possible confrontation scenario with the US

[RavenWing278]

i've recently read a very interesting novel by Patrick Robinson whos a military( naval) specialist/analyst depicting a possible confrontation between the USN and the PLAN

Possible scenario:

After undergoing extensive refit, the chinese SSBN renamed Xia III is undergoing sea trials in the Taiwan Strait and the US has despatched the USN most advanced SSBN the USS Seawolf to shadow and gain valuable data concerning the capabilities of this new Xia.

tensions between China and Taiwan/USA has now escalated and following another test fire of chinese ballistic missiles near the Taiwan Strait. The US is under pressure from Taiwan to act if their was an armed conflict with the mainland and the US issues a clear warning that should the PRC continue to menace and threaten Taiwan, America will most certainly step in, to which the Chinese counter " should there be an ICBM contest between our nations, we wonder if you'd really trade Taiwan for Los Angeles".

the seawolf arrive in the south china sea un-detected and shadows the Xia for a period of a week while learning its speed and dimensions in order to work out if the ICBMs she's armed with will be able to reach the west coast of the US. disaster strikes when the ships executive officer accidentally gets seawolf's rudder entangled in the Towed array sonar sported by China's new 167 luhai class guided missile destroyer in what is legally international waters.

The chinese Commander in Chief ordered her to be towed to the naval base of GuangZhou under the pretence of the USA sending such a Advanced/dangerous ship so close to chinese waters, where she'll be examined and copied, her crew incarcerated.

in this scenario how is the US going to react and how will China counter the US's effort to regain the billion dollar ship and her experienced crew?

Regards Raven

[MIGleader]

this will likely be another e-3 situation. the seawolf knows it doesnt have the power to take on the entire chinese navy. the u,s will probably make threats and demands on the political stage. but i dont see any battle. the chinese probably just scored a big hit

international waters? this is taiwan strait. both sides of it are "owned" by china.

there is no way china can forcibly tow the seawolf, but if the u.s wants to remain law abiding in the international community, it must allow the ship to be towed. the china would probably search the ship under the pretenses of removing any type 93 related data, but they might take a couple of extra things with them.

[Soyuz]

i've recently read a very interesting novel by Patrick Robinson

LOL for a minute there i thought you were refering to that american preacher guy, the one that called for Hugo Chavez to be assasinated by the CIA because he had made Venezuela a communist safe haven for islamic terrorists:roll:

[bd popeye]

I don't think the US would send a Seawolf class SSBN to shadow a PLAN SSBN. More than likely an LA class sub would be used to shadow a PLAN SSBN. They are more suited for the task.

As for the Seawolf being snagged in the Towed array sonar. It's just not going to happen. But in someones immagination it would. If it did the Seawolf commander might well send out divers to cut the cable.

Honestly the story seems somewhat far-fetched to me.

[FriedRiceNSpice]

this will likely be another e-3 situation. the seawolf knows it doesnt have the power to take on the entire chinese navy. the u,s will probably make threats and demands on the political stage. but i dont see any battle. the chinese probably just scored a big hit

international waters? this is taiwan strait. both sides of it are "owned" by china.

there is no way china can forcibly tow the seawolf, but if the u.s wants to remain law abiding in the international community, it must allow the ship to be towed. the china would probably search the ship under the pretenses of removing any type 93 related data, but they might take a couple of extra things with them.


First of all, it does not have to allow itself to be towed by the Chinese. The Taiwan strait is international waters, owned by neither China nor Taiwan. A nation can only claim territory up to 15km off of their coastline. Everything else is considered international waters. In fact, the Chinese is on more shaky legal ground that the US would be in that scenario. Furthermore, the US submarine really doesn't have a choice- its got its propellars tangled. If it damages its propellars while trying to get free, it will lose its means of propulsion, making it a sitting duck. Furthermore, the Chinese can use that as a pretense to sink the sub, but I doubt they'd do so, since capturing the sub is much more advantageous.

[MIGleader]

sorry, i thought that the rudder was actually entangled, then loosened again, and that was how the sub was detected. i think the entangling is quite unrealistic. if the seawolf was indeed towed in, it and its crew would be a great bargaining chip for america. especially if china "checked it out", then sold it to iran or russia.

[RavenWing278]

I don't think the US would send a Seawolf class SSBN to shadow a PLAN SSBN. More than likely an LA class sub would be used to shadow a PLAN SSBN. They are more suited for the task.

As for the sSeawolf being snagged in the Towed array sonar. It's just not going to happen. But in omeones immagination it would. If it did the Seawolf commander might well send out divers to cut the cable.

Honestly the story seems somewhat far-fetched to me.

as for sending out divers to try and severe the cable, they did try that but was fired upon by small-arms fire which prevented any 1 from leaving the sub.
but i thought they could've left the sub via the torpedo tubes and then severe the cable underwater where the effects of small arms fire will be negligible.

[bd popeye]

but i thought they could've left the sub via the torpedo tubes and then severe the cable underwater where the effects of small arms fire will be negligible

From my understanding of a LA class they maybe equipped to allow divers/swimmer to exit the boat via torpedo tubes. Most of these guys that write these techno novels never served a day in anyones military.

[Jeff Head]

i've recently read a very interesting novel by Patrick Robinson whos a military( naval) specialist/analyst depicting a possible confrontation between the USN and the PLANI've written my share of fictional techno thriller scenarios, particulalry about this specific PLAN-USN conforntation (The Dragon's Fury Series). That's pretty much what they are...fictional. I tried to give something plausible, but only if a whole bunch of unlikely things came together. I had to do that to account for the tremendous advantage the USN holds and is likely to hold over the next 20+ years.

So, while this scenario may sound good and be a fun read (and I am not going to deny that at all), to try and equate it to reality becomes a stretch because, outside of the chance that the PLAN had obtained the acoustic signatures of all other US boats, and the US knew it (which, by the way, is a part of my own scenario) the US would not use a Sea Wolf, they would use either and ADCAP LA class or a Virginia class depending on the time frame.

Once you get past that hurdle, there is the very unlikely scenario of the sub being tangled up in the towed array. They would know the DDG or FFG was there and stay plenty far enough away to avoid that. If something did happen, they would use divers or remote control unerwater vehicles to clear things up. One thing I do not believe they would do in any case is to deliver the sub to the PLAN...a war would be fought to prevent that...perhaps depending on who was in the White House at the time (which I also take into account in my scenario).

Just my own opinion on the matter based on my own dealvings into writing such scenarios...but I believe this one, while maybe a very exciting and fun read, is also unlikely.

[FriedRiceNSpice]

Jeff, do you have your books available in the e-book format? If so, could you send me a free copy? I'd appreciate it greatly, thank you.

[FreeAsia2000]

I don't think the US would send a Seawolf class SSBN to shadow a PLAN SSBN. More than likely an LA class sub would be used to shadow a PLAN SSBN. They are more suited for the task.

As for the Seawolf being snagged in the Towed array sonar. It's just not going to happen. But in someones immagination it would. If it did the Seawolf commander might well send out divers to cut the cable.

Honestly the story seems somewhat far-fetched to me.

relax popeye I think he was making a general point about a confrontation
situation please substitute whatever ships/subs you want for this scenario

[bd popeye]

relax popeye I think he was making a general point about a confrontation
situation please substitute whatever ships/subs you want for this scenario

You are right Freeasia2000..:o

See us old military types have a bad habit of picking techo/military movies/books.. etc apart. Trying to make it as real as possible. We should realize afterall it's just make believe.

