PLAN choke points [Archive] - China Defence Today Forum

IDonT

09-22-2005, 02:20 PM

The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defence strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal.

The major problem of attaining the 2nd island chain capability is that China's geography makes it hard for her to break out into blue waters. These choke points will really hamper China's blue water ambition.

They are:
1.) Straight of Malacca towards the Indian ocean. Indian held Andaman Islands guard the Indian Ocean entrance while Singapore guard the south china sea entrance.

2.) Luzon straight and East China Sea pass the Ryukyu islands are the only way out towards the Pacific. Okinawa and Guam bases guards the exit out.

Choke points were the same problems faced by the Soviet Union. Its Black Sea fleet is hemmed in by the Straight of Bhospurrous (sp), North Fleet by the Greenland, Iceland, UK gap, Baltic Fleet by Denmark and the North Sea, and the Pacific Fleet by Tsushima and the LA Perouse Straight which takes it very near Japan.

IDonT

03-17-2006, 10:12 AM

I want to ressurect this topic...:)

The main question is, what type of procurement strategy and tactic should the PLAN use to over come this geographic advantage

crobato

03-17-2006, 10:48 AM

What open source writings? From a long retired admiral in the PLAN? Does these still reflect the PLAN's current emphasis or strategy? Despite the PLAN's modernization efforts, there isn't enough effort and procurement being placed to "design" a navy intended for power projection capabilities.

Gollevainen

03-17-2006, 10:54 AM

well as the situation is close to the Soviet/russian historical proplem, as you mentioned, Propaply the solutions could be similar. You allready mentioned foreing bases and those were crucial to Soviet blue water deployment...as they practically are crucial to every super powers global reach. Most of the strategyes used are to be determ by the potential enemyes that chinese forces could face. But mostly its due the chinese foreing policy and bigger strategical choices that are the key to the proplem where as the normal naval tactics play little role. In effect there isent any off-the-shell solution in purely tactical level.

One major tactic that was dictated by similar situation of Russians was the strong ambhipious forces in Baltic combined by substansial amphibious forces of Poland and Germany. They were mostly mented to crush the relatively small danish opposition in Danish straits and rabidly secure them to free Soviet usage. Now, due the Taiwan proplem China has always maintained strong amphibious forces whit similar reach than warsav pact and PLAN is currently updating these. combined use of other strategic deployment troops to gain controll of these chocke points migth be the most visible tactick that China migth field to overcome this proplem. From others we can hardly tell, as its known fact that only way to determ Chinese naval tacktics are analyzing its troops and ships.

crobato

03-17-2006, 12:02 PM

The real PLAN choke point comes from those army generals who want more of the budget for the army and less for the navy, not to mention the air force wanting its share too. Grandoise plans aside, the real PLAN plans is to get a better budget next year and modernize within those means.

FreeAsia2000

03-17-2006, 12:08 PM

Following on from the idea of 'choke-points' . How about sea lanes as
a 'scarce resource'. Not just the idea that the PLAN might have problems
with choke points but what about the economies ?

While there are hundreds of chokepoints of regional and local economic importance, fewer than two dozen lie on the world’s international maritime trade routes (see figure 8–1), endowing them with global economic significance. Of these, nearly half are vulnerable to a form of stress or threat that could make them economically scarce resources. As such, they may become a source of conflict between nations.

Sea Lanes as Scarce Resources

The security of maritime trade hinges on the conception of sea lanes and chokepoints as scarce resources. Resource scarcities are typically characterized as absolute (the resource is nonrenewable) or relative; that is, “limited with respect to human wants and needs”14 (some scholars refer to these as Malthusian and Ricardian scarcities, respectively), but what all definitions have in common is that resource scarcity reflects the forces of supply and demand. In other words, scarcity of a resource implies that the quantity available and/or accessible falls short of effective demand. A resource is scarce when its supply is threatened: either the resource is nonrenewable or it is being used up too quickly to renew itself. Scarcity also exists when there is an increase in demand for the resource and, for whatever reason (typically because the supply of the good is fixed or diminishing and it has few, if any, substitutes), the market cannot set the price high enough to regulate the demand for the resource (the resource is price-inelastic).

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/09_ch08.htm

essentially not only the PLAN but also other world economies will need island nations as
bases for shipping. Thus I can see the wisdom behind Chinese attempts to use 'the pearls' as economic bases because the military use is secondary. commerce being the lifeblood etc

DPRKUnderground

03-17-2006, 04:49 PM

China needs a foreign base. I've been hearing stuff about a base in Indonesia(But don't Indonesians hate Chinese people?) which would provide access to the Srait of Malacca. Myanmar/Burma could do the job if a base could be created there. That way the Indian Ocean is up for the PLAN.

IDonT

03-30-2006, 04:06 PM

essentially not only the PLAN but also other world economies will need island nations as
bases for shipping. Thus I can see the wisdom behind Chinese attempts to use 'the pearls' as economic bases because the military use is secondary. commerce being the lifeblood etc

You know it was a Greek Admiral Themistocles that said: "He who commands the seas holds command of everything." While it is true that a conflict between US and China can deny the US the chinese market, the USN can deny China 90 percent of the world market.

MIGleader

03-30-2006, 04:22 PM

You know it was a Greek Admiral Themistocles that said: "He who commands the seas holds command of everything." While it is true that a conflict between US and China can deny the US the chinese market, the USN can deny China 90 percent of the world market.

Wrong. the U.s navy is not allowed to blockade china or try to sieze/sink chinese merchant ships going to foreign nations, in war or peace. I dont know why americans always think they are above international law and can do anything they want too. If america tries to do this, it will find that it's own market is going to be denied chinese goods aswell. The world will condemn the u.s actions.

IDonT

03-30-2006, 04:39 PM

FriedRiceNSpice

03-30-2006, 04:46 PM

Are you guys serious? Do you really think the USN can blockade the entire Chinese coast? You guys are too funny. :roll:

IDonT

03-30-2006, 04:51 PM

Are you guys serious? Do you really think the USN can blockade the entire Chinese coast? You guys are too funny. :roll:

Yes...the concept is called far blockade. All the US has to do is guard the Straight of Malacca, Luzon straight, and East China Sea exit. No shipping can go China's ports with US permission.

This won't be a 100 % blockade of course. The land route to Russia is still open. But considering the the majority of the world's goods travel by sea, then you have an effective economic blockade.

hallo84

03-30-2006, 05:40 PM

adeptitus

03-30-2006, 06:31 PM

Wrong. the U.s navy is not allowed to blockade china or try to sieze/sink chinese merchant ships going to foreign nations, in war or peace. I dont know why americans always think they are above international law and can do anything they want too. If america tries to do this, it will find that it's own market is going to be denied chinese goods aswell. The world will condemn the u.s actions.

In the event if US-PRC war, I doubt the US would be worried about trade with the PRC or seizure of PRC registered ships. Generally speaking Americans are law-biding 90% of the time, the when the other 10% infringes on its self-interest, the law is opposed or disregarded.

To cite one example, the US has no problems with seizing and sending foreign nationals for trial by the ICC, but when it comes to its own citizens, the US Congress passed the American Servicemember's Protection Act (ASPA), which authorizses the US President to use military force to free any US military personnel held by the ICC.

In addition, the US also pressured other countries to sign the Article 98 bilateral immunity agreement, which prohibits the surrender of any US citizen to the ICC. If the country refuse to sign, the US President may suspend military aid/sales to the country.

Are you guys serious? Do you really think the USN can blockade the entire Chinese coast? You guys are too funny. :roll:

The answer is, yes. The USN is the only naval power in the world today with such a capability, and the political muscle to use ports from Japan to Singapore for its war effort. They can sink every major PLAN vessel and destroy PRC port facilities with stand-off weapons. The PLAN & PLAAF may be able to sink some USN ships, but it wouldn't change the outcome. It's not necessary to maintain a blocade over long period of time, if you can muscle other countries into joining in economic sanctions against China.

If we look at some of PRC's neighbors, they wouldn't shed a tear if the USN sunk the bulk of PLAN ships. I think China's leadership understands the political the militay realities, and is willing to work patiently to develop a more favorable condition/environment. Notice I did not say "wait patiently". I said "work patiently". Slowly and surely, building up PRC's military might and economic influence over its neighbors.

FriedRiceNSpice

03-30-2006, 07:33 PM

It's not necessary to maintain a blocade over long period of time, if you can muscle other countries into joining in economic sanctions against China.

I find that much more agreeable. In open waters, the USN would be able to absolutely tear the PLAN apart with very little if any losses. However, much of the USN's advantages are mitigated when the battle takes place close to Chinese shores. The PLAAF and Chinese land-based air defenses will be able to nullify American carrier-based air power, and land-based missile systems can even out the odds a bit against superior American naval firepower. And even though the USN do possess high-tech standoff weapons, the Chinese also posses countless land-based naval attack and ballistic missiles.

Yes...the concept is called far blockade. All the US has to do is guard the Straight of Malacca, Luzon straight, and East China Sea exit. No shipping can go China's ports with US permission.

Yes, yes that is true. I didn't fully grasp what you were suggesting before that post. The PLAN is helpless outside the range of PLAAF cover and land-based weapons systems.

Finn McCool

03-30-2006, 08:12 PM

These routs you mentioned are not only the life line to China but also the whole of south east asia including Japan. Could the sea lanes be completely closed by the US? I don't think so... eventually US will submit to global and internal pressure to open up sea lanes again.

The US would let other nations supplies through...especially Japan's. Only Chinese ships would be turned back.

This blockade would not have an immediate enough effect. There are many examples of nations survivng blockade. The United States survived a blockade in the War of 1812, and before that the British were harrassing shipping to a lesser extent and had been for years. Again in the American Civil War the Confederate States were blockaded and even without an industrial base of their own they still fought against far superior forces for years. In WWI the Germans were competely blockaded but still fought for years. The same in WWII. In both cases Britain survived a mostly ineffective submarine blockade by the Germans (as any US blockade would probably have large holes simply because of China's size even with a deep blockade strategy or whatever its called.).

The conclusion I have drawn from these historical examples is this: blockades do effect an enemies war fighting capability, but not enough to destroy it on their own. In order to truly defeat an enemy through economic war, their industrial heartland must be destoryed. Look at WWII: Germany had a big enough empire to keep on fighting without getting resources from the rest of the world. Only when GROUND TROOPS denied them those resources was Germany finished. It would be the same with China. China is a large enough nation to survive a blockade and provide for itself.

However, China's economy would suffer massively. The CCP:china: leadership probably wou;d not be willing to take so massive a hit to the economic progress China has made in recent years. In a case of total war, a blockade would be something China could survive. But put one in place, and China may well decide that it is not worth the pain and simply concede on whatever issue it is that brought up the war.

