Could the Nationalists have won the Civil War?

[Finn McCool]

After WWII, the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Sheik were in strong position to destroy the Communists, under Mao. The Communists were largely confined to Manchuria, and the Nationalists had massive amounts of American support, as well as more troops who were more experienced than the Communists, as the Nationalists fought much more of WWII than the Communists. Soviet support was half hearted, as they did not want to be the supporters of the losing side. The Republic of China attacked Manchuria in 1946, and was on the path to victory. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during WWII and architect of America's grand strategy for victory in that war, was secratary of state for the Truman Administration. He was sent to China and applied pressure on Chiang to halt the offensive. His mission was to coordinate a negotiated peace between the Communists and the Nationalists .Obviously, he failed. In the intervening time, the Communists regrouped and the superior military capabilites of their commanders took advantage of Nationalist corruption, incompetence, poor morale and renewed Soviet support. This brought about a reverse in fortunes, and, as we all know, the Nationalists lost the war.

My question is Could the Nationalists have won the war? They had an opportunity, but was it big enough? What would have happened if they did win?

[swimmerXC]

Please stay away about politics in this discussion.

[Finn McCool]

I don't know if there will be much of a disscussion...This thread hasn't really sparked interest.

[DPRKUnderground]

If Chiang Kai-Shek wasn't so corrupt then maybe. Also I think his tactics were a little iffy. He didn't really understand guerilla war like Mao.

[The_Zergling]

The problem is that it's very hard to answer a, "Could who win what" scenario, because of the many possible factors affecting an outcome. Could the Nationalists win if World War II hadn't broken out? If Mao wasn't so good at winning the hearts and minds of people? If, if, if...

If you're merely asking if it was POSSIBLE for them to win I'd say yeah, it's not a stretch of imagination, what with all things being equal, both sides having similiar weapons and numbers... of course saying something is possible isn't really saying anything. A example of impossible would be, "Could the US Army defeat the Empire? (of Star Wars)".

Now if you're asking if it was possible under "x" circumstances well then it depends on what "x" is.

[ahho]

One big probability that help them loose the civil war is no heart from the citizen. (translate it to chinese and you'll understand) This could be caused by not allying the japanese to fight the communist.

[The_Zergling]

Technically they did ally with each other against the Japanese... taking a break from trying to kill each other probably counts as a truce.

It's just that the effort between the Nationalists and the Communits was so half-assed because of such dislike between the two factions that it wasn't really effective.

[SampanViking]

The Nationalist as the Recognised Government, held all the cards.

The question surely is why did the Nationalists lose? what was it that swayed popular feeling to go with the communists? Weapons alone will not be decisive, especially in a largely guerilla war. It is the side that enjoys the most popular support that will ultimatly win.

[Finn McCool]

Good point Sampan. That's something every major power has to learn painfully at some point. I'm afraid that China, with its growing power, will learn it too one day, maybe soon.

Anyway, I was just pointing out that the Nationalists did indeed come very close to winning the war, in the situation described above and at many other points, such as the Long March and just before that, when they had the Communists trapped. Indeed, the Nationalists destroyerd most of Mao's army in that period. Other units were trapped in pockets, cut off from the largest body under Mao, and were destroyed. Mao's force also took huge casualties during the March. So there's another point where the war could have very eaisily gone the other way.

What do you think that China today would be like, had the Nationalists won either in 1946 or 1934?

[renmin]

Jian Jie Shi was all about power and victory. He did not care for his people. The guy fought well, you must admit, but he was a sour leader, and the nationalist army had low morale not to mention loss of support from chinese citizens. On the other hand, Mao's army was strong and good to go and had plenty of morale. the thought of fighting till the last breath was in the hearts of all communist soldiers. If the nationalists had won, on my point of veiw, China would be one huge corrupt nation today.

[Finn McCool]

Well, there are two ways I think that it could go. It depends on when the Nationalists win. If they won in the 30s, then renmin would probably be right. China would be heavily influenced by the Soviets and still be divided up by foreign powers. If they had won in the 40s, it would be different. China would have recieved much more American help, and would have been able to cash in on the economic boom that made Taiwan, Japan and South Korea rich. So China would be much farther along in its development, probably democratic, and would be facing some of the same, mundane problems that those countries are facing today. If only...

[MaxTesla]

No

During operation august storm when the Soviet Union exploded out the Japense 1.1 million strong army in less then 2 weeks out of china The Soviet forces gave ALL japanese equipment to MAO

And also the SU gave the chinese tactics so there was no way for the nationals to win

also if MAO hade not won then there would not be 1 china but 50 chinas, MAO united china

[Kilo636]

No

During operation august storm when the Soviet Union exploded out the Japense 1.1 million strong army in less then 2 weeks out of china The Soviet forces gave ALL japanese equipment to MAO

And also the SU gave the chinese tactics so there was no way for the nationals to win

also if MAO hade not won then there would not be 1 china but 50 chinas, MAO united china


American General George Marshall arrived in China and was part of negotiations over a ceasefire between the KMT and the CCP, the terms of which would build a coalition government that would include all of the contending political/military groups in China. Neither the Communists (represented by Zhou Enlai) nor Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were willing to compromise on certain fundamental issues or relinquish the territories they had seized in the wake of the Japanese surrender.