If a US sub of anytype US sub was captured by the PLAN I wonder what the reaction of the US would be? It would probaly be far different than when the EP-3 made an "emergency landing":rolleyes: :cool:....That would be way to much technology to compromise.

[crazyinsane105]

If the US had one of its nuclear submarines captured by the Chinese, the US would by no doubt have it hit and destroyed by Tomahawk missiles. Capturing a US nuclear submarine would seriously compromise decades of painful research and work and since we all know that the China is quite good at reverse engineering advanced machinery, yeah, missile strikes would be the US option.

[renmin]

If the US had one of its nuclear submarines captured by the Chinese, the US would by no doubt have it hit and destroyed by Tomahawk missiles. Capturing a US nuclear submarine would seriously compromise decades of painful research and work and since we all know that the China is quite good at reverse engineering advanced machinery, yeah, missile strikes would be the US option.Your theary depends. Does the US have any ships near the area? Second, if they were to use cruise missiles, wouldnt that kill the Seawolf's crew too? Americans, are, life is the most important thing while Chinese are fight to the last breath. I do not think the americans will kill their own people. The two countries has to work out some sort of negotiation first before any one takes action. BY the way, even in internatinal waters, that US sub was spying on Chinese property, then there is no good excuse for US to claim the seawolf can't be towed away.

[MIGleader]

If the US had one of its nuclear submarines captured by the Chinese, the US would by no doubt have it hit and destroyed by Tomahawk missiles. Capturing a US nuclear submarine would seriously compromise decades of painful research and work and since we all know that the China is quite good at reverse engineering advanced machinery, yeah, missile strikes would be the US option.

but if the ship is being towed, the gps of the tomahawk cannot locate the ship. besides, who knows where the chinese might tow the ship. probably somewhere well protected by missles and other plan vessels.

[RavenWing278]

Your theary depends. Does the US have any ships near the area? Second, if they were to use cruise missiles, wouldnt that kill the Seawolf's crew too? Americans, are, life is the most important thing while Chinese are fight to the last breath. I do not think the americans will kill their own people. The two countries has to work out some sort of negotiation first before any one takes action. BY the way, even in internatinal waters, that US sub was spying on Chinese property, then there is no good excuse for US to claim the seawolf can't be towed away.

well in the book they said they moved the prisoners to a remote military prison on xiachuan dao a small island located of the coast of China.the book also stated that among the prisoners was the American presidents son and then the US dropped a bomb on the stationary seawolf causing the reactor to overload and causing a nuclear meltdown on the naval base at guanzhou.

but then again its just a book:o

[Yimmy]

I don't know if this has already been mentioned, but the most likely outcome would be the Amerian crew scuttling the boat, and taking to the life boats.

Scuttling it could be as simple as opening the outer and inner torpedo tube doors, and leaving the boats bulkheads open, but I would expect charges to be placed to destroy the boat on the bottom, and prevent it being raised by the Chinese.

America would not let such sophisticated technology fall into the hands of the Chinese.

[MIGleader]

well, if the ship is caught in a cable, its really hard to scuttle. the chinese might even send in a boarding crew to make sure the submariners dont do anything to sabotage the ship.

[renmin]

Through out this whole time I do not Know what book this is. Do you mind telling me the name of this book? I would really apreciate that. Thank you.

[RavenWing278]

uh...it was Patrick Robinson's SeaWolf, he's written some other classics aswell like Kilo, HMS Unseen and Nimitz class.

as about scuttling the sub, they were prevented from doing that by chinese small arms fire as im sure i mentioned before, they where onli 500 feet apart so thats about 167 metres well in the effective range of type-56's etc

for those who want to know what the book "Kilo" is about:
the Chinese have ordered a further 8 kilo class submarine and that US is keen prevent China from obtaining them, you get the picture. so they devise a plan to destroy them before they can reach Chinese waters or territory.

[renmin]

Sounds like Robinson likes to right about naval stories. Well it seems to me the seals sent to rescue the American sailors are going to suceed since this is an American book then of course Robinson is going to make the Chinese lose, hey just a guess. oh and thanks Raven

[darth sidious]

in the cold war something similar to this happened a Russian victory class was caught in the cable. but the incident to place near cuba the sub was soon freed by a rescue craft and the russian got to keep the cable

[RavenWing278]

Sounds like Robinson likes to right about naval stories. Well it seems to me the seals sent to rescue the American sailors are going to suceed since this is an American book then of course Robinson is going to make the Chinese lose, hey just a guess. oh and thanks Raven

no problem, and your right the chinese did lose in the end, with the sinking of the 167 and a couple of coastal patrol ships and the chinese admiral of the south sea fleet lost his job n got court marshalled for gross incompetence..

-.-"
but to me it seemed like a fair trade : a US SSBN that cost a billion$ to research and another billion $ to construct for the 167 and 1 coastal patrol ship, 100+ chinese naval guards+ a kilo sub

[PiSigma]

reverse engineering would only be one of the things they got to worry about.. the more important thing USN going to worry about is now that china knows how to detect their super advanced subs... and going to use it against them. which make all their subs obsolete against china.. removing a huge force that the USN can use against china. also basically wasting billions of dollars. since china can sell that information to other countries. USN will need to spend billions more to design and build new designs that are radically different.

[Yimmy]

Small arms fire would not be able to preent the Captain scuttling the boat, neither would the cable.

All small arms fire would achieve, would be killing the men abandoning the boat, which would result in international condemnation against China.

[renmin]

no problem, and your right the chinese did lose in the end, with the sinking of the 167 and a couple of coastal patrol ships and the chinese admiral of the south sea fleet lost his job n got court marshalled for gross incompetence..

-.-"
but to me it seemed like a fair trade : a US SSBN that cost a billion$ to research and another billion $ to construct for the 167 and 1 coastal patrol ship, 100+ chinese naval guards+ a kilo subHa! I new it Americans always win (seems kind of unfair). Anyways it seems kind of unpracticle that the sub can become intangled in those cables because of the size and weight. Second the Sea wolf would have been probably too heavy to be towed. Next, in realty, the Americans would not send Seals right away into Chinese terrotory without nigotiations first with the Chinese government. It just seems unpracticle. I doubt the Chinese in real life would actually inprison the sailors, they would probably send them back instead since this is not a war.

[MIGleader]

a an attempt to sink the subamrine by scuttling might drag 167 down with it, so the naval guards on 167 are perfectly justified in shooting any people comming outside. most like a larger replenishment.tow vessel would be accompanying 167, so it could grab on to the sub to tow it away.

[Yimmy]

Migleader, how on Earth do you come to the conclusion that it is acceptable for the crew of the destroyer to shoot any Americans leaving the submarine?

This is an American submarine tangled in the array of a Chinese destroyer, in international waters. Neither side has the right to open fire on the other, as neither side are conducting a hostile act - they have simply colided.

[MIGleader]

if the two ships are entangled, then attempting to scuttle one ship puts the other ship in dager of sinking with it. do you think the chinese will let america scuttle the seawolf and take 167 and her crew with it? the crew of 167 have the right to protect their ship from sinking.

[Yimmy]

Indeed they do - however shooting men in life boats does not save their own ship.

In such an event, I assume the destroyer would have to cut their array free. Whatever happened, it would be a very delicate situation, which could easily be escalated.

[RavenWing278]

even if the crew of the Seawolf did manage to scuttle the sub, with the closest friendly forces over 2 or 3 days away they will suffer from dehydration and lack of food. thats assuming that the chinese didn't pick them up and imprisoned them already

[Yimmy]

Well I should certainly hope the Chinese ship would pick them up!

Why exactly would they imprison them?

