Coming battle of Baghdad

[crazyinsane105]

Well, according to me I think that the people on this forum have matured enough to start including topics about Iraq. We had a great Hezbullah/Israel thread over the summer without any major issues and the other threads about Iran are going quite well too. So let us now descend about what is probably going to be the turning point of the Iraq war-the Battle of Baghdad.

The troop surge that is already happening will target Baghdad and the surrounding areas. Nearly 21,500 troops will be put into the streets. The US wants to target both the Mehdi Army and the Sunni insurgents, but I don't think it will be possible to fight both sides. So the real target are the Sunni insurgents. And it seems like the insurgents are pretty much preparing for this unlike Fallujah where the majority of them fled the city. This seems to be it. Within two months we will probably witness another bloody battle in this already bloody war.

Please keep conversations civil. Don't involve politics (like whether the war was right or not etc. etc.) This is a military discussion so keep it that way!:nono: And this thread will be both for news about Baghdad and about discussions relating to it. So, I guess I shall begin by posting two articles by atimes.com about the Sunni insurgency. They are an interesting read. And please try to focus more on the military points on the article.

http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IB09Ak02.html

http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IB09Ak01.html

[SampanViking]

I think comparisions with the British experience in Northern Ireland are probably more apt than the usual ones of Vietnam.

The reason is simple, whatever the insurgency begain as, it has now developed into a civil war, irrespective of whether or not it is called by that name.

The British Army spent 20 years trying to contain sectarian violence and were often the target of Nationalist attacks for appearing to be an extension of the Loyalist forces.

In Iraq, the situation will be different as both sectarian groups will be anti Western forces and so it will be a 3 way fight. I find the notion that somehow just one more charge of the cavalry and it will all be alright as very naive. This is far more than a military struggle, as it also marks the rise of new power groups (militia and gangs) which will fill the political and economic vacume. The militia will offer not only "patriotic" or "faith" struggle but also provide livelihoods for many of the community. These gangs will control criminal activity and much of the violence can be seen just as clearly as turf wars. Where there is crime there is also corruption and it is highly likely that Iraqi goverment and Security officials will be either directly or indirectly involved.

I see this operation as a no win situation. If you clear out one group you simply extend the territory and interest of another, the losing side will accuse you of collusion etc etc, and the prospect of western forces unwittingly participating in sectarian cleansing is a very real one and one which will make for very uncomfortable TV viewing.

This kind of situation can drag on for decades and in Iraq it probably will.

[Scratch]

If you're really serious about militarily solve the situation, you have to go forward against both sides in the city.
That counter-insurgency plan mentioned in the first article is something strange. And if pursued, something that could perahaps only be done in Baghdad and few other cities.
What I mean is the "forces will stay in a cleared area" point.
I mean somehow it was the US forces problem from the beginning that there were not enough troops to police each and every street in Iraq, far away from it. The small size was focused on modern warfare, but not on the following nation building. Remember that incident in the early month were US troops left a dump with large amount of explosives behind because they had not enough personnal to guard it? If you dissolve all of a countries military and police units, you should compensat that.
The 21,500 troops to be send additionally now can make a difference in Baghdad, and mayby a few other cities, but fore sure not in the hole country.

[bd popeye]

The 21,500 troops to be send additionally now can make a difference in Baghdad, and mayby a few other cities, but fore sure not in the hole country.


True. But>>> only if the Iraqi "government" allows the US to do what it is capable of doing. How's that? By not interfering with the military aspect of the operation. They quite often put restriction on what sort of action US forces can take against known insurgents. This happened in both battles of Fallugah and in many other instances in Iraq.

[Neutral Zone]

And of course while this surge has been trailed since before Christmas and has been debated at length in the US Congress, the Mahdi Army, Al Qaeda and all the other militias have had plenty of time to work out what to do in response, which will probably be to melt back into the background and give the Americans and the Iraqis very little to fight against. They know that Bush will be gone in 2 years and that his successor will be unlikely to have the same level of personal commitment to Iraq.

[crazyinsane105]

And of course while this surge has been trailed since before Christmas and has been debated at length in the US Congress, the Mahdi Army, Al Qaeda and all the other militias have had plenty of time to work out what to do in response, which will probably be to melt back into the background and give the Americans and the Iraqis very little to fight against. They know that Bush will be gone in 2 years and that his successor will be unlikely to have the same level of personal commitment to Iraq.