In the front row, Mao Zedong is on the right and Chiang Kai-shek is in the middle.The Nationalists demilitarized 1.5 million troops ostensibly to support the Marshall Mission, which turned out to be a fatal mistake for Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang, because in reality, Chiang and his associates used this excuse to reduce the power and influence of warlords who allied with Kuomintang. Nearly none of the 1.5 million troops discharged belonged to Chiang's own force, and all of them belonged to that of warlords, including those who collaborated with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War and pledged their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang after World War II. This move alienated many within the Kuomintang. As for the ordinary soldiers who were discharged, their prospects changed for the worse as nothing effective was done to help them integrate into civilian life. Many protests and riots by the discharged soldiers broke out, particularly in Chongqing by discharged former soliders of the Sichuan warlords. Faced with such desperate situations, these former soldiers turned against Chiang and the Nationalist government, and while some turned to banditry, most of them decided to join the communists. The communists welcomed these new recruits because their resentment towards the Kuomintang made them easily susceptible to communist indoctrination. The largest Nationalist defection to the communists occurred in Manchuria, where over half a million discharged Kuomintang soldiers (mostly former Japanese puppet governmental troops) joined the communist force, which previously had never exceeded 50,000, a more than 1000% boost for Lin Biao's forces.

In addition to this, the Nationalist demilitarization also provided communists with much needed weaponry. When Chiang Kai-shek attempted to solve the problem of warlords that plagued China by reducing their troops after World War II via demilitarization, the action backfired badly for him and Kuomintang in Manchuria when it was combined with other critical mistakes the Nationalists made. The Japanese strategy had been to give up Japan rather than give up Manchuria because the latter was so vital, and thus, they had stockpiled large amount of weaponry (enough to sustain more than 700,000 troops for several years) in hidden remote and hard-to-reach areas all over Manchuria. Although the Soviets captured a large quantity of Japanese weaponry, the majority of the Japanese stock survived. The Kuomintang was infatuated with obtaining as many urban centers as possible; therefore, the rural and hard-to-reach areas were ignored. Militarily, the Kuomintang did not have any incentives to recover and destroy this large stockpile of weaponry because the American weaponry used by Nationalist forces was superior. More importantly, since operating modern weaponry needed considerable knowledge and training, the Kuomintang believed that even if these weapons were to reach Communist hands, it would be impossible for the Communists to use them because most of their troops were illiterate. Therefore, the Kuomintang regime generally ignored the information on these Japanese secret depots because they deemed it not worth the effort to recover or destroy the weapons. Furthermore, since the information was provided by those former warlords' troops turned Japanese puppet regime troops who rejoined Nationalist force after World War II, and they were to be discharged, Kuomintang considered their actions no other than attempting to show their importance and to ask for financial rewards, and thus failed to take proper actions to prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands. Chiang and Kuomintang were correct on the matter originally but when Nationalist demilitarization began, things turned out to be completely opposite. Because those discharged warlords' troops were former Japanese puppet regime forces that rejoined Kuomintang after World War II and had the experience and training needed to handle the weaponry, communists in Manchuria had hit a gold mine when these troops joined them en masse. Not only these valuable troops were able to teach the rest of communists who had no knowledge on how to operate these weapons, but more importantly, these new troops knew exactly where the Japanese secret depots were and contrary to their old Kuomintang master, the communists were extremely appreciative to the information and weaponry obtained, because what was less advanced to Kuomintang was of great value to the poorly equipped communist troops.

Contrary to the Nationalist propaganda that the Soviets had given huge quantity of weapons to the communists in Manchuria, the actual amount was extremely low: the total Soviet weaponry and Japanese weaponry captured by Soviet given to the communists was merely enough to equip 30 infantry regiments and 2 mountain gun battalion, equipping a mere 20,000 communist troops out of a total of 400,000 (as of the end of 1947), and the Soviet aids to communists completely stopped by the end of 1947. The communists originally expected the Soviets to play a much larger role and Lin Biao personally wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin on June 25, 1947 asking for Japanese weaponry to be turned over to the communists, and he even asked for captured German weaponry. Stalin, however, did not even bother to respond. On December 28, 1947, Lin Biao wrote another letter directly to Stalin, asking for more weaponry, including: 200,000 rifles, 15,000 light machine guns, 7,000 heavy machine guns, 700 heavy mortars, 1,000 light mortars, 100 anti-aircraft artilleries, 200 mountain guns, and communication gears for 20 divisions. Again, Lin Biao also appealed to Stalin in the letter that if such demand could not be met with captured Japanese weaponry, then captured German weaponry could fill the gap. Stalin, just like he had done previously, did not respond. However, the nearly nonexistent Soviet help proved not to be a problem for the communists, because in the mean time, the huge communist need was filled by an unexpected source, its adversary, Kuomintang. Thanks to the fatal mistake Kuomintang made in its demilitarization, communists were able to pinpoint nearly every Japanese secret depot with the help of former Kuomintang troops in its rank, and the total amount of Japanese weaponry recovered was enough to sustain the communists for 2 years before relying on captured American weaponry from Kuomintang in the later stage of the war. For example, a single secret depot typically contained as much as 150,000 artillery rounds. By February 1947, hundreds of artillery pieces were recovered by the communists included: 49 howitzers, 300 heavy mortars, 137 anti-aircraft artilleries, 141 anti-tank guns, 108 mountain guns, 97 cannons, and many other smaller artillery pieces. More importantly, due to the rapid expansion of its ranks filled by former Kuomintang troops discharged from the demilitarization, the sudden increase of troops of the communists meant that the original Communist peasantry army that was largely illiterate had suddenly became an army with 90% of its force being well trained, technically capable and combat hardened veterans that was more than a match for the Kuomintang force, who now had only three-quarters of the amount of Communist weaponry, with a handful of tanks and aircraft. However, even at this stage, Kuomintang troops still greatly underestimated their communist adversary because the American weaponry used by Kuomintang troops was superior to the Japanese weaponry used by the communist troops. Thus, the huge qualitative advantage of the Kuomintang would, they believed, be more than enough to make up for the numerical superiority of the Communists, a heavy price for which they would have to pay later.