These are international waters remember. If the Chinese tried to (illegaly) tow the American submarine to Chinese waters, and the Americans scuttled it, the Chinese would be in no position to hold the American submariners as prisoners.

[RavenWing278]

well it was technically in international waters but the seawolf was spotted around 3 times by chinese surface vessels, and the 167 was deployed in the area where the chinese command think the seawolf would be in so i think you could arrest the crew and confiscate the ship because it tresspassed into chinese territorial waters

and if they scuttled the seawolf, how do you think the 167 would be able to pick them up? theres over 100 crews and officers aboard the seawolf and the 167 can only carry ~250 personell, assuming it was not already at that capacity when the seawolf is scuttled

[FriedRiceNSpice]

if the two ships are entangled, then attempting to scuttle one ship puts the other ship in dager of sinking with it. do you think the chinese will let america scuttle the seawolf and take 167 and her crew with it? the crew of 167 have the right to protect their ship from sinking.

No... because the 167 can just sever the cable. It is a process that takes about 5 seconds to accomplish. I personally think that it would be a better solution than gunning down the American crew.

[MIGleader]

sever the cable? why waste a perfectly good towed sonar? beijing would then probably accuse amnerica of purposely staging the collision to damage the sonar, with the excuse that the seawolf was entangled.

but lets not go there. the sub woud most likely be an LA class, ans china sdoenst have much to gain from the la class, seeing how the 93 is already at that level. china should simply embarass america on the international stage, and make some monay by making the u.s navy pay for the damage to 167 and its sonar.

[Yimmy]

Migleader, the Americans are not the only party who would be embarassed, it take two ships to collide.


"beijing would then probably accuse amnerica of purposely staging the collision to damage the sonar"

I wasn't aware Beijing was populated by complete idiots. Such an accusation would gain nothing but laughter. Why on Earth would America want to damage a Chinese sonar (that is not onlt likely fairly obsolete to America, but could be replaced with ease).

"and make some monay by making the u.s navy pay for the damage to 167 and its sonar."

Why would America be paying for the damage?
You seem convinced that America is the party in the wrong. Don't forget that the instance is two vessels becoming entangled, in international waters. It is the Chinese vessel in the wrong, if they try to tow the American boat to Chinese soverign waters, and especially if they fired upon the American crew.

[MIGleader]

"international" waters. it may be so legally, but no so in many peoples eyes. how would many americans feel if the russians and chinese started sailing nuclear armed submarines 16 km from the coast of the u.s? they would demand the sub be towed away.

the sub should not be there in the first place, so a collsion is the u.s's fault. 167 was only doing a routine coastline patrol. china would be perfectly justified in towing the sub and removing any sensitive information it had obtained about during its spying mission.

if u think sending a nuclear sub within 10 mi of someones shoreline is legal, perhaps china should deloy the plan for exercises of the coast of guam, or california.

[Yimmy]

"international" waters. it may be so legally, but no so in many peoples eyes.

Thankfully, international law is what is important here, not what certain people see.


the sub should not be there in the first place, so a collsion is the u.s's fault. 167 was only doing a routine coastline patrol.

It is international waters. The AMerican boat has as much right to patrol the area as the Chinese ship does.


if u think sending a nuclear sub within 10 mi of someones shoreline is legal, perhaps china should deloy the plan for exercises of the coast of guam, or california.

If China saw herself as the next USSR, and had the capabilities to do so, I am sure that is exactly what she would try to do. Fortunately, she is neither.

[MIGleader]

sending military vessels close other countries is not legal, or accepted. the seawolf is armed, and terefore posess a threat to chiense cities. an un security council would review the case, and america would be guilty. even if america is allowed to send a sub into "international" waters, why would it? spying is the reason. and that is not legal.

[Sea Dog]

sever the cable? why waste a perfectly good towed sonar? beijing would then probably accuse amnerica of purposely staging the collision to damage the sonar, with the excuse that the seawolf was entangled.

but lets not go there. the sub woud most likely be an LA class, ans china sdoenst have much to gain from the la class, seeing how the 93 is already at that level. china should simply embarass america on the international stage, and make some monay by making the u.s navy pay for the damage to 167 and its sonar.

The 093 is not at an LA 688 level. I have only seen speculation that it might approach the noise level of Victor III with equivalent sensors. I admit, that's a credible and very capable submarine. It may reach the level of technology fused into Flight I LA class of 1980's, but it is no Flight I with current specification upgrades. And that's from every source you can name, including Sinodefence.

On the topic at hand, if this is in international waters, I doubt China would provoke hostilities of this kind. I actually agree with whoever said they would sever tha cable. The cost of a towed array cable is negligible when compared to starting hostilities with the USA, which would prove very costly to China in then long run...and dangerous.

[MIGleader]

according to a posted article from typhuang, the type 93 had reached the level of todays improved la, which isnt that impressive compared to seawolf. its redicoulous to think china cant better a 30 year old design.

china perhaps would let the sub free under the conditions chinese officers would be allowed to search it for any sensitive informaation obtained in its mission. its only fair that way.

[Sea Dog]

according to a posted article from typhuang, the type 93 had reached the level of todays improved la, which isnt that impressive compared to seawolf. its redicoulous to think china cant better a 30 year old design.

china perhaps would let the sub free under the conditions chinese officers would be allowed to search it for any sensitive informaation obtained in its mission. its only fair that way.

Which is why I said I wish I could read Chinese characters so I can read some of the neat stuff tphuang posts. The Russians themselves have alot of experience designing and fielding new sub technology. They came along way after the 'Walker' incidents. And their newest Akula-II's are said to be as quiet and may be a little quieter than the LA 688(I) subs at low speeds only. I'm talking 4 knots or less. For every knot above 5 knots the LA 688(I) significantly has an edge in quieting. It is said that 093 technology has been given alot of technical assistance by the Russians. Chinese previous HAN SSN is an extremely noisy SSN by comparison. Using deduction and reasoning here, I don't think 093 is going to be a caable in acoustic or sensors as a current FLT III LA 688(I). Russia's best design only equals LA class at low speed. China relies on Russian assistance for maritime technologies. Hello.

And BTW, I think 093 is going to be a good sub. But saying it's at an LA level is a pipe-dream until there is something substantial out there proving it beyond a reasonable doubt.

Back to the situation. China would have no right to board a US nuclear sub in international waters. Unless they wanted an ugly situation to arise.

[darth sidious]

Sea Dog

wish you could read chinese

the main sell point of the 093 will not be quietness but the gas coled reactorwitch gives it high speed ( also reduce noise )

lession learned from the kilo and song can also be applied especialy those in reduceing noise so its going to be much quieter

plus the 093 also has 16 lonch tube for the YJ-62 missile


PS russian subs are noise mainly beacause of poor propeller construction.
in he 80s after toshbia sold one of its milling machines to the soviets there was a great drop in the noise level of russian subs followed by a attempt to ban all toshbai product in the US

[MIGleader]

sea dog, you are so certain the chinese do everytrhing because iof the russians. but the gas cooled engine technology is something very unique to the 93, indegedously developed(with russian sicentists). russia is simply too poor to futher the technology, so china will be the sole user of this kind of engine.

