PLA deployment against India

[Greyfalcon]

I'd like to know the details of the PLA deployment in the TAR and against India. Can anyone provide these ?

[Red Guard]

so far, one of the weakest military district is in that part of the country. in tibet, we only have some armed police units, and border guards. china has no interest about india.
i think we have a mountain division somewhere there between tibet and xin jiang.
but anyway, indian army is too weak, in 1959, our border guards kicked their elite troop butt, and a brigader general was taken prisoner, what a shame...........

[ArjunMk1]

so far, one of the weakest military district is in that part of
but anyway, indian army is too weak, in 1959, our border guards kicked their elite troop butt, and a brigader general was taken prisoner, what a shame...........

???????? :confused:

They were not elite troops , they were just ordinary soldiers , unacclimatised , without adequeate arms, ration and clothing !!!

[Red Guard]

???????? :confused:

They were not elite troops , they were just ordinary soldiers , unacclimatised , without adequeate arms, ration and clothing !!!

****************

we didn't and still don't know about indian army very much. but in the war, they thought they were pretty tough, and i think the reason i called them as "elite troop" is because, i remember one of the unit we crashed was an unit that fought in WWII and korean war (i might be wrong about korean war). and it's like they are pretty tough, they are british equiped, with good weapons and stuff. and the indian PM (don't his name in english) was pretty proud of this army he raised. i remember seeing him parading the troop before the war, and they thought the poorly equiped PLA border guards were easy to crash............

[vincelee]

India has the best high altitude infantry in the world, but her martial leadership is rather lacking, even today.

[Red Guard]

ja, heard of that. their mountain troop has way better equipments than us. but somehow.........somehow.............

[simonov]

That's unique, The Indian get training from British. And many of veteran involved in WW II. So if comparing with PLa during that time, PLA is nothing in experience. (PLA experince in Civil War and Korea War, The india is far experience than that, they involve in Asia, Western and North Africa Theatre during in WW II)

[vincelee]

you're kidding me, right? PLA, at that time, is probably one of the most experienced armies in the world. 10 continous years of combat, then Korean. The PLA leadership at that time consists of battle hardened generals who fought through 3 wars, and won.

[simonov]

No I'm not kidding. I saw from different poin. Under the British Command The Indian officer fought in North Africa, Asia (burma n Malaya), and Europe. ts mean they officer who become the basic of India Armed Forces very rich in experience, bcoz they fight in 3 continent and they fought with Germany which have a brilliat General. I saw from point of this
Of Course PLA winning 3 war with Nasionalist, IJA and Allied in Korea. But the 2 of them is 50% (IJA and Nasionalist with bitterness in guerilla war)

[vincelee]

I'm talking about command structure here. If you haven't noticed, there aren't many command-giving Indians in the British involvement during WWII.

[simonov]

Command structure , I agrre with u. If not the PVA will loss much in Korean War

[Indianfighter]

I may daresay that the 1962 Sino-Indian war was probably the first war in modern times, in which the victors lost far more soldiers than the defeated side.

But China cannot repeat a 1962 today, because :

a] Indian armed forces have modernised significantly since then.

b] There cannot be forced mass-recruitment of young boys and men from rural areas and pushed into the war because China has also come a long way from Mao-style dictatorship.

[vincelee]

what the hell are you talking about?

What do you call WWII? Semi modern? What about Korea?

There was never a forced recuitment in China and there probably never will be-with a standing force of 2 million if you count the PAP, you really think the PLA needs to conscript people?

If the Indians are still as inept at command as they were in 1962, even Pakistan can gain considerable foothold into the country.

Apparently not only are you totally devoid of any technical knowledge, it seems that you're not exactly a history/poli-sci major either.

[FreeAsia2000]

India has the best high altitude infantry in the world, but her martial leadership is rather lacking, even today.

I think Pakistani troops in Siachen would dispute that....:)

which is why...

U.S. soldiers selected to attend the mountain-warfare school in Kakul, Pakistan, required additional climbing time to attain the desired level of physical fitness. The body must adjust to the thin mountain air, and climbing muscles must be developed.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_5_84/ai_n6252063

Also during the British period the Industani army was a lot different from the BHARAT army...I know because my great-grandfather fought with distinction in Burma...most of the higher ranking officers who had fought with distinction in world war 2 were sikhs, muslims and ghurka hindu nepali's. after independence they had either left or in the case of the sikhs were passed over

anyway just to be fair to IndianFighter i'll quote from an INDIAN source...

All colonial armies are liable to suffer from the tugs of contradictory allegiance and, in the case of India's, that fissure was opened in the Second World War by Japan's recruitment from prisoners of war of the Indian National Army to fight against their former fellows. By the beginning of the 1950s, two factions were emerging in the officer corps, one patriotic but above all professional and apolitical, and orthodox in adherence to the regimental traditions established in the century of the Raj; the other nationalist, ready to respond unquestioningly to the political requirements of their civilian masters and scorning their rivals as fuddy-duddies still aping the departed rulers, and suspected as being of doubtful loyalty to the new ones. The latter faction soon took on an eponymous identification from its leader, B M Kaul.

At the time of Independence, Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. Although Sandhurst-trained for infantry service, he had eased through the war without serving on any frontline and ended it in a humble and obscure post in public relations. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that Independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman.

Boosted by the prime minister's steady favouritism, Kaul rocketed through the Army structure to emerge in 1961 at the very summit of the Army HQ. Not only did he hold the key appointment of chief of general staff but the army commander, Thapar, was, in effect, his client. Kaul had, of course, by then acquired a significant following, disparaged by the other side as 'Kaul boys' ('call-girls' had just entered usage), and his appointment as CGS opened a putsch in HQ, an eviction of the old guard, with his rivals, until then his superiors, being not only pushed out but often hounded thereafter with charges of disloyalty.

The struggle between those factions both fed on and fed into the strains placed on the Army by the government's contradictory and hypocritical policies -- on the one hand, proclaiming China an eternal friend against whom it was unnecessary to arm; on the other, exerting armed force to seize territory it knew China regarded as its own.

Through the early 1950s, Nehru's covertly expansionist policy had been implemented by armed border police under the Intelligence Bureau, whose director, N B Mullik, was another favourite and confidant of the prime minister. The Army high command, knowing its forces to be too weak to risk conflict with China, would have nothing to do with it. Indeed when the potential for Sino-Indian conflict inherent in Mullik's aggressive forward patrolling was demonstrated in the serious clash at the Kongka Pass in October 1959, Army HQ and the ministry of external affairs united to denounce him as a provocateur and insisted that control over all activities on the border be assumed by the Army, which thus could insulate China from Mullik's jabs.

The takeover by Kaul and his 'boys' at Army HQ in 1961 reversed that. Now, regular infantry would take over from Mullik's border police in implementing what was formally designated a 'forward policy,' one conceived to extrude the Chinese presence from all territory claimed by India. Field commanders receiving orders to move troops forward into territory the Chinese both held and regarded as their own warned that they had no resources or reserves to meet the forceful reaction they knew must be the ultimate outcome: they were told to keep quiet and obey orders.


By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only "thinkable" but inevitable.

From the first days of India's Independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India's inheritance. China's other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing.

The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable -- that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at will -- Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.

Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing 'aggression' by refusing to surrender to Indian claims.

From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On October 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of 'Chinese aggression' had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: 'If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked.'

On October 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along the borders, overwhelming the feeble -- but, in this first instance, determined -- resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the eastern sector. On October 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese withdrawal on the condition that India agree to open negotiations: Nehru refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local counterattack on November 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total victory.

The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by November 20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted.

Naturally the Indian political public demanded to know what had brought about the shameful debacle suffered by their Army. On December 14, a new Army commander, Lieutenant General J N Chaudhuri, instituted an Operations Review for that purpose, assigning the task of enquiry to Lieutenant-General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/may/23spec.htm

[vincelee]

US Navy SEAL was actually training with some Indian high altitude unit a year ago or so in desimilar combat. Mountain warfare is tough.

Edit: blame my laptop keyboard

[vincelee]

is that you BritBoi?

have you returned to terrorize SDF?

[EssexBoi]

u mean me? na, its mi 1st time here mate, dont no y im here, maybe coz im bored, just lukin ramdom stuffs on interenet, thought this is coool,lol

[FreeAsia2000]

is that you BritBoi?

have you returned to terrorize SDF?

it's him.

somebody ban him please. ban his whole IP in fact

[Gollevainen]

Now cool down, lets not make any assumptions yet. But Essexboi, you should notice that we have certain rules about posting so i advice you to take a good look at them before posting

[EssexBoi]

oi oi wat u talkin about mate!?
i aint got a bloody clue who da hack is that britboi, i like chinese stuffs, wats wrong with it? y should i get da ban??????

[Red Guard]

I may daresay that the 1962 Sino-Indian war was probably the first war in modern times, in which the victors lost far more soldiers than the defeated side.

But China cannot repeat a 1962 today, because :

a] Indian armed forces have modernised significantly since then.

b] There cannot be forced mass-recruitment of young boys and men from rural areas and pushed into the war because China has also come a long way from Mao-style dictatorship.


my oh my, aren't what they say true.............

