bd popeye
09-26-2005, 03:24 PM
Oh I think so. It has been converted from a Trident SSBN to a cruise missile packin SSGN. It can carry 154 missiles + speical detatchments of Navy SEALS. As far as I can research the USN is converting only 4 of these subs. Check it out!! I edited the text. It was way to long. Use the posted link to read the entire text.
http://www.ohio.navy.mil/html/conversion.htm
USS Ohio SSGN 726
Trident SSGN
The basic idea behind Trident SSGN is that nuclear deterrence will require fewer ballistic missile submarines in the post Cold War period than the l8 Tridents presently in service, but that boats rendered redundant by nuclear force reductions are uniquely well-suited for conversion to conventional land attack missions. These missions have been growing in importance in Navy and Marine Corps planning since the early 1990s, but as the fate of the arsenal ship demonstrates, acquiring the platforms and technology to execute them effectively is no easy feat. Much of the current force structure was designed for blue water operations that some observers believe have diminished relevance in the post Cold War world, but it is not feasible to rapidly replace that force structure with new vessels oriented to littoral warfare. Aside from the fact that nuclear deterrence, sea control and other traditional missions remain important, the resources to quickly design and build several new classes of littoral warships simply are not available. Even if they were, the desirability of building new vessels specialized in a particular type of naval warfare rather than having broad, multi-mission utility would be debatable.
Trident SSGN resolves these dilemmas by providing a near term solution to littoral warfighting requirements that is low cost, sur-vivable and highly versatile. In its baseline concept, the SSGN would replace nuclear missiles in 22 of the Tridents 24 tubes with Vertical Launch System (VLS) canisters that hold six conventional land attack missiles per tube. A single Ohio class boat would carry 132 such missiles, a mix of Tomahawk cruise missiles and the naval variant of the Army Tactical Missile system known as NTACMS. The Tomahawk would provide precision strike against interior land targets, while the NTACMS short range ballistic would provide rapid response against targets closer to the coast, including such time urgent targets as Scud bases. With a full complement of 132 missiles, a single Trident SSGN provides a covert and powerful force to serve as the forward echelon of a Joint Task force, suppressing defenses and anti-access forces. In addition, the SSGN also serves to make more missiles cells in the surface battle force available for anti-air and TMD missions.
But it also could serve as tar more than a summered version of the ill-fated arsenal ship. In the baseline concept, two of the Trident SSGN tubes would be modified to function as lockin-lockout chambers for special operations personnel. The large interior volume of Ohio class boats could accommodate 66 such personnel for extended periods, and over 100 for briefer spans. In addition, the Trident would retain its existing anti-ship and undersea warfare capabilities, plus its extensive capacity for reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering. The Trident SSGN would thus be transformed into a multi-role warship with numerous littoral applications, and at the same time could serve as a tested for innovative submarine modular payload concepts, ideas that have been inhibited by the traditional 21 inch torpedo tube.
There are many operational advantages in such a concept. First of all, Trident SSGN would be highly survivable; able to non-provocatively operate near potential littoral adversaries in advance of hostilities without fear of being preemptively attacked. Second, Trident SSGN could operate autonomously throughout all phases of a conflict, collecting intelligence useful in impending operations, preparing the battlespace for the arrival of surface and/or airborne assets, and delivering the first highly precise response to aggression.
Third, Trident SSGN also would operate seamlessly as part of a larger Joint Task Force, integrating its capabilities with those of surface, air and land assets to create a multi-dimensional approach to littoral warfare. Fourth, it could operate without requiring local air or sea control, and would require little or no protection from other friendly forces because of its combination of stealth and self-defense capabilities. Finally, it would require little logistical support during forward deployments and littoral operations due to its relatively low manning requirements and the remarkable endurance afforded by nuclear propulsion.
These operational virtues are complemented by Trident SSGN's low cost. New ship construction would not be needed because the vessels would be drawn from the four SSBNs designated for removal from strategic service by the Nuclear Posture Review. Following refueling and relatively inexpensive modification, the four converted boats would be available for 20 years of service. In fact, with dual crews similar to the SSBN operating regimen, two of the four boats could be on station near littoral trouble spots over 80 percent of the time. The cost of new support infrastructure would be minimal, because the present concept is to operate the SSGNS from the existing Trident bases, with two deploying from Bangor, Washington to the pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and two from Kings Bay, Georgia to the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Aside from its fiscal and operational advantages, the Trident SSGN would have considerable growth potential. At additional cost, tubes could be further modified to carry 12 missiles each rather than the presently planned six. New variants of Tomahawk and NTACMS can be introduced for attacks against buried command centers and other special categories of targets. Unmanned aerial or underwater vehicles can be employed to enhance situational awareness and targeting capability. Even the number of boats could be increased beyond four if future strategic arms control agreements further reduce the requirement for strategic forces. As the National Defense Panel apparently recognized, Trident SSGN is not only a concept with tremendous near term operational and fiscal appeal1 but it has potentially even greater advantages in the medium to long term.