[Sea Dog]

Sea Dog

wish you could read chinese

the main sell point of the 093 will not be quietness but the gas coled reactorwitch gives it high speed ( also reduce noise )

lession learned from the kilo and song can also be applied especialy those in reduceing noise so its going to be much quieter

plus the 093 also has 16 lonch tube for the YJ-62 missile


PS russian subs are noise mainly beacause of poor propeller construction.
in he 80s after toshbia sold one of its milling machines to the soviets there was a great drop in the noise level of russian subs followed by a attempt to ban all toshbai product in the US

Very interesting. But it remains to be seen whether this project is everything it's said to be. There's no doubt there is something advantageous in gas-cooled reactors. But so far, we haven't seen what it can do. Quieting is not just about how you cool your reactor. But it's about how you manufacture your propeller, how you operate your internal equipment, and how the internal engineering spaces are defined. (Trying to be vague here). So at this time, I don't know how you can claim a 093 to be at a level of 688(I). How the heck do you know? I don't know myself. But based on the experts, Chinese design history, Chinese reliance on Russian technological assistance, Russian assistance in conjunction with their own lags and problems, and such, you can deduce this yourself. While my interest is peaked, I have many doubts on the quality some here place on 093 at present. I think it's going to be a credible sub...no doubt. But not 688(I) level. I'm sorry, but nothing out there really points in that direction. And many point 093 at a Victor III level. The gas cooled reactor may give it added quieting, but I remain skeptical at this high a level.

[MIGleader]

sea dog, russian submarine technology is far ahead of what the red navy fielded. the red navy wanted ssbns, and it wanted them fast. so it hurried their construction, giving them speed and numbers in exchange for quieting and safety. but if 300 or so russian sub designers were hired for china, they could take their time to guarenty quality and stealth. it can bne argued that the la has superior interio equipment to the victor III, but the chinese have shown themselves capable of making better electronics than the russians.

[Sea Dog]

sea dog, russian submarine technology is far ahead of what the red navy fielded. the red navy wanted ssbns, and it wanted them fast. so it hurried their construction, giving them speed and numbers in exchange for quieting and safety. but if 300 or so russian sub designers were hired for china, they could take their time to guarenty quality and stealth. it can bne argued that the la has superior interio equipment to the victor III, but the chinese have shown themselves capable of making better electronics than the russians.

Well, if so, their fielded subs never have outclassed western SSN designs. Even now LA 688(I), Seawolf, Virginia, pretty much outclass anything in Russia's undersea arsenal. The Akula-II changes this a little though with the low-speed tactical comparisons. But even then 688(I) has more range in tactical speed in undersea warfare giving it more stealth at higher speed. In submarines, stealth is everything. 688(I) thusly has the advantage. If Russia cannot achieve what's in 688(I), I have my doubts about 093.

[MIGleader]

did u even read my article? i said russia could not field advanced subs do to cost, but russian designers can do quite a bit. stop with the A>B>C, cause everything china makes does not have to be behind russia.

[renmin]

did u even read my article? i said russia could not field advanced subs do to cost, but russian designers can do quite a bit. stop with the A>B>C, cause everything china makes does not have to be behind russia.
Exacty! well stated. Remeber most help from russia today are just emport products like engines, Su-27s etc. Currently in terms of research, China is pretty much independent so dont think everything China has made came from Russia, that was in the past.

[Sea Dog]

Exacty! well stated. Remeber most help from russia today are just emport products like engines, Su-27s etc. Currently in terms of research, China is pretty much independent so dont think everything China has made came from Russia, that was in the past.

Well, both you and Migleader are correct about this. I'm not disputing that China can build some neat stuff on their own. J-10, JH-7, C-802, YJ-62, WZ-10, and Yuan SSK prove this point. I'm not disputing that. But some of these designs have significant Russian influence. And that's all I'm saying. In this regard, I'm assuming 093 is going to be a very capable submarine, but I just find it difficult to believe that they will surpass Russia's design specifications with their reliance on Russians. You do know that Russia has input into the 093..don't you?. And I do have to disagree with Migleader on this point only. That economics precluded Russians from fielding western equivalent capabilities. Look how much they sunk into the Typhoon, Sierra, Alfa, and Akula(Bars). The record here speaks for itself.

[crobato]

Actually I can say that the Russian influence on the 093 is practically none at alll, just like they're not there for the Han, Xia and Song class. The Russians are interested to sell their subs to the Chinese, not teach the Chinese to build subs so they won't buy Russian subs later.

[MIGleader]

the 93 probably bewnifited from russian design, such as steel welding and construction, but not too much more. think of it like this: the gas cooled engine on the 93 is superior in speed ans quietness to any russia sub, since no russian sub has the technology. that means the 93 is quieter thna the aluka II. if the aluka II is quieter than the l.a at low speeds, the 93 must be quieter than the l.a at medium speeds.

[renmin]

Well, both you and Migleader are correct about this. I'm not disputing that China can build some neat stuff on their own. J-10, JH-7, C-802, YJ-62, WZ-10, and Yuan SSK prove this point. I'm not disputing that. But some of these designs have significant Russian influence. And that's all I'm saying. In this regard, I'm assuming 093 is going to be a very capable submarine, but I just find it difficult to believe that they will surpass Russia's design specifications with their reliance on Russians. You do know that Russia has input into the 093..don't you?. And I do have to disagree with Migleader on this point only. That economics precluded Russians from fielding western equivalent capabilities. Look how much they sunk into the Typhoon, Sierra, Alfa, and Akula(Bars). The record here speaks for itself.Actually, the only support from the russians for the J-10 project was only the AL-31FN engines. The WuZhuang 10 does not have enough info to support who was involved so dont just asume

[tphuang]

Actually, the only support from the russians for the J-10 project was only the AL-31FN engines. The WuZhuang 10 does not have enough info to support who was involved so dont just asume
J-10 got support from the Israelis too. There is no question about that. As for WZ-10, you can pretty much guess who is involved just by the partners that are involved with the CMH project (basically Eurocopter, Agusta and Pratt & Whitney)

[MIGleader]

Actually, the only support from the russians for the J-10 project was only the AL-31FN engines. The WuZhuang 10 does not have enough info to support who was involved so dont just asume

dont forget the arsenal hms, and some of the weapons such as r-77. but its far from a foreign design.

the wz-10 undoubtedly recieved european assistance, although it would foolish to start assuming on what scale that assistance was.

[slackpiv]

according to a posted article from typhuang, the type 93 had reached the level of todays improved la, which isnt that impressive compared to seawolf. its redicoulous to think china cant better a 30 year old design.
It would be near impossible for China to reach the level of todays improved LA. Every credible source thus far has put the noise level to that of the Victor III. Its not rediculous to think that china cant better a 30 year old design because China has only a first gernation SSN being the Han class which is among the most noisest submarines ever built.

the gas cooled engine on the 93 is superior in speed ans quietness to any russia sub, since no russian sub has the technology. that means the 93 is quieter thna the aluka II. if the aluka II is quieter than the l.a at low speeds, the 93 must be quieter than the l.a at medium speeds.
This is if the article is accurate and somehow some1 managed to leak out top secret technologies on a submarine that officially is not recognized. As for gas cooled egine, there is a lot more to noise level than the engine. I would like to know how a gas cooled engine reduces noise levels. For China to jump from a first generation sub to sub thats more advanced than the Akula II is not feasable.

[darth sidious]

slackpiv

the victory is noisy beacause of its primitive propeller china has already sloved that problem

Isuggest you look more into gas cooled reactor provide evidance they are not possible

the han was designed in the early 60s with no throught toward noise reduction what so ever

also the most noisey submarine is the russian november class

its silly to compare the 091 to the 093

all the lession learned form built the song and yuan can be applyed to the 093

slackpiv

maybe you would like to learn chinese first before saying there are no info on the 093

[slackpiv]

info would be mostly speculation as no country, especially China, would release information on their SSNs. I would like to see a credible source compare the 093 to an akula II or the improved LA class. A next gen SSN always reflects the sub class before it. btw the Russians fixed the prob problem with the improved Victor III.

