion or even a regiment (or whatever is needed at the time), but at least two permanently organized, (Western) division-sized forces? The US Army only has 2 Armoured Divisions. As for UACs/OMGs, they do not have the stamina (due to their relative lack of infantry) to take and hold ground, so it is unclear that Group Armies organized along such lines are of much use in defensive operations. As far as I know, the two Group Armies in question are stationed in the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions, respectively.

As I wrote in my last post (#20) on this thread, if the PLA intends to use these as the Soviets did, then there will have to be several conventionally-organized Group Armies for each UAC/OMG-organized Group Army for the concept to work, especially in offensive operations. Someone, somewhere, has to close with and destroy the enemy, and that requires forces that can take and hold ground. The German panzerkorps of WWII were usually able to defeat their opponents (especially in the early years), but because of their lack of infantry, they were unable to close with and destroy the enemy. On the Eastern Front, hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were able to escape capture or destruction, though ostensibly surrounded by the Germans, even with the main heavy-marching infantry holding the Soviets to their front while the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions of the Panzer Corps took the Soviets by their flanks and rear, tearing up their rear areas as they went.

What we would knowadays refer to as "Manoeuvre Warfare" was not possible to put fully into practice. "Attrition Warfare", for all sides in WII (and many other wars since) proved impossible to completely escape from. In any case, the physical destruction of the enemy is necesary, and should be the objective; only if the enemy otherwise gives in beforehand or simply collapses can his physical destruction be dispensed with. And so, traditionally-organized heavy ground forces capable of such are completely necessary. The PLA needs to reaffirm this if it is finding itself tempted (Western-style) to change its mind on this matter.

If the PLA ultimately converts most or all of its armoured/mechanized army corps/Group Armies to a UAC/OMG organization (it is not clear what their intentions are here), then they will end up with formations incapable of defensive operations and lacking the requisite heavy forces to fight the main-force battle in order to engage in offensive operations. I think the two main questions at this stage are, is the PLA going to convert either just a few, or most/all of its Heavy forces to this UAC/OMG organization? And given either choice, do they grasp the implications of either result? The answer to the latter question: the first means that they are assuming a Soviet-style offensive posture, and intend to possibly strike first if they deem war to be inevitable; the second means that they have a main-force incapable of sustainable offensive as well as defensive operations. The answer to the former question: only time will tell whether only a few or many Group Armies will be reorganized along UAC/OMG lines with Stryker Brigade Netcentric capabilities.

I suppose that latter point (Stryker Brigade-type Netcentricity) raises another question: does the PLA believe that Netcentricity will allow it to dispense with traditionally organized Army corps/group armies and fight the main-force battle with UAC/OMG type Group Armies instead?:confused: I guess we'll find out if the PLA converts several more formations to this organization. If the PLA knows what it is doing, at least at the operational level, it will not pursue this course.

[King_Comm]

There is no sign to suggest that the PLA is converting all of its forces formations that are unsuitable for close combat, from what I have seen, the Chinese have only converted 2 out of the 18 armies into some sort of high mobility groups, and from what I have seen so far, most infantry units that were downgraded to brigades had this happened to them because of there low manning and readiness rather than anything else, most high readiness units have retained their division structure, saving a few elite units that are experimenting with net-centric warfare.

[Norfolk]

There is great uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the reogranization of the PLA, especially in the area of Combined-Arms Warfare. crobato recently started a thread in the other forum called Right Sizing the PLA, based upon the USAWC SSI publication called "Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army":

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB784.pdf

This document covers practically the entire Chinese Armed Forces; however, the part that is applicable to this thread concerns the reorganization of its land forces, and for the purposes of this post, those that pertain espeically to its Heavy Formations. According this document, the PLA has or is in the midst of converting 2 of its 18 Group Armies into a Soviet-style UAC/OMG organization - 2 Armoured Brigades, 2 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, a Brigade each of Artillery, Air Defence, Engineers, Aviation, etc., with a further 3 Group Armies either also undergoing or planned to undergo said conversion. Thus a total of 5 of the PLA's 18 existing Group Armies may possess this organization within a few to several years. Martin Andrew provides a description of this Group Army organization, pointing out that it would be useful to secure Chinese access to petroleum reserves in Central Asia in the event of war there:

http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2900.html

However, the PLA seems also to be retaining more traditional organization for some of its Heavy Formation Group Armies. The same Martin Andrew describes a modernization of the traditional PLA Mechanized Infantry Division, noting that it too, is well suited for operations in China's Far West, particularly in desert and mountainous regions:

http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373403

The new Mechanized Infantry Division organization is not a dramatic departure from the earlier organization; neverthless, there are some innovations. One of them is the adoption of 4 IFVs per infantry platoon instead of the traditional 3, affording the Platoon HQ its own vehicle. Furthermore, the Type 86 (BMP-1) IFV has been modified by the removal of its 73mm gun and ATGM, replaced by a 30mm Chain Gun. Each Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Division has 18 ATGM and 12 portable SAM. Each Mechanized Infantry Battalion possesses a Support Company with 5 100mm mortars, 3 ATGM, and 4 Automatic Grenade Launchers.

