SinoDefence Forum

Andrew

Hi everybody

I read somewhere a few days ago that China was producing 400 ICBMs every month. To me, this figure seems complete fantasy but does anybody know anything about the rate at which China is expanding its nuclear forces? On this site, I think it says that there is no intention to rapidly raise the stockpile of nuclear warheads.

Obviously, China is trying to catch up with the most sophisticated military powers in the world, in particular the US. To be fair, it seems as though it has fared well so far. This is illustrated by the fact that waging a sustained non-nuclear air campaign à la Kosovo 1999 would today create severe headaches even for the U.S. Airforce. But clearly, the modernisation of China's military is a cumbersome and very complicated process as the American forces are constantly upgrading their weaponry, strategy and training. E. g., there is no use in simply acquiring 2'000 Su-30s if these aircraft are likely to be outdated or rendered useless by critical innovations by the US airforce over the next ten years.

I am layman on military or strategic affairs, but still I would like to raise the following question: Could a strong emphasis on the rapid development and production of long-range nuclear missiles make any sense? This would have to be accompanied by establishing/ significantly upgrading corresponding early warning capabilities (over-the-horizon radar, surveillance satellites etc.) The Soviet Union's vast concentration of assault guns and T-34s appeared rather unimpressive after Hiroshima and Nagasaki - until the Russians managed to catch up on the US by developping its own arsenal nuclear and hydrogen bomb. China does have a nuclear deterrent but it is no match against either the US or Russia's.

Once a potential attacker realises that an attempted nuclear strike against China would be retaliated with equal ferocity, his enthusiasm to launch military interventions in China's sphere of interest would be dulled considerably. Policy makers would take notice if China's nuclear strike capability expanded dramatically and would within a comparably short time cover, say, not merely the American west coast but the whole American mainland.
Does anybody know whether this would be a particularly costly undertaking? After all, China seems to be proficiant at developping and producing ICBMs and nuclear warheads. It does not - unlike in other areas - need help from other powers with this task. This may be less the case when it comes to a setting up an integrated early warning system for this nuclear arsenal (?)

An alternative for China might be to develop its own ABM-system. However, this endavour would probably prove more difficult and possibly less reliable. Not least, the US is already active here, too. What my consideration boils down is that a rapid and massive reinforcement of China's nuclear deterrent could yield comparatively high psychological and diplomatic gains and that this strategy would set a comparably clear roadmap perhaps less prone to set-backs and misinvestments which occur in other services (e. g. submarine fleet). Without doubt, though, the nuclear detterent is not the absolute but rather the ultimative instrument in foreign policy and therefore not very flexible. Therefore, there could be no question that the current modernisation of China's conventional forces has to proceed.

I'm looking forward to reading your thoughts!

With kind regards
Andrew

walter

I am sure there are other posters much better informed than I am, but 400 ICBMs a month must be HUGELY exaggerated. I think 400 SRBMs, MRBMs and ICBMs all added up would also be pushing it. Maybe if you factored in cruise missles that could be an accurate number. Also, China is actively working on conventionally armed ballistic missles, so it may be that a significant portion, perhaps the majority, of their current ballistic missle production is intended for outfit with conventional rather than nuclear warheads( comments anyone?).

You might want to consider finding where you read that figure and posting it as a source. There is an awful lot of hyping CHina as a threat these days, mixed in with all the fair analysis, so most here will want to see where or from who this number is coming from.

Totoro

Figures i've read range from 200-400 new ballistic missiles alright, but per year, not per month. And that sounds reasonable. Most of those are, though, short and medium range tactical ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.

I do believe china does need to expand its nuclear arsenal in order to have better deterrance capability. In the next 5-10 years it'd be prudent to expand on its current fleet of strategic nuclear subs - currently numbering just one operational vessel, and even that seems to be operational mostly on paper. So for some short term goal, say 3-5 years, it would be wise to vastly expand on the number of mobile icbm launchers. Current estimates i've read say china has under 200 mobile nukes - which is quite inadequate. Not counting any future sub carried ones that number should be at least doubled.

adeptitus

400 ICBMs/month is definately... whacked.

The PRC is said to have enough weapons grade uranium to produce at least 2,000 nuclear warheads. However having the uranium is not the same as a warhead. Conservative estimates have put the PRC nuclear stockpile at 400-430 warheads.