[slackpiv]

info would be mostly speculation as no country, especially China, would release information on their SSNs. I would like to see a credible source compare the 093 to an akula II or the improved LA class. A next gen SSN always reflects the sub class before it. I never said Gas cooled reactors are not possible. I'd like to know how they reduce sub noise.

[tphuang]

my view is that it was originally developed to match Victor III in performance, but it will be more powerful than Victor III now (possibly matching Early Akulas) due to the modern weapons in the Chinese arsenal + the latest Russian control systems + electronics and such. This is stated in the latest Kanwa article. Add on top of that, you can add asymmetrical seven-blade skewed propeller and anechoic tiles to 093. These are the reasons why it would be better than Victor III.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_blank.htm
"Russia is also helping develop a new generation of Chinese SSN's
and SSBN's, the new 093 and 094 attack and missile submarines. Russia is
helping China cover the hulls of these submarines with a layer of anechoic
tiles to improve their quieting capabilities and help them elude detection,
i.e. U.S. and Japanese detection. These submarines will conduct missions
related to daily activities of U.S. and Japanese warships, compare
favorably with Victor III class SSN's, and should become operational in
2007."

It was also mentionned in the latest Richard Fisher article that China is probably get some technological assistance from the revived SEVERDOVINSK project.

[slackpiv]

Thank you. But i would like to know whether or not Sino defence refers to the old Victor III or the improved Victor III.

[tphuang]

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/11/21/13404.shtml
They were initially supposed to construct the "093 project" submarine as an improved variety of the Soviet Victor III nuclear attack submarine equipped with the following major weapons:

* submerge-launched anti-ship cruise missile with a range of less than 100 km;

* anti-submarine missile with 40-km range.

It seems that the "093 project" equipped with HN-3B long-range LACMs is a greatly improved variety of Victor III.

Probably the PLA has no intention of constructing additional "093 project" submarines, which belong, in general, to the world level of the 1980s.

[MIGleader]

newsmax is a redicoulous site. never try to obtain any hints about unclear info from it, cause its bound to be false. it sounds liek some russian wrote this. no more 93s? a third ones in construction as we speak. its gone far mroe modern that the original 1980s specs called form this guy seems to be putting faith in kilos, but they can only take you so far.

[slackpiv]

That artical's over 3 years old.
[QUOTEits gone far mroe modern that the original 1980s specs called form .[/QUOTE]

Evidence? So far all sources point to the same direction, Compares favorably to the Victor III with advanced weapon system. however, i woudln't be surprised if the submarine performs the same role as the Russian Oscar class.

[darth sidious]

slackpiv

the 093 maybe more oriented toward attacking large surface target then a purely asw weapn

china can relie on its numerous SSK for asw

[slackpiv]

agreed, thus the reason i stated that the 093 might turn out to be similar in role as the OSCAR class. However SSKs are inefficient in ASW missions due to their lack of endurance and speed. And ASW is an area where China needs to improve.

[darth sidious]

thats beacause in the past all of chinas enemy has a weak submarine force

the Taiwanese has some WWII age submarine one kilo is enough to hunt them down

if a war breaks out over taiwan then the ssk will most likely to swamp the asw befence through a mass missile attack

the current udaloy deal with the russians should help to improve asw ability

[slackpiv]

thats beacause in the past all of chinas enemy has a weak submarine force
The Russians submarine force was at the time of their height almost on par with the USN. SSKs have very limited ASW capability due to their lack of speed.

[darth sidious]

Russian ssk will not launch a sea born invasion on china

also most of the Russian sub in the 60s.early 70s are very NOISEY

and not hard to track

[slackpiv]

Russian ssk will not launch a sea born invasion on china

also most of the Russian sub in the 60s.early 70s are very NOISEY

and not hard to track
By standards now yes. Standards back then not as so. However they were still a lot quieter than the HAN. And exactly with wat was China going to track them with? Of course Russian ssks will not launch a sea born invasion of China. I doubt any country will have the resolve or stupidity to invade China.

[MIGleader]

actually, the han is alot quiter thna 60s era soviet subs, not to mention safer. it features french sonar, and anechoic tiling. but its still really noisy. russian subs in the 60s were big and loud, and ususally were shadowed anywhere they went, from the sea of oskotsk to cuba. soviet ssks however, were much quieter than their nuclear counter parts. at the time of its release, the kilo was the quitest and most advanced ssk in the worlds. now, its lost some of its edge to europe, but its weapons armaments give it an edge.

[slackpiv]

Nope the HAN (before the refits, which really didn't do much) is considered to be the noisiest SSN ever built. Even noisier than the Nautilus.

[MIGleader]

and here is time when i ask you for proof. i mean sites. ive never heard of the noisiest sub, simply "among" the noisiest.

[darth sidious]

the noverber class is the noisiest submarine

the han has a better hull design and only one reactor

the november has two very noisey reactor and numerous flood holes along the hull

single screw is also less noisey the the wo on the november

the han is more on par with the early victory class

[IDonT]

the noverber class is the noisiest submarine

the han has a better hull design and only one reactor

the november has two very noisey reactor and numerous flood holes along the hull

single screw is also less noisey the the wo on the november

the han is more on par with the early victory class

Please provide proof before you make such broadstroke comments.

The HAN subs rarely go to sea, and when they do, they are track on their entire route.

[PLA-MKII]

Hello ppl this is my first post on this forum. I want to share this article with you which really brings to light the actual capabilities of the USN.

http://www.g2mil.com/thompson.htm

[slackpiv]

and here is time when i ask you for proof. i mean sites. ive never heard of the noisiest sub, simply "among" the noisiest.
I learned it from discussion with experts.

[MIGleader]

yeah, thats really going to make me beilive you.:roll: can you actually post the site, or the source?

none of sinodefences professional members seem to think so. the han isnt as outdated as most people think.

[Sea Dog]

yeah, thats really going to make me beilive you.:roll: can you actually post the site, or the source?

none of sinodefences professional members seem to think so. the han isnt as outdated as most people think.

The HAN SSN did go through a mid-life update pretty recently. I have no doubt it's been somewhat improved with the anechoic tiling and maybe a rework of reactor systems(???). But it's performance remains edgy at best. On 10 November 2004 it was tracked deep in 300 meters of water pretty easily by JMSDF. Apparently, keeping a track was pretty easy. That does not indicate a quiet design. Source: globalsecurity(HAN SSN)

HAN SSN is basically an outdated nuclear submarine. If it was viable now, China wouldn't be pursuing the 093 with such vigour as they are now. But on the same note, I find it interesting that most sources speculate the HAN to remain in service up to 2015. That means it does have some kind of usefulness. But still, I have yet to find a source giving it the credence of modern nuclear designs of LA or Akula levels. Not even Alfa, Sierra, Victor, Permit, or Sturgeon.

[MIGleader]

i think the plan sent the han in to intentionally be detected. if stealth was a true target of the mission, the chinese wouldve used a kilo. it sends a message: our submaries will infiltrate your sea space if conflict arises

the han is a very outdated submarine, but cannot be called the noisiest in the world

[slackpiv]

The HAN is the noisiest sub in the world. Name me another sub in service thats noiser.
stealth was a true target of the mission, the chinese wouldve used a kilo.
A kilo has an extremely limited range. If a kilo needs to retain its stealth it needs to travel at about 2 knots.

yeah, thats really going to make me beilive you. can you actually post the site, or the source?
Believe what you want, i'm just telling the truth. Its sometimes described as having train with all its windows open.