During the Kuomintang demilitarization, the Communists did not sit idly either; it also reduced its troops by a million both in the regular army and in militia to ostensibly support the Marshall Mission. However, such reduction was the result of Mao Zedong's class struggle theory, and in fact, most were discharged due to political persecution and "rectification" campaigns. As a result, the Communist force reduction was much harsher than that of Kuomintang because it was a political purge. Most of those targeted in the Communist force reduction were from the wealthy, land owning and middle classes, and despite their loyalty to the Communists, they were considered unreliable due to their background and thus were purged. These unfortunate souls did not have the luxury like those discharged Nationalist soldiers who at least were able to live on the streets. Those discharged by the Communists were considered "class enemies" and were targeted by their former comrades, and were often executed, jailed, or forced to commit suicide. As a result, most Communist members from well-to-do family backgrounds chose to desert, with the majority defecting to the Kuomintang and becoming ardent anti-Communists. The defection rate was particularly high in those Communist-controlled regions where the struggles of persecutions were brutal, and in Mao's own admission, "in Shandong alone, over 300,000 (former Communists) were driven to the enemy (Kuomintang) side." In addition to joining the regular Nationalist force, Communist defectors also formed their own militias to help the Kuomintang to exterminate the Communists in the civil war that soon followed. The Communists also used the cease-fire period ushered by Marshall to arm and train huge numbers of peasants who had joined the People's Liberation Army during the war with Japan. The political persecution and purges during this era was an extension of Mao's Rectification Movement and was kept secret by the Chinese government, and it was not until the 1990s that the bloody details were allowed to surface in the domestic Chinese media.

The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full scale war broke out on June 26, and although negotiations continued, Marshall was recalled in January 1947, the same time when the last communist envoys in Kuomintang controlled regions were recalled back to Yan'an.
COntinue at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War

I would think Nationalist put too much stake in Manchuria Battle and lost it big. 2 out of 5 elite units he had were wiped out in that major battle!

Also Soviet actually didi not supply much weapon to PLA,most of PLA weapon were those leftover Jap weapons in China....

[adeptitus]

The post-WW2 ROC government had serious economic problems with hyper-inflation. It's said that in those days, you could sit down for a bowl of noodles, and by the time you're done the price posted on the wall have gone up.

The ROC government had a huge defense budget and couldn't afford to pay for it. Could they have won the civil war? Maybe, if the US was willing to foot the bill. But the US government at the time was pretty stretched too and would've preferred if the two sides could've settled their differences peacefully, or keep China divided between the two factions.

Now, if we want to get into "alternate reality" scenarios, had Japan not attacked and invaded in 1930s, I think the KMT-lead government might have wiped Mao off the map.

[MaxTesla]

The communist got some equipment from the USA during 1944 and 1945 when they showed some american observers how well and efficient they were conducting partisan activities against the Japanese

But the most important part of the Victory was that they won the hearts and minds of the local pupulation

And on a side note, do not use wikipedia, because most of it is bad or written from a a point of view that often hides some part of information and over exploits other part of information.

And all the numbers are just pulled out from their behinds, everything is so twisted and so spinned that nothing you read or see is correct except the names

[Neutral Zone]

Certainly the Nationalists could have defeated Mao militarily, but I don't think that would have ended the war. Mao was able to exploit the greivences of the people to win them to his side. The Nationalists represented the "established interests" and they would have been less likely to address the greivences. Had for example, Mao been ambushed and executed during the Long March, the causes of the civil war wouldn't have died with him and they would have kept smouldering away in the background. A new revolutionary movement, with Mao as an ideological figurehead and inspiration, would probably have emerged in the 1950's. This of course would have been at the height of the Cold War and the Soviets would have backed it and the Americans the Nationalists. Under this scenario, China's fate could have been to have become a gigantic Korea or Vietnam. :(

[Sakura]

I do not belive that the KMT could have won. There was hyperinflation due to the Japanese Invasion and Chinese Civil War. The KMT officials were infamously corrupt and the Nationalist Army had virtually no support from the Chinese population. The CCP, on the other hand, had wide support from the peasants of China because they presented a solution to their dire straits. The Nationalist Army was also unexperienced against the guerilla tactics that the Communists used. The nationalists could have probably won if Japan had not invaded China.

[tphuang]

American General George Marshall arrived in China and was part of negotiations over a ceasefire between the KMT and the CCP, the terms of which would build a coalition government that would include all of the contending political/military groups in China. Neither the Communists (represented by Zhou Enlai) nor Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were willing to compromise on certain fundamental issues or relinquish the territories they had seized in the wake of the Japanese surrender.