With the kinds of asymmetric strategies capable adversaries might adopt. It described a series of technological, organizational and tactical steps broadly compatible with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs to remake American forces. The Panel described the key characteristics of future US forces as including mobility, stealth, speed, range, precision, automation and a minimal logistics footprint. In addition, it placed great emphasis on network-based force structures exploiting digital technologies to both conduct information warfare and protect their own information systems.
Within this intellectual framework, the Trident SSGN stands out as an especially effective platform-a harbinger of what future naval warfighting platforms will need to look like. First of all, it has the stealth feature necessary to survive in the fast-paced, extremely violent environment of future littoral warfare.
Second, it has the speed, mobility and range of modern nuclear powered submarines.
Third, it has almost no logistics footprint at all once on station in an operational mode.
Fourth, its Tomahawk and NTACMS missiles would provide extremely precise targeting options against a wide variety of assets at considerable ranges-a feature likely to be bolstered with the introduction of advanced missile and targeting technologies.
Fifth, the Trident SSGN will operate autonomously rather than being dependent on vulnerable forward bases or surface assets. Sixth, the Trident SSGN will be networked with other naval and joint warfighting elements to be part of a truly network-centric force structure while being largely impervious to attacks against its onboard information systems
Finally, a combination of stealth, intelligence gathering and special operations capability will enable Trident SSGN to conduct its own unique forms of information warfare.
When all of these features are considered, it is clear that no other system likely to enter the near term inventory of any US military service so completely matches the performance criteria of the National Defense Panel as the Trident SSGN. While no one system can provide all the capabilities required by the NDP's transformation strategy, Trident SSGN incorporates a remarkable wide range of the features assigned highest priority in the Panel report. Thus it is no surprise that a body that had little to say about the vast majority of current Navy and Marine Corps systems nonetheless focused on the Trident conversion as an important step toward more capable military forces.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Trident SSGN proposal is that it provides a platform thoroughly consistent with the requirements of the Revolution in Military Affairs not by mounting a leap-ahead development program, but through the inexpensive modification of a proven legacy system. The NDP report underscores this fact and also points to the broader relevance of submarine stealth, range, endurance and precision in the radically transformed warfighting environment of the future. As an initial, low cost step in dealing effectively with the challenging demands of that environment, Trident SSGN deserves the support of the Navy and the nation
http://www.ohio.navy.mil/html/conversion.htm
USS Ohio SSGN 726
Trident SSGN
The basic idea behind Trident SSGN is that nuclear deterrence will require fewer ballistic missile submarines in the post Cold War period than the l8 Tridents presently in service, but that boats rendered redundant by nuclear force reductions are uniquely well-suited for conversion to conventional land attack missions. These missions have been growing in importance in Navy and Marine Corps planning since the early 1990s, but as the fate of the arsenal ship demonstrates, acquiring the platforms and technology to execute them effectively is no easy feat. Much of the current force structure was designed for blue water operations that some observers believe have diminished relevance in the post Cold War world, but it is not feasible to rapidly replace that force structure with new vessels oriented to littoral warfare. Aside from the fact that nuclear deterrence, sea control and other traditional missions remain important, the resources to quickly design and build several new classes of littoral warships simply are not available. Even if they were, the desirability of building new vessels specialized in a particular type of naval warfare rather than having broad, multi-mission utility would be debatable.
Trident SSGN resolves these dilemmas by providing a near term solution to littoral warfighting requirements that is low cost, sur-vivable and highly versatile. In its baseline concept, the SSGN would replace nuclear missiles in 22 of the Tridents 24 tubes with Vertical Launch System (VLS) canisters that hold six conventional land attack missiles per tube. A single Ohio class boat would carry 132 such missiles, a mix of Tomahawk cruise missiles and the naval variant of the Army Tactical Missile system known as NTACMS. The Tomahawk would provide precision strike against interior land targets, while the NTACMS short range ballistic would provide rapid response against targets closer to the coast, including such time urgent targets as Scud bases. With a full complement of 132 missiles, a single Trident SSGN provides a covert and powerful force to serve as the forward echelon of a Joint Task force, suppressing defenses and anti-access forces. In addition, the SSGN also serves to make more missiles cells in the surface battle force available for anti-air and TMD missions.