[MIGleader]

i think a kilo surfaced is quieter than a han underwater

quieter? so now its only "deployed subs"? your quick to change your boundaries...

but i will take your word for it.

[Sea Dog]

i think a kilo surfaced is quieter than a han underwater

quieter? so now its only "deployed subs"? your quick to change your boundaries...

but i will take your word for it.

Well, honestly, it does no good to compare a FltIII 688(I) with the USS Nautilus which has been out of service for a long time now. I thought all along we were only discussing "deployed" SSN's.

i think the plan sent the han in to intentionally be detected. if stealth was a true target of the mission, the chinese wouldve used a kilo. it sends a message: our submaries will infiltrate your sea space if conflict arises

The only message it sends is that they don't understand how to use their submarines. It would make more sense to send a SAG on the periphery than a sub. I don't buy it at all. Sorry. The whole notion that you blast your way into any space with a submarine is ludicrous. Submarines are intended to be stealthy platforms. Not boisterous battleships.

[IDonT]

The only message it sends is that they don't understand how to use their submarines. It would make more sense to send a SAG on the periphery than a sub. I don't buy it at all. Sorry. The whole notion that you blast your way into any space with a submarine is ludicrous. Submarines are intended to be stealthy platforms. Not boisterous battleships.

Exactly, submarines are not meant to be the "show the flag" type vessels. There is a reason that they are called the "silent service". A submarine's job is to be stealthy, to evade detection and launched a devastating attack from an unseen flank.

The HAN SSN is the noisiest commisioned sub in the world.

[Totoro]

This is really funny though. In the chinese sub thread you're discussing massive asm attacks on carrier fleets, something that suitable for this thread, and here you've been discussing the han sub... anyway, this is the right thread for me even if it's closely connected to what is now talked about in the sub thread... anyway, here's another 'wild and unrealistic idea'. Only it's not so unrealistic, you just have to think big.

IF you're gonna go with total saturation attack with asms against a carrier group (or even groups) instead of large, heavy supersonic missile which is expensive you're better off designing a smaller, cheaper, winged (im talking big foldable wings, like an airplane) missile with simple engine, that doesn't have to faster than, say, 0.6 mach. It could carry the same punch as far as warheads go, and it'd surely be much more fuel efficient. I can't stress this enough - such planes would need to be extremely fuel efficient, enough so that they can be lauched from airfields (or dropped from a bomber, for that matter) at distances like 1000 km inland of china.

Detection? Yes, that's always an issue. Thankfully, a CBG is large force, with large ships. In theory, awacs detectable from 300-350 km away, in practice that awacs would need a large fighter cover to fight through US planes to get to such a range from the CBG. So that tactic is kinda shaky. A fair bet would be satellites, looking down through their lenses. It'd require blue skies, of course. Plus it'd be something like looking for a needle in a haystack, it could be found in 5 mins, but it also could require day or two to be found, to get a lucky pass. Thankfully, there's only so many places a CBG can be around china to be useful to the USN. And yes, satellites could be attacked but that's escalating it, something US which depends on satellites much more than china, doesn't really want to do.

Then there are the missiles themselves. Actually, UAVs, since they'd look more like a plane than a missile. And here's the beauty part. They'd be modelled to have same RCS like your regular sukhoi. No, that doesn't require same size, it just needs careful design to accentuate RCS instead of lowering it. missile/uavs would communicate via some sort of datalink that can't be jammed, like a laser. Sure, range of such a datalink would be small but that's ok. All that'd be needed is for the uavs to know where the other uavs in the loose formation are, where the other planes around it are going. So you'd launch a flight of, say, 60 sukhois, with awacs behind them at safe distance. If they get a location of the CBG from a satellite - great. If they don't they'd just spread around, looking for them. Each two sukhoi group would have something like additional 40 uavs flying in loose formation with it. In a case where the reference sukhois would be shot down, remaining uavs would go the closest remianing sukhoi, or a new sukhoi would be dispatched from the rear.

Attacking multiple such groupd would be costly for US since they'd waste tons of their missiles at BVR ranges but since there ARE real planes in the group, it would be dangerous to ignore the whole group. Yes, they could approach to visual range for confirmation, but they'd already be brought down by chinese BVR a2a missiles by then. Actually, attacking multiple such groups would only show approximate location of the carrier group.

Sooner or later, the CBG would be located, one way or another - be it with satellite, sukhois that have survived, awacs from behind, etc. After that it's easy. All the uavs would switch to attack mode, converge so they form one unified force, and go for the carrier, still close enough to use the datalink but far away from each other so a single missile can't destroy more than one of them. Of course each uav would pack it's own targeting system, an irst of some kind and telephoto lens tv system with a cpu matching the visuals with the library of targets. the uavs wouldn't even need to try to avoid th standards and ESSMS and RAMs and phalanx. Let them come. Even if CBG starts moving at full speed the uavs would already be close enough to catch them and then a continuous wave of something like 1000 missiles/uavs would rain on the fleet. Sure, tons would get destroyed but enough would come through. If for any reason 1000 isnt enough ( i do believe it is), next attack would feature more.

Yes, such a plan would need a few years to develop and build such huge number of missilse. And it'd require a dozen airfields in the inland of china to launch all those missiles. Since they'd be in flocks, you wouldn't need to coordinate all 1000 or so, but just the sukhois. It sounds like SciFi only cause no one has tried it before, but everything i said here is perfectly within reach of todays' tech and command ability that china posesses. Thing is, that's the best way to go about attacking a CBG, in my opinion. China right now can't compete with US in expensive high tech systems. But it can go the opposite route of relatively cheap low tech solutions used in massive numbers. When i say relatively cheap i'm aware that producing and maintaing such a force of uavs would cost several billions of dollars. But that's a small price to pay for negating USN of the power they bring to the war with their CBGs.

[IDonT]

The problem is, its not that easy to find a Carrier.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.htm

The following discussion will be split into several parts and will remain at a somewhat top level. The reasons should be obvious. Specific references will be made to a particular operation, NORPAC 82, but details on tactics and modern systems will not be disclosed. These tactics are essentially the same as during WWII. The historical accounts of the German surface raiders, USN submarine actions, IJN surface and CV operations, and of course the USN surface and CV operations during that conflict include many examples of the following basic tactics.


The main question is: How do you hide a task force at sea? The answer in very general terms is; by not telling the other guy where you are.

This is not as dumb as it sounds.

To illustrate take the following generic situation and think of the naval environment. One actually could extend this to other environments as well.

Put two football teams in a stadium at night each on their defended goal line. Each team will provide the backfield players with rifles and the linemen all have a pistol. Each weapon is equipped with a flashlight fastened to the barrel. The quarterback is equipped with a flashing signal light.

Now turn out all the lights so it is absolutely dark.

Who wants to turn on their light first?

Now to more accurately replicate the naval environment we put half the fans in the stands more or less evenly distributed on the field. We also put two blimps overhead, one for each team, equipped with flashing light and binoculars.

Obviously the light will replicate both communications and radar systems. Everybody's eyes replicate ESM, ELINT, COMINT, and radar receivers.

Obviously if you want to hide the best way is run silent and blend into the general traffic.

There are several conditions of hiding a task force. First is undetected. In this condition the presence of the force is not known. For this to really work it should be coupled with a deception plan so that the opposition not only does not know the force is present, but does not know they don't know and for some reason believes the force to be elsewhere. I will say no more about deception. The second condition is that you have been detected, but not located. This can include the presence of the force is known, but no system has detected the force, or the force has been detected but not identified. And finally, the force has been detected and located which implies identification of the targets.