In the front row, Mao Zedong is on the right and Chiang Kai-shek is in the middle.The Nationalists demilitarized 1.5 million troops ostensibly to support the Marshall Mission, which turned out to be a fatal mistake for Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang, because in reality, Chiang and his associates used this excuse to reduce the power and influence of warlords who allied with Kuomintang. Nearly none of the 1.5 million troops discharged belonged to Chiang's own force, and all of them belonged to that of warlords, including those who collaborated with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War and pledged their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang after World War II. This move alienated many within the Kuomintang. As for the ordinary soldiers who were discharged, their prospects changed for the worse as nothing effective was done to help them integrate into civilian life. Many protests and riots by the discharged soldiers broke out, particularly in Chongqing by discharged former soliders of the Sichuan warlords. Faced with such desperate situations, these former soldiers turned against Chiang and the Nationalist government, and while some turned to banditry, most of them decided to join the communists. The communists welcomed these new recruits because their resentment towards the Kuomintang made them easily susceptible to communist indoctrination. The largest Nationalist defection to the communists occurred in Manchuria, where over half a million discharged Kuomintang soldiers (mostly former Japanese puppet governmental troops) joined the communist force, which previously had never exceeded 50,000, a more than 1000% boost for Lin Biao's forces.

In addition to this, the Nationalist demilitarization also provided communists with much needed weaponry. When Chiang Kai-shek attempted to solve the problem of warlords that plagued China by reducing their troops after World War II via demilitarization, the action backfired badly for him and Kuomintang in Manchuria when it was combined with other critical mistakes the Nationalists made. The Japanese strategy had been to give up Japan rather than give up Manchuria because the latter was so vital, and thus, they had stockpiled large amount of weaponry (enough to sustain more than 700,000 troops for several years) in hidden remote and hard-to-reach areas all over Manchuria. Although the Soviets captured a large quantity of Japanese weaponry, the majority of the Japanese stock survived. The Kuomintang was infatuated with obtaining as many urban centers as possible; therefore, the rural and hard-to-reach areas were ignored. Militarily, the Kuomintang did not have any incentives to recover and destroy this large stockpile of weaponry because the American weaponry used by Nationalist forces was superior. More importantly, since operating modern weaponry needed considerable knowledge and training, the Kuomintang believed that even if these weapons were to reach Communist hands, it would be impossible for the Communists to use them because most of their troops were illiterate. Therefore, the Kuomintang regime generally ignored the information on these Japanese secret depots because they deemed it not worth the effort to recover or destroy the weapons. Furthermore, since the information was provided by those former warlords' troops turned Japanese puppet regime troops who rejoined Nationalist force after World War II, and they were to be discharged, Kuomintang considered their actions no other than attempting to show their importance and to ask for financial rewards, and thus failed to take proper actions to prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands. Chiang and Kuomintang were correct on the matter originally but when Nationalist demilitarization began, things turned out to be completely opposite. Because those discharged warlords' troops were former Japanese puppet regime forces that rejoined Kuomintang after World War II and had the experience and training needed to handle the weaponry, communists in Manchuria had hit a gold mine when these troops joined them en masse. Not only these valuable troops were able to teach the rest of communists who had no knowledge on how to operate these weapons, but more importantly, these new troops knew exactly where the Japanese secret depots were and contrary to their old Kuomintang master, the communists were extremely appreciative to the information and weaponry obtained, because what was less advanced to Kuomintang was of great value to the poorly equipped communist troops.

Contrary to the Nationalist propaganda that the Soviets had given huge quantity of weapons to the communists in Manchuria, the actual amount was extremely low: the total Soviet weaponry and Japanese weaponry captured by Soviet given to the communists was merely enough to equip 30 infantry regiments and 2 mountain gun battalion, equipping a mere 20,000 communist troops out of a total of 400,000 (as of the end of 1947), and the Soviet aids to communists completely stopped by the end of 1947. The communists originally expected the Soviets to play a much larger role and Lin Biao personally wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin on June 25, 1947 asking for Japanese weaponry to be turned over to the communists, and he even asked for captured German weaponry. Stalin, however, did not even bother to respond. On December 28, 1947, Lin Biao wrote another letter directly to Stalin, asking for more weaponry, including: 200,000 rifles, 15,000 light machine guns, 7,000 heavy machine guns, 700 heavy mortars, 1,000 light mortars, 100 anti-aircraft artilleries, 200 mountain guns, and communication gears for 20 divisions. Again, Lin Biao also appealed to Stalin in the letter that if such demand could not be met with captured Japanese weaponry, then captured German weaponry could fill the gap. Stalin, just like he had done previously, did not respond. However, the nearly nonexistent Soviet help proved not to be a problem for the communists, because in the mean time, the huge communist need was filled by an unexpected source, its adversary, Kuomintang. Thanks to the fatal mistake Kuomintang made in its demilitarization, communists were able to pinpoint nearly every Japanese secret depot with the help of former Kuomintang troops in its rank, and the total amount of Japanese weaponry recovered was enough to sustain the communists for 2 years before relying on captured American weaponry from Kuomintang in the later stage of the war. For example, a single secret depot typically contained as much as 150,000 artillery rounds. By February 1947, hundreds of artillery pieces were recovered by the communists included: 49 howitzers, 300 heavy mortars, 137 anti-aircraft artilleries, 141 anti-tank guns, 108 mountain guns, 97 cannons, and many other smaller artillery pieces. More importantly, due to the rapid expansion of its ranks filled by former Kuomintang troops discharged from the demilitarization, the sudden increase of troops of the communists meant that the original Communist peasantry army that was largely illiterate had suddenly became an army with 90% of its force being well trained, technically capable and combat hardened veterans that was more than a match for the Kuomintang force, who now had only three-quarters of the amount of Communist weaponry, with a handful of tanks and aircraft. However, even at this stage, Kuomintang troops still greatly underestimated their communist adversary because the American weaponry used by Kuomintang troops was superior to the Japanese weaponry used by the communist troops. Thus, the huge qualitative advantage of the Kuomintang would, they believed, be more than enough to make up for the numerical superiority of the Communists, a heavy price for which they would have to pay later.