The same goes for the US, but in a different way. The US could survive a blockade as well, it would be painful too, just as in China case. However China cannot blockade the US. So basically the above sentence doesn't matter. The most important point to remember in this case is that while China loses almost the entire world in markets and suppliers, the US only loses China. China is a big thing to lose, but much of the slack would be picked up by Mexico, India, etc.

I hope that made sense.

darth sidious

03-30-2006, 08:57 PM

In the event if US-PRC war, I doubt the US would be worried about trade with the PRC or seizure of PRC registered ships. Generally speaking Americans are law-biding 90% of the time, the when the other 10% infringes on its self-interest, the law is opposed or disregarded.

To cite one example, the US has no problems with seizing and sending foreign nationals for trial by the ICC, but when it comes to its own citizens, the US Congress passed the American Servicemember's Protection Act (ASPA), which authorizses the US President to use military force to free any US military personnel held by the ICC.

In addition, the US also pressured other countries to sign the Article 98 bilateral immunity agreement, which prohibits the surrender of any US citizen to the ICC. If the country refuse to sign, the US President may suspend military aid/sales to the country.

The answer is, yes. The USN is the only naval power in the world today with such a capability, and the political muscle to use ports from Japan to Singapore for its war effort. They can sink every major PLAN vessel and destroy PRC port facilities with stand-off weapons. The PLAN & PLAAF may be able to sink some USN ships, but it wouldn't change the outcome. It's not necessary to maintain a blocade over long period of time, if you can muscle other countries into joining in economic sanctions against China.

If we look at some of PRC's neighbors, they wouldn't shed a tear if the USN sunk the bulk of PLAN ships. I think China's leadership understands the political the militay realities, and is willing to work patiently to develop a more favorable condition/environment. Notice I did not say "wait patiently". I said "work patiently". Slowly and surely, building up PRC's military might and economic influence over its neighbors.

I wonder who will give base to the US for such an action countries connected by land will face an invasion from the chinese army if they try ( an invasion the US wont be able to stop)

also most of these countries are economeicaly connected to china so even less reason for them to do this

if you are thinking of Japan it will most likely be turned in peaice of waste land if it ever try as for SK china can unlesh KIM

darth sidious

03-30-2006, 09:08 PM

The US would let other nations supplies through...especially Japan's. Only Chinese ships would be turned back.

This blockade would not have an immediate enough effect. There are many examples of nations survivng blockade. The United States survived a blockade in the War of 1812, and before that the British were harrassing shipping to a lesser extent and had been for years. Again in the American Civil War the Confederate States were blockaded and even without an industrial base of their own they still fought against far superior forces for years. In WWI the Germans were competely blockaded but still fought for years. The same in WWII. In both cases Britain survived a mostly ineffective submarine blockade by the Germans (as any US blockade would probably have large holes simply because of China's size even with a deep blockade strategy or whatever its called.).

The conclusion I have drawn from these historical examples is this: blockades do effect an enemies war fighting capability, but not enough to destroy it on their own. In order to truly defeat an enemy through economic war, their industrial heartland must be destoryed. Look at WWII: Germany had a big enough empire to keep on fighting without getting resources from the rest of the world. Only when GROUND TROOPS denied them those resources was Germany finished. It would be the same with China. China is a large enough nation to survive a blockade and provide for itself.

However, China's economy would suffer massively. The CCP:china: leadership probably wou;d not be willing to take so massive a hit to the economic progress China has made in recent years. In a case of total war, a blockade would be something China could survive. But put one in place, and China may well decide that it is not worth the pain and simply concede on whatever issue it is that brought up the war.

The same goes for the US, but in a different way. The US could survive a blockade as well, it would be painful too, just as in China case. However China cannot blockade the US. So basically the above sentence doesn't matter. The most important point to remember in this case is that while China loses almost the entire world in markets and suppliers, the US only loses China. China is a big thing to lose, but much of the slack would be picked up by Mexico, India, etc.

I hope that made sense.

welcome to the 21th centry this is not 1812 learn a bit more about econ before talking

there are a million ways china can use to seek revenge on on america for this
they include :

1 dumping all T-bonds causing hell on the US economey

2 attack those nation that support the american effort

3 use ties to forgein nations the pressure US ( you can hold out against the world forever

the list goes on and on

also chinas surface fleet maybe be destroyed reletive quickly but airforce and sub fleet wont be so easy they can be usd to imposed counter blockade

especialy at those who provide base to US with impovements in weaponary over the last 50 years the effect will be devasting

darth sidious

03-30-2006, 09:14 PM

if you are thinking of Japan it will most likely be turned in peaice of waste land if it ever try as for SK china can unlesh KIM

What do you mean a wasteland? Surely you aren't suggesting nukes? Are you a 14 year old? And KIM! You make him sound like some giant robot or a Pokemon or something.:rofl: But that is a good point. I bet Kim would like to use his military if he thought he had a chance of success, which is what this situation would give him. However, I don't think the US would need South Korean permission to blockade the Straits of Tsushima.

About nations being invaded by the PLA if the support the blockade...How? Let's take the Straits of Malacca as an example. How does the PLA get there? Are they going to invade Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia to get there? The best China could do was try to get Indonesia onto its side diplomatically, and attempt to persuade them to deny the US access. If that doesn't work, well, then there's not very much China can do, other than try to force the blockade.

also chinas surface fleet maybe be destroyed reletive quickly but airforce and sub fleet wont be so easy they can be usd to imposed counter blockade

especialy at those who provide base to US with impovements in weaponary over the last 50 years the effect will be devasting

Look Darth, I wasn't saying it was easy. I was just saying that both nations could survive a blockade and the other economic blow they could throw at each other. And are you suggesting that with what the Chinese have left after fighting the US they can blockade, well, lets see...BASICALLY THE WHOLE WORLD? As I said, the Germans tried a submairne blockade with an INTACT force in only the North Atlantic and failed. And remember, the US still has access, compete unfettered access to all the oil it needs. China will be getting what it needs through a few pipelines. These cross quite a few nations. Each one is a chance for the flow to be turned off.

Look...I'm not saying it would be easy. It could cause worldwide depression. But I think that in a situation like this the US has some big advantages.
If you had actually read my post you would see that I was saying that China has some big advantages too. Basically my arguement is that blockade and economic war would not bring this war to a conclusion.

Sorry for the double post.

What do you mean a wasteland? Surely you aren't suggesting nukes? Are you a 14 year old? And KIM! You make him sound like some giant robot or a Pokemon or something.:rofl: But that is a good point. I bet Kim would like to use his military if he thought he had a chance of success, which is what this situation would give him. However, I don't think the US would need South Korean permission to blockade the Straits of Tsushima.

About nations being invaded by the PLA if the support the blockade...How? Let's take the Straits of Malacca as an example. How does the PLA get there? Are they going to invade Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia to get there? The best China could do was try to get Indonesia onto its side diplomatically, and attempt to persuade them to deny the US access. If that doesn't work, well, then there's not very much China can do, other than try to force the blockade.

kims army is a peaice of crap but in time like this it can be used to pressure SK with the threat of invasion and destruction of captial

he is also eager for oppunity to "reunite" the nation so with a bit of chinese aide they will cause massive trouble for the US count in the reasource nedded to stop a NK invasion and your blockade force will be over streached

nation cant move unlike the US they do not have a ocean to hide behind after the war the will be remenbered as having betryed china in this time of need. After the war they will face a hateful china like Germany after WWI . over long term I doubt any nation would like that.

as for japan I suggest you look up how muched of its trade its conducted with china this alon will made them think twice before allowing an US blockade

obiously you have not been to china recently the HATE against japan in there is fearful to say the lest if does side with US them anything less them a nuke will be throw at it( remenber china has countles cheap balastic/cruise missile ) it also vunerable to a a chinese counter blockade from chinese aircraft /submarine ( these can be produced quickley and will most likely surive the inital american attack)

china can surive with out the sea ( example germany) japan cant(example england)

also with the forces you are describing here it looks like WWIII so its rather point less

Spike

03-30-2006, 09:36 PM

What do you mean a wasteland? Surely you aren't suggesting nukes? Are you a 14 year old? And KIM! You make him sound like some giant robot or a Pokemon or something.:rofl: But that is a good point. I bet Kim would like to use his military if he thought he had a chance of success, which is what this situation would give him. However, I don't think the US would need South Korean permission to blockade the Straits of Tsushima.

About nations being invaded by the PLA if the support the blockade...How? Let's take the Straits of Malacca as an example. How does the PLA get there? Are they going to invade Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia to get there? The best China could do was try to get Indonesia onto its side diplomatically, and attempt to persuade them to deny the US access. If that doesn't work, well, then there's not very much China can do, other than try to force the blockade.
I don't think any ASEAN nations would support a US blockade of China unless it was extremely serious (like China attacking them first or something). China runs a huge trade deficit with South East Asia, any blockade would have serious reprecussions for the economies of ASEAN. South Korea and Taiwan (assuming the blockade wasn't triggered by a Chinese attack) would not support it for economic reasons as well.

Granted the reasons behind a blockade will affect the outcome, but obviously the politcal-economic reality is not as simple as you think.

darth sidious

03-30-2006, 09:54 PM

Look Darth, I wasn't saying it was easy. I was just saying that both nations could survive a blockade and the other economic blow they could throw at each other. And are you suggesting that with what the Chinese have left after fighting the US they can blockade, well, lets see...BASICALLY THE WHOLE WORLD? As I said, the Germans tried a submairne blockade with an INTACT force in only the North Atlantic and failed. And remember, the US still has access, compete unfettered access to all the oil it needs. China will be getting what it needs through a few pipelines. These cross quite a few nations. Each one is a chance for the flow to be turned off.

Look...I'm not saying it would be easy. It could cause worldwide depression. But I think that in a situation like this the US has some big advantages.
If you had actually read my post you would see that I was saying that China has some big advantages too. Basically my arguement is that blockade and economic war would not bring this war to a conclusion.

Sorry for the double post.

in short term there will be no shortage of oil for china she can increase production in her own oil fiel buy from Russia and rely and stocked reserve

during the battle the odds are usuely

100 allied sailor VS 1 u-boat crew

10 escorts+5 aircraft VS 1 u-boat

its inpossible for US to achive this kind of superiorty right now. or establish establish a convey system in time

also with out convey escort are preety much useless in protecting merchant ship.