One's tactics will change based on the above.

If the force has not been detected one can run in to a launch point and hit the target with the first wave while operating completely silent until initial weapon impact. Once the survivors pick themselves out of the rubble they will deduce the presence of the carrier force from the initial wave.

With a force underway the opposition for some reason believes it knows that the ships are elsewhere and has no information to the contrary. Such operations are most effective when coupled with a deception plan that keys the opposition to know for a certainty that you are somewhere else and is therefore not looking. This goes far beyond local efforts of the group.

Every man in the entire task force is kept informed of the tactical situation and what is going on. Full awareness, training, and discipline by all hands is essential.

The force transits to its objective area in complete electronic silence. Deceptive formations are used dispersed over a broad area to ensure any detection system does not see the classic "bullseye" formation made famous in countless Public Affairs shots and never used in operations. Broad surveillance systems are known so any detection method is countered either by denying sensor information, misleading, or providing expected results consistent with something else. For example, ESM systems rely on active emissions from radars or communication systems. So nothing is radiated. Overhead systems are in known orbits, are predictable, and their sensing capabilities known. So the track is varied, weather is sought out to hide in when vulnerable, blending into sea lanes (while staying out of visual detection range of ships) and such techniques. Deceptive lighting is used at night so that the obvious "blacked out warship" is instead thought to be a merchant or cruise liner. Surface search radar identical to commercial ones are used. Turn count masking is used by the ships. Aircraft maintenance on the CV and other helo equipped ships is limited to prevent transmissions.

In NORPAC 82 using these and other tactics the CV force operated close enough to support each other, but far enough and randomly dispersed to avoid identification by anyone. One night in bad weather a man went overboard when the ship was within 200nm of a Soviet airfield in the Kuril Island chain. Despite launch of helicopters and active search methods by several ships in the successful SAR, including clear voice UHF transmissions, the force is not detected because no Soviet asset was above the radar horizon. No overhead system was cued. The force continued on.

At the initial objective point the ships have managed to penetrate without the opposition having any clue that the force was within 2,000 miles. Limited air operations have been conducted to this point with no aircraft transmitting radio, radar, or any other detectable phenom. The aircraft launch "ziplip" and fly a mission without any transmission. Aircraft stay below the radar horizon of defense sites which are less than 200nm away. The E2 flies a passive mission in readiness, but silent unless called to go active.

At the objective "mirror image strikes" are flown. These are full strike missions by the airwing flown on a bearing 180 degrees out from the actual objective. Again, no active transmissions. The entire launch, strike, and recovery are flown without a key being touched. In NORPAC 82 these mirror image strikes within range of Petroplavask and the SSBN bastion in the Sea of O are conducted for 4 days without being detected by the opposition. All day, every day, the E2 orbits on a passive profile. All of the ships operate in passive mode simply listening. In a real war our presence would have been deduced on the first strike as the survivors picked themselves out the rubble of their airfields. But for this operation we continued to train in silence.

One should not miss the implications of this feat. A strategic strike capable force operated with complete impunity for 4 days within range of strategic assets without being detected.

Today, the capability to operate in a passive mode while receiving the complete tactical picture from off-ship has been expanded and refined to an extraordinary degree. All of the vulnerabilities to detection of the force are also its strengths in tracking everyone else. The complete range of overhead and other sensors are downlinked to every ship and many aircraft. If one system in the USN or Space detects a contact, everyone receives it. One could, with training and discipline, sail a complete 6 month deployment and merely listen to all of the other sensors, and strike without warning if need be.

But enough is enough. After dodging Soviet Naval Aviation strike regiments going out to "raid" the Enterprise group the time came to tip our hand and enter the next phase. So out of the blue a Badger group going out against Enterprise and expecting F14s was intercepted some 500nm from Enterprise by F4s with "Midway" painted on the side. And all hell then broke lose!!

Every Soviet asset that could fly, sail, submerge, or orbit was focused on the area in an attempt to locate the group.

The force has now successfully transited to the operation area and conducted the first flight operations which reveal its presence. In wartime this would result in the survivors picking themselves out of the (possibly radioactive) rubble of their airfields and other key military facilities.

So the game is up. But is it? The key as before is to deny targeting information to the opposition, leave them confused about your precise location, and continue to operate.

The task force has as its advantage the element of long-range striking power which allows it to operate at considerable range, thus giving the opposition a very large area to visually search. Check a chart and draw a 600nm circle, cut it in half to represent the sea/land interface, and see how many square miles have to be searched. If operating F18s cut the range in half (Side note. A recent USN article on F18E testing quoted a strike range of only 600nm which equates to a strike radius of 300nm. This loss in capability will cost future striking Admirals key sea space which will bear on this problem).

As before, much of the process of targeting is determining which of the many contacts detected is the one you are looking for. Most techniques rely on exploiting the Achilles Heal of Radar and Communication. To work, you have to transmit, and by transmitting you tell the opposition who and where you are. Don't transmit, and he has to find you the hard way, by visual identification searching the vast ocean area 10sqnm at a time.

Recall the original parallel. The Football field with both teams equipped with flashlights and handguns, with half the fans also on the field and the lights turned out. Who wants to turn their flashlight on first?

The USN has the additional advantage of a networked surveillance system where if anyone in the USN (including shore based facilities such as Naval Space Command) has the contact, everyone has it. So one can stay silent, and receive all the data from the other participants. This allows tactical deception, missile traps, decoys, etc.

Also, if the opposition is going to search with active sensors such as Radar, he is also telling you where he is and who he is. So our fighters can run out the ESM line of bearing and bag the recon Bear or strike pathfinder.

A word about the opposition. The SNA strike regiments were (are) structured and armed very well to go kill naval formations. The AS4/6 on a Badger or Backfire in regimental strength backed with Bears in the recon role were and are formidable. They roughly had a Regiment per carrier. In a straight-forward engagement, the issue would have been "in doubt" at best. If a strike regiment caught a CV by surprise it would have been curtains. An alerted CV would have a better than even chance of surviving, but probable losses would have been severe. But the Regiment running through fighter opposition to their launch points and then getting back out would have taken crippling losses. They would have not been able to mount a second strike and would have been effectively destroyed if not annihilated. If a missile trap is set so that the regiment is climbing to launch altitude over a missile ship it doesn't know about until the radar comes up and missiles start impacting, the fight will be over before it barely starts. So it was critical for the target to be identified and located prior to the regiment being committed. This takes time and allows the CV time to maneuver, set decoy groups, missile traps, fighter ambushes, etc.

With two hours warning for example, a CV could dispatch a surface CG missile trap 60nm down the threat axis, station the CAP Outer Air Battle Grid, put a CG decoy group stationary, and run another 60nm down range and off axis in a silent mode. Then the regiment locates a likely target at the expected point, runs into a missile trap, fighter grid, and a target that can defend itself without ever threatening the CV.

So the trick is to prevent identification and localization of the force. Decoys run out and radiate. Aircraft launch on missions running silent, fly out to a deception point at low altitude, then climb and radiate as normal. The searchers locate the pop-up point but don't find the CV. This is particularly effective if the first launch of the day locates a large, neutral merchant or cruise liner and everybody uses that as the reference deception point. Then the searchers actually see a target at the point that the flight patterns indicate. In wartime they commit, they lose their regiment, and the CV then has a free ride.