During the Kuomintang demilitarization, the Communists did not sit idly either; it also reduced its troops by a million both in the regular army and in militia to ostensibly support the Marshall Mission. However, such reduction was the result of Mao Zedong's class struggle theory, and in fact, most were discharged due to political persecution and "rectification" campaigns. As a result, the Communist force reduction was much harsher than that of Kuomintang because it was a political purge. Most of those targeted in the Communist force reduction were from the wealthy, land owning and middle classes, and despite their loyalty to the Communists, they were considered unreliable due to their background and thus were purged. These unfortunate souls did not have the luxury like those discharged Nationalist soldiers who at least were able to live on the streets. Those discharged by the Communists were considered "class enemies" and were targeted by their former comrades, and were often executed, jailed, or forced to commit suicide. As a result, most Communist members from well-to-do family backgrounds chose to desert, with the majority defecting to the Kuomintang and becoming ardent anti-Communists. The defection rate was particularly high in those Communist-controlled regions where the struggles of persecutions were brutal, and in Mao's own admission, "in Shandong alone, over 300,000 (former Communists) were driven to the enemy (Kuomintang) side." In addition to joining the regular Nationalist force, Communist defectors also formed their own militias to help the Kuomintang to exterminate the Communists in the civil war that soon followed. The Communists also used the cease-fire period ushered by Marshall to arm and train huge numbers of peasants who had joined the People's Liberation Army during the war with Japan. The political persecution and purges during this era was an extension of Mao's Rectification Movement and was kept secret by the Chinese government, and it was not until the 1990s that the bloody details were allowed to surface in the domestic Chinese media.

The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full scale war broke out on June 26, and although negotiations continued, Marshall was recalled in January 1947, the same time when the last communist envoys in Kuomintang controlled regions were recalled back to Yan'an.
COntinue at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War

I would think Nationalist put too much stake in Manchuria Battle and lost it big. 2 out of 5 elite units he had were wiped out in that major battle!

Also Soviet actually didi not supply much weapon to PLA,most of PLA weapon were those leftover Jap weapons in China....

well, you got all your sources from wikipedia, so you know, it's not exactly a good source by any stretch of the information. But as far as I know, PLA was pretty much hardened soldier due to the circumstances they faced pre and during WWII. It wasn't because of those demilitarized troops that they became more hardened, but rather the other way around. If those troops were so hardened and motivated to fight, it would not make a lot of sense for them to fight for the Japanese in WWII, would it?

[adeptitus]

The KMT had a good opportunity in 1930's to destroy the communists, but between CKS's incompetence and the Sino-Japanese war, that opportunity was lost.

It can be said that Japan was a major factor in regime changes in China over past few hundred years since the Ming. It contributed to the downfall of Ming, Qing, and ROC. Had Japan not invaded ROC, I doubt Mao would've won.

[dannytoro]

....In a historical context, American support did erode away from Chaing Ke as his corruption was uncovered. This was further compounded by an american unwillingness to create any form or haterd for the affable Mao, who hardly seemed comparable to despisable figures like Stalin and Lenin. In short Americans really desired to maintain good relations with China, but where left with no good vehicule to do so...On the other hand, Americans fail to understand the Chinese desire to intergrate Taiwan, especialy given the two dissimalar economic systems. Now however, those concerns diminish as China increaingly embraces free market policies....

[kunmingren]

The answer is Yes, there are a lot of political problem under the KMT, but the reason they lost on the battle field is that Chiang was not a good military commander. He frequently went against sound military judgement of his chief of staff an did things his own way, he also made that enemy with many warlord who end up helping the communist. If Chiang had not lost on the battlefield, then his government could have survived a lot longer.

[SteelBird]

The KMT was stronger in both material and experience compared to the Communist, but they finally lost the war. Parts of the reason is that the KMT lost the people's heart. If you watch some historical movies, many Communist's officials were from Huangpu military school. So, the war between KMT and Communist was a war between the teacher and his student and the final result was the teacher had lost the war. Interesting, the sino-vietnam war during 1979 was also considered as a teacher-student's war, but this time the teacher won :off . Now, watching another movie 亮劍 (Showing Sword - not historical one), a KMT officer talk to a Communist officer after loosing the war: "the commands were made by a genius but was carried-out by an idiot". So, I quite agree with you that Jiang Jieshi was quite a bad commander and led to the lost of the whole war.

In the 1990s, when the Mainland and Taiwan's relationship was on honey moon period, some Taiwanese officer first visited Mainland China, Song Meiling asked her to put a flower wreath on her father's grave but never mention about her elder sister, Song Qingling (reported by Taiwanese TV). Jiang Jieshi died in 1975 in his age of 88 years while Song continued to live another 28 years and died in 2003 in her age of 106 years old. Consider how she led her life in that 28 years without Jiang? I think that it's only regret and sorrow. But that gave me a thinking that Jiang and Song only consider China as their private property! Well, just think, if the Nationalist would have won the war, what would today's China be?