PiSigma

03-30-2006, 09:56 PM

think you guys are thinking not outside the box yet.. don't just think of china and US. sure US loss the chinese market and china loss the rest of the world's market.. but the REST OF THE WORLD losses the chinese market also, and that's not a market that any nation can just pick up. nations that sell to china will complain loudly to USA.

also if USA only blockade ships registered in china, then the suppliers can use ships registered in their own countries to ship commodities to china that's not something USA can stop unless they blockade the harbors... which we already know they can't unless risk being destroyed.

and what about civil unrest in USA?? millions of consumers that just realized everything in walmart just got an extra zero behind it. india and mexico can't take on the extra work in a day. it will take years to train and build the factories to produce all that stuff.

Finn McCool

03-30-2006, 10:56 PM

KYli

03-31-2006, 12:11 AM

1. Cambodia
2. Myanmar
3. Pakistan

If China could get these three countries on their side, they could put good use on the harbors. US would have hard time to blockade China.

1. Veitnam
2. Thailand
3. Cambodia
4. Myanmar
5. Malaysia
6. Lao

If china could get three out of these six countries to support them, they will get many much needed resources.

Shaighai Six and Pakistan will be also important, they provide oil and route to the Middle east.

And we all know Russsia will be the most important allies of China, they could provide both weapons and Oil.

FriedRiceNSpice

03-31-2006, 01:14 AM

Is it just me or did Darth sidious just triple post? And why does it look to me as if he is talking to himself?

darth sidious

03-31-2006, 01:32 AM

Is it just me or did Darth sidious just triple post? And why does it look to me as if he is talking to himself?

some mods made a mitake in joining posts they combined mine and Finn McCools

FriedRiceNSpice

03-31-2006, 01:34 AM

some mods made a mitake in joining posts they combined mine and Finn McCools

Haha I see. I was fearing you had split-personality/schiziophrenia for a second there.

PiSigma

03-31-2006, 01:54 AM

sorry my bad.. i did that.. wasn't paying too much attention.. don't really know how to split them up.... was going to merge the other posts....

IDonT

03-31-2006, 08:13 AM

Perhaps this disscussion should re-orient itself away from an apocalyptic war between China and the US and back to what China can do to get the natural chokepoints it has that restrict its Navy.

1. Gwadar, if it is all that it is cracked up to be, would be a tremendous aid to the Chinese. Especially if the could base a sizeable fleet there. Then they could target Diego Garcia! If Gwadar is not all it is cracked up to be, China needs to find a replacement. China needs to have an Indian Ocean Fleet. The political difficulties of pulling it off would be great, because the US and India would both be heavily opposed. But China needs to do it.

2. Expand the Alliance with Russia. This will threaten Japan's northern flank and provide China with a route into the North Pacific. It will also guarantee a supply of oil.

With a capable fleet in the Indian Ocean and a strong alliance with Russia, China will be able to project its power world wide.:china: :china:

Just a thought...Myanmar would be good. It can be reached overland from China and it has good harbors and a long coastline on the Indian Ocean. It is also in need of international backers. I think this idea was disscussed but I forget what happened.

Again China will still face blockade even with overseas bases like Gwadar. The problem is how to get it resupplied. By land yes, but as a said, naval re supply is much more efficient. Having far flung bases without adequate logistics is just foolish. Those will be the first to be cut off.

China does not have the capability to challenge the Indian Navy in its backyard.

If China could get these three countries on their side, they could put good use on the harbors. US would have hard time to blockade China.

1. Veitnam
2. Thailand
3. Cambodia
4. Myanmar
5. Malaysia
6. Lao

Vietnam still has lingering memories of the 1980's Chinese invasion and naval battle in the spratleys area.
Thailand is a US ally
Cambodia maybe
Myanmar maybe
Malaysia is in the ANZAC alliance, which included UK and Australia. Easy diplomatically to adopt a pro US stance.
Laos Maybe.

Those countries are part of ASEAN. SIngapore, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia are the senior members of the organization and will have some sway on which side those countries will be on. Since most of them are US allies or have shown some hostilities to the Chinese, they will be in the US camp at best or neutral at worst.

FreeAsia2000

03-31-2006, 09:54 AM

IDonT

03-31-2006, 10:54 AM

welcome to the 21th centry this is not 1812 learn a bit more about econ before talking

there are a million ways china can use to seek revenge on on america for this
they include :

1 dumping all T-bonds causing hell on the US economey

2 attack those nation that support the american effort

3 use ties to forgein nations the pressure US ( you can hold out against the world forever

the list goes on and on

also chinas surface fleet maybe be destroyed reletive quickly but airforce and sub fleet wont be so easy they can be usd to imposed counter blockade

especialy at those who provide base to US with impovements in weaponary over the last 50 years the effect will be devasting

1.) Dumping T-Bonds will not caused hell in the US economy, just in the bond market. Look at it this way, if I owe you money and refuse to pay you, what can you do? China can't exactly make the US pay up.

2.) Attacking neutral countries is a sure way of isolating yourself. These countries will go from supporting US diplomatically to supporting US militarily.

3.) US has greater ties to other countries than China has. More importantly, US has greater ties to more powerful countries, both militarily and economically, such Japan, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, India, Mexico, and Brazil. Chinese ties are with weaker and poorer countries.

4.) Name more...

Hmm I think you guys are downplaying the importance of Indonesia..have
you noticed how EVERYBODY is visiting Indonesia ?

I don't think the Indonesia public would support an American blockade of
China and if the chinese government played it's cards right it would
outright oppose it.

I don't think there is any love between Indonesians and Chinese. Chinese in Indonesia are not exactly well treated.

KYli

03-31-2006, 11:13 AM

Vietnam still has lingering memories of the 1980's Chinese invasion and naval battle in the spratleys area.
Thailand is a US ally
Cambodia maybe
Myanmar maybe
Malaysia is in the ANZAC alliance, which included UK and Australia. Easy diplomatically to adopt a pro US stance.
Laos Maybe.

Those countries are part of ASEAN. SIngapore, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia are the senior members of the organization and will have some sway on which side those countries will be on. Since most of them are US allies or have shown some hostilities to the Chinese, they will be in the US camp at best or neutral at worst.
Vietnam will be netrual because they have no strong tie with both China and US.
Thailand also have a very strong tie to China. As you don't know, Thailand buys a lot of their weapons from China. Thailand also have long friendly relationship with China. So I can't agree on this one.
Cambodia, maybe.
myanmar maybe.
Laos, maybe.
Malaysia don't like US, they definite will not support US. Malaysia previous PM had a very strong anti-US stance. So Malaysia will be netrual.
Indonesia is very unlikely to support US either, same reason as Malaysia their muslim population will not like the idea.
Singapore is very complicate. They might support US for many things, but in a war with China. They probably will stay netural. Chinese ethnics in Singapore still have a strong connection to China, and singapore and China have a friendly term for years. I just don't see they will go to US side.
Philipines probably will in US camp.

I don't think you take into serious conderation for the change of environment after the Asia financial crisis. Many countries in Asia just don't view US as they did before.

hallo84

03-31-2006, 11:41 AM

1.) Dumping T-Bonds will not caused hell in the US economy, just in the bond market. Look at it this way, if I owe you money and refuse to pay you, what can you do? China can't exactly make the US pay up.

2.) Attacking neutral countries is a sure way of isolating yourself. These countries will go from supporting US diplomatically to supporting US militarily.

3.) US has greater ties to other countries than China has. More importantly, US has greater ties to more powerful countries, both militarily and economically, such Japan, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, India, Mexico, and Brazil. Chinese ties are with weaker and poorer countries.

4.) Name more...

I don't think there is any love between Indonesians and Chinese. Chinese in Indonesia are not exactly well treated.

Do you have an degree in economics or related work experience or at least any credentials to support what you've just claimed?

I think you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about and is making up shit as you go along...

"Dumping T-Bonds will not caused hell in the US economy, just in the bond market"

That so funny on so many levels... :roll: I can't fathem the possiblilty of anyone aside from the average joe claiming the bond market is somehow an non related entity that is independant of our economy.

bond market, Forex and stock market are interrelated. They have direct relations to the interest rate and foreign exchange of a country. It all has to do with economic well being of a country. A chinese hit on the bond market will translate to decrease in the money market, lower money pool to the extent that the national bank can not jack up the prices to balance the market. It will severely shock all market systems.

Unless US choose to default on the T-bill which is unlikely since that would create a new wave of horror in market confidence and suck all foreign funds away from the US market.

So in conclusion its a no win situation either way and will definately have the US end up in a severe stagnation.

2)If a country chooses to assist the US military then by no means are the netural.

3) yup... lets see world economy tremble before the EU consideres supporting US actions on China.
It the same EU that is considering to drop the weapons embargo.

Gollevainen

03-31-2006, 11:43 AM

And how does this relates to PLAN choke points???
:off :off

MIGleader

03-31-2006, 03:45 PM

Yes...the concept is called far blockade. All the US has to do is guard the Straight of Malacca, Luzon straight, and East China Sea exit. No shipping can go China's ports with US permission.

This won't be a 100 % blockade of course. The land route to Russia is still open. But considering the the majority of the world's goods travel by sea, then you have an effective economic blockade.

Again, no nation is above international law. Do you think the world will sit back and and nothing when the U.s navy starts firing on harmless chinese civilian freighters, killing innocent sailors? Do you think the world will do nothing when the u.s navy sinks chinese tankers, spilling thousands of barrels of oil into the oceans? Do you think the world will do nothing when the u.s cuts off their primary steel and textiles producer? I dont think so.

The WW2 blockade of Germany was justified in that Germany had blockaded the u.k earlier in the war. Most of Germany's essentials still came by land. Besides, the primary things sunk were oil and rubber, materials fo war. In the Cuban missle crises, the u.s did not fully blockade Cuba. Only weapons were not allowed to pass. These past events do not give the u.s the right to break international law again.

I do not wish to be off-tipic, but it is nessecary to show how impossible a blockade is.

Thus, if we talk about a war that is conducted fairly, China will have few chokepoints. The only major concern is if the u.s fleet chooses to block off the northern entrance to taiwan strait, preventing the east and north sea fleets from sending ships tp assist the south.

The only other ckoke point i can think of is the area south of the korean penninsula. A blockade their could lock up the north sea fleet.

IDonT

03-31-2006, 04:49 PM

Again, no nation is above international law. Do you think the world will sit back and and nothing when the U.s navy starts firing on harmless chinese civilian freighters, killing innocent sailors? Do you think the world will do nothing when the u.s navy sinks chinese tankers, spilling thousands of barrels of oil into the oceans? Do you think the world will do nothing when the u.s cuts off their primary steel and textiles producer? I dont think so.

The WW2 blockade of Germany was justified in that Germany had blockaded the u.k earlier in the war. Most of Germany's essentials still came by land. Besides, the primary things sunk were oil and rubber, materials fo war. In the Cuban missle crises, the u.s did not fully blockade Cuba. Only weapons were not allowed to pass. These past events do not give the u.s the right to break international law again.