But it also could serve as tar more than a summered version of the ill-fated arsenal ship. In the baseline concept, two of the Trident SSGN tubes would be modified to function as lockin-lockout chambers for special operations personnel. The large interior volume of Ohio class boats could accommodate 66 such personnel for extended periods, and over 100 for briefer spans. In addition, the Trident would retain its existing anti-ship and undersea warfare capabilities, plus its extensive capacity for reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering. The Trident SSGN would thus be transformed into a multi-role warship with numerous littoral applications, and at the same time could serve as a tested for innovative submarine modular payload concepts, ideas that have been inhibited by the traditional 21 inch torpedo tube.
There are many operational advantages in such a concept. First of all, Trident SSGN would be highly survivable; able to non-provocatively operate near potential littoral adversaries in advance of hostilities without fear of being preemptively attacked. Second, Trident SSGN could operate autonomously throughout all phases of a conflict, collecting intelligence useful in impending operations, preparing the battlespace for the arrival of surface and/or airborne assets, and delivering the first highly precise response to aggression.
Third, Trident SSGN also would operate seamlessly as part of a larger Joint Task Force, integrating its capabilities with those of surface, air and land assets to create a multi-dimensional approach to littoral warfare. Fourth, it could operate without requiring local air or sea control, and would require little or no protection from other friendly forces because of its combination of stealth and self-defense capabilities. Finally, it would require little logistical support during forward deployments and littoral operations due to its relatively low manning requirements and the remarkable endurance afforded by nuclear propulsion.
These operational virtues are complemented by Trident SSGN's low cost. New ship construction would not be needed because the vessels would be drawn from the four SSBNs designated for removal from strategic service by the Nuclear Posture Review. Following refueling and relatively inexpensive modification, the four converted boats would be available for 20 years of service. In fact, with dual crews similar to the SSBN operating regimen, two of the four boats could be on station near littoral trouble spots over 80 percent of the time. The cost of new support infrastructure would be minimal, because the present concept is to operate the SSGNS from the existing Trident bases, with two deploying from Bangor, Washington to the pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and two from Kings Bay, Georgia to the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Aside from its fiscal and operational advantages, the Trident SSGN would have considerable growth potential. At additional cost, tubes could be further modified to carry 12 missiles each rather than the presently planned six. New variants of Tomahawk and NTACMS can be introduced for attacks against buried command centers and other special categories of targets. Unmanned aerial or underwater vehicles can be employed to enhance situational awareness and targeting capability. Even the number of boats could be increased beyond four if future strategic arms control agreements further reduce the requirement for strategic forces. As the National Defense Panel apparently recognized, Trident SSGN is not only a concept with tremendous near term operational and fiscal appeal1 but it has potentially even greater advantages in the medium to long term.
With the kinds of asymmetric strategies capable adversaries might adopt. It described a series of technological, organizational and tactical steps broadly compatible with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs to remake American forces. The Panel described the key characteristics of future US forces as including mobility, stealth, speed, range, precision, automation and a minimal logistics footprint. In addition, it placed great emphasis on network-based force structures exploiting digital technologies to both conduct information warfare and protect their own information systems.
Within this intellectual framework, the Trident SSGN stands out as an especially effective platform-a harbinger of what future naval warfighting platforms will need to look like. First of all, it has the stealth feature necessary to survive in the fast-paced, extremely violent environment of future littoral warfare.
Second, it has the speed, mobility and range of modern nuclear powered submarines.
Third, it has almost no logistics footprint at all once on station in an operational mode.
Fourth, its Tomahawk and NTACMS missiles would provide extremely precise targeting options against a wide variety of assets at considerable ranges-a feature likely to be bolstered with the introduction of advanced missile and targeting technologies.
Fifth, the Trident SSGN will operate autonomously rather than being dependent on vulnerable forward bases or surface assets. Sixth, the Trident SSGN will be networked with other naval and joint warfighting elements to be part of a truly network-centric force structure while being largely impervious to attacks against its onboard information systems
Finally, a combination of stealth, intelligence gathering and special operations capability will enable Trident SSGN to conduct its own unique forms of information warfare.
When all of these features are considered, it is clear that no other system likely to enter the near term inventory of any US military service so completely matches the performance criteria of the National Defense Panel as the Trident SSGN. While no one system can provide all the capabilities required by the NDP's transformation strategy, Trident SSGN incorporates a remarkable wide range of the features assigned highest priority in the Panel report. Thus it is no surprise that a body that had little to say about the vast majority of current Navy and Marine Corps systems nonetheless focused on the Trident conversion as an important step toward more capable military forces.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Trident SSGN proposal is that it provides a platform thoroughly consistent with the requirements of the Revolution in Military Affairs not by mounting a leap-ahead development program, but through the inexpensive modification of a proven legacy system. The NDP report underscores this fact and also points to the broader relevance of submarine stealth, range, endurance and precision in the radically transformed warfighting environment of the future. As an initial, low cost step in dealing effectively with the challenging demands of that environment, Trident SSGN deserves the support of the Navy and the nation