[hongkongpride]

Steelbird,

You are wrong about Chiang and Soong Meiling treating China as their own private property. Although Chiang was a bit of an 'eggheaded' idiot, a name reflected in his nickname of 'Cash My Check' in Washington during the 1940's partly due to corruption, I am sure he and his wife wanted the best for China just as the original Communists wanted the best for China. Chiang modernised China in a far more positive way than the current CCP, establishing the University of Nanjing, Academia Sinica and the Bank of China-laying the groundwork for the rise of China and growth of gradual democracy. All the CCP ever did was introduce the Great Leap Backwards and Cultural Revolution that destroyed Chinese culture and retarded China's growth-and with NO democracy at all, in violation of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's Three Principles of the People which the hypocrites of the CCP claim to follow. Deng Xiaopeng's economic reforms in the 1980's was a small improvement compared to what Chiang advanced in the 1930's before the Japanese invasion of China stopped this program of modernization. Unfortunately, under the increasingly corrupt KMT during the 1940's, the ROC lost the war to the Communists at the time, who had the people's hearts. I do not think it would be fair to assign all the blame to Chiang because he was just an incompetent leader who could not control his corrupt subordinates and on corrupt advice from his advisors, sacked several of the best generals that could have saved the ROC from total collapse such as Li Tsung Jen . The results of this can be seen today in the environmental dystopia that China has evolved into such as the loss of the Three Gorges, the rampant corruption among government officials and the CCP (contrast this to the ROC on Taiwan handling of corrupt officials, see "Two Chens face Two Systems http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/07122006/20/china-taiwan-chens-face-systems.html" and the great social inequality among the farmers that had made the CCP's rise to power possible. If the
Nationalists had managed to rally and hold on to the Sichuan and Canton areas of China where their last strongholds were instead of cowardly fleeing to Taiwan, they would have implemented the modernisation of Dr. Sun, creating a free and strong society like the USA or UK but without the social ills, based on the Three Principles of the People. If you want proof, look at the way the humbled Chiang modernised Taiwan in the 60's to 80's, turning it into an economic powerhouse and prosperous country without the social and environmental ills that plague China today. The crash course in ROC democracy that pits the still corrupt KMT (who have betrayed national security by blocking the weapons procurement bill more than 70 times!) against the equally corrupt DPP) is a story for another day as it is very interesting. However today it is the CCP of China that has turned into the corrupted KMT of the 1940's and have even made 'reunifying Taiwan into the motherland' a "national priority"-even though doing so will cost Chinese lives on both sides of the strait, destroy the environment of Taiwan and China and cause a possible nuclear war with the US-for what?

For starters, the CCP leadership might want to revise their history and realise that it is the will of the people that determine victory and that you cannot force people to 'reunify', only persuade them-a fact forgotten since 1949. If China does not offer any good reasons for reunifying, only verbally and psychologically threatening Taiwan with thug-like language like "drowning separatist forces in Taipei in a sea of fire" and aiming 800 missiles at your fellow Chinese is a sort of funny if it wasn't so deadly serious way to go about 'persuading' them to return to the motherland.

So the CCP should be smart and reform the political system-and make the ultimate sacrifice to show that they put China's benefit above their own love of power like the KMT of the late 80's did-by holding gradual elections from the mayor's level up to president STARTING NOW over a period of 30 years-avoiding the social hooliganism that uncontrolled democracy can bring (refer to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan antics for more uncontolled democracy) and do something about the environment that is slowly killing China.

If not, the current CCP might soon find themselves in the position of the KMT of the 1940's, this time with angry peasants and revolutionaries at their back-and no Taiwan to flee to and NO TIME to Cash a Check before the mob tears down the door.

[Ryz05]

Steelbird,

You are wrong about Chiang and Soong Meiling treating China as their own private property. Although Chiang was a bit of an 'eggheaded' idiot, a name reflected in his nickname of 'Cash My Check' in Washington during the 1940's partly due to corruption, I am sure he and his wife wanted the best for China just as the original Communists wanted the best for China. Chiang modernised China in a far more positive way than the current CCP, establishing the University of Nanjing, Academia Sinica and the Bank of China-laying the groundwork for the rise of China and growth of gradual democracy. All the CCP ever did was introduce the Great Leap Backwards and Cultural Revolution that destroyed Chinese culture and retarded China's growth-and with NO democracy at all, in violation of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's Three Principles of the People which the hypocrites of the CCP claim to follow. Deng Xiaopeng's economic reforms in the 1980's was a small improvement compared to what Chiang advanced in the 1930's before the Japanese invasion of China stopped this program of modernization. Unfortunately, under the increasingly corrupt KMT during the 1940's, the ROC lost the war to the Communists at the time, who had the people's hearts. I do not think it would be fair to assign all the blame to Chiang because he was just an incompetent leader who could not control his corrupt subordinates and on corrupt advice from his advisors, sacked several of the best generals that could have saved the ROC from total collapse such as Li Tsung Jen . The results of this can be seen today in the environmental dystopia that China has evolved into such as the loss of the Three Gorges, the rampant corruption among government officials and the CCP (contrast this to the ROC on Taiwan handling of corrupt officials, see "Two Chens face Two Systems http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/07122006/20/china-taiwan-chens-face-systems.html" and the great social inequality among the farmers that had made the CCP's rise to power possible. If the
Nationalists had managed to rally and hold on to the Sichuan and Canton areas of China where their last strongholds were instead of cowardly fleeing to Taiwan, they would have implemented the modernisation of Dr. Sun, creating a free and strong society like the USA or UK but without the social ills, based on the Three Principles of the People. If you want proof, look at the way the humbled Chiang modernised Taiwan in the 60's to 80's, turning it into an economic powerhouse and prosperous country without the social and environmental ills that plague China today. The crash course in ROC democracy that pits the still corrupt KMT (who have betrayed national security by blocking the weapons procurement bill more than 70 times!) against the equally corrupt DPP) is a story for another day as it is very interesting. However today it is the CCP of China that has turned into the corrupted KMT of the 1940's and have even made 'reunifying Taiwan into the motherland' a "national priority"-even though doing so will cost Chinese lives on both sides of the strait, destroy the environment of Taiwan and China and cause a possible nuclear war with the US-for what?