I do not wish to be off-tipic, but it is nessecary to show how impossible a blockade is.

Thus, if we talk about a war that is conducted fairly, China will have few chokepoints. The only major concern is if the u.s fleet chooses to block off the northern entrance to taiwan strait, preventing the east and north sea fleets from sending ships tp assist the south.

The only other ckoke point i can think of is the area south of the korean penninsula. A blockade their could lock up the north sea fleet.

Mig,

You are confusing the concept of a blockade with unrestricted submarine warefare. There are standard operating precedures on how to stop liners in the ocean without resorting to firing a harpoon.

Also, international law? Do not tell me you are that naive. The world is an anarchic system. That is there is no single body that governs it. To effectively govern it you need coersive power (military or economic). Without a police force to enforce it, international law is not worth the paper it is printed on.

As for choke points, most of China's oil still come from the Straights of Malacca, easy to blockade. (stop tankers to inspect their traveling papers and escort them to their destination) A single aegis ship can keep in tabs of all the naval traffic in the area.

Enough with economic blockade though. In military terms, the PLAN does not have the capability to break out of the first Island Chain. It is stuck their. Its naval forces cannot sortie out into "open" ocean without being easily detected, tracked, and in a wartime, engaged because its path is detectable. That was one of the problems with the Soviet Fleet.

MIGleader

03-31-2006, 04:55 PM

China can tell all of its merchant liners to not stop for U.s Ships. If the u.s ships open fire on the Chiense merchant vessels, that would trigger an international outcry. I'm sure presidents nowadays care more about approval ratings than the country, so if the u.s public is opposed to the war heavily, the war will end. After spending XXX dollars in iraq, XXX in iran, XXX in venezuela, do you honestly think the American public will put up with the u.s engaging another enemy?

darth sidious

03-31-2006, 06:43 PM

IDONT

acording to your plan all china has to do is register its ships in another nation and the US cant do a dame about it ( during the war bewten Iran and Iraq some nation did this to protect their tankers)

thats what the flag of convinence is for ( also that why you see ships registerd in poor countries )

unlessthe cargo are weapons the ship must be allowed to pass

if you conduct your blockade wil be preety much useless block netural shipping then china can hit back with subs

also if itsa short term war ( less then a year ) oil supply wont be badly effected rationing and increase production in chinese oil field will large over come this

ontop of that there are Russian imports and reserve stock

if nation support the US blockade then they are by no means netural this can be consider an act of agression aginst china so you point is moot

asmentioned before the bond market is connected to the stock market unless America defults it has no means of countering the chihnese bond dump

Nation cant be moved after the war they will still face a hateful china likely Germany after WWII I doubtanyone want that ( especialy those connected to china by land ) right now I cant think of any nation (except russia ) capableof resisting a chinese land invasion

so they will think twice before joining the US

Finn McCool

03-31-2006, 06:53 PM

Hmm I think you guys are downplaying the importance of Indonesia..have
you noticed how EVERYBODY is visiting Indonesia ?

I don't think the Indonesia public would support an American blockade of
China and if the chinese government played it's cards right it would
outright oppose it.

Yes. As with any Muslim nation, the US is in a precarious position. However, US tsunami aid went along way in Indonesia. But right now Indonesia is "up for grabs." It should stay that way. It could be like in India in the Cold War, playing both sides and maintaining freedom.

Indonesia would have a lot less value if Singapore went the opposite way of Indonesia. There are a lot of Chinese people in Singapore, but they have a good defense relationship with the US so they too are up for grabs.

sumdud

04-23-2006, 03:19 AM

Uh, How will Having a relation with Laos help the PLAN? Laos is landlocked!

Indonesia's situation depends from area to area, but if you are talking about Sumatra, yeah, I wouldn't go there.

Ifyou form relations with Cambodnia/Thailand, it wouldn't sour the other's relation, will it? And how good will Thailand's deal be anyway? It has some pretty big relations with the US also.

Myanmar might be a good option for the PLAN, since a base there gives you good access to the Bay and ocean, and that to get from China to Myanmar by land, just drive through Yunnan. The deal will be Okay as long as people don't think too much of either country.

Malaysia, possible.
Singapore, I wouldn't.
Even though Singapore has a largely Chinese background, Malaysia is not without its own, and that's when China has probably better relations there.
------
Too bad PLAN is locked out of PLAN.
Japan, Taiwan, and Phillipines is lining the shore there and none of them are pro-China.......

Finn McCool

04-24-2006, 12:12 AM

You know, this isn't just about a USN blockade of China. What if...

China, India on Brink of War
by Finn McCool
Chinese Premier Hu Jintao announced Friday that the People's Republic of China "would not stand to continued violations of our sovreignty", referencing continued Indian incursions on their shared border in the Himalayas. Tensions in the reigon began several months ago after Indian troops moved into the Himalayan nation of Nepal to restore order there and to crush a decades-long Maoist insurgency. Although China denies the claim, international observers have said that there is undeniable evidence of Chinese support for the insurgents, which has fueled continuing resistance to Indian occupation in Nepal. India claims that the rebels have retreated to bases across the border in Chinese-occupied Tibet. Indian troops and air assets pursuing Maoists they say have crossed the border have been fired on by units of the People's Liberation Army stationed in the area. The crisis was brought to a head on Wednesday when Chinese S-300 SAM batteries brought into the area downed 3 Indian Mig-27s and a Jaguar IS, in addition to a the downing of a Mi-8 Hind attack helicopter in another area. On Thursday, the Indian Army retailated by shelling what were apparently PLA installations on the Chinese side of the border. The Indians said only Maoist bases were started. Indian Army spokesman Chnadragupta Ramayana told reporters "Units of the Indian Air Force and Army have been attacked by Chinese forces, without provocation and without reason. It is obvious to all that the Chinese are sheltering the Nepali terorrists." It appears that both countries are readying for war, despite the efforts of American and European diplomats that have rushed to Beijing and New Delhi.

Indian Navy Moves to Cut Chinese Oil Supply
by Finn McCool

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has announced that the Indian Navy will blockade the Straits of Mallacca and Java, in an attempt to cut China's oil supply and one of its main sea lanes for other cargo. The Indian Navy has deployed most of its ships to the blockade, including the aircraft carriers INS Virrat and INS Vikramaditya, the destroyers Delhi, Mysore, Mumbai, (Delhi Class) Ranjivay, Rana, Rajput, and Ranvir, (Rajput Class), frigates Trishul, Talwar and Tabar (Talwar Class), and the Brahmputra and Bewa (Brahmputra Class). Deployment of Indian sub-surface assests is unknown. China responded to the announcement with a barrage of ballistic misssles aimed at Indian command posts in Nepal, and with heavy shelling of Indian positions on the Himalayan front. The Chinese Navy, or PLAN, has been moving out of its ports in response to the Indian move. PLAN deployment has been reported to include the Chinese Aircraft carrier T'ang (formerly known as the Varyag), most of the PLAN's Type 053 frigates, 4 Sovremmeny class destroyers, an dan unknown number of other ships.

By all accounts the stage appears to be set for a naval showdown, a battle the size of which the world has not seen since WWII.

Basically I'm saying what would the efffect of the Strait of Mallacca chokepoint be on a possible PLAN vs. IN scenario.

Part Two is coming tomorrow!! Stay tuned

:china: :china: :china: :china: :china:

IDonT

04-24-2006, 09:36 AM

Basically I'm saying what would the efffect of the Strait of Mallacca chokepoint be on a possible PLAN vs. IN scenario.

Part Two is coming tomorrow!! Stay tuned

:china: :china: :china: :china: :china:

Think of it this way, India owns the Adaman Islands about 2-300 km from the straights, which guards the Indian Ocean opening of the Straights. Stationing 1 or 2 squadron of SU-30 armed with Brahmos along with a TU144 Recon squadron supported by elements of the Indian Navy and you have a very tough oponent to beat. Compounded by the fact that the PLAN route is known, coming out of the straights, and the Straights is very small thus constricting the PLAN battlespace, the PLAN will have a rough time.

Gollevainen

04-24-2006, 10:39 AM

before anyone of you is writing any sequals, mind to take a look to the latest annoucment, showing atop of every forum?

Finn McCool

04-24-2006, 06:18 PM

Sorry Goll...I guess I violated the no india vs. china stuff rule. If you aren't gonna let me, I won't post a part two. (It's good though;) )

And I don't, that's for part 3. (If there is one). I figured that the Indians would probably deploy their SU-30s to the "Himalayan front", so that's why their not inclded

IS it any good

McZosch

04-26-2006, 09:00 AM

Most people here are mixing wartime scenarios with peacetime scenarios.

In warime, a lose blockade of the china coast is an effective effort. If the US goes to war, nobody will ask which flag the sinking merchant ship wears.

In peacetime, blockade is even easier. You just proclaim the chinese waters closed for shipping. For Taiwan, Japan and SK, two or three lanes will be held open. EACH ship crossing the line of blockade will be stopped.

What should be the problem with that? There is no good, PRC is exporting which can not be acquired elsewhere. Economy is adjusting just rapidly.

Essentially, PLN needs Taiwan. Taiwan is in effect what the UK has ever been to Germany: the blocking breakwater-island. A good reason for the U.S. to don't let them go.

Second island chain a.s.o. is worthless. That mistake has been made by Japan 60 years ago. In the event, no single base was capable of resisting the US 5th Fleet. Btw, how many japanese traders have been inspected before sunk?

A base in Burma will not change the strategic situation.
A 300-ship fleet with 10 carriers will.

FreeAsia2000

04-26-2006, 11:04 AM

Finn McCool

05-23-2006, 12:21 AM

And with this post Finn breathed life into the thread, and the people rejoiced and there was much celebrating and feasting.:nana:

The PLAN should essentially adopt the strategy of the Soviet Navy, that Istvathan is writing about in his thread about the Soviet Navy. The PLAN needs to have suffuicent force to pose a credible surface, air and subsurface threat to in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. To do this it needs bases to get around Indonesia and Taiwan. African countries are particularly promiseing canidiates for basing because they are poor and can be easily "persuaded" with foreign aid. The US has realized this and is doing quite a bit to work its influence throughout the Horn of Africa, with troops based in Dijabouti, the CIA operating in Somalia (mostly to counter Islamist warlords) and plying Ethiopia with money as well. However, Africa is still China's best bet for getting around the Straits of Malacca. Think about what a force with a couple of Sovs, 052s 093s and a squadron of J-10s would do to the whole world balance of power if based in, lets say, Tanzainia, or Kenya in 2009.