[EssexBoi]

yer mate, i dont fink india boiz can stand a chance in da war with bruce lee boiz

and plz, whoever that is(written in red), dont get rid off my message, free speech innt?!

[FreeAsia2000]

Respectfully IndianFighter in mountainous areas the infilterated force
has the advantage once it's in a good defensive postition which can be
resupplied.

Since China and India would BOTH have access to aircraft and artillery
the first side to infilterate would be virtually impossible to remove

[Gollevainen]

First of all Essexboi, free speach in here is limited to reasonable saying. Sofar you haven't showed any. Your posting is imature, ridicilous and completly useless so i might just edit it out right away. Didn't you read what i said? GET FAMILIAR TO THE FORUM RULES BEFORE POSTING!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Here are examples of your misconducts:

1. Flaming arguments and country bashing We don't allow any thrash against any nation in here. All Indian related topics and statements are under special observation as so many other beside you cannot talk maturely over the issue.

2. Overall contest of your posts If your posts are only oneliners and one sentences, you might just spare us for your "insights" eg. keep quiet untill you have something reasonable to say. We are trying to enstabilish a respectfull military forum so statements like yer mate, i dont fink india boiz can stand a chance in da war with bruce lee boiz doesen't really fit on the matter....

3. Disrespectful behaivior towards forum leaders If moderator advices you to do something, you better do it before the moderator has to tell you to do it. And if you still wont obey, well :nono: :nono: quess who's name is next on the ban list

Now are these things clear? Good, then you can spend little more time to learn the other rules as well and you are then welcomed to participating.

[Indianfighter]

India lost the 1962 war because Indian troops were outnumbered almost 1:30 in most theaters. The overall ratio was heavily against India.

Chinese troops suffered many more casualties than Indian troops. One lone Indian soldier manning a post killed 50 Chinese soldiers (when they attempted to climb up to his post), before he was martyred.

Today that numerical inferiority does not exist, and hence China cannot launch an attack on India on the same scale/strategy as 1962.

[KYli]

India lost the 1962 war because Indian troops were outnumbered almost 1:30 in most theaters. The overall ratio was heavily against India.
You are talking about BS here, please don't make stupid statement like this without backing up with facts.


Chinese troops suffered many more casualties than Indian troops. One lone Indian soldier manning a post killed 50 Chinese soldiers (when they attempted to climb up to his post), before he was martyred.
You should be mature enough to know that is just fake information, one man against 50 you are out of your mind.


Today that numerical inferiority does not exist, and hence China cannot launch an attack on India on the same scale/strategy as 1962.

*******

KYli, I know these numbers are out of the mind too, but please show some respect!!! Don't try to abuse the emoticons!!!!! What break? You give me a break!

[ArjunMk1]

Yes uts true , Chinese suffered more casualty than the Indians in 62 though Indian army was completely routed !!

Actually Chinese were using wave-style attacks , means charging posts with a large army which appeared as sea waves . In this situation the indian soldiers got time to empty their LMGs and Chinese had casualty, but they did win the battle and in a short time !!!

Actually Chinese were using their tactics of Korean war , charging with a lot of men, making sound with whistles , shouting , etc . But Indians were not Americans !!!!!

[netspider]

China/India conflicts in 60s is history now, there is no point to discuss this in this post. This post is about the CURRENT chinese deployment along the border.

As far as I know, there are only some border patrol units along the China/India border. These units may not even from PLA, they might be armed police forces.

Far away from the border, there is a mountain division stationed either in Yuan Nan or Si Chuan.

There is no immediate concerns about possible China/India conflicts. Parkistan/India conflicts are also not likely to happen since both countries have got their nukes.

However, in case of emergency, PLA can quickly mobilize their troops and deploy them to this region. There are one fast reaction division each in the Cheng Du and Lan Zhou military district. Also recently, China has finished the construction of a railway from Lan Zhou to Tibet, which obviously will help the movement of these troops.

There are probably very few air fields in that region though.

[KYli]

Yes uts true , Chinese suffered more casualty than the Indians in 62 though Indian army was completely routed !!

The official chinese casualty record showed 1460 killed and wounded. It is generally accepted by the west. Some people put the PLA number as high as 3000, and put the India number of killed and wounded about 4000 which did not included the 7000 who surrended.

http://www.onwar.com

[adeptitus]

I'd like to know the details of the PLA deployment in the TAR and against India. Can anyone provide these ?

Going back to the original question...

The PRC has 2 military regions that border India, Chengdu MR to the east (eastern India), and Lanzhou to the north (Northern India). These military regions cover a wide area and units deployed within are spread out and not concentrated along the border. You can read about the forces here:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-ground.htm

[tphuang]

No I'm not kidding. I saw from different poin. Under the British Command The Indian officer fought in North Africa, Asia (burma n Malaya), and Europe. ts mean they officer who become the basic of India Armed Forces very rich in experience, bcoz they fight in 3 continent and they fought with Germany which have a brilliat General. I saw from point of this
Of Course PLA winning 3 war with Nasionalist, IJA and Allied in Korea. But the 2 of them is 50% (IJA and Nasionalist with bitterness in guerilla war)
No, PLA was still a small force compared to the Nationalists in the WWII, that's why it was not the mian force against the Japanese. Of course, PLA vs Nationalists was a 1 on 1 thing. The Korean war was again one on one vs the Americans. The North Korean army was pretty much defeated already by the time PVA entered Yalu. In all three wars, PLA started off as the far inferior side. That's how it pretty much mastered guerilla warfare and fighting in different types of terrains. From early 30s to early 50s, that's 20 years of continuous warfare. PLA had pretty much the most experienced troops by the end of the Korean war. You think that having British command means you would get the most trained troop? Basically, the real fighting that the British got themselves into was in Africa in 1942, western europe from 1944-45, Italy in 43 and 45 and south Asia in 44-45. There is no way the British troop even had as much experience as the Russians let alone PLA.

You failed to mention that General Montgomery was a great general in his own right. Maybe not as a good as Rommel, but he was basically the one that turned the tides of the war. And basically, Rommel was ruined by the insane commands of Hitler. Pretty much every great German general from WWII was hampered by the stupid commands of Hitler. So, attributing beating Rommel to the Indians is totally hogwash.

You should read up on what the Americans thought of PLA for the Korean war. Let's just say they were quite amazed. Considering how inferior PLA was compared to the Americans in Korean war in terms of weapons, it was amazing what PLA was able to do.

[vincelee]

can we please stop with the "human wave" shit? It's not human wave, but superior tactical planning and execution. Question is, if it were a shitload of people charging a defensive position, why the hell didn't US/UN notice it in Korean? Why didn't the Indians notice it during 1962? Of course it is a rhetorical question.

[crazyinsane105]

About the Indians in mountain warfare, I am not dobuting they are not good, but during the whole Kargil episode with Pakistan the Indian Army made regular infantry (guys who never really trained or fought at high altitudes) climb up the hills and try to retake the positions captured by Pakistan. Now, as to why that happened there are two reasons:

1. India doesn't have any good mountain warfare troops
2. India did, but they were limited in number

Number one has been refuted so we have number two. India probably did have good mountain warfare troops, but the Kargil skirmish was quite large (dozens on peaks had been captured by Pakistan) so the Indian soldiers that were specially trained in mountain warfare were probably in short supply. Now one can argue that since Kargil India has decided to increase the number of mountain troops substantially, but Kargil took place decades after 62 yet India still wasn't completely prepared. How would Kargil be any different?

As for China, the Chinese have an extremely good advantage. The PLA holds the high ground against the Indians and PLA ELINT and radar units would be able to detect any Indian ground and air movement hundreds of miles away (similar to the situation of Golan heights: the Israeli ELINTs can detect all the movements of the Syrian army). Above that, several sources have pointed out that the PLA has made an extraordinary system of roads that can be used to attack the Indian border at any front, but the main purpose of the roads are for economical purposes. Also, I am not sure if the tactical Chinese aircraft bases by the Indian border have the mainatanence ready for China's more advanced aircraft (MKK, J-10, Su-27, etc.)

[darth sidious]

I may daresay that the 1962 Sino-Indian war was probably the first war in modern times, in which the victors lost far more soldiers than the defeated side.