If the Sunni insurgents simply back down and not put a fight, they risk the Mehdi army swooping in and taking over all the Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad. The Sunnis aren't about to let that happen and that's why there will probably be a long and bloody fight.

[SampanViking]

I have just finished reading the two articles that Crazyinsane posted with his opener.

Its the second article you posted Crazy that bothers me the most. The idea that the entire push could be largely aimed at creating a "just cause" for striking Iran is highly distasteful, but sadly, fully in line with the degree of mendacity that we have seen from the Bush Administration in relation with Iraq.

The most horrifying prospect however would be that such a strike would be nuclear. I think it needs to be fully understand that such an act, on a pre-emptive basis, against a country with whom the US is not at War, which has not invaded or is threatening to invade any other country and which certainly is not threatening the US homeland , would to be cross a very fundemantal line and that such a crossing could not be tolerated by the rest of the world community, including those that the US regards as its staunchest allies.

Such an act would represent a catastrophic misjudgement and set in motion events that would very quickly spiral out of America's ability to control. I sincerely hope that the author was simply voicing his own darkest fears and not articulating the genuine policy view of the US Government.

[Neutral Zone]

The most horrifying prospect however would be that such a strike would be nuclear. I think it needs to be fully understand that such an act, on a pre-emptive basis, against a country with whom the US is not at War, which has not invaded or is threatening to invade any other country and which certainly is not threatening the US homeland , would to be cross a very fundemantal line and that such a crossing could not be tolerated by the rest of the world community, including those that the US regards as its staunchest allies.

Such an act would represent a catastrophic misjudgement and set in motion events that would very quickly spiral out of America's ability to control. I sincerely hope that the author was simply voicing his own darkest fears and not articulating the genuine policy view of the US Government.

Those stories have been kicking around for about a year, I remember reading one story about how Rumsfeld wanted to consider using nukes against Iran only to be met with a point blank refusal from the top brass and the claim that "no pilot in the USAF would drop a nuke in those circumstances." Personally I think (I hope!) that these stories are just propaganda. I still don't think America will ataack Iran, rather the Americans know that Ahmadinejad is under pressure in Iran for his handling of the economy and for making an attack more likely with his fiery rhetoric. Rather than attack, I think America is cranking up the pressure on Iran, politically, economically and militarily in the hope that enough of the regime's leadership are so unnerved that they reign in Ahmadinejad and negotiate a settlement on the nuke issue. And if the Iranians suspect that the surge to Iraq is linked to an offensive against them, then the Americans will be happy to let them think that. Another factor that makes it harder for America to attack Iran is the Iraq situation, if the attack happens then the Shia areas are likely to erupt completely and there will be all out civil war.

[FuManChu]

The British Army spent 20 years trying to contain sectarian violence and were often the target of Nationalist attacks for appearing to be an extension of the Loyalist forces.

The main difference is that in Northern Ireland, the British authorities sympathised far too much with the Loyalists. What is official knowledge now, in terms of the collusion, was generally suspected by the Catholics for a long time. Gerrymandering also created huge problems. Things were only able to get better when the authorities treated both sides more even-handedly.

However, in Iraq the coalition troops are already trying to be less partisan and will tackle any illegal or dangerous military forces - the member countries have also encouraged all ethnic groups to participate in the democratic process, rather than favour one group to support their interests. If they are in the long-run unable to contain the violence, it will be because the Shias and Sunnis want to kill each other, regardless of what anyone says or does. I don't think they'll really care about the non-Iraqi troops (it's more of an excuse) - things would continue as they are now after they'd left.

The ways I think the chance for peace could be lost (when it could have been secured) is if:

The US and/or other coalition countries chicken out and run for it.
The Iraqi government stops Shia death-squads/militias being dealt with.

There is still a chance for peace, but it has to be pursued by both the Iraqi government and the coalition forces. If either one is unwilling to go the whole way, things will fall apart. I don't think we've seen the worst of the potential violence at all! I think the troop surge is worth a shot, but only if all three of the "clear, secure and rebuild" targets are fully applied (rather than just the first, which has been what happened in the past).

Interesting.

Kurd fighters may add muscle to Baghdad offensive (http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=KHA725039)

When U.S. and Iraqi forces step up an offensive against militants in Baghdad, 4,000 Kurdish soldiers will be there on the frontlines, taking part in their first major operation under Iraq's new army.

Those soldiers, drawn largely from Kurdish Peshmerga militias in the northern autonomous region of Kurdistan, will have to navigate a different language, a largely foreign city and perhaps a hostile population.