For the Pacific, the options are much worse. Any base here would be unsustainable, as the main rival it would be designed to counter, the US, has complete domination of the Pacific beyond the East China Sea. For now, the PLAn can continue its sea-defence strategy in the Pacific, as (IMO) there is really no need to expand the PLANs reach in that direction

BLUEJACKET

10-04-2006, 08:47 PM

There are also Malaysia, Madagaskar, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, South Africa & Maldives-all have friendly ralations with China and could host both ships & aircraft.
http://english.people.com.cn/english/199912/06/eng19991206A105.html
http://www.newkerala.com/news3.php?action=fullnews&id=18797

And don't forget Burma's neighbor Thailand with the possible Kra canal-
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Kra%20Canal.htm
http://2bangkok.com/2bangkok/MassTransit/kracanal.shtml
http://matrix.bangkokpost.co.th/forums/thread.php?Thread_ID=244
http://www.angkor.com/2bangkok/2bangkok/forum/archive/index.php/t-1126.html
http://www.atimes.com/editor/BD28Ba01.html
http://www.littlespeck.com/ThePast/CPast-Thai-010312.htm
http://american.edu/ted/canalth.htm
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ07Ae02.html
Also, the SCO member Kazakhstan has access to the Caspian Sea and Chinese missile boats theoreticaly could be stationed there- in a crisis they could be transported via Iran to the Persian Gulf or sail via Volga-Don rivers to the Black Sea- (Turkey is also China's friend), then to Med. Sea, and on to via the Suez canal to the Red Sea/Indian Ocean.
http://www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?ArchiveNews=Yes&NewsCode=38711&NewsKind=CurrentAffairs

I would like to add few more points. China is a net importer of oil, mostly from the Middle East, particularly Iran. There are already pipelines that run from Siberia and Central Asia in both West & East directions. http://journal.heinz.cmu.edu/Current/AsianOilBridge/bridge3.html
If the pipelines leading to China are connected with Iranian oilfields, there will be less need for the PRC to patrol Indian Ocean SLOCs. The PLAN could then concentrate on the South China Sea/Western Pacific.
http://www.pinr.com/

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=455&language_id=1

http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3686&article_id=2370974

[QUOTE]The naval construction plan as a whole indicates that the duties that P.L.A.N. will be called upon to tackle in the next few years will be the protection of sea lines of communication to keep open the "choke points" relevant to China's trade flow, and power projection in areas identified as vital for China's national interests. All these tasks coincide with China's anxiety to acquire and protect the necessary natural resources (especially oil) to sustain the growing energy requirements of its national industrial system. Increased dependence on overseas resources will bring Beijing to require a greater effort by Chinese naval forces to protect the trade flows and show the flag in ports of countries that are considered important trading partners.
Moreover, P.L.A.N. will be required to conduct long-range missions in the open sea to defend exclusive economic zones and to control areas with uncertain sovereignty, as in the case of the Spratley Islands. These isolated islands, situated in the South China Sea, are claimed by China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines [that country is the weakest link in the big island chain, i.e. Taiwan & Japan; during the Ming Dyanasty China considered annexing it, and in the future it will undoubtedly fall into Chinese orbit http://english.people.com.cn/200610/28/eng20061028_315869.html ]
due principally to the rich oil deposits believed to be located there. The ships commissioned in P.L.A.N. will enable China to conduct missions of this kind, with the aim of deploying a fleet overwhelmingly superior to those of all other Asiatic countries (especially Taiwan) with the exception of the Indian and Japanese navies which Beijing can try, at least, to counterbalance.[QUOTE]
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=364&language_id=1
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=439&language_id=1
As for direct access to the Ocean, PLAN could get basing rights in N.Korea (from the Sea of Japan it would be easier to get to the Pacific via the Laperouse strait & Kurile Island chain), and/or on the Russian Kamchatka Peninsula and/or Sakhalin island, were submarine bases been for decades. Sooner or later the Russian Far East will return to Chinese control
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=4540
http://www.howardwfrench.com/archives/2006/05/07/chinese_reoccupying_russia/
making China's coastline even longer-and the Sea of Okhotsk may become an ideal deterrence patrol operating area, as it was for the Soviet Navy during the Cold War http://www.ndu.edu/library/n3/90-E-068.pdf.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1989/1989-2-2.htm
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/nucflt/pacflt/pacflovr.htm .
Armed with 16 JL-2 SLBM with a maximum range of 8,000kms. (approximately 4,970.97 statute miles), the Type 094 SSBN would only have to stay undetected in the Okhotsk and Yellow Seas to target practically any part of North America.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Sea_of_Okhotsk_map.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Sea_of_Okhotsk_map.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Perouse_Strait
http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0823849.jpg
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/nucflt/pacflt/rybachiy.htm
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=oct91handler
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamchatka_Oblast

IDonT

06-25-2008, 10:28 AM

Here are maps from wikipedia that shows China's choke points

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/China%E2%80%99s_Critical_Sea_Lines_of_Communicatio n.png

The first and second island chain

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/Geographic_Boundaries_of_the_First_and_Second_Isla nd_Chains.png

Hendrik_2000

06-25-2008, 03:18 PM

Any talk of blockading China is not going to be effective .China is continental economy and almost self sufficient in Food and Basic metal .Most power station run on Coal. Again China is self sufficient in Coal The Only vulnerability is with Hydrocarbon used mostly for tranportation. As this report show, blockade is not going to bring China to its knee. China oil import make up around 40% of total consumption but Recently China found a lot of natural gas and feverishly building pipeline to bring it to east coast and plan underway for coal to gasoline plant using Sasol technology

NO OIL FOR THE LAMPS OF CHINA?
Gabriel B. Collins and William S.Murray

The ubiquitous Made in China stickers and labels on consumer products remind us daily of China’s incredible economic rise. The world is accustomed to this powerful phenomenon and seems to expect that China’s economy will grow at 10 percent annually for at least another decade. Such remarkable economic progress has lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty and also substantially benefited the global economy. It is also arguably the cornerstone of Chinese Communist Party legitimacy.

Western and Asian hunger for inexpensive Chinese goods fuels much of this growth, but China’s economic engine cannot run without imports of raw materials, such as bauxite, iron ore, timber, and, perhaps most significantly, crude oil. Once a significant exporter, China became a net importer of crude in 1993 and now struggles to deal with this dependency.

Chinese security analysts fear that oil import dependency is a potential pressure point that could be exploited by future adversaries of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Approximately 80 percent of China’s 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in crude oil imports passes through the Straits of Malacca. Such funneling could facilitate interdiction of China’s oil lifeline in times of crisis.2 The United States, India, and Japan are all seen as potential blockaders, but Chinese observers appear to believe that only the United States has both the capability and the will to blockade oil shipments to China.3 One recent Chinese article postulates that the most likely triggers of an oil blockade of China include a fight over Taiwan and a situation in which China’s rise becomes hostile and directly threatening to other major powers.4

Some Chinese analysts argue that the need to protect shipments of oil and other vital raw materials is a key driver behind the PRC’s intensive aerial and naval modernization programs.5 Yet despite impressive improvements, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) lacks the ability to defend the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) over which Chinese oil supplies flow. Among other limitations, the PLAN lacks guaranteed access to ports for refueling, repairing, and replenishing as well as adequate numbers of at-sea-replenishment vessels necessary to support long-range missions. More fundamentally, the PLAN rarely undertakes long-distance operations, which would provide vital training and experience for SLOC-protection missions.

In contrast, some of Beijing’s potential adversaries have decades of blue-water experience, world-class logistical capacity, global access to replenishment ports, and doctrine and equipment oriented toward warfare on the high seas. Beijing’s strategists recognize this disparity and are presumably devising plans to counter any possible future efforts to cut China’s petroleum umbilical cord.

This article examines potential Chinese responses to possible forms of energy blockade.6 The first two sections discuss how a distant blockade might be conducted and surveys possible Chinese responses to such an action. The third section hypothesizes a close blockade and then analyzes potential courses of action in response. The fourth section examines the possibility of a “blockade by convoy,” while the final section considers an energy-denial strategy that would target China’s ability to transport and process crude oil.

The authors conclude that an energy blockade of China would not only fail to achieve its objective but also send destructive shock waves through the global economic and political landscape. Frankly discussing energy sea-lane security will, ideally, promote trust and lay a foundation for deeper energy security cooperation between China and other major oil consumers.

ASSUMPTIONS

The imperatives of continued economic growth and global interdependence among states make major wars unlikely. Nonetheless, this analysis assumes a state of war between the PRC and the blockading state. Even an “embargo” implemented as a measure short of war would likely trigger open hostilities, because it would threaten China’s continued economic growth and would be interpreted by Beijing as an intolerable and unjustifiable breach of sovereignty. We assume, therefore, that Beijing would interpret a blockade under any name as an act of war and would respond accordingly.

This article also assumes that if faced with an energy blockade China would restrict or prohibit the use of private automobiles and other nonessential transportation and ration the sale of all liquid fuels to commercial users. These and similar measures would reduce PRC oil needs, perhaps even to levels that could be sustained with domestic production and Kazakh and Russian pipeline and rail imports. China’s indigenous oil sources currently provide more than 3.5 million bpd and by 2010 could reach 4million bpd. For comparison purposes, in fiscal year 2004 the U.S.military, fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and sustaining normal operations as well, used approximately 395,000 bpd of oil.7 While U.S. military fuel consumption levels cannot be directly correlated with those of the Chinese military in a hypothetical context, these figures strongly suggest that even in a high-intensity conflict the PRC would have access to sufficient fuel to run its military machine, as well as most portions of its current economy, assuming that the export channels and the import of critical non energy imports continued unabated.

We acknowledge that a blockade that prohibited fuel imports while permitting the continued shipment of other raw materials to China, as well as the export of finished products, is an artificial and unlikely contingency. A comprehensive ban on maritime shipping in and out of Chinese ports would have a far more powerful effect than an energy blockade alone. However,much of the Chinese internal discussion on blockades deals directly with the possibility of a maritime energy blockade.

MODES OF BLOCKADE AND POSSIBLE PRC RESPONSES

The Distant Blockade

An energy blockade of China could be initiated at such choke points as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, both of which lie far from the Chinese coast. Chinese analysts worry, perhaps with good reason, that a relatively small number of warships could in that way effectively sever China’s oil lifeline.After all, a distant maritime energy blockade might be very attractive to civilian policymakers and military planners preparing for conflict with China. If successful, such a course might achieve political objectives with very low levels of violence.8 Additionally, at least in the near term, there would seem little that China’s conventional military forces could do to challenge such a blockade directly.