But China cannot repeat a 1962 today, because :

a] Indian armed forces have modernised significantly since then.

b] There cannot be forced mass-recruitment of young boys and men from rural areas and pushed into the war because China has also come a long way from Mao-style dictatorship.

china does not want to repeat 1962 right now it seeks to improve relation with India if you notice most of the chinese units are the weakest avilible mainly armed police

No, PLA was still a small force compared to the Nationalists in the WWII, that's why it was not the mian force against the Japanese. Of course, PLA vs Nationalists was a 1 on 1 thing. The Korean war was again one on one vs the Americans. The North Korean army was pretty much defeated already by the time PVA entered Yalu. In all three wars, PLA started off as the far inferior side. That's how it pretty much mastered guerilla warfare and fighting in different types of terrains. From early 30s to early 50s, that's 20 years of continuous warfare. PLA had pretty much the most experienced troops by the end of the Korean war. You think that having British command means you would get the most trained troop? Basically, the real fighting that the British got themselves into was in Africa in 1942, western europe from 1944-45, Italy in 43 and 45 and south Asia in 44-45. There is no way the British troop even had as much experience as the Russians let alone PLA.
You failed to mention that General Montgomery was a great general in his own right. Maybe not as a good as Rommel, but he was basically the one that turned the tides of the war. And basically, Rommel was ruined by the insane commands of Hitler. Pretty much every great German general from WWII was hampered by the stupid commands of Hitler. So, attributing beating Rommel to the Indians is totally hogwash.
You should read up on what the Americans thought of PLA for the Korean war. Let's just say they were quite amazed. Considering how inferior PLA was compared to the Americans in Korean war in terms of weapons, it was amazing what PLA was able to do.

the british army is one ofthe weakest in WWII matbe slighty above the japanese

Rommel was defeated through lack of supplies if he had half the number of tanks the english had then Montgomery would have been kicked out long ago
funny some one mentioned Humen wave. in north africa it was the BRITISH that resorted to massive numders to defeat the germen panzers

[JonMan]

Yes uts true , Chinese suffered more casualty than the Indians in 62 though Indian army was completely routed !!

Actually Chinese were using wave-style attacks , means charging posts with a large army which appeared as sea waves . In this situation the indian soldiers got time to empty their LMGs and Chinese had casualty, but they did win the battle and in a short time !!!

Actually Chinese were using their tactics of Korean war , charging with a lot of men, making sound with whistles , shouting , etc . But Indians were not Americans !!!!!

Chinese may have suffered more than Indian casualties, but both sides closer to the same number. Indian soldiers are not superior to Chinese, and you did not do your homework when researching tactics. I know an American high ranking officer who told me how the Korean war really went. Rarely attacks were in waves, but mostly Chinese used good tactics.

Chinese only lose about one and half soldiers per american army that includes tanks and vehicles, even though Chinese soldiers had almost no tank support. And the UN recognizes this count. They didn't even lose more than 2 men for each 'superior' american. They used flanking and attacking in the night, and very coordinated attacks. They still had to use grenades to destroy the tanks, but they did good. It was the same way they beat India. India didin't have good military leaders, and didn't know how to support outlying bases when both under attack, by coordinated forces.

PLA does not use wave style attacks as the normal. They know how ineffective it was even before sino-indian war and korean war. PLA does not fight like nationalist, like you think. You do not know the PLA. And many Indian generals gave bad excuses to losing. One report is that 600 chinese soldiers storm fort, but was really 60. It is a true story.

[jatt]

I agree. In this mountian warfare. Wave attacks wouldn't happen. It was I imagine something like Kargil. Dozens of men moving around. Of course the attackers need suprise. 1962 was a suprise. No one can argue that. The attacker always has to have numbers on their side. 1962 PLA deployed rather rapidly sinking into Indian territory. Gaurded by light Indian mountian infantry. PLA after realizing they had taught India a lesson to fast realized that they had walked too far in. If they did not step back the IA would deploy full force. India was getting international attention aswell. New weapons arrive for the IA. PLA's supply line is stretched thin obviously. PLA moves back while IA advances on what China sees as their territory. But PLA had to move back to their proper barrier to recieve supplys. IA didn't have this to worry about. The IAF would have sent enough biscuts and tea bags for 2 Chinese New Years.:o
And thats how I think it went down. How else do you explain PLA giving up what once China claimed to be their territory? It was a must.

[tphuang]

the british army is one ofthe weakest in WWII matbe slighty above the japanese

Rommel was defeated through lack of supplies if he had half the number of tanks the english had then Montgomery would have been kicked out long ago
funny some one mentioned Humen wave. in north africa it was the BRITISH that resorted to massive numders to defeat the germen panzers
The British army may not have been at the same level as the Germans or the Russians, but the one that was in Africa was still quite good after years of fighting against the Germans and Italians. Rommel was defeated through lack of supplies and lack of numbers in general, but that was because Hitler forced him to battle to the end in spite of his situation. As a result of that, the German losses were a lot worse than it should've been.

[rommel]

Hum...I'll have to say that most british tank wave was easily break with 88 Flak... There's a anecdote saying that Rommel, interrogating a british prisonner, told the prisonner, I admire your bravour to charge on my defence, but you attacked my defence with 3 armor brigade one after each others... And the British answered: But's it's unfair, you are using FLAK against us, which none of our tank can resist. Rommel just said, well, it's your fault... You are using tank that only our 88 can destroy (Matilda II).

In fact yes, Rommel lost his north africain campaign due to a lack of supply and renforcement also. He rarely receive the replacement tank for those he lost during battle and the RAF and the RN cut his supply pretty well... To give you idea, from 1942, most of his supply were captured british stock... Including his command truck which a british one....

Sorry, i'm drifting offtopic... i'm bad...

So to get back to mountain warfare.

I'll have to say that's we cannot take what happen in the past and apply it to our modern time. It's only up to the moral, the tactical brightness and the will of the soldier which can determine a fight now... Rommel, in 1916-1917, was in a Gebirjaeger Regiment (sorry about the spelling,it's a mountain regiment) He manage to capture an Italian of 1000 men with only his company (which was the machine-gun compagny).

Also, I think that most people have a fake idea of what could have happen, human wave and things like that... Read more book people, knowledge is the key to the world.

It's better to look dump and don't say anything than open you mouth and prove it.

[Gollevainen]

well I 'forgive' you of going bit offtopic..the Uk warmachine indeed earns a defending from such immature accusisations. Rommel (real life's) Lost his gampaing and I wouldnt call any army a weak that can achieve military victoryes....

But if we return to the topic (and do remember, going offtopic can be looked trough fingers, if the subject stays intresting and doesent attract negative side effects), The most important factor to determ wich army is wich, Is the commanding atmosphere and the innovativity of the officers.

-Moscow could have been invaded in 1941 if The generals would have been able to decide what to do, not the national leaders...the 2nd Armoured Group (Guderian) did manage to adventure lot and show remarkable manouvrability, but in what end?

-The whole invading nazi horde could have been defeated well before 1942 if the red army would have been enjoing same sort of athmosphere than....lets ay we did. That no generals have to fear of getting shot after ill-fated campaing and ifLower officer could have worked in liberal and innovative-supporting spirit, miracles could have happen...

To my knowlidge, PLA inherited much of its military culture from the red army, and from the political choices of its mother government, So i could just imagine in what kind of athmosphere there were back in 60's if you add the Cultural revolution to it. This kind of misschieves in the overl military life usually ends up, in the actual warfighting to massive (and useless and easily avoidaple) loss of lifes....lack of using the advantages that sudden situation changes afford...lack of capapility to exploid the quantative or qualitive advantage of own forces...And Sino-indian confrontations are good examples of this...supraisngly from both sides, But I wouldnt give the credit of Indians poor showing to british army. It would have ended far differently if there would have been british forces in place of Indian ones.

[darth sidious]

well I 'forgive' you of going bit offtopic..the Uk warmachine indeed earns a defending from such immature accusisations. Rommel (real life's) Lost his gampaing and I wouldnt call any army a weak that can achieve military victoryes....

But if we return to the topic (and do remember, going offtopic can be looked trough fingers, if the subject stays intresting and doesent attract negative side effects), The most important factor to determ wich army is wich, Is the commanding atmosphere and the innovativity of the officers.

-Moscow could have been invaded in 1941 if The generals would have been able to decide what to do, not the national leaders...the 2nd Armoured Group (Guderian) did manage to adventure lot and show remarkable manouvrability, but in what end?

-The whole invading nazi horde could have been defeated well before 1942 if the red army would have been enjoing same sort of athmosphere than....lets ay we did. That no generals have to fear of getting shot after ill-fated campaing and ifLower officer could have worked in liberal and innovative-supporting spirit, miracles could have happen...

To my knowlidge, PLA inherited much of its military culture from the red army, and from the political choices of its mother government, So i could just imagine in what kind of athmosphere there were back in 60's if you add the Cultural revolution to it. This kind of misschieves in the overl military life usually ends up, in the actual warfighting to massive (and useless and easily avoidaple) loss of lifes....lack of using the advantages that sudden situation changes afford...lack of capapility to exploid the quantative or qualitive advantage of own forces...And Sino-indian confrontations are good examples of this...supraisngly from both sides, But I wouldnt give the credit of Indians poor showing to british army. It would have ended far differently if there would have been british forces in place of Indian ones.

my finnish friend your knowledge of the chinese army is a bit lacking

the pla in its early days has much more in common with the japanese army then the the red army relieing more on its solider then equipment, night infantry attack is also very similar

right before the long march moscow send some advisers to china they quickly took over the command of the red army and ordered it to enage in fronteal battle with the KMt the end result is the destruction of the suthern communsit base and suriveror were forced into the long march. for this reason the chinese did not adopt the soviet armys tatics en mass

also the chinese army in 1962 has superior equipment compared with the indians
Ak-47/CKC vs lee enfield
M-1938/D-30vs 25 pounder
RPG-2 vs well nothing same goes for flamethrowers
RPD is also superior to the BREN

also the british is not as invincible as you claim most of Rommel tanks are PanzerIII( old G/H not newer J or N) when he invaded egypt he had only 25 panzer IVf2. aginst this the british ahs thousand of grants / M-4 superior in quality and quanity to the PanzerIII. as for aircraft the english has an even better advantage.

their defeat to the japanese in 1942 in just pathetic jap army has no tank limited air support and some old cannons and outdated infantry weapons

[Gollevainen]

well Soviet Misschieves werent exactly results of the Tsarist russian tradition, but rose from the proplems of Stalinism, that same political system that PRC fielded, and From what I have heard, It only proovens my assumptions. Tactics and even stratecigs have little to do whit it, but if you consided this 'human wave' that has been on the trapestry lately, You will find it almoust similar than NPP tactic of Soviet union dating from '34 field manuals...
But where it is seen most is in the officers working enverioment, and things like Cultural revolution didnt anyways improve the situation.

ahs thousand of grants / M-4 superior in quality and quanity to the PanzerIII. as for aircraft the english has an even better advantage.