Overall, the modernized Mechanized Infantry Division will consist, as before (except for the change from Regiments to Brigades), of 3 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, an Armoured Brigade, an Artillery Brigade with 72 122mm SPGs, an Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and an Engineer Battalion, etc.

Andrew also mentioned a modernization of the Armoured Division, and the article indicated that the reoganization would include 105 MBTs for each Armoured Brigade (35 Type 88B or Type 99 per Tank Battalion), 72 152mm or 155mm SPGs (Model 83 or PLZ-45), an anti-Tank Regiment with 6 PTZ-89 120mm SPATGs and 18 Red Arrow 8 ATGM.

Andrew's articles do not mention how many Mechanized Infantry and Armoured Divisions were being so modernized, nor how many of the "Heavy" Group Armies would likewise be retained and modernized. However, given that 5 of the 18 Group Armies will have a more-or-less strictly offensive configuration (those being reorganized along Soviet UAC/OMG lines), there should be perhaps twice that many (at least) conventional Heavy Group Armies to fight the main force battle as the former conduct break-outs and then tear up the enemy rear echelons, permitting the main force Group Armies to roll up and destroy the enemy main battle forces.

As a total of 13 Group Armies will not have a UAC/OMG type configuration, there may be some operational strain in a general war situation (unforeseeable as that may be), particularly as at least a few Group Armies will either be rquired on other frontiers, or necessarily possess a "Light" or "Medium" configuration for other necessary tasks. Nevertheless, the PLA is aggressively reorganizing and modernizing for Combined Arms Warfare; if the PLA is ever required to engage in said, it would be interesting to see how its innovations work out.

Lastly, Martin Andrew has also written an article about the PLA's reorganization of its Logistical system; some of this appears dated, particularly with regards to feeding and messing (SampanViking's thread and its accompanying article on the feeding of PLA troops seems to demonstrate that some of Andrew's information in this regard is rather obsolete). Nevertheless, the information, in the absence of anything better, is useful, and it covers Combat Support (Engineers particularly) as well as, of course, Combat Service Support. "Modernizing PLA Logistics":

http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2781.html

[Norfolk]

Modest news blurb from PLA Daily about how a Division has been able to both economize on training resources while at the same time improving Combined-Arms training:

Division of Chengdu MAC cuts down training cost (http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2008-02/02/content_1112771.htm), By Wang Jun and Zhang Picong, PLA Daily (English Version), 2 February, 2008 -


Division Commander Rao went on to say that the previous decentralized training and independent training between the officers and men practiced by units of all levels are likely to decentralize the training resources and lead to low efficiency. To address this issue, the Party committee of the division decided on three types of training foci, i.e. long-distance maneuver, command and control, and combination of personnel with armaments, and decided on organizing a minor training of combat readiness monthly, a comprehensive camping and field training quarterly, and an all-member, all-element and full-course targeted exercise with actual troops annually.

More, including how this was achieved and what the savings were determined to amount to, at the link.

This is a recurring issue for Armies; do you concentrate your time and money on training from the individual through sub-unit to minor-unit levels, or skimp on those and devote your time and resources to major-unit and formation-level training? There is often not enough money to do both, and sometimes there is not enough time anyway, depending upon personnel rotations or training courses, operational taskings, and of course the competence of commanders and staff, amongst other things.

This Division has apparently achieved something remarkable in that it has apparently been able to do both the lower-level and the higher-level training, and with substantially fewer resources to top it off. Simulators certainly have their place, and substantially reducing the number of staff officers involved in running things is, in all too many Armies, a major improvement in and of itself, never mind the other benefits that accrue to placing key functions back into the hands of commanders themselves.

That said, there is no substitute for the hard and nitty-gritty of the field, and when the PLA Daily reports that a 40% reduction in "equipment exercises" has been achieved, I get nervous. Cutting Field time by perhaps up to 40% will certainly reduce peacetime training costs, but it seems doubtful that replacing that amount of field time with simulation is really an improvement, efficient though it is. The use of simulators to replace field training has become very popular over the last decade or so in many militaries, and will continue to do so. Unfortunately, the only way to know if this approach really works is to get into a major war and win it more or les handily; conversely, if things don't turn out so well on the battlefield, it is a pretty good presumption that something in the training system went wrong. Hopefully we'll never know one way or the other.

[SampanViking]

To me, the training issue sounds more like a response to modernisation than anything else. It works on the premise that a more modern army is a more expensive army and that what used to work fine, when everything was a lot of guys with AK's RPG7's and light mortars, is no longer fine when its Heavy Armour and State of Art guided weaponry.

It also suggests that more time in the classroom is needed to become familiar with modern equipment, rather than just being fit and keen eyed.

On that basis, less can be more, if time is spent improving efficiency and knowledge which is then put to use in larger less frequent field operations (which presumably is the only way to practise joint operations).