One of the greatest obstacles facing the PRC in such a scenario would be the distance of the energy choke points from its naval bases. China’s naval vessels rarely operate very far from their home waters or for very long and, with a few exceptions, probably lack the experience necessary to undertake extended, distant missions during wartime. Compounding this weakness, Beijing’s limited number of replenishment vessels is inadequate for and inexperienced in sustaining distant operations.9 In the near term, therefore, any PLAN counter blockade task force would be operating at or beyond the limits of its professional ability and combat range. Blockading forces, on the other hand, would probably suffer from neither limitation. Another feature of the long distances involved is that PLAN ships would likely be detected well before they could bring their weapons within range, if not immediately after departing their home ports.During its entire transit, therefore, a PRC surface action group would be vulnerable to subsea, surface, and aerial threats at locations of the blockading force’s choosing.

Another symmetrical option available to the PLA would be attacks by air-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) against blockading vessels. Yet the distances involved, the likely early detection of incoming aircraft, and the lack of an adequate in-flight refueling ability would be severe impediments. Furthermore, PRC bombers and strike aircraft operating far from mainland China would be highly vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air-superiority fighters, and carrier-based aircraft. China possesses approximately ninety highly capable Su-30 fighter bombers that could conceivably reach the Straits of Malacca, conduct strikes against enemy surface warships there, and return to base. Such an operation would, however, require a level of proficiency in aerial refueling and long-range strike operations that the PLA has yet to demonstrate. Thus, successful aerial attacks against blockading forces are presently unlikely, although the situation could change if the PLA develops the doctrine, infrastructure, and experience necessary.

Alternatively, China could threaten distant blockading ships with its submarine force. However, its submarines would be at a disadvantage; any attempt to transit from a mainland base to the Straits of Malacca would have to overcome the antisubmarine efforts of the blockading powers, some of which could be extremely sophisticated.10 Beijing’s diesel-powered submarines would be forced to snorkel frequently, greatly increasing the probability of detection and destruction. China’s limited number of notoriously noisy nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) could deploy from their North Sea Fleet base but would be vulnerable while en route. PLAN submarines also rarely undertake long patrols and so are likely to have little institutional knowledge of how to conduct such an operation.

China’s submarines, furthermore, would have little utility if the blockade were conducted in the Straits ofMalacca.Many portions of those waters are too shallow to allow the submerged passage or sustained operation of any submarine. If the blockade were on the western approaches to the strait proper, PLAN submarines would have to either pass through on the surface, and be readily detected and attacked, or transit submerged around the Indonesian archipelago, making the journey that much longer and more challenging. For a variety of reasons, shallow waters greatly inhibit the use of torpedoes, thereby depriving submarines of their most lethal weapons, at least in many areas of the straits. ASCMs would also be of limited use, since their difficulty in discriminating among targets would make successful attack on a warship in the crowded strait statistically unlikely, especially from longer ranges.11 The same arguments apply to the Strait of Hormuz. PLAN submarines, consequently, are not a counter blockade panacea, though the threat they represent cannot be completely dismissed. Itmust also be said that should the Shang or follow-on classes of Chinese SSNs—or even, to a somewhat more limited extent, air-independent-propulsion diesel submarines—prove sufficiently quiet and are capably operated, the threat they would pose to surface warships would be significantly increased.

Since Beijing has limited ability to oppose directly forces conducting a distant energy blockade, it might seriously consider taking retaliatory actions elsewhere.12 One option available includes using submarines to mine the entrances to a blockader’s commercial ports and naval bases. Others include using short and medium-range ballistic missiles to pummel regional targets and attacking a blockader’s replenishment ships with submarines.13 There is strong evidence that China has developed a land-attack cruise missile similar to the Tomahawk.14 In the near future, this weapon, particularly variants launched by long-range bombers or submarines, could be employed against a wide range of critical regional targets, giving China a powerful asymmetric response option. The PLAN could also mine the approaches to an opponent’s harbors with submarines or converted merchant ships.Defending against these threats would tax the blockading navy by forcing individual ships to be on the tactical defensive throughout the region, thereby straining the theater’s military forces overall as they struggled to protect vulnerable infrastructure. A host of other escalatory steps could be taken in response to an energy blockade, perhaps even including the use of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding China’s “no first use” pledge.

But if the distant blockade seems relatively attractive from a blockading state’s point of view, its implementation poses several critical challenges. Captured ships would have to be sent to a central marshaling area. If the crew proved unwilling, the blockader would have to supply a prize crew of mariners to take the ship there, in addition to a warship escort. This could be a complex undertaking, especially if multiple vessels were seized in a short period of time. It is unlikely that many military sailors have the necessary knowledge to operate oil tankers, and certainly naval ship-manning requirements are not set with an eye to prize crews. Selecting the marshaling area would also likely be problematic, since Southeast Asian states might balk at openly abetting the blockading state. Further, many, if not most, harbors are too shallow to allow the entry of deep-draft supertankers.

Aside from the seized tankers themselves, blockading forces would face the perplexing issue of what to do with the seized crews and cargoes. Tanker crews are often multinational.15 The owners of seized ships and cargoes would presumably vigorously protest to their governments;16 their pressure, in turn, on the blockading state to release the ships might lead to the phenomenon, not infrequent in blockades, of having to seize the same ship more than once.17

The oil trade’s flexibility would also make a distant blockade difficult to execute. Fifty-two tankers pass through the Straits of Malacca daily, carrying approximately 11.7 million barrels of crude oil.18 A blockading naval force would have to determine which of these tankers carried, among them, the roughly 3.3 million of these daily barrels that were bound for China.19 Presumably, tankers sailing under PRC flags or having known PRC ownership would also be relatively easy to distinguish and stop. Yet only about 10 percent of China’s energy imports are presently carried on domestic hulls, a fact that would force a blockader to identify and intercept the other 90 percent.20 A very large crude carrier (VLCC) of 250,000 deadweight tons (DWT) serving the Arabian Gulf–Far East route typically carries just under two million barrels of crude oil per trip. This suggests that as few as two VLCCs can carry China’s daily crude oil imports, and that would seem to bode well for a navy contemplating a distant maritime energy blockade. Yet the tankers carrying oil to China on any given day could be in any of a wide range of configurations, depending on commercial concerns that will be discussed shortly, and their number could range from two vessels to ten or more. This larger prospective volume suggests that identifying in advance which tankers are destined for the PRC would be problematic. Each tanker passing through the strait, therefore,would have to be boarded, and its shipping documents examined. Any tanker with a legitimate bill of lading that stated the oil was destined for Japan, Korea, the Philippines, or elsewhere would have to be allowed to proceed;21 those stating a PRC destination would be seized.

But a distant blockade would be easy to defeat using conventional commercial means. For instance, it is not unusual for cargoes to be sold between ports of embarkation and destination; some oil cargoes are resold on the spot market as many as thirty times while the tankers carrying them are still at sea.22 This suggests that the cargo of a tanker with a legitimate bill of lading for, say,Korea could be sold to PRC interests after it had been inspected at the blockade and allowed to pass. This feature of the modern oil trade would greatly reduce any state’s ability to determine a tanker’s final destination by examining only the bill of lading. In addition, oil cargoes are frequently “parceled out,” with one tanker carrying oil bound for several consumers.23 For example, of a VLCC’s two-million-barrel crude oil cargo, five hundred thousand barrels might be headed to Singapore, five hundred thousand to South Korea, and a million to the PRC. If an embargo against oil shipments to China seemed imminent, parceling would likely quickly rise as Chinese oil importers sought to avoid being singled out. Even if a shipper honestly declared that a quarter of the cargo was headed to China, a blockader might create very serious diplomatic and economic repercussions if it detained a vessel that was also carrying crude to South Korean and Singaporean buyers. This would be particularly true in the case of a conflict over Taiwan, as regional nations might resist taking sides in a confrontation between the PRC and an outside power.

Shipping documents can also be forged. Forgery can be quite sophisticated, especially if (as it no doubt would be in this case) abetted by the PRC government. The blockading force would probably find no tankers with bills of lading that declared China as their destination. The Chinese government and state-owned energy companies could almost certainly offer private shippers and oil producers sufficient compensation to ensure their complicity in such a scheme.

Another issue would be how to stop a ship that simply refused to stop and be boarded. Sinking an uncooperative supertanker seems implausible in conditions short of total war, given the value of the cargo, the environmental havoc created by the resulting oil spill, and the threat to the civilian crew. With high enough stakes, a blockader might use the minimum force necessary to ensure compliance, but serious diplomatic repercussions could follow disabling fire directed against a foreign vessel (e.g., a Greek or Norwegian supertanker). A blockader would probably be able to stop uncooperative ships without gunfire or other lethal force, but those means could be overtaxed if enough ships resisted boarding. Beijing could orchestrate disobedience; blockaders might encounter ten vessels in one day that refused to stop.

Maritime insurance and its effect on oil transport during war is also worth consideration. Under normal operating conditions, hull insurance for a tanker runs between 2.5 percent and 3.75 percent on an annualized basis.24 Thus, a tanker owner operating a $130 million VLCC can expect to pay $8,900–$13,300 a day in insurance costs. Lloyd’s of London, like other insurers, however, automatically revokes hull insurance upon any outbreak of war between China and the United Kingdom, France, the United States, or Russia, potentially meaning that all shipping to and from China would automatically stop during hostilities.25 In practice, however, cargo owners and shippers can obtain compensating coverage, known as “hull war risks and strikes” policies, if they operate in a declared war-risk exclusion zone.26 In waters so designated, rates can climb to 7.5 percent to 10 percent of a ship’s value on a per-trip basis,meaning that the same VLCC operator would have to pay between $8.9 and $13.3 million per trip to insure his ship while it was in the danger zone.27 Beijing would have to subsidize such costs, either directly or indirectly, if it wanted delivery of oil on privately owned vessels to continue.

PRC state-owned tankers could conceivably be self-insured and thereby continue oil delivery to the home country without paying such premiums.This may explain recent efforts by Chinese nationally owned shipping corporations to build and operate larger fleets of oil tankers. In addition, it is possible that the PRC could entice shippers and shipowners with direct payments or through some type of laundering mechanism. A high enough return can induce some shippers to send vessels into war zones without insurance. Crews willing to sail them can also be found, for the right price.28 In such ways, insurance barriers during blockades would likely be overcome.

Yet another method of sidestepping the blockade would involve avoiding the Malacca Straits altogether by sailing tankers through the Lombok and Sunda straits, or even circumnavigating Australia and approaching East Asia from the open Pacific.29 This would render a distant blockade even more unlikely to achieve its goal and would necessitate additional forces. Tanker rerouting would result in four to sixteen days of disrupted oil shipments to East Asian consumers depending on whether shippers rerouted through the Lombok Strait or all the way around Australia. That in turn would drive up shipping rates and final prices for all oil consumers. The figure shows the increased tanker demand and delivery disruption times that would result from rerouting tankers around the Malacca Straits.