British didnt have thousands of Grants/M-4 in the beging of the 41 when Rommel came along, And it was Crusader tanks that fromed the bulk of British troops and it wasent anyway superior to Panzer III ...and remember Rommel still lost the war...

their defeat to the japanese in 1942 in just pathetic jap army has no tank limited air support and some old cannons and outdated infantry weapons

?? They were colonial troops, thousands of miles away from their homeland and support...they didnt have any change at first place.

[darth sidious]

well Soviet Misschieves werent exactly results of the Tsarist russian tradition, but rose from the proplems of Stalinism, that same political system that PRC fielded, and From what I have heard, It only proovens my assumptions. Tactics and even stratecigs have little to do whit it, but if you consided this 'human wave' that has been on the trapestry lately, You will find it almoust similar than NPP tactic of Soviet union dating from '34 field manuals....But where it is seen most is in the officers working enverioment, and things like Cultural revolution didnt anyways improve the situation.....

get it put of your head that the PRC based their infantry tatics on the russian model in organization they were closer to the jap/nationalist army if you have no clue then look in the korea war thread

find me one chinese general that had military training in the CCCP and did well
in fact none of they communist commandrs in 1962 had military training in the soviet union

there was no such thing as human wave if they tried that the 2 chinese division would have been wiped out long ago

in the chinese army poltical commisers are not what they are in soviet union
several key differance
1 commisser usue;y have battle experiance they have been fighting the japanese/kmt for 20 years not you average stalist

2 military comanders have power to over ride their decision even if the general is a KMT defector

culteral revoulation =1966-1976 if 1962 ther was no such thing

ritish didnt have thousands of Grants/M-4 in the beging of the 41 when Rommel came along, And it was Crusader tanks that fromed the bulk of British troops and it wasent anyway superior to Panzer III ...and remember Rommel still lost the war....

when they british used the crusader tank( again with superior numbers) the german did well aginst british armour with a kill ratio of 4:1 they lost when the odds wher like 40 panzer VS 250 M-4

?? They were colonial troops, thousands of miles away from their homeland and support...they didnt have any change at first place.

they have the advantage of numbers and equipmant whey can they win ????

[Gollevainen]

get it put of your head that the PRC based their infantry tatics on the russian model in organization they were closer to the jap/nationalist army if you have no clue then look in the korea war thread

Thats your saying I already said that isent a factor of it. I speak about commanding athmosphere, not organisations


in the chinese army poltical commisers are not what they are in soviet union
several key differance
1 commisser usue;y have battle experiance they have been fighting the japanese/kmt for 20 years not you average stalist

The fact that they have political officers speaks a lot about my suspicious, But again You fail to show any example of Why the PLA commanding atmosphere wouldnt have been similar than in other totalitarian armyes.

But Guess by consulting someone inside PLA would be sufficent enough to answer this dilemma



culteral revoulation =1966-1976 if 1962 ther was no such thing

I gave it as overal example of what sort of things the PRC managed to conduct as second hand evidence that based on these you cannot deny my orginal sucpicous. Korean War and its cassualty rates also Speaks from my behalv.

they have the advantage of numbers and equipmant whey can they win ????

support base, support base...Why did German lost WWII? couse they couldnt support their troops in Russia sufficently ennough...This is basic 'art of war' if using eastern terms and I think there shouldnt be any guestion what so ever over it.

[vincelee]

"I gave it as overal example of what sort of things the PRC managed to conduct as second hand evidence that based on these you cannot deny my orginal sucpicous. Korean War and its cassualty rates also Speaks from my behalv."

It clearly does not. If you were to take the US counts at face value, the entire PVA would have been dead before reaching the 37th parallel.

As for the command atmosphere of the PLA during 62 and before, let me ask you this: can an army that was brought up in unconventional warfare and must keep fighting superior enemies AFFORD to be tactically inflexible? Because the Soviet army was anything BUT flexible, and they paid dearly, in the initial defense of the Motherland, and in Finland. Mind you, Stalin and Mao approached military command from very different angles, Stalin wanted a wave of steel, while Mao prefered a more...indirect approach. These ideologies are passed down the command structure.

And the political atmosphere during 62? It wasn't as bad as the Soviet Union during 52, that's for sure. The real proverbial shit did not hit the fan until 66.

[Gollevainen]

well the thing is that (like i have said now couple of times) strategical or tacktical thin´king isent the factor in this....Perhaps I havent been clear enough But I try to explain it now from the iron...

Im talking about atmosphere, commanding enverioment. How much chinese officers have liberty to decissions. Who makes the strategical decissions? What sort of pennalty system/philoshophy they have? How big importance does doctrines and textbooks have? Is everything covered in there or do they allow adjustment and improvisation? what is the fate of failuring officer? failuring mens?

Answer to these questions And you will get closer to what I mean. Dont take it as offence that I seem to see things from differnt eye when Im not looking behind 'chinese' eyes and I have actual first hand experience of how military units works and operate and How big issue is the commanding enverioment.
Wars arent won by weapons and tactics alone but by supply and innovativety of company/battalion level commanders. Tactics and strategyes aply to the situation before the battle, There are useless in actuall combat where the officers and mens capapilty to adjust to the situation makes the difference.

When It seems to be clear that no one of us has any information nor experience of these matters in PLA (or if anyone has, Please share it whit us), we just have to make assumptions. And in that ligth several factors speaks against PLA. The fact that Chinese communism has always been the most authoritan by its nature isent exactly benefit to the open enviroment which is the key to the innovativity. If one has to drawn single unificating factor of why west has overal succeeded in any cases better than its counterparts, Is the innovativity and athmosphere to support it.

[darth sidious]

well the thing is that (like i have said now couple of times) strategical or tacktical thin´king isent the factor in this....Perhaps I havent been clear enough But I try to explain it now from the iron...
Im talking about atmosphere, commanding enverioment. How much chinese officers have liberty to decissions. Who makes the strategical decissions? What sort of pennalty system/philoshophy they have? How big importance does doctrines and textbooks have? Is everything covered in there or do they allow adjustment and improvisation? what is the fate of failuring officer? failuring mens?
Answer to these questions And you will get closer to what I mean. Dont take it as offence that I seem to see things from differnt eye when Im not looking behind 'chinese' eyes and I have actual first hand experience of how military units works and operate and How big issue is the commanding enverioment.
Wars arent won by weapons and tactics alone but by supply and innovativety of company/battalion level commanders. Tactics and strategyes aply to the situation before the battle, There are useless in actuall combat where the officers and mens capapilty to adjust to the situation makes the difference.When It seems to be clear that no one of us has any information nor experience of these matters in PLA (or if anyone has, Please share it whit us), we just have to make assumptions. And in that ligth several factors speaks against PLA.

I see what you mean so style of management :D

here is the thing during the korean war when the chinese supply was over streched and they had to abandon soul there was strong objection from the the soviets and Kim without direct order from Mao the chinese comander order the whole army to retret.( thats what saved them from the encirculment of the 8th army)

innovativity is essencial for the surival a weaker army. Many PLA comanders wree ex-nationalist if the princaple of Stalinism apply here they would have been shot insted of promotred

in the chinese civial war there are plenty of example of military commanders overriding dicision by the political leadership to achive victory.

the working relationship bewten the commisers is different from the model in soviet union

in CCCP they are nembers of communist party with little military experince in warfere sent by the party to watch tarist commander.

in china the commisers are usuely military commanders themself Deng Xiaoping was a capable commander before he become the head of the communist party. their main purpose is to teach communist princaples to to the ranks sothey are better motivated .

the generals them self are usuely menbers of the CCP so the need for political policing is far less then the soviet union

in fact to attempts to politicalized the PLA in 1935/1940( again started by soviets) both failed proves you point is moot

The fact that Chinese communism has always been the most authoritan by its nature isent exactly benefit to the open enviroment which is the key to the innovativity. If one has to drawn single unificating factor of why west has overal succeeded in any cases better than its counterparts, Is the innovativity and athmosphere to support it.

the communist army proved they are capable of switching from convential warfere to guerrilla warfare in 1937 proved they are capable of change. the fact the they manage to creat effective tatics that allowed them to break jap encircument proved they are capable of innovation. in the korean war they had to rapadily adpt from semi-guerrilla to trench warfere also proves my point.