Going back to formations, I hope that the PLA retains a large number of more traditional formations but geared to modern Light Infantry work. I see this as a Sword and Shield approach with the Light Units holding territory, moving forward and reconnoitring and probing, with the Heavy Units coming out and hitting hard and then withdrawing just as quickly behind the shield. It makes little sense to simply choose from one formation over the other, as the great thing with being China is that you should be able to have plenty of all the possible variations you might want to use.

[Norfolk]

I largely agree with you SampanViking; the only place that I would substantially disagree with you is on the matter of using simulators to replace field work. Simulators should really be used to replace much of the classroom time that goes some way to making up the 2/3rds of the training cycle that troops normally spend in Garrison. There can be a lot of useless "information" flung at the troops while in Garrison, with 1-hour's worth of instruction shoe-horned into 3 or 4 hours by mediocre or even incompetent lesson plans and teaching points. The nonsense that often passes for "instruction" in Garrison is often grossly wasteful, and worse, often utterly ineffectual. Simulation used in lieu of padded and pedantic classroom lessons would go a long way to improving training and readiness. The 1/3rd of the time that troops spend in the Field is necessary.

[Norfolk]

Very good article on our parent site, SinoDefence.com on the PLA's experience with the new Brigade structure. It turns out that combined-arms at Battalion-level has yet to really take off, and that the Battle Group concept is only now being fully and formally pursued in place of leaving combined-arms to be handle mainly at the old Regimental or the new Brigade levels:

"PLA's New Modular Force Structure (http://www.sinodefence.com/research/battalion/default.asp)", at SinoDefence.com, 27 April, 2008.

[Gollevainen]

And what is important is that this article only descripes the "joint arms" operations inside the normal land force divisional spectrum of arms. I would assume that the joint-branch operational ability is even more in the level "good to have in the future".

That article in SD mainsite pretty much reveals what I've been saying a long time now, PLA is no way near ready in its land forces modernisation program. The proplem is that in these forums, many members tends to focus solely on the weapons and equipment and their off-the-context performance datas. Most of them have no idea of even the basics of how land force organisations works and how some weaponsystem fits on to it.

Having fancy toys is one thing, having the ability, knowledge and organisational structure to operate them is another. The latter is IMO more cruisal than the first one in some extent. Altough PLA has made considerable effort in fielding some very potential new weaponsystems, it still rely too much of the old, stiff and inferior-prooven operational doctrines. Sadly many member in these forums just sees the guns and think they are ready to be used just like that.

[King_Comm]

I think the traditional structure of the PLA has made this transition some what more difficult, PLA's units are usually significantly smaller than their western counterparts, and commanded by some one of lower rank, basically, a Chinese regiment is like a slightly larger battalion.

Then is it possible for the Chinese to build this modular combat groups based on regiments rather than battalion? Each brigade can have one such combat group, and each division can have 2 to 3.

[Norfolk]

Not sure whether it's so much the PLA's concentration on the Regimental-level as what it has expected each tactical-level to do. True enough, Eastern Armies in general tend to use Regiments in much the same way as Western Armies generally use Battalions. But then, the Germans retained the Regimental-level and did not bother with the Brigade-level expect in extraordinary cases; and of course, the Germans were the masters of tactical-level combined-arms warfare. To develop that point a little further, the Germans recognized that the commander of an Armoured Regiment had the specialized training, experience, and knowledge (not to mention particular temperament) best suited for leading tactical-level armour-heavy combined-arms operations. As such, the Armoured Regiment in an Armoured Division normally lent itself (or its constitutent Armoured Battalions) to task-organizing as a Battle Group(s) for such operations; conversely, as the commanders of the two Infantry Regiments usually possessed the best skills for handling combined-arms operations requiring the holdign of ground, clearing of enemy positions, or fighting in close country, those Regiments (or their constituent Battalions) of course formed the basis of Battle Groups task-organized for such operations. In short, my argument is that by seeking to replace the Regiment and Division structures with Brigade and the latest Group Army structures, the PLA has actually introduced a structural impediment to its mastering of tactical-level combined-arms warfare.

I would argue that there is probably an undue emphasis upon "Modularity" these days in many Armies, that there is a doctrinal predilection to see Battalions as "plug n'play" add-ons to rather amorphous Brigades. This is a mistake. Mixing-and-matching beers (when beer retailers are so willing) is great; mixing and matching Battalions from different Regiments and Brigades who have infrequent or no permanent working associations is just asking for trouble. This is all the greater a problem when those Regiments or Brigades are from very different-type Formations, such as slotting an Armoured Battalion (from an Armoured or Mechanized Infantry Brigade) into a Light Infantry Brigade, or an Air Assault Infantry Battalion into an Armoured Brigade. The tankers are thinking, anticipating, and working in terms at 25 km/h; the Light Infantry are thinking, anticipating, and working in terms of 4 km/h. And this does not even address the matter of the very different tasks and roles between different type-Formations which in turn affect the way their constituent Battalions "work".