In any case, a distant blockade would be unable to interdict oil transshipped from neighboring nations to China. The blockading state could exert pressure on East Asian nations to prohibit such transshipments, but the economic incentive to allow them would doubtless be considerable. Furthermore, preventing trans shipment would mean intercepting—in close proximity to the mainland—large numbers of smaller ships carrying oil cargo into China, a problem that will be discussed shortly.

Estimating Required Forces. The practical problems associated with conducting a distant blockade suggest a robust force structure. That would have a high opportunity cost, because it would reduce the number of ships available to deal with the conflict that prompted the blockade in the first place. The number of surface warships necessary to conduct a distant blockade can be roughly estimated. The driving factor is the need to ascertain which tankers passing through the Straits of Malacca contain oil bound for China. If each tanker must be boarded, a given warship can send teams on board four tankers in a twenty-four-hour period, and fifty-two tankers pass through the strait every day, as at present, thirteen surface warships are needed. If the number of tankers requiring boarding could be winnowed—say, if bills of lading could somehow be verified electronically—the number could be reduced. Perhaps then six surface warships would be able to conduct the necessary boardings and inspections, with one dedicated replenishment vessel.30

The ships on station, however many there are, would also require in-theater replacements for maintenance or combat casualties, as well as backups should any of the blockading ships be diverted to escort or pursuit functions. It appears then, that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would be required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of Malacca. This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait, Sunda Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled. The authors estimate that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment vessels per additional strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that all passing tankers could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to a quarantine anchorage. This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships and four replenishment vessels, counting neither the supporting forces that would be necessary to interdict and defeat any attacking PRC counter blockade forces or the units necessary to relieve the initial group. Clearly, only large navies would be capable of contemplating such a blockade.

More Limitations, and PRC Options. In addition to the problems mentioned above, a distant maritime energy blockade would be unable to prevent the overland transport of oil into China.As with the transshipment to smaller ships, economic incentives would drive oil delivery to China in significant amounts via pipeline, train, truck, or other means. Russia currently ships over three hundred thousand barrels per day of oil to China by rail and anticipates being able to pipeline up to 280,000 bpd of crude to northern China by the end of 2008. Severing these overland oil flows would require attacking critical infrastructure deep within Chinese territory, with all the escalatory risks such strikes would entail. Notably, no blockade of China in history has succeeded without Russian acquiescence.

China also has diplomatic options should it be subjected to a blockade. Unless China committed some misdeed of such magnitude as to unite the international community against it, a blockading power would likely face Beijing alone. China’s vital role in the global economy means that a blockader, while it might be militarily superior, would face extreme international pressure to conclude operations quickly. Such pressure would rise steadily as economic damage mounted, whereas even if conducted flawlessly the blockade would probably take months or even years to register its full effect; eventually the blockader would alienate its allies and even become an international pariah. Meanwhile, international diplomacy would severely hamper the blockade. Beijing would doubtless employ its proven diplomatic ability to align states sharing its energy and economic interests, thus raising the diplomatic, economic, and even military costs for the blockader.

Among other diplomatic options, the PRC might decide or threaten to proliferate previously denied arms to states unfriendly to those conducting the blockade, or renege on previous agreements that benefited the blockading state. Beijing could also reflag its tankers to a third nation and thereby greatly complicate the legalities involved in boarding them. It is likely that Chinese planners, believing that an energy blockader could in some such way convince or compel some states to acquiesce to boarding, searching, and interdiction, might place vessels under the flags of states that a blockader would be reluctant to confront. Such ships could sail through a distant blockade with impunity, unless the blockading state were prepared to risk broadening the conflict.

China might also attempt to disrupt the energy systems of its opponents. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the fragility of Gulf Coast oil production, refining, and distribution; other nations dependent on hydrocarbon imports doubtless have similarly vulnerable concentrations of energy infrastructure. China could conduct physical or electronic attacks against such critical nodes and so limit the amount of oil blockading nations could themselves import. Attacks against financial, electrical, and even food distribution networks are also conceivable and could have very profound effects.

In short, although China would not be able to counter a distant oil blockade effectively by traditional military might, it would likely be able to reduce a blockade’s effectiveness greatly by commercial, diplomatic, and unconventional military means. Even if Beijing could not maintain its peacetime level of oil imports, domestic production, overland importation, and restrictions on consumption would allow it to hold out as long as the population remained convinced that the objective that had brought about the blockade was worth the cost.Simultaneously, global business and diplomatic interests would doubtless clamor for a resumption of trade with China. Such a scenario would seem to be to Beijing’s, and not a blockader’s, advantage.

The “Supply Side” Blockade

A state contemplating an energy blockade against China might consider a “supply side” blockade, in which major oil exporters would be forbidden to sell oil to China. Such an approach could be enforced by either inducing the countries to reduce exports by an amount equal to their average exports to China or monitoring outbound tankers and taking punitive actions against those carrying cargoes to China. A supply-side blockade, however, would likely require the use of force to achieve cooperation from recalcitrant oil exporters like Iran or Venezuela, thereby substantially widening the conflict. In addition, by reducing the total amount of oil available to the world market, a supply-side embargo would trigger frantic bidding by China and other major consumers, causing increased costs for all oil consumers, including those in the blockading state. Furthermore, as the 1973 Arab oil embargo demonstrated, the embargoed country eventually receives oil, even from the embargoing states, at increased prices and through third parties. A supply-side blockade, consequently, would be neither effective nor feasible.

The Close Blockade

If a distant blockade cut off delivery of oil to China via large tankers, it is likely that delivery via smaller vessels would increase, in response to this new demand signal. A blockading state would be forced to consider a close blockade.

A close blockade would entail placing surface warships in close proximity to China’s three major oil-handling port concentrations, Guangzhou/Hong Kong, Shanghai/Ningbo, and Tianjin/Dalian. Each of these concentrations would require perhaps six surface combatants to conduct the boardings, inspections, and, if necessary, seizures of ships attempting to run the blockade. Blockading forces would also have to be prepared to stop, or at least greatly reduce, the coastwise traffic of smaller ships between Chinese and other Asian countries. In all, a close blockade would require tens of surface warships near the Chinese coast. The risks to them in a wartime environment would be substantial; the blockading state would probably quickly find itself in a naval and aerial war of attrition. A blockading state would be tempted, in order to achieve the upper hand in such a scenario, to strike at PLAN supporting infrastructure (e.g., command and control nodes, fleet headquarters, and fuel depots). Such actions could prove dangerously escalatory and define a critical difference between the distant and close blockades.

Blockade by Convoy

Another option available to the blockading state would be to implement a system of convoys—not for defensive purposes but to ensure compliance with an energy embargo against China. Each convoy would consist of tankers bound for neutral and friendly Asian states and would be escorted by a surface warship.No other tankers would be permitted to sail in eastern Pacific waters. That seems simple, but assuming that five VLCCs per day would be needed to supply non-Chinese Asian oil demand, the logistics would overwhelm most or even all navies. Each group of five VLCCs would require a round-trip sailing time of upward of twenty days between Singapore and Japan or South Korea—which are the two largest non-Chinese oil consumers in Asia—plus a two-day turnaround, making cycles of twenty-two separate convoy groups, one leaving per day; each would need at least one escort and corresponding replenishment ships. Additional ships would be required to allow maintenance to be performed on the escorting ships and to establish patrols to ensure that no cheaters entered China from the east or from other routes. All this would require an enormous force structure; it could be mounted only by the largest of navies, and only with the active cooperation of neighboring states.

CALIBRATED ENERGY-ACCESS DENIAL AND POSSIBLE CHINESE RESPONSES

Given the shortcomings of the maritime blockade options discussed above, a blockading state might seek an alternative way to deny China energy imports. A possible method of at least partially achieving the intent of an energy blockade would involve preventing China from processing and distributing oil, regardless of how it got into the country. China, like all other major oil consumers, is vulnerable to precision attacks on key energy infrastructure, such as refineries and pumping stations. The destruction of critical infrastructure components could almost completely deny China the ability to process crude oil or transport refined products efficiently. This could conceivably be achieved with minimal destruction and violence while minimizing risk to attacking forces.

A sufficiently capable adversary could conceivably destroy such a target set in a very short time.Conversely, an attacker might adopt a calibrated approach as a method of demonstrating resolve and increasing incentives for negotiated settlement. In such a scheme, oil off-loading wharves and adjacent strategic petroleum reserve facilities could be attacked first, followed perhaps by pumping stations on the Chinese portion of pipelines carrying oil from Kazakhstan and Russia, and finally, if necessary, by strikes on oil refineries. With key refining units thus disabled,China would lose the ability to produce liquid fuels from petroleum for six or more months.31

Yet unlike imposing a naval blockade,which can be quickly reversed, destroying refinery components that take a half-year or more to replace would have serious long-term repercussions for China’s economy and would effectively constitute an irreversible act, likely to trigger conflict escalation. Compounding these escalatory dangers, Russia and Kazakhstan could react strongly to the loss of significant portions of their energy exports and to the prospect of political, social, and economic upheaval on the other side of their Chinese borders.

PRCmilitary planners undoubtedly realize that the destruction of energy infrastructure could appeal to an adversary. The PRC’s heavy investment in advanced air defense systems, such as the Russian SA-10 and S-300 and indigenous variants like the HQ-9, suggests that countermeasures to precision weaponry upon which such a scheme would depend are being acquired.32 China could also defend against such a campaign by stockpiling parts necessary for quickly rebuilding critical energy nodes. Fear of precision conventional attacks on energy infrastructure and other critical potential targets could also explain why China’s naval modernization seems designed to render its fleet able to push opposing forces beyond the “first island chain,” and hence eventually out of manned tactical aircraft and cruise missile range.33

If China were subjected to a precision energy infrastructure destruction campaign, it could employ the same retaliatory options described earlier. Nonetheless, Beijing’s symmetrical military response options would be less likely to be effective, since naval forces supporting the precision campaign would operate at distances from China sufficient to provide some measure of safety. This difficulty in responding in a parallel manner would, however, only increase the escalatory pressures that accompanied the crisis leading to the blockade’s imposition.