[Gollevainen]

Now we seem to nearing the point where we are both talking about the same issue.
But we are not there yet...You see i'm not stating that China and Soviets used their political officers in similar ways, in fact the politruks in soviet army units had their role being varied several times. It was very soon discovered how badly it worked in practise, and the political officers were surpassed in the chain-of-command in quite early stage.

But again you fail to see my point about the athmosphere whihc isen't purely relative to any spesific issue, more of result of many fafourable (or in this cas infafourable) elements. But actually you nor I cannot awnser to my question, only those actually served PLA in those days can...

the communist army proved they are capable of switching from convential warfere to guerrilla warfare in 1937 proved they are capable of change. the fact the they manage to creat effective tatics that allowed them to break jap encircument proved they are capable of innovation. in the korean war they had to rapadily adpt from semi-guerrilla to trench warfere also proves my point.

I'm not going to venture to pointing out all non so succesfull efforts of PLA's operational history, we are already way too oftopic. But i will say this: If you take good look at all conflicts were PLA has involved, can anyone honestly say that it has performed without faults? I can name few good examples which will support my doupts quite unquestionably, but like i said it isen't the issue in this thread and we can do it in some other place.

[darth sidious]

I'm not going to venture to pointing out all non so succesfull efforts of PLA's operational history, we are already way too oftopic. But i will say this: If you take good look at all conflicts were PLA has involved, can anyone honestly say that it has performed without faults? I can name few good examples which will support my doupts quite unquestionably, but like i said it isen't the issue in this thread and we can do it in some other place.

if you want to know the exact athmosphere then only some PLA vetern can tell you but from all we already know my guess is its not ruled by fear as it stalins army

every army has its faults what matters its how quickly it can adpt in each war the Pla manage to get the better of its enemy by the end

[lazzydigger]

Had a quick look around this interesting, yet easily escalated topic.

Good old 1960's
1. India army are no sloush at that time as individuals. They are battle harderned and has proven their valor in WWII for British Empire.

Problem: India was a clonial force. British Gov knows that the baton must be hold at their own hands. There for, the Officer are filled by Jolly old poms. Indian officer are very very rare. Most Indian makes good soldiers, but to the leadership of Other Rank only. They can be great up to the level of company, but any thing higher than that is missing. After the British pull out, the warrant officers and lower rank officer from the former colonial force raise quickly to the level of decission makers with out proper training. IMHO, they were experience and equiped to fight a battle, but not winning the war.

2. Human wave:
Yes, chinese army were Huge at that time. Still huge in numbers till these days. But in Tibert, it is a different story. PLA just don't have the money and logistic supplier to keep a large number of troops stationed in Tibet. Only after the conflict break out, Mao decided to purchase large airplane to ferry troops into Tibet. I did hear the stoy of one soldier hold of a large number of opponents. That was from PLA side though. There was other artical from Chinese source regard heavy losses too. If i remember correctly, it was a company trying to take over an fortiled position. It was successful initially, but one machine gun nest holding a choking point. Chinese toked very heavy casulty to over run that position. Not at the order or 50 but was 1 and half section in casulties.

3. Today.
The Natural terrian of Tibet will make a land assult costly as it did many many moons ago. The elite mountain warefare troop are still much limit in members compare to convensional army. The conflict is still centered with infantry tactics with small arms fire with battalion level fire support. Divisional fire support are very limited. logistic for the second wave are diffcult as well. So the conflict will remain as a quick boarder conflict. I think areial conflict will probably decide the few yard of boarder line..

Best thing. Set down and start deal making. :)

[FreeAsia2000]

.
The Natural terrian of Tibet will make a land assult costly as it did many many moons ago. The elite mountain warefare troop are still much limit in members compare to convensional army. The conflict is still centered with infantry tactics with small arms fire with battalion level fire support. Divisional fire support are very limited. logistic for the second wave are diffcult as well. So the conflict will remain as a quick boarder conflict. I think areial conflict will probably decide the few yard of boarder line..

Best thing. Set down and start deal making. :)

I agree with some of the points however two points I can't agree with

1. It won't remain a quick border conflict. Please see Siachen

2. Artillery will be the deciding factor along with AA missiles

[adeptitus]

The PRC today isn't dependent on putting more troops in Siachen Glacier to fortiify its borders.

Canada's best defense in the past against being swallowed by the US was to build a railway across the nation and promote settlement westwards. With populated towns and cities, it's easier to maintain your claim than leaving them empty.

Unfortunately, Tibet region is both landlocked and high-altitutde, so a railroad across the border region with India and establishing settlements is out of the question. But the Qingzang Railway will at least bring more economic development to Lhasa and fortify PRC claim to the area, contributing to the "China Western Development" effort.

China's western region (as defined by the Western Development plan) accounts for 71% of China's territory but only contains 29% of its population and 17% of total economic output. Populating and developing those areas will fortify the PRC hold a lot better than putting more troops in. Look at it this way, who's going to invade from those border regions today?? The only threat is poverty, local nationalism, and instability.

[Mate]

so far, one of the weakest military district is in that part of the country. in tibet, we only have some armed police units, and border guards. china has no interest about india.
i think we have a mountain division somewhere there between tibet and xin jiang.

1) Chengdu Military Region is responsible for India and Tibet. CMR is by far the best equipped MR.
a) 13th Group Army (56005 Unit), Chongqing

149th Mechanised Infantry Division, Emei, Sichuan is is rapid reaction unit.

2nd Army Aviation Regiment has front base at Lhasa, Tibet.

b)Tibet Military District has higher administrative power than normal provincial military districts.

* 52nd Moutain Infantry Brigade, Linzhi, Tibet
* 53rd Moutain Infantry Brigade, Tibet
* 8th Motorised Infantry Division, Shawan, Xinjiang
* Artillery Brigade
* AAA Brigade
* Engineer Regiment

2) Lanzhou Military Region comes second in line. It has higher administrative power than normal provincial military districts.

That's unique, The Indian get training from British. And many of veteran involved in WW II. So if comparing with PLa during that time, PLA is nothing in experience. (PLA experince in Civil War and Korea War, The india is far experience than that, they involve in Asia, Western and North Africa Theatre during in WW II)

I read somewhere that the Indian leader Nehru "almost" disbanded the army. Indian Army started getting equipment after 1962.

India lost the 1962 war because Indian troops were outnumbered almost 1:30 in most theaters. The overall ratio was heavily against India.

Chinese troops suffered many more casualties than Indian troops. One lone Indian soldier manning a post killed 50 Chinese soldiers (when they attempted to climb up to his post), before he was martyred.

Today that numerical inferiority does not exist, and hence China cannot launch an attack on India on the same scale/strategy as 1962.

Wrong, Majority of the Indian troops did not see the Chinese. There were Indian outposts which fought and they were not equipped. The fighting which took place involved a small portion of Indian Army, this particular small section was out numbered.

The failure was because of Indian Leader Nehru and General Kaul who happened to be liked by Nehru inspite of his aversion to army.

Chinese causuality figure are not known, but they did have have atleast 2-3 soldiers for a gun. technically it means, if one soldier dies, the other one picks up the gun and fights. (i don't know how it was implemented)

I study a lot about India and China sitting here in India.

[ArjunMk1]

I read somewhere that the Indian leader Nehru "almost" disbanded the army. Indian Army started getting equipment after 1962.
....
.....

The failure was because of Indian Leader Nehru and General Kaul who happened to be liked by Nehru inspite of his aversion to army.

You are right on target Mate !!! Nehru was so di-illusioned with B.S theories like NAM , Peaceful coexistance , Asian Aliance .... .bla bla ....
Also Indian defence minister Krishna Menon shares half of the blame , he who rejected the calls for modernisation of army but later signed the order for aggressive patrolling !!! Its actually his and not Nehru's fault , Nehru being a Gandhian was easy to get chanted towards those fine looking theories !!!

Also a lot of men blame General Kaul, but its to be noted that he was heading a weak army directed by an ill conceived plan .



Chinese causuality figure are not known, but they did have have atleast 2-3 soldiers for a gun. technically it means, if one soldier dies, the other one picks up the gun and fights. (i don't know how it was implemented)

Now this is new to me !! Sounds like Soviet army conscripts and partizans in Leningrad , Kiev , etc !!!

[Mate]

You are right on target Mate !!! Nehru was so di-illusioned with B.S theories like NAM , Peaceful coexistance , Asian Aliance .... .bla bla ....
Also Indian defence minister Krishna Menon shares half of the blame , he who rejected the calls for modernisation of army but later signed the order for aggressive patrolling !!! Its actually his and not Nehru's fault , Nehru being a Gandhian was easy to get chanted towards those fine looking theories !!!

Also a lot of men blame General Kaul, but its to be noted that he was heading a weak army directed by an ill conceived plan .


Now this is new to me !! Sounds like Soviet army conscripts and partizans in Leningrad , Kiev , etc !!!