But they will bring with them a reputation for discipline and in Iraq's bitterly split Shi'ite and Sunni Arab sectarian divide -- could be seen as neutral, even if some Kurdish soldiers have mixed feelings about their deployment.

[RedMercury]

The most horrifying prospect however would be that such a strike would be nuclear.

There was an interesting flash animation posted by FAS (I think?) about the possible fallout from such a nuclear strike. After looking at it, I told my loved ones in China that if such a thing happened, they should stay indoors for a week. Such things lend one perspective.

[SampanViking]

Hi Rdm

The effects of long range radiation is certianly one factor that should not be ignored, but maybe we should not (yet) stray to far from the central topic of the action in Baghdad itself.

Hi Fu

However, in Iraq the coalition troops are already trying to be less partisan and will tackle any illegal or dangerous military forces - the member countries have also encouraged all ethnic groups to participate in the democratic process, rather than favour one group to support their interests. If they are in the long-run unable to contain the violence, it will be because the Shias and Sunnis want to kill each other, regardless of what anyone says or does

This comes down to whether or not the members of the Iraqi government have a genuine constituency or are simply unsupported placemen.

If they have no constituency (genuine grass roots support with provides legitimacy) then the situation on Baghdad is as much to do with filling a power vacume as it does an insurgency, as the Governemnt does not actually represent anyone or command any real public support. This suspicion is I think magnified by the lack of large Pro-Government demonstrations. I doubt if these things are simply being ignored, as if they were happening, then thry would be blasted onto our TV screens on everry news report.

Worse however, would be if the Individuals in the Iraqi Govt, turn out to be the leaders of the Individual Street militias and that rather than providing unified leadership, they are simply using their postions to manouver themselves and their factions into the next "Strongman" slot that becomes available.

In both scenarios the chance of quick success by the military are negligible if not impossible, as nature abhors vacumes or artificla environments. It would be like trying to bail out a ASM holed AirCraft Carrier with an empty Bean Tin!

Only a government that has genuine support can restore order as it is that support that is the order!

[zraver]

I am of the school of thought that thinks the Sunni insurgetns are not going to be target number 1. I think the madhi Army will be on the chopping block. Sadr is the biggest threat in Iraq long term and needs to be dealth with. The other armed groups are all figthing for some sort of politcal goal. Those goals can be harrnessed into peace talks. But warlords who would be king cannot be tolerated.

[The_Zergling]

Possible Disaster in Baghdad
by Olds88
Tue Feb 13, 2007 at 10:44:29 AM PST

The title of this diary may sound vastly understated, even sarcastic. It isn't meant that way. It is meant as an alarm.

The current escalation in Baghdad might not be just more of the same, might not just be worse, it might be a military disaster. From what I have learned, it seems the elements of a large-scale defeat for US forces could be drawing into place in the city. The result could be hundreds of casualties on top of a failed mission.

Below are my observations drawn from current news reports and study of previous operations in Iraq. If my fears are borne out, the current Baghdad security plan leaves our troops vulnerable to almost every weapon at the insurgents' disposal.


* Olds88's diary :: ::
*

"People (in America) think it's bad, but that we control the city. That's not the way it is. They control it, and they let us drive around. It's hostile territory." --1st Lt. Dan Quinn, platoon leader, 1st Infantry Division in eastern Baghdad http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16600612.htm


THE PLAN SO FAR...
Few specifics about the plan have been released except for the AEI's original map which simply showed Army Brigade Combat Teams sprinkled across the districts of Baghdad. It wasn't clear if the troops would be garrisoned on bases in brigade strength (3,500-4,000 soldiers), battalions (800-1,000), or smaller units. If early operations are any indication, the troop deployments will be modeled on a single house in northeastern Baghdad.

The Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad is the last Sunni enclave on the east side of the Tigris. Despite being only a short car bomb drive from Sadr City, it has stayed Sunni largely because of the presence of US troops. Since August of 2006, an Army company has lived in a house in the neighborhood. They patrol the streets, getting attacked daily from inside the neighborhood by Sunnis or from outside by raiding Shiites. They are a unit of 120 soldiers and they are a long way from friendly forces. When I read about this situation, the first word that popped into my head was, "Alamo." I would never consider using such a cynical term out loud but, hell, that's what the soldiers on the ground are calling it. Its real name is a much more reassuring fort Apache (http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/08/cnr.03.html):


[MICHAEL HOLMES, CNN INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT]: We're with Charlie Company, 126th Infantry, based at forward operating base Apache. Although it's not really a base, it's actually a house. A hundred and twenty men in the middle of probably the city's most dangerous area.