For starters, the CCP leadership might want to revise their history and realise that it is the will of the people that determine victory and that you cannot force people to 'reunify', only persuade them-a fact forgotten since 1949. If China does not offer any good reasons for reunifying, only verbally and psychologically threatening Taiwan with thug-like language like "drowning separatist forces in Taipei in a sea of fire" and aiming 800 missiles at your fellow Chinese is a sort of funny if it wasn't so deadly serious way to go about 'persuading' them to return to the motherland.

So the CCP should be smart and reform the political system-and make the ultimate sacrifice to show that they put China's benefit above their own love of power like the KMT of the late 80's did-by holding gradual elections from the mayor's level up to president STARTING NOW over a period of 30 years-avoiding the social hooliganism that uncontrolled democracy can bring (refer to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan antics for more uncontolled democracy) and do something about the environment that is slowly killing China.

If not, the current CCP might soon find themselves in the position of the KMT of the 1940's, this time with angry peasants and revolutionaries at their back-and no Taiwan to flee to and NO TIME to Cash a Check before the mob tears down the door.

Political reform is not the surest way to ensure its survival. The CCP can save itself by fighting against corruption, and the best way would be the establishment of a free press. However, it seems they are not interested in letting the population know the ugliness, which can cause a mob-mentality (common in Chinese history) and mass social disruptions. Instead, they circulate investigative reports within the Party, and punish officals silently without revealing too much about what they've done to the public.

[Gollevainen]

No politics! Expecially in offtopic manners. Back to the topic or I close the thread!:nono: :mad: :mad: :nono:

[goldenpanda]

Unfortunately I think politics has a lot to do with how the military situation could have reversed in such an impossible way.

I have a simple view about this. The Nanjing government were a cultural elite in China. They were intelligent, educated, and many of them were noble and patriotic individuals. It also meant they could communicate with maybe 5% of China's people at the time, the rest being illiterate peasantry and laborers. Against Japanese they could call upon a simple idea -- defeat cruel invaders -- to lead the nation. After Japanese they had no message for the common people.

The common people saw in communism a way to attain status in society which kuomintang told them was not possible--they were to fall in line and follow the instructions of their "betters". Chiang had identified democracy as unworkable in China from his earlier republican experience. On the other hand, the communist prescription of "class struggle" was very germane to Chinese society at that time. The common people, who had suffered and paid in blood against Japanese, did not see any fruits of victory. Communists said simply, you are now the masters, you are as good as anyone else, take the wealth you see before you, it is yours. Take the love we give to you, and give love to others.

Chinese simply did not resist this message.

[ofone]

hah

Nationalists could not win in any way.

The key point of Maonism is how to handle the people's power to insulate the enemy.

Indirect outside power can change the balance between two countrys.but can not change the balance of two partys in one country.

[hongkongpride]

Well, in a way ofone is correct in that the Nationalists would have lost due to hyperinflation, loss of morale and desertion-losing up to 1/5 of their total pre- war (1945) troops to desertion in Manchuria-but they had a very good chance of holding onto their last stronghold in Sichuan as the peasants of China's 'breadbasket' were not as disaffected or opposed to the KMT as in the other provinces such as Henan.

Geographically, the Sichuan plateau was isolated from the rest of China for centuries, accessible only via three main "channels" or gorges, rocky and near impossible to pass through without a skilled guide. Even the, treacherous currents and humid, rainy weather would make life hell for attacking troops. The kingdom of Shu during the Three Kingdoms period was only conquered after the General Deng Ai led a force from behind Jiang Wei's Shu army (guided by a traitor) unopposed through a gorge and captured Chengdu, Shu's capital, forcing the Emperor Liu Shan to surrender (Romance of the Three Kindgoms).

Fast foward to 1949, where in an almost identical situation the Three Kingdoms, Deng Xiaopeng led a PLA force from behind through a gorge to capture Chengdu, the last ROC held city on the mainland, Chiang snr. and Chiang jnr. abandoning their loyal troops, flew out of the city for Taiwan onboard their private aircraft 'Mayling'. I am quite sure that if the modern day fool Chiang had not panicked and ordered all ROC forces to flee to Taiwan, then the ROC in Sichuan could have held out indefinitely to the present day.

If Chiang had ordered his three elite German trained divisions, the 88th, 101st and 76th divisions of the ROCA or National Revolutionary Army as it was known back then, to secure the Three gorges leading to Chengdu instead of retreating to Taiwan then Deng Xiaopeng's pathetic largely untrained PLA force would have been mown down and totally destroyed by the superb German tactics and MG-42 machine guns of these divisions in the gorges -instead of the half trained panicky men that made up the warlord forces defending Sichuan and who were responsible for the nationalists losing much of Manchuria and China.