We would also deliberately provide a false contact reference. If a searching aircraft is intercepted they can draw an operational radius of previously observed intercepts and conclude the CV is in that area. That allows a concentrated search. Now if we had deliberately intercepted him at an extended range and then moved the carrier at high speed in the other direction the search effort is concentrated at the wrong point. I did that one day by tanking an A7, running him out a long range and bringing him into an intercept of two Bears that were visually searching and identifying fishing boats and merchants trying to find us. I brought him in off-axis and took him back out off-axis (in other words not directly to or from the CV). We then cranked up the 32.5 knots the Midway could then do and went in the other direction. A few hours later we observed a "large number" of search aircraft vainly saturating that area of the ocean and giving all the fishing boats a great air show.

They could identify the E2's radar. They could then draw the normal circle around the E2's location and search that area. Trouble with that was that I was particularly adept at running out long range while silent, and then running a distant patrol point and acting as if the CV was close by. I used to routinely obtain contact at extended ranges. So by drawing their datum points based on my patrols they also looked in the wrong places, and at the same time I data-linked the complete tactical picture to all the silent participants.

We would also recover the returning aircraft by marshalling as normal but in the wrong place. Then, under E2 control, the returning aircraft would fly a recovery pattern to a deception point, and then run in at low altitude and silent to the CV.

A sub vectored out to find us has to have some idea of where to look. If the CV has freedom to operate it can avoid contact by "random and dynamic" movement. Only if the CV locks itself to a set operational area and pattern (as in most structured exercises which lends itself to the prevailing myth of submarine superiority) does it become predictable and hence, vulnerable. If the CV moves it forces the sub to move to catch it, thereby making the sub more detectable. Of course, one could run over the sub by accident in which case it falls to CV group number two to take up the fight! Such is war.

We continued to operate in that manner during NORPAC much as a boxer might in the ring, dodging and weaving for four days with everything in Siberia that could fly, sail or submerge looking for us. Our success can be measured by the fact that not once did any unit ever come close enough to identify us, and at no time was any strike group committed against us in a mock attack. During this time several regimental mock raids per day were flown against the Enterprise which operated openly. And we continued to fly mirror-image strikes within strike range of key Soviet facilities several times per day with complete impunity.

At the conclusion of four such very interesting days it was determined that not only had we obtained all the needed training and experience we were looking for, but that we had also probably trained the Soviets more than we probably wanted to. So we then rendezvoused with the Enterprise group during the night. The next morning, as scattered light filtered into the Northern Pacific, the initial Soviet strikes and shadows saw two carriers where there had been but one the day before. And then all Hell really broke lose!! But that is another story and a very conventional one.


Editor's note: Abbreviation Glossary

A7 – Daylight Light Attack aircraft.
AS4/6 - Soviet Air-Launched Anti-Ship Missiles.
CAP – Combat Air Patrol
COMINT- Communications Intelligence
CV – USA designation for an Aircraft Carrier.
E2 – Electronic Surveillance and Radar aircraft, also used for Command and Control functions. An apt description that I wish I could claim credit for is that it looks like "an aircraft being terrorized by a flying saucer."
ELINT – Electronic Intelligence
ESM – Electronic Support Measures
F18E – A Fighter/Attack aircraft intended to replace the A-6 attack bomber. As noted in this essay, it is debatable if this aircraft can truly replace one of the most successful Naval Attack Aircraft ever built.
IJN – Imperial Japanese Navy
nm – Nautical Mile (1.151 statute miles or 1.852 km)
NORPAC 82 – North Pacific 1982 Exercise.
SAR – Search And Rescue
SNA – Soviet Naval Aviation. Includes all of the commands, regiments and squadrons.
sqnm – Square Nautical Mile
USN – United States Navy

[Totoro]

GAH!! i HATE when i write a big piece and then stupid people come and close my browser window. So you'll get a short version, i'm sorry.

Article is fine and all, i've seen it before, but it's talking bout a different scenario. In US vs china, a CBG needs to come to certain range to launch the attack. China, therefore, needs to search a smaller area, a belt from chinese shore, some 1000-1500 km deep. Part of it is searchable from the shore, so...while it still is a large area, there's only so many places a USN carrier would be useful to aide taiwan.

Secondly, article mostly talks bout reducing emissions and using decoys for el. emissions and so on. Yes, that's the high tech way to go about it. But what i was saying it a low tech approach. Simple radar search combined with visual identification. Yes, it'd be something like searching for a needle in a haystack but that's a very doable thing - to find such needle. sure, it'd take you a day or so, but it's doable. Or perhaps a CBG would be able to elude for more days. Or it'd be deteced right away. There'd be lots of luck there, granted. But it is my opinion china can sustain the blow(s) that a US carrier can deliver, while a loss of 2-3 CBGs would be a rather heavy blow to the USN.

Also, you haven't said a word about using awacs to search the seas with a forward force of dummy uavs indistinguishable from afar from the core force of real fighters. Again, yes, it'd need a fair number of awacs, a large number of sukhois and a massive number of uavs but it'd doable. Tech is there to produce them, launch them and coordinate them, you just need money and determination.

[darth sidious]

slackpiv

please provide us with a artical or source to prove that the han is the noisest sub ever built

the November has a typeXXI hull that will make more noise then the waterdrop on the HAN

the november has two reacor compare to the han's one that will make more noise

the november has a turbine drive that noiser then the hans turbo-electric trive

the november has two propellers compared with the hans one that willmake more noise


here is my reason now tell me why the november is quieter then the Han???:coffee:

[coolieno99]

The problem is, its not that easy to find a Carrier.
.... etc ....


It's not that hard with a Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR) space satellite. At low resolution a large swath of the ocean can be monitor. At higher resolution(25M) the target can be determined to type. And it can penetrate through cloud cover ... :coffee:

[Su-34]

For the PLAN to consider fighting the US Navy over Taiwan, then the PLAN needs a minimum number of these ships:

1. 15 Song SSKs
2. 10 Yuan SSKs
3. 8 Type 093 SSNs
4. Retain older Mings, Romeos, and Hans to serve as 'baits'.
5. 10 Type 052C/D Air Defence DDGs
6. 15 Type 054A FFGs
7. 2 guided-missile cruisers with lots of air defense missiles and cruise missile launchers.

Also it would be nice if the PLAN gets an SSN that matches the performance of the current-generation Russian Akula-II, which is way better than the Victor-III.

[IDonT]

It's not that hard with a Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR) space satellite. At low resolution a large swath of the ocean can be monitor. At higher resolution(25M) the target can be determined to type. And it can penetrate through cloud cover ... :coffee:

It's not necessarily that simple.... Spy satellites operate in low earth orbit, round 100-400 miles up. Their orbital path is very predictable and they need time to position themselves in order to see which swath of the ocean.

Then there is a problem of response time. Say you see the Carrier strike group at point A with your satellite, how long do you think you can fuel, arm, assemble, fly to your launch point, and fire your missiles? By the time it takes you to get within optimal firing range of point Athe carrier is no longer there. Remember a carrier can move 500 miles a day. If your strike is seen by an E-2 well before, the carrier group commander could plan for a silent sam trap, F-18 ambush, or both. Also, lurking SSN's could launch TLAM's at the airbases thereby affecting bingo fuel issues (bingo fuel = is when you only have enough fuel to return home) by forcing the airstrike to return to another airbase, which could be further.

Attacking a manuevering and fighting Carrier Group with a competant commander is not that easy.

[KlubMarcus]

Attacking a manuevering and fighting Carrier Group with a competant commander is not that easy. Yep, especially since the USN will probably deploy three within striking distance! Plus they will have small groups of ships pretending to to be CBG's and looking to take shots at enemy aircraft and shipping.