HENDRIX: Some guys call it the Alamo, you know. It's just a house in the middle of Adhamiya. Nobody else around. No other units.

HOLMES: They are fired on regularly by insurgents, both Sunni and Shia. The house shows the scars.

A couple of months ago, insurgents attacked her. Charlie Company killed 38 of them. Around here, something as simple as leaving a house after speaking with the owners requires smoke grenades for cover.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We unfortunately, you know, learn some hard lessons.

HOLMES: Since arriving here in August, Charlie Company has never left, never stopped patrolling, 24/7. They've lost five men, two dozen wounded, and earned a fistful of medals for bravery.

(on camera): Is there a day here where something doesn't happen?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No. No.


Surge author and tin soldier abuser Fred Kagan has bitched that soldiers need to get out of their vehicles and make contact with the residents to quell violence. Since early reports suggest there could be a critical vehicle shortage (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR2007012901584.html), that part of the plan seems assured. The situation described above is what they may look forward to.

http://aycu01.webshots.com/image/11640/2002159665459302959_rs.jpg

LITTLE HOUSE ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Another house was recently set up in the ethnically-cleansed Shiite neighborhood of Shaab just northeast of Adhamiya. You may remember the fighting in Shaab and adjacent Ur around February 6th. A Stryker Brigade was clearing an area of insurgents in order to establish a house for a company from the 82nd Airborne. Those soldiers of the 82nd will have a challenging task of winning hearts and minds if this resident's account (http://xml.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.iraq07feb07001518,0,3309043.story) of the clearing operation is accurate:


A resident of Ur said about 10 U.S. Stryker armored vehicles had snaked through her neighborhood but became stuck on a narrow street. Unable to turn around, she said, the first Stryker rammed down the walls of a school and drove through it, followed by the rest of the convoy.

Is it just me? Does that paragraph depict a crystal-clear, multi-dimensional problem of interfacing troops with a high-density civilian population? In the event of an emergency, it is likely that these Strykers will be coming to the aid of troops under attack. Situations like the one above are going to kill civilians and vehicle occupants alike as insurgents attempt to turn tight alleyways into incinerators.

Getting back to the houses: they are officially known as JSSs, Joint Security Stations-- buildings where US and Iraqi troops will work and live together... at least until they don't. US officers won't have authority over the Iraqis-- who will take orders from a separate chain of command. (http://xml.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.iraq07feb07001518,0,3309043.story)

Given the infiltration of Iraq's Security Forces, (http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16655490.htm) having them within the walls could be incredibly dangerous. A cynic might see them as an early warning system-- the day they disappear is probably the same day the Mahdi Army is planning to attack. Of course, when they do disappear, they will be taking knowledge of the building's layout, weak points, schedules, ammunition storage, supply levels, etc.

In short, this "Surge" plan will expose US soldiers to every weapon the Shiite and Sunni militias have: snipers, mortars, IEDs, car bombs, but most importantly: supply route interruption.

SUPPLY ROUTES
Research for this diary keeps circling back to the events of April 2004. That month is most vividly remembered for the image of four mercenaries killed and suspended from a bridge and the subsequent siege of Falluja. But it was also the month Sadr's Mahdi Army joined the fighting and took over large areas of the South. During the first half of April, his militia took over Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, and Kut,. The result was one of the deadliest months of the war. What was far less reported was the simultaneous and extremely effective attack on supply routes:

The south-north highway, over which all the deliveries out of the main supply hub crossed, was marked with more than 300 bridges. The bulk of these bridges are low, culvert-style structures. Insurgents cut as many as they could in any way possible. They punctured oil pipelines under bridges and set them aflame to inspire a collapse. They detonated explosives to punch ragged holes in the roadway. In one instance, insurgents dissembled a tall bridge spanning a river. They also targeted likely alternative routes. “They effectively shut us down,” he said. “When they took out the bridges ... we lost about seven days. In conjunction, they increased the op tempo in the north, especially in the Fallujah area ... I didn’t sleep for eight days.”

http://aycu21.webshots.com/image/8620/2002134487739309891_rs.jpg
DoD map of attacks on April 7, 2004 (Green arrows are Mahdi Army attacks on cities lining supply routes).