With these three divisions Chiang and the ROC could have held out forever in Sichuan until possibly now-that would have put a brake to Communist excesses such as the Great Leap Backwards and Cultural Revolution.

[goldenpanda]

I am quite sure that if the modern day fool Chiang had not panicked and ordered all ROC forces to flee to Taiwan, then the ROC in Sichuan could have held out indefinitely to the present day.


I cannot emphasize enough what a ridiculous view this is.


If Chiang had ordered his three elite German trained divisions, the 88th, 101st and 76th divisions of the ROCA or National Revolutionary Army as it was known back then, to secure the Three gorges leading to Chengdu instead of retreating to Taiwan then Deng Xiaopeng's pathetic largely untrained PLA force would have been mown down and totally destroyed by the superb German tactics and MG-42 machine guns of these divisions in the gorges -instead of the half trained panicky men that made up the warlord forces defending Sichuan and who were responsible for the nationalists losing much of Manchuria and China.


The problem was never KMT lacked equipment or troops. The problem was they *wouldn't fight*, not very hard anyway. Your "elite German divisions" melted in a few days against Japanese. How long do you think they'd have held up against Chinese coming to liberate them, when the rest of the country has already gone 大势已去?

Also your "pathetic largely untrained PLA" forced USA to evacuate 100k troops by sea and beat them back 700 kilometers, just one year later.

With helpful minds like yours no wonder KMT lost.

[adeptitus]

One of the biggest problems that the ROC government faced, was lack of stability even prior to the Japanese invasion. What the people of China needed in post-Qing era was a long period of stability, to transition from the old world to the new. But they were never given the time because of certain people's greed for power.

Had the original agreement with Qing Monarch's abdication been kept -- that is, the ROC pays Puyi a couple million silver dollars annually to maintain a quasi constitutional monarchy in name/appearance only, while real power rests with the republican government, as the country slowly transition toward reforms and the modern world, I think it might have worked. But Yuan Shikai had other ideas.

Chiang wasn't able to consolidate his power until 1928, and the Japanese invaded soon afterwards. Had the country been stable from 1912-1930, I think China would've developed quite nicely, and the communists might have simply became one of many political factions. But things didn't go that way and the chaos gave Mao the opportunity to rise. I mean if everything had been peaceful and the economy was growing, I don't think the people would've been so upset at the KMT to join in communist armed revolt?

The chaotic conditions that give rise to Mao, I think also made it very difficult for Chiang to win the "hearts and minds" of the people, which ultimately lead to his downfall. He had a second chance after WW2, when his popularity was at its highest for "winning" the Sino-Japanese war. The economy was in such a sorry shape that he really shouldn't have re-started the civil war. I think Chiang could have "won" by humbling himself and agree to more power-sharing and negotiate peace with Mao, but he was way too selfish to do that.

[hongkongpride]

Goldenpanda, I'm afraid you misunderstand my point.

I'm talking from a purely military point of view here.

It's generally an accepted fact that the ROC's German trained divisions were far superior than the rest of the warlord forces that made up the ROC army. In Manchuria, most of the ROC soldiers were conscripts that had no experience in counter guerilla warfare. You misintepreted my quote-in every army there are elite units and not-so elite units. Deng Xiaopeng's force that captured Chengdu was a sorry lot-very different from Lin Biao's battle hardened veterans who had fought both the KMT and the Japanese in Manchuria and Henan.

However, it is an insult to the brave Chinese soldiers who fought against the Japanese in World War II to say that they "melted away" when facing the Japanese. The 88th Division was the main German trained division facing the Japanese at the Battle of Shanghai in 1937 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_shanghai (for quick reference)
-while taking heavy losses, they proved to the world that China was ready to stand up and resist the Japanese and were also responsible for the heroic stand at the Sihang Warehouse on the banks of the Suzhou River. In short, the German trained divisions of the KMT bore most of the heavy fighting while the Communists were busy hiding from the 14th Imperial Japanese Army sweeping down from Manchuria to Shanghai. In the end, the 88th and 99th Divisions were almost destroyed defending Chinese soil from the aggressor while the Communists built up their arms stockpiles in anticipation for the coming civil war. In 1939, Germany allied with Japan, bringing an end to German training of Chinese divisions.

While it is true that while ROC troops in Manchuria were well supplied but could not fight effectively, it was only because they could not take the Communist guerilla warfare and broke-also because most of them were former men of warlord Chang Tso-Lin who had no real loyalty to the ROC.

The 76th, 88th and 101st Divisions were ordered to Taiwan to guard the gold reserves and treasures of China from the Communists -who would have certainly destroyed them in the Cultural Revolution if it was not for the efforts of these men. As an interesting fact, the following year at the Battle of Kuningtou (1949) the 76th Division wiped out almost the entire amphibious PLA assault on Quemoy island and taking the rest prisoner, proving that regular ROC troops were not as easily defeated as the 'warlord' ROC troops were by the PLA.

[bd popeye]

No politics! Expecially in offtopic manners. Back to the topic or I close the thread!:nono: :mad: :mad: :nono:

Some of the members need to see the optometrist! Make no mistake about this, Gollevainen meant what he posted.

Thread Closed

bd popeye super moderator