Au Contraire General Kaul seems to be the cause of degradation of the army. But what do I know? I just read it in books and i derived the conclusion. I remember reading about a particular General who used to outwit the political Nehru. Jokes like Nehru used to sit in front of the Jeep to embaress the General and the good humoured general used to pull the driver to back seat and take over the wheels.

If you read the history, you will find the Indian Intelligence on Chinese was bad. The Kaul was clueless what was in offing. There is a outfit called SFF (special frontier Force, am I correct?) which is made of Tibetians. Their intelligence network was never used. CIA was using this force effectively for Tibet games. But the General kaul never planned for the Chinese. So did his boss. Yes you mention correct on a Menon character. He was a communist minded chap. Another man who was part of the failure was (he was never right on China policy) a character called Pannikar (spell?)

Another anecdote i recall reaiding is a Chinese military man witnessed Indian excerces in 1950's. I think kaul was interacting with him then. After the Chinese Military man left to Burma where he mentioned that Indians know knothing about fighting a war. Lol. the same Chinese was directing the 1962 war and Gen kaul was on Indian side.

That human wave (nice terminology ;) ) is true. But i really don't know howit was implemented. Chinese were not rich then. They had more manpower than guns, so one gun was used by many men. The logistics was well planned. Chinese built good reads and ammo stocking was good.

[darth sidious]

1) Chengdu Military Region is responsible for India and Tibet. CMR is by far the best equipped MR.
a) 13th Group Army (56005 Unit), Chongqing

149th Mechanised Infantry Division, Emei, Sichuan is is rapid reaction unit.

2nd Army Aviation Regiment has front base at Lhasa, Tibet.

b)Tibet Military District has higher administrative power than normal provincial military districts.

* 52nd Moutain Infantry Brigade, Linzhi, Tibet
* 53rd Moutain Infantry Brigade, Tibet
* 8th Motorised Infantry Division, Shawan, Xinjiang
* Artillery Brigade
* AAA Brigade
* Engineer Regiment

2) Lanzhou Military Region comes second in line. It has higher administrative power than normal provincial military districts.



I read somewhere that the Indian leader Nehru "almost" disbanded the army. Indian Army started getting equipment after 1962.



Wrong, Majority of the Indian troops did not see the Chinese. There were Indian outposts which fought and they were not equipped. The fighting which took place involved a small portion of Indian Army, this particular small section was out numbered.

The failure was because of Indian Leader Nehru and General Kaul who happened to be liked by Nehru inspite of his aversion to army.

Chinese causuality figure are not known, but they did have have atleast 2-3 soldiers for a gun. technically it means, if one soldier dies, the other one picks up the gun and fights. (i don't know how it was implemented)

I study a lot about India and China sitting here in India.

stop BSing is you have no proof the best equipted division in china at the time are those that fought in the Korean war E.G 39 38 50 army
troops near india are on the bottoum of the list for new equipment in 1958 they were still using bolt action rifle

as for 2/3 men per gun thats even more pathetic please look in the korean war thread for info on that matter they were alot better armed in 1962 the 1950. Humen wave in not possible in such mountainous territory. NO they were never used by the chinese army but a western myth India picked up to cover its defeat.

each squad had 2*Ak 1*RPD and the rest have CKC rifle not to mention flame throwers and RPG-2s

fire support include M1938 cannon and US 105s

[PiSigma]

Mate: please please do more reseach before you post again. we would like this to develop into a more professional forum with concret information that's backed by facts.

it is certainly NOT true that there's 2-3 soldier per gun, by 1962, chinese small arms industry was already fully developed and the soldiers were definitely well armed already.

the CCP have never used human wave tactics in korea or india, that is a proven myth. here's a question you can chew on.. how do you send millions of men to ther other side of the himalayans??? even today it's very hard to send a entire division over there, in 1962 it's almost impossible. so with limited troops, how can a officer use human wave??

[Mate]

darth sidious and PiSigma,

We have mil interaction programmes. We keep inviting Mil and ex Mil personnel. One of them happens to be maj gen (retd) E. D'Souza from IA. He served the IA against the Chinese in 1960's which included 1962 and 1965. He is Ex. British India veteran too. Its a fact and its confirmed by him. I am credible to the fact that have pointed out a living person. You can send the Chinese rep to the mentioned personnel for confirmation. It shouldn't be difficult. Some of the Chinese mil reps have already met in him a seminar. I was present there too. The Chinese reps were keen to learn the Indian ABM defences status from him. I am not aware of the full converstaion, but the Chinese do know him.

I have no intenton of taking sides. I just happen to stumble on this discussion which happens to be a subject of my study too.

[PiSigma]

i don't think a personal opinion can be considered as fact. and a general's opinion is equally as a grunt's, they are just opinions after all..

think of it this way. if the chinese commander wanted the indians to think they are using human wave and didn't actually use it, and the indians fell for the trap and believed in the chinese commander, their opinion of the war will automatically be that chinese used human wave when in reality they didn't.

mate you haven't been on this forum long enough to know my background.. i have an uncle that is a colonel in the PLA. he is in the chengdu MR working under the logistics department (this is from experience and not personal opinion since he doesn't run the department, and if you ask around you'll know chengdu gets some very good funding). from what he told me, chengdu region have some of the best logistics in the MRs. this reason was because of the sino-indian war. you see during the war, china used lessons they learned in korea about logistics, so they were able to make sure that all soldiers got warm clothing (in korea they didn't) and sufficient food and munition (and of course guns, without guns morale drops). as a result their logistics for the war was very good, and only when they couldn't support a longer supply route did the chinese pull back. and with more experience from the sino-indian war, chengdu MR still have some excellent logistics.

my uncle drive up to Lhasa every spring and fall with the troops and inspect the guards along the way, and trust me they definitly know what they are doing. i'm not entitled to tell you more information as i'm not even allowed to know it, so i'll stop here.

[Mate]

Its difficult to explain to non-Mils. Anyway, we have interactions with the PLA too. And much more aces to records. Anyway, I cannot find some usefull inputs i wanted here. I cannot post more. You see i got a job to keep. thanks for the co-op...

[darth sidious]

darth sidious and PiSigma,

We have mil interaction programmes. We keep inviting Mil and ex Mil personnel. One of them happens to be maj gen (retd) E. D'Souza from IA. He served the IA against the Chinese in 1960's which included 1962 and 1965. He is Ex. British India veteran too. Its a fact and its confirmed by him. I am credible to the fact that have pointed out a living person. You can send the Chinese rep to the mentioned personnel for confirmation. It shouldn't be difficult. Some of the Chinese mil reps have already met in him a seminar. I was present there too. The Chinese reps were keen to learn the Indian ABM defences status from him. I am not aware of the full converstaion, but the Chinese do know him.

I have no intenton of taking sides. I just happen to stumble on this discussion which happens to be a subject of my study too.

How much does your general know about chinese army in the 50s????
from your post you have no idea what their equipment is let alone their tatics
country bashing and Flaming is not allowed

he may have known some command level thing but not down to equipment and squad tatics

[Mate]

How much does your general know about chinese army in the 50s????
from your post you have no idea what their equipment is let alone their tatics
country bashing and Flaming is not allowed

he may have known some command level thing but not down to equipment and squad tatics

I am sorry to hear the such arrogance.

You seem to have understanding problem too. I have already mentioned that the person in Q was deployed on Chinese border in 1960's and he is an officer rank. I have already mentioned that the Chinese attaches know him. I am sure i have done it in best of english even if its not my native language.

The question will be what is your background to question such issues? What is more important what is your background to understand these issues. If you are a high ranking PLA officer, I would understand. I might have surprise for you if you tell me which part of the world you live in. You could be invited for our interractions. If you are not a authority, please escuse....

[FreeAsia2000]

i don't think a personal opinion can be considered as fact. and a general's opinion is equally as a grunt's, they are just opinions after all..

think of it this way. if the chinese commander wanted the indians to think they are using human wave and didn't actually use it, and the indians fell for the trap and believed in the chinese commander, their opinion of the war will automatically be that chinese used human wave when in reality they didn't.

mate you haven't been on this forum long enough to know my background.. i have an uncle that is a colonel in the PLA. he is in the chengdu MR working under the logistics department (this is from experience and not personal opinion since he doesn't run the department, and if you ask around you'll know chengdu gets some very good funding). from what he told me, chengdu region have some of the best logistics in the MRs. this reason was because of the sino-indian war. you see during the war, china used lessons they learned in korea about logistics, so they were able to make sure that all soldiers got warm clothing (in korea they didn't) and sufficient food and munition (and of course guns, without guns morale drops). as a result their logistics for the war was very good, and only when they couldn't support a longer supply route did the chinese pull back. and with more experience from the sino-indian war, chengdu MR still have some excellent logistics.

my uncle drive up to Lhasa every spring and fall with the troops and inspect the guards along the way, and trust me they definitly know what they are doing. i'm not entitled to tell you more information as i'm not even allowed to know it, so i'll stop here.


'mate' a lot of people in here have relations in the military and some of us
having friends and relatives in more than one military. Therefore showing us the biased opinions of a general from one side isn't really going to convince
anybody is it ?

secondly d'souza seems to be quite anti-chinese and believes that China
will undertake a military offensive against India in 2007 !