While US forces were dealing with critical shortages and resorting to air resupply across the country, Iraq's militias were joining forces. Within days of the uprising, Sadr militia and ex-Baathist-- hated enemies-- were working together in sophisticated (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9532-2004Apr13?language=printer) attacks as reported at the time:

"The dropping of the bridges was very interesting, because it showed a regional or even a national level of organization," Pittard said in an interview. He said insurgents appeared to be sending information southward, communicating about routes being taken by U.S. forces and then getting sufficient amounts of explosives to key bridges ahead of the convoys.

With occupation forces battling Sadr's Shiite militiamen south and east of Baghdad and Sunni Muslim insurgents to the north and west, the timing of the Iraqis' tactical development is nearly as troubling for U.S. forces as its effect. But the explanation for the change is not yet clear, military commanders said.

Here in southern Iraq, which is overwhelmingly Shiite, U.S. officers say the best guess is that former soldiers who served under President Saddam Hussein have decided to lend their expertise and coordinating abilities to the untrained Shiite militiamen.

"It's a combination of Saddam loyalists and Shiite militias," Maj. Gen. John R. Batiste, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, said in a brief interview here at FOB Duke, where he was reviewing combat preparations.

The generally accepted conclusion to this episode was that the US entered a stand off in Falluja while decisively beating concentrations of the Mahdi Army in the south. While those events did occur, the timing suggests other forces were at work beyond the battlefield. Around the middle of the month, it was reported that Sadr was ready to negotiate. Shortly after, attacks on convoys lessened. At the time, Sadr's willingness to deal was depicted as desperation to avoid the destruction of his militia. But just three months later, he was given his own 32-seat faction in the new Iraqi Parliament and the health (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-11-12-al-sadr-cover_x.htm), agriculture, transport, and education ministries. Negotiations appear to have gone well.

Regardless of the backdoor machinations, US combat support units had a job to do: move supplies. Their immediate response was additional escorts, fast driving, and emergency airlifts for critical items like ammunition. After April, alternate routes were added, trucks were armored, and supply points were decentralized. While these changes might help on the open road, they are not applicable to delivering supplies over the last mile in Baghdad. Resupplying dozens of JSS buildings will mean either many small, lightly defended convoys or fewer, but larger, convoys snaking their way through the crowded streets of Baghdad.

HELICOPTERS
Coordinated attacks on road traffic would leave the forward-deployed companies at the JSS buildings reliant on helicopters for supplies, reinforcements, and evacuations-- medical or otherwise. Helicopters, as widely reported, are facing increased threats themselves. Al Qaeda in Iraq has claimed it has a newer "Strella" type shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles [they may be referring to the Strella-3 (NATO-code SA-14), or Igla-1 (SA-16) or Igla (SA-18) missiles that can attack aircraft from any side, not just from behind like the easily-confused, heat-seeking Strella-2 (SA-7), of which Iraq has many]. Al Qaeda in Iraq is also claiming the weapons are being made available to all groups regardless of affiliation (I presume they mean only other Sunni groups, though). Whether this is true or not, there has obviously been effective coordination against helicopters. Even worse, most of the recent attacks have occurred outside of the cities. A helicopter attempting to land or hover in order to drop supplies to a house in Mansour or Sadr City would be an extremely easy target even to RPGs (remember Black Hawk Down?).

By dividing our forces, the plan not only gives the Sunni and Shiites a chance to attack, it gives them a chance to lay siege.

And most frighteningly, it gives Shia and Sunni an strong incentive to work together again.

CAN THEY WORK TOGETHER AGAIN?
Probably. Despite the ongoing civil war, there are individuals and groups with connections across sectarian lines. On the Shiite side, there is Moqtada al Sadr. His organization provided relief supplies to Falluja during the April 2004 siege-- an act that made him a lot of friends among the Sunnis. His relatively nationalistic outlook and his constant call for Americans to leave Iraq roughly lines up with the priorities of non-al Qaeda groups on the Sunni side. That makes Sadr the man who can determine whether Baghdad waits out the American presence, fights, or lays a trap.

At this stage, Sadr's wisest strategy would still be to wait. Whether we leave in 6 months or two years, we are leaving. Despite the ravings of Bush, the Baghdad meat grinder is going to run out of cash and bodies soon enough. Once we're gone, Sadr can ethnically cleanse Baghdad before destroying SCIRI. At that point, it is just a matter of having a giant statue cast for Firdos Square.