An even more critical failing of an energy denial campaign is that it immediately involves strikes conducted against the PRC mainland. This is antithetical to the purpose of naval blockades,which could be considered a desirable use of military power specifically in that they rely on a limited use of force that can be modulated and, if necessary, withdrawn quickly, with little permanent damage done. In contrast, any actions, such as those involved in a precision energy-denial campaign, that significantly endanger Chinese economic growth also threaten the survival of Chinese leaders and their regime’s legitimacy, thereby producing extreme escalatory pressures. Beijing has long maintained a nuclear deterrent, which is being made extensively more survivable through the addition of a long-range ballistic missile on new missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) and road-mobile ICBM systems. Occasional mutterings and dark allusions from senior PLA officers suggesting a willingness to trade nuclear blows raise real questions as to what constitutes Beijing’s nuclear “red lines.” One would hope that such scenarios would be avoided in all but the most fundamental and unconstrained struggles for national survival.

RECALIBRATING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

A distant naval energy blockade, though it could be conducted with low to moderate tactical risk with some navies’ force structures, could probably not prevent the delivery of oil to China by means of alternative sea routes, falsified bills of lading, or transshipment of oil via third parties. Such a blockade will become even less feasible as China extends the reach and lethality of its naval and aerial forces. A close blockade, on the other hand, would require large numbers of ships to operate in close proximity to the PRC’s impressive and increasingly lethal anti access weaponry, where they would be subject to attrition, with attendant escalatory risk. A blockade by convoy would also require a very large force structure, and a supply-side blockade of oil shipments to the PRC would only drive up prices for all global oil consumers.

None of these blockade schemes could prevent the flow of oil into China via pipeline, rail, or truck, and none could prevent China from extracting oil from its interior oil fields. In 2005, domestic sources accounted for over 60 percent of the oil that China consumed. That same year imported oil constituted only about 10 percent of China’s overall energy consumption. These numbers strongly suggest that China could withstand a complete denial of seaborne oil imports. Furthermore, effective blockades typically take years to achieve their goals and even then succeed only when they are a part of a comprehensive military action that usually includes invasion or massive aerial bombardment.34 It is difficult to imagine a limited-war scenario that would justify such actions by any blockading nation.

The primary conclusion of this article’s examination of blockade scenarios, then, is that, contrary to what appears to pass for conventional wisdom among naval analysts and observers in the PRC, China is not fundamentally vulnerable to a maritime energy blockade in circumstances other than global war.35 This view has far-reaching implications. For one, it suggests that China does not need to build up naval capacity for the purpose of defending energy SLOCs against potentially hostile naval forces.

Such a realization might recalibrate internal Chinese discussions in ways that increase transparency and engender increased trust between China and concerned regional powers. This in turn potentially opens the door for much more meaningful naval and SLOC security cooperation between the PLAN and other navies. The twin trends of China’s skyrocketing resource demands and the accelerating tendency of regional countries to modernize their navies creates a dire need for frank discussions on core energy and maritime security issues. Including tough subjects like blockades puts the discussion in concrete terms and may help participants move beyond the “talking” stage and into policy implementation.

Seeking deeper understanding between China and other regional and global powers would help reduce tensions and foster more effective multilateral solutions to energy transport security. This might be accomplished by such measures as encouraging the International Energy Agency to accept China as a full member, increasing military-military contacts, and offering to share strategic petroleum reserve management expertise. For players on either side of a potential confl ict to play, whether accidentally or explicitly, on China’s sense of vulnerability to an energy blockade is destabilizing and ultimately erodes security of all sides.

The views expressed are the authors’ personal thoughts and analyses and do not reflect official assessments or policies of the Department of Defense or other agencies of the U.S. government. This article borrows extensively from the authors’ China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, forthcoming in 2008 from the Naval Institute Press.

Mr. Collins is a research fellow in the China Maritime Studies Institute who focuses on energy and shipbuilding. He is a 2005 honors graduate of Princeton University (AB, politics) and is proficient in Mandarin and Russian. Professor Murray spent twenty years in the U.S. submarine service and qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines. A founder of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, his research focuses on China’s naval and maritime development. The authors welcome reader feedback and can be reached at william.murray@nwc.navy.mil and gabriel.collins@nwc.navy.mil.

Captain Smith, a frequent contributor to the Naval War College Review, is adjunct professor in both the Department of Surgery and the Department of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland. He is also professor of surgery (urology) at the Medical College of Georgia, in Augusta.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/documents/NWCRSP08.pdf

adeptitus

06-27-2008, 12:28 PM

This dependence on fossil fuel imports (through the choke points) is one reason why the PRC is looking very hard at nuclear and alternative energy sources.

Currently, China only has about 11 working (power producing) reactors, producing just 2% of China's energy needs (~9 GWs). That's a very small number and they're working to increase it.

Nuclear fuel rods can last up to 3 years in a reactor, then reprocessed into MOX fuel to power thermal reactors (now) and fast breeder reactors (in future).

A "cut" in the supply of oil will have immediate impact on your economy and power supply. But nuclear power fuel will last years and you don't have to worry about short-term supply disruptions.

The Chinese government is also looking to supply 10% of its energy needs via renewable sources (solar, wind, bio-fuel) by 2020, which is quite ambitious.

RedMercury

06-27-2008, 01:05 PM

For China, electricity is mostly from coal. Oil affects transportation and manufacturing. Of course, logistics affect everything.

Hendrik_2000

06-27-2008, 05:57 PM

For China, electricity is mostly from coal. Oil affects transportation and manufacturing. Of course, logistics affect everything.

Correct China has no vulnerability in Power Generation Anyway Nuclear is too expensive and take too long to build average 7 to 10 years Better technology is coming on stream like Fuidized Bed Coal generating station Anyway here is article about Coal to Oil conversion courtesy of Mr Unknown from CDF

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080604/lf_nm/china_ctl_dc

China builds plant to turn coal into barrels of oil

By Nao Nakanishi and Niu ShupingTue Jun 3, 8:25 PM ET

With oil prices at historic highs, China is moving full steam ahead with a controversial process to turn its vast coal reserves into barrels of oil.

Known as coal-to-liquid (CTL), the process is reviled by environmentalists who say it causes excessive greenhouse gases.

Yet the possibility of obtaining oil from coal and being fuel self-sufficient is enticing to coal-rich countries seeking to secure their energy supply in an age of increased debate about how long the world's oil reserves can continue to meet demand.

The United States, Australia and India are among those countries looking at CTL technology but are constrained by environmental concerns associated with the process which releases excessive amounts of carbon gases into the atmosphere and consumes huge amounts of water.

But China, which lacks the powerful environmental lobbyists that might stymie any widescale initiative elsewhere, is building a major complex on the grasslands of Inner Mongolia.

"Those countries with large coal reserves, like South Africa, China or the United States, are very keen on CTL as it helps ensure energy security," said Yuichiro Shimura at Mitsubishi Research Institute Inc (MRI) in Tokyo.

"However, the problem is that it creates a lot of carbon dioxide. Also you need a huge amount of energy for liquefaction, which means you end up wasting quite a lot of energy," the chief consultant at MRI in charge of energy told Reuters.

In Erdos, Inner Mongolia, about 10,000 workers are putting the final touches to a CTL plant that will be run by state-owned Shenhua Group, China's biggest coal mine.

The plant will be the biggest outside of South Africa, which adopted CTL technology due to international embargoes on fuel during the apartheid years.

"We cannot fail," Zhang Jiming, deputy general manager at Shenhua Coal Liquefaction, told Reuters. "If things go smoothly, we will start with the expansion next year," he said.

The plant will start operating later this year and is expected to convert 3.5 million tonnes of coal per year into 1 million tonnes of oil products such as diesel for cars.

That's the equivalent of about 20,000 barrels a day, a tiny percentage of China's oil needs as oil consumption in China is around 7.2 million barrels a day.

If all goes well, then Inner Mongolia will push on with an ambitious plan to turn half of its coal output into liquid fuel or chemicals by 2010. This would be around 135 million tonnes, or about 40 percent of Australia's annual coal output.

The region, as big as France, Germany and England put together, hopes CTL will propel development while contributing to Beijing's plan to have CTL capacity of 50 million tonnes by 2020.

That would be about 286,000 barrels a day, or about four percent of China's energy needs based on current consumption.

UNITED STATES LOOKS AT CTL

CTL is also being considered by a number of coal-rich countries such as the United States, which has the world's largest coal reserves.

The relatively low cost of CTL produced oil given current oil prices, plus the chance to be more energy self-sufficient is a powerful incentive.

The technology is being seen in some quarters as offering an opportunity for the U.S. to reduce its dependency on other countries for oil and a small U.S. CTL industry is emerging.

DRKW Advanced Fuels plans to start construction on a plant in Wyoming next year in partnership with Arch Coal Inc and with technologies licensed by General Electric and Exxon Mobil. The defense department is experimenting with CTL in an effort to cut reliance on fuel from countries unfriendly to the United States.

But CTL is highly controversial. Experts say the whole lifecycle releases about twice as much carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse gas, as fossil fuel. Liquefying coal also requires large amounts of energy and drains water supplies.

The fuel produced through this method has a shelf life of up to 15 years, unlike other motor fuels which is attractive to the military and to governments keen to ensure fuel security.

Though CTL technology was developed about 100 years ago, it has been little used, except in Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, which had difficulty accessing then-inexpensive oil.

Oil prices, which have more than quadrupled this decade to above $130 a barrel, have reignited interest in CTL.

The Oil and Gas Journal in April suggested it costs $67 to $82 a barrel to produce CTL fuel, based on the experiences of South Africa's Sansol. Exact prices would depend on a range of factors including coal and water prices and of course it is very expensive to build CTL plants.

Shenhua will be the first to use direct CTL technology on a large scale. It is different from indirect CTL, proven in Nazi Germany and by South Africa's Sasol, and converts coal directly into liquid fuel, skipping gasifying coal into syngas.

"CTL happened only twice in world history, and both times it's been in nations facing some kind of state of emergency with respect to energy. It should sound an alarm bell," said Gary Kendall, from the WWF conservation group.

"There are two defining issues in the 21st century: one is carbon dioxide and one is water ... And the (CTL) process is horrifically carbon intensive. It is also very water intensive."

The "holy grail" for CTL enthusiasts is to find a way to turn coal into liquid without releasing carbons into the air. The idea is that the carbon dioxide, the main global warming gas, would be captured and stored deep under ground.

Carbon capture and storage, which is still the subject of much research, would alleviate the environmental impact of carbon dioxide being released into the environment, the main argument against CTL by critics. This could spur CTL development in the United States and other western countries.

Coal lobbyists in the U.S. have been clamoring for more research into CTL but they have failed to override environmental concerns due to the carbon emissions of the process. Pro-CTL amendments were dropped from the 2007 U.S. energy bill.

"If there is no good solution for CO2, the (CTL) industry will not flourish," Chen Linming, executive vice president at Sasol China, told a conference last month, urging the government to support carbon capture and storage technology.

Shenhua and Sasol are conducting a feasibility study to build two mo