MUMBAI, DEC. 3. Some of the most distinguished former military men are highly apprehensive about the capability and intent of China and have warned that India should be on its guard and not lulled by the present tranquillity and peace on the border and Line of Control.

China has been building new roads in Tibet leading to the Indian territory and improving the existing one, even while laying a railway line to facilitate movement of large number of troops and their maintenance in the forward areas.

The Chinese, working for total supremacy in Asia, had found India to be their only rival in the race, though they are already leading in many areas. But now they want time so that their economic development progressed and their military strengthened.

The view emerged at a seminar organised by the Leslie Sawhny Programme in Mumbai on Sunday, that addressed itself to: ``India's Security Strategy - Historical Lessons and Future Responses.'' The former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao (retd.), who presided over the deliberations, endorsed the views put forth by Maj. Gen. Eustace D'Souza who thought that the Chinese might wait till 2007 when they were hosting the

Olympics. Gen. Rao said that it could be even earlier.

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/12/04/stories/2001120400571200.htm

I mean this bit REALLY made me laugh

Major General (Retd) Eustace D'Souza broke the ice by presenting the Indian case. D'Souza studied the defence and security issues of India vis-a-vis China-Tibet. Narrating his experiences of facing Chinese at the border when he served the Indian army, he said "with the Chinese, one should maintain one's position and they won't move an inch"

http://www.friendsoftibet.org/sofar/triangle.html

[Mate]

Sure, Those are the things he mentioned to me too. But we are talking the concept of Human Wave attacks. Lets not digress here. Maj gen D' is actaully refered in many a literature (I haven't seen in Chinese Journals though)wrt actual combat description and not opinions. Human Wave attacks is actual occurance in 1962 war. He also happens to be one of the highest decorated officers in the Indian army. He was also stationed in Japan for long time. when Singapore asked India to help organise their armed forces, he was deputed. But the Chinese protested and he was sent back. Subsequently, Uk/US stepped in to set up Armed forces for Singapore. But, he is not all, I have interacted with many of the 1962 batches. Unfrtunately, I am not able to name them for some reason or the other. Your Chinese mil reps are in touch with them too.

China used "human wave" attacks against American soldiers in Korea as well as the Vietnamese.

Its well recorded by India, US and Vietnam.

Note: Please understand, I am not willing to discuss the integrity of mil officers of that era with non-mil personnel.

[PiSigma]

human wave in korea have already been proven to be COMPLETELY FALSE, and please read my previous post again and think about it. how can a officer use human wave when he have very limited troops. chinese tactics is never to rush in, the CCP tactic have pretty much been separate enemy and when outnumber them (outnumber them in a small area, not the whole battle) then crush them. that's how they can defeat a larger enemy. and remember, even with good logistics, tibet is hard to transport supplies, so only very limited troops can be send.

just because someone has been in a lot of literature doesn't mean this guy knows anything. the best example would be our favorite president george bush, he says a lot of crap, but does he know anything?? of course not..

[darth sidious]

I am sorry to hear the such arrogance.
You seem to have understanding problem too. I have already mentioned that the person in Q was deployed on Chinese border in 1960's and he is an officer rank. I have already mentioned that the Chinese attaches know him. I am sure i have done it in best of english even if its not my native language.
The question will be what is your background to question such issues? What is more important what is your background to understand these issues. If you are a high ranking PLA officer, I would understand. I might have surprise for you if you tell me which part of the world you live in. You could be invited for our interractions. If you are not a authority, please escuse....

your arrogance blinds you 'mate'

so far you have claim the pla
1 uses humen wave
2 has 2/3 rifle per solider
3 vastly outnumber indian forces
4 scarfices mass of its soliders for tiny outposts

unless you can porovide some evidance to support ( indian crap dont count)
you are just a troll looking for flaming war

in order to end the spread of disinformation by a certain nembers whos only intrest is flaming here are some accurate info regarding chinese equipment and organization

to those who cant read chinese use translation software

发生在60年代初的中印边境自卫反击战以印度军队的惨败而告终。此战发生在中国与美苏交恶，国家经济情况极 度困难，台湾国民党残匪疯狂反扑，西藏农奴主叛乱和新疆暴乱时期。虽然反击作战仅改善了西段边境态势，没有 乘胜收复全部争议地区，但是粉碎了印度的“北进政策”，维持了中印边境近四十年的和平局面，超过当时“一场 胜仗管30年”的估计。更粉碎了超级大国利用印度牵制中国的美梦。

　　中印边境的战区地处青藏高原边缘地带，海拔一般在4500—5000米以上；高寒，零下30度以下；缺 氧，人的体能仅相当于平地的40-50%，行军速度和负重能力要低一半，登山速度每小时100米左右；道路稀少；气候恶劣，多雪崩、泥石流， 对作战行动和后勤保障有很大影响。每年仅9月—11月间适合进行大规模作战行动。

　　由于战区特殊的地理环境和其他因素限制（印度空军因顾虑中国空军轰炸印度城市而没有出动，中国心脏地区 离战区在印度空军打击范围之外，这是中国地理上的优势）作战任务主要由步兵担任，因此轻武器的作用就显得特 别突出。本文着重从轻武器和直接配属步兵分队的武器的角度，回顾当时的历史，总结双方的经验和 教训。


　　武器性能对比

　　弹药

　　中方步兵连主要使用56式7.62*39mm口径弹（仿前苏联M43弹），是前苏联参考了德国的突击步 枪弹，于二战末期研制成功的。配用56系列半自动步枪、冲锋枪、班用机枪。有普通弹,穿甲燃烧弹,燃烧曳光 弹,曳光弹等弹种。

　　印军步兵连主要使用英国0.303in步枪弹 ，又名 7.7*56mm R步枪弹或MK VII式7.7mm弹。此弹1889年研制成功，是英联邦制式弹，20世纪60年代被北约弹代替。配用李· 恩菲尔德步枪，布伦轻机枪和维克斯重机枪。有普通、重弹、穿甲、曳光、燃烧、爆炸等弹种，最早的达姆弹就是 用这种弹改进的。其普通弹采用尖头，铅铝复合结构，瓶型铜壳，有凸缘。其B6燃烧弹装有硝酸钡，RTS1爆 炸弹装有硝化甘油和黄磷。

　　步枪

　　中国军队主要使用新换装不久的56式半自动步枪（仿苏联的西蒙诺夫半自动卡宾枪），经实战检验，我军对 56半自动步枪的性能是满意的，此枪动作可靠，轻便灵活，400米内精度良好，而且节省子弹。一个当时参战 的老同志评价说：“定在常用表尺（表尺3），指哪里打哪里。”。

　　印度军队使用的步枪种类较多，主要装备7.7*56mm(0.303in)李·恩菲尔德III型和NO .4等老式步枪。这种枪有效射程远，但是由于是手动枪机，射速慢，已经不适合现代战争的需要。印军一般要求 随枪携带90发子弹，后备40发；实战中，印军士兵不堪重负，往往减少携弹量，最低时只带一条装50发的空 投子弹袋。在正式开战前的巡逻队冲突中，多次出现半小时交火就打光弹药的情况。印度从1953年起就开始了 研制自动步枪的计划，1956年出了样枪，后来印度生产的叫伊莎普尔半自动步枪（仿英国L1A1）。这也是 梅农出任国防部长后确定的重点武器计划之一。但是直到1962年，还没有大量装备部队。

　　我军第一次反击之后，印度立即放弃不结盟的伪装，向美英寻求军事援助，英国援助的武器是在印度公开发出 请求的当天到达的，美国也很快用运输机运来了大量自动武器和轻型火炮，但是这些美英新式自动武器不但性能不 及中国的56系列班用武器，而且还带来了后勤供应的混乱，文化水平较低的印军士兵也没有时间熟悉这些新式武 器。我军缴获了大批根本没有开箱的美国自动步枪，但是我军战士根本看不上眼。

　　冲锋枪

　　中方使用的是56式冲锋枪（仿著名的AK47突击步枪，我军习惯称冲锋枪），在步兵班一级，装备给正副 班长。实战中，由于56式冲锋枪火力猛，但精度稍差，和半自动步枪配合使用效果很好，常常有少数兵力击溃比 自己多几倍印军的情况。比如西山口——邦迪拉战役中，某部9连副班长庞国兴，在和主力失散的情况下，和另外 3名战士自动组成战斗小组，使用2支56式冲锋枪和2支56式半自动步枪，深入印军纵深7.5公里，多次主 动向敌人优势兵力发起冲击，占领两个炮兵阵地，缴获7门87.6毫米加农榴弹炮。后又配合主力部队缴获另外 8门（此炮英军称为25磅炮，在著名的阿拉曼战役中发挥很大作用，是印军对我军威胁最大的武器，部署在西山 口的印军野炮团共24门炮，大部在此战中被我军缴获，余下几门炮逃跑时翻车掉进山沟，团长夏马尔中校只身逃 回印度）。在我军遭到印军伏击的时候，重火器来不及展开，分队中的冲锋枪手常常要担负起迅速压制敌人火力， 掩护其他战友的重任，这时冲锋枪的作用非常关键，但是冲锋枪手的伤亡也很大。