The US seems intent on drawing Sadr out though. As I first mentioned in this diary ("http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2007/1/4/2390/25812), many of his lieutenants have been captured or killed and several officials have been arrested from ministries he controls. There have also been several strikes within Sadr City in the last few weeks. Provoking Sadr like this makes a limited amount of sense: if you can take him on individually and crush him now, smaller groups would likely refrain from doing the same. Also, a weakened Sadr may lose the the confidence of other groups.

But the greatest danger comes from a coordinated Sunni/Shia planned uprising. If they lay in wait until JSS houses are spread across the city, they could inflict severe casualties at those outposts while paralyzing movement on the roads and in the sky. Eventually, Abrams tanks and Strykers could reach the houses-- but only by cutting wide swaths of destruction trough dense neighborhoods (much like the Stryker path through the school, just miles longer). The mission in Baghdad would be over in many senses: practically, militarily, and morally.

CONCLUSION
The events described here may or may not come to pass. Like Fred Kagan, I am no expert. All I know is what I have read about the situation and how the participants have acted in the past. Our troops will be spread out in vulnerable positions. The Sunni/Shia factions has stopped convoys in the past. They are shooting down helicopters now. Most importantly, they have cooperated jointly in combat before. These are seemingly the perfect conditions for disaster. If theses dangers haven't been addressed, that negligence would be criminal.

UPDATE: I just want to make clear that I am not predicting a defeat for the entire US Army in Baghdad. A siege of the airport, for instance, is incredibly unlikely. Specifically, I am saying it appears the Joint Security Stations are too small to provide adequate protection for US forces manning them. If the stations are vulnerable, the soldiers will not be able to provide neighborhood security. An attack could result in needless casualties and failure of the operation's goal. The Army would in no way be swept from the city though.

Still, the most likely outcome is that the factions wait until we leave. It's sad that could be considered a good outcome.



Note: I found an article on a blog. Despite my mistrust of blogs in regard to military information, this analysis seems to be well researched and backed up with reliable sources. But read it and decide for yourself... (slightly edited and formatted)

[Finn McCool]

Well it seems as if all sides in Iraq's blood-stained Battle Royale are waiting out the surge. There has been little violence out of the ordinary and no major attacks against US or Iraqi forces yet, and the US and Iraqi Government troops have not really made any major offensive moves just yet. Of course, the surge is just beginning.

Zergling-While I agree with you that attacks on supply routes and a coordinated pan-sect uprising are the worst case scenario, I find both very unlikely. I highly doubt that the Sunnis and the Shiites could ever cooperate considering fragmentation on the Sunni side and the fact that both sides are more intersted in killing each other than the Americans. And I find coordinated attacks on supply routes unlikely because the war in Baghdad has become neighborhood-based; the Sunnis and the Shiites compete for control of neighborhoods, crossing from one to another is near impossible, and it seems to me that all insurgent groups operations are planned around the neighborhoods they control. So if or when the Americans enter a neighborhood they can expect to meet a well prepared defence but most insurgent groups don't seem like they will reach out of their territory or change the paradigm of combat like that.

Of course supply convoys are going to have to enter into various neighborhood to resupply JSS buildings so I guess that the point is moot. In any circumstance I wouldn't want to be in an American convoy in Baghdad in a week or two when the US should be getting its offensive operations underway. Its like poking a burning log; its already on fire but when you poke it it burns much more intensely for a short time.

[The_Zergling]

The scenario outlined above is one. However, as you noted, the scenario in which the Mahdi army simply waits it out is also likely, and so far reports from Iraq regarding resistance have seemed to confirm this. Either that, or it's the calm before the storm.

[Finn McCool]

The scenario outlined above is one. However, as you noted, the scenario in which the Mahdi army simply waits it out is also likely, and so far reports from Iraq regarding resistance have seemed to confirm this. Either that, or it's the calm before the storm.

Well I don't think that American troops have moved into Sadr City proper or very many Sunni areas yet, so there still is plenty left to wonder about. However, if Sadr and his lieutenants are in Iran as rumoured, I would guess that they are not planning to resist more than usual.

[crazyinsane105]

Well I don't think that American troops have moved into Sadr City proper or very many Sunni areas yet, so there still is plenty left to wonder about. However, if Sadr and his lieutenants are in Iran as rumoured, I would guess that they are not planning to resist more than usual.

I doubt Sadr is going to stay in Iran for a long time. It would be political suicide for him.