　　印军主要装备司登II、III、V式冲锋枪。除射程近外，由于发射手枪弹，弹药不能与步机枪通用。印军 冲锋枪一般装备一线部队，和步枪混编，但数量较少。一般要求随枪270发，后备90发弹药。由于印军害怕近 战，所以冲锋枪作用不大。

　　轻机枪

　　中方56式班用机枪（仿苏联捷格佳廖夫班用机枪），100发弹链供弹，缺点是不能速换枪管。战斗中通常 携带500-900发弹药，因此可以充分地发扬火力，连续作战。56式班用机枪火力持续性好，在进攻中通常用来封锁敌地 堡枪眼，掩护火箭筒和无后坐力炮攻击。

　　印军主要装备英式7.7mm布伦MK1式轻机枪，是著名的捷克ZB26的改型，是二战中最出色的轻机枪 之一，但在1962年，已经落后了。此枪可靠性好，结构简单，射击精度好，射程远。缺点是火力弱，枪和弹都 比较重，一挺布伦式加7个30发实弹匣的重量大致相当于一挺56式加5个100发实弹盒。印军一般要求随枪 带1200发弹药，后备600发。但野战中很难做到。在战前的对峙时期，印军有时派出携带布伦式的机枪班， 主动出击，潜伏到主阵地侧翼，和主阵地形成交叉火力，对我军巡逻队进行侧射。布伦式轻机枪也是前线印军地堡 的火力骨干，每个地堡都有2-3个射孔，只是大多朝向阵地正面，死角太大。因此在我军攻击印军阵地时缴获了很多布伦式。印军大概是对布伦 式过分偏爱，第7旅旅长达尔维准将逃跑时也没忘记带一挺布伦式保命，达尔维将军等9个人被我军俘获时带有1 挺布伦式，8支步枪。印军步兵至今还装备着改为北约口径的布伦式轻机枪（L4系列）。

　　重机枪

　　中方使用53式重机枪（仿自苏联郭留诺夫机枪），战斗性能和印军重机枪相近，只是枪管不需要水冷。此枪 采用笨重的轮式枪架，重量太大，且不利于山地作战。有时为了在山坡上架枪，不得不由其他战士用肩膀架起一个 架轮。重机枪一般是编在步兵团机枪连和步兵营机炮连里，支援步兵连作战，也有加强给主攻连队1-2挺的。在阻击印军溃逃时，重机枪火力发挥了重大作用，曾经有机枪连加入步兵连战斗队形向印军冲锋的战例。 战斗经验证明，重机枪不宜过分前出，否则一旦出现伤亡，就会削弱支援火力。

　　印军装备有英式7.7mm维克斯重机枪（水冷）和美式勃郎宁重机枪（气冷），印军习惯称为中型机枪。前 沿连级支撑点用的不多，大部分集中在二线阵地的营级据点里，备弹（6000+3000发）。比如卡龙据点， 拉加普特联队第2营营部和第4连，共140余人，加强有81mm迫击炮4门，重机枪一个排（2挺）。本来重 机枪是用于支援一线作战的，但在一线阵地被攻击时，二线阵地往往因为害怕我军迫击炮轰击而不敢开火。一个典 型的战例是在扯东，第9旁遮普联队的一个巡逻队遭到攻击时，乔杜里少校向他的旅长达尔维将军请求火力支援， 结果在距离1300米以外二线阵地上的达尔维拒绝开火，一个奇怪的理由是看不清目标和事先未曾标定距离，其 实对于重机枪和迫击炮来说，对1300米外的目标进行拦阻射击是完全胜任的，尤其是维克斯机枪，配用MKV IIIZ重弹可以对4000米外的目标射击。印军114步兵旅下属有重机枪营，这是基于印军在二战时期在平 原和北非沙漠作战的经验，但不适合极度分散的山地战，实战中重机枪营在后方未及展开，前线的步兵营已被击溃 ，未能发挥应有作用。西山口主阵地上印军的3挺重机枪配置很内行，曾把某团前指压制在一个巨石后面（幸亏印 军没有用迫击炮打几下），又给我军一个连造成很大杀伤。

　　无后坐力炮和火箭筒

　　我军步兵团编有无后坐力炮连，主要是57mm和75mm线膛无后坐力炮，线膛无后坐力炮的优点是射击精 度高，但是由于装填时要把炮弹上的刻槽对准膛线，所以射速较低。战斗中无后坐力炮一般加强给担任主攻的步兵 连，每连2-4门炮。主要用来打击印军的地堡。我军在攻击前都是精心选择打击目标，特别注重先打击敌弹药库和指挥所。7 5mm无后坐力炮射程远，威力大，除直接支援步兵作战外，还参加步兵团炮兵群，进行炮火准备。75mm无后 坐力炮在远距离射击时，准确测距非常关键，尤其是山地，很容易误判，某团一个平时号称“十发十中”的75炮 班在1000米外对西山口敌重机枪射击，三发不中，结果班长爬上去用手榴弹炸掉了那挺重机枪。57mm无后 坐力炮主要伴随步兵作战。由于气候恶劣，发起攻击前有的火炮炮膛和瞄准镜结冰不能射击，炮手们把瞄准镜捂在 怀里化冰，继续战斗。由于地形复杂，灌木太高，我军炮手还创造了用背包带把无后坐力炮绑在树上发射，摧毁敌 人4个地堡的战例。57炮一般推进到200-300米距离上占领射击阵地（最近40米），所以实战中射击精度很高，如：进攻“阿印8号”据点的战斗中， 骑兵某团无后坐力炮排的2门57炮，发炮28发，命中25发，摧毁9个地堡，自己无一伤亡。参战很多分队都 克服体力困难，尽量增大携弹量，人均负重35KG，一般上级要求带20发弹，上述炮排带了29 发。

　　我军步兵连编有火箭筒班，使用56式40mm火箭筒（仿自苏联RPG-2火箭筒，最早的原型是二战中德国的铁拳100型火箭筒。），体积小，重量轻，100米内可以打中胸环靶大 小的目标，曾经有9发火箭弹消灭10个地堡的战例。40火箭筒发射超口径弹，地堡被击中后，往往被炸得碎石 、残肢、机枪零件满天飞。由于火箭筒比无后坐力炮机动性好，野战中能跟上步兵猛打猛冲，及时进行火力支援。 如某连火箭筒班班长黄绪林，冲击时在50米距离上击毁拦阻我步兵的机枪一挺，后又击毁正准备逃跑的106. 7mm迫击炮一门，牵引车一辆。但是40火箭筒的后喷火对在复杂地形上使用影响较大，有时为了消灭敌人，射 手宁可自己腿部被烧伤，也坚持向敌人开火。

　　美制M20式88.9mm火箭筒在印军中使用非常普遍，各前沿支撑点都有，本打算用于攻击我方哨所，但 由于我军先发制人，使印军处于被动防御地位，火箭筒用处不大，多被我军缴获。这种武器缺点是太长，太笨重， 尤其是弹药重，优点是威力大，射程比56式40火箭筒远，有效射程200米，最大射程1200米。反击作战 第二阶段还缴获了一些美英援助的57mm和106mm无后坐力炮。

　　迫击炮

　　我军步兵连炮排编有60迫击炮班，有时上级还加强82迫击炮。对迫击炮来说，最大的问题是弹药，除步兵 帮助炮兵携带弹药外，战前连团里的干部都得去背弹药。

　　印军的51mm迫击炮紧随步兵，连冲锋时都带着。印军81mm迫击炮通常布置在据点里。印军的炮手训练 比较好，射击准确，但缺乏和重机枪火力的协同。

　　火焰喷射器

　　我军使用的仿苏的58式火焰喷射器，因为58式不用压缩空气而采用火药燃气喷射，所以火力猛，射程远， 但只能喷三次，使用灵活性差些。在攻击印军地堡地战斗中，火焰喷射器还是发挥了很大作用。比如某师，战前临 时编组了喷火连，57人，28具喷火器。担任主攻任务的连队一般可以得到2—6具喷火器得加强。在零下30 度地严寒条件下，经常出现冷喷（就是只喷油不发火）现象。经战后统计冷喷竟达50%。比如某次战斗，对一个 地堡前两次喷火都是冷喷，第三次才喷出火消灭了里面的印度兵。

　　印度军队在向我国领土蚕食的时候，曾经打算给每个排装备一具喷火器用来攻击我军阵地，但是后来因故不了 了之。当然，即使有了，在被动防御的条件下也没有什么用处。

　　手榴弹、爆破筒、炸药包、地雷

　　由于印军地堡数量很多，我军携带的炮弹数量有限，因此步兵不能完全依赖配属的轻型火炮来消灭全部地堡， 有很大一部分攻坚任务最终是靠爆破筒和手榴弹完成的，这是我军的传统战法，但是伤亡也很大，作战中曾经涌现 过一批黄继光式的烈士。攻坚作战时我军常常组织投弹组与喷火器配合作战。我军使用的手榴弹是1950年定为 我军统一装备的4号小型木柄手榴弹，这