Let's do a hypothetical comparison between European nuclear powers.

UK is said to maintain 4 SSBN's armed with MIRV capable SLBM's, but will limit each boat to 48 warheads. 4 * 48 = 192, which confirms UK's claim of maintaining "fewer than 200" nuclear warheads.

PLAN's Type 094 SSBN is said to carry 16 JL-2 SLBM's. Each JL-2 can have up to 4 MIRV warheads. So 16*4 = 64. IF the PLAN follow European (UK, French) example and maintain a fleet of 4 SSBN's, the hypothetical maximum number of warheads used is 64 * 4 = 256. Most likely, it'd be fewer, as some missiles will only be armed with 1 warhead (so commanders will have more options in "measured response").

So, if we assume the total warhead inventory is ~400, and the PLAN takes 200, that leaves anotehr 200 warheads for ground/air based missiles and even free-fall nuclear bombs.

That'd give the PRC a decent nuclear deterrance force. However currently the PLAN only has 1 obsolete SSBN (Xia) and 1 new SSBN under test (094), plus around 24-36 DF-5/A ICBM's and unknown number of DF-31's.

So you could say that the PRC doesn't really NEED more warheads, but is lacking in the long-range delivery vehicles.

Defense

OPINION: The trouble with China's nuclear doctrine

Jane's: http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jd...0216_1_n.shtml

IDonT

What China needs is a credible second strike capability. It is a well documented fact that the reason that the Cold War never became an all out armed conflict between the superpowers is that each side has credible second strike capability. Hence the nuclear triad of ICBMs, SSBNs, and nuke capable bombers.

The US have fleets of ultra quite submarines, like the Ohio that prowl the oceans. USSR has similar fleets but they based them in bastions protected by their surface fleet. Their job is to survive a cripling nuclear first strike and deliver a similar second strike on the enemy.

What China need is a credible SSBN fleet. The Xia and 094 are a start, but they are useless if they remain in port for most of their service lives. China needs at least one, more is better, to make any attempt to criple her retaliation capable with a first strike null. I mean ICBMs and Bombers, in fact the whole of China, can be wipe out in 30 minutes with the US nuke arsenal. The SSBNs are another matter. The threat of an undiscovered SSBN, with the ability to wipe out the US, is all it takes to prevent a nuke war.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think there are only 30 ICBMs that can reach the entire continental US and these are not in a position to lauched within 30 minutes. Very vulnerable to a 1st strike scenario.

Also, a network of sophisticated radar, like the US NORAD, that can detect a ballistic missile attack and provide ample time to respond with your 2nd strike is also needed.

In short, building more nukes is not the answer. Building an early warning and a survivable second strike capability is.

Andrew

@adeptius

Compared to European powers, China indeed has enough warheads but does its current nuclear force suffice to pose a credible threat against the US? Of course, it depends on what you define as "credible". At any rate, the strategic reality remains that China is not on par with the US when it comes to a (potential) nuclear confrontation.

That's where my question enters. Why not build more delivery vehicles (primarily ICBMs) in order to achieve strategic parity on the nuclear level first. As long as China is incapable of striking back with equal force and the US has an advantage and can act more agressively in the East Asian theatre.

If we see the problem on a sort of continuum, clearly, China would be far worse off if it didn't have ANY nuclear missiles at all. I do however think that being on par would be better than being inferior. It's all a rather theoretical discussion having to do with perceptions but I do think that it might have significant diplomatic and military implications.

with kind regards
Andrew

Roger604

That's silly. The US cannot wipe out China with just long-range ICBMs. Not even close. Bombers are unreliable since you can intercept them.

China's DF-5's are in tunnels deep within mountains and are nearly impossible to get at using a counterforce first-strike. So no matter what the US does, China is guaranteed to be able to destroy 20 population centers with the DF-5's. I think there's a new DF-5 Mod 2 being deployed recently.


Totoro says that China needs mobile launchers. I think this is quite obviously the way to go. I have read some sources that say DF-31 is already deployed (capable of reaching west coast) and that DF-31A (capable of reaching all of ConUSA) will be deployed before 2010. I don't really see why it would need to take so long. China acquired the Topol technology in the late 90's and apparently copied the DF-31A booster technology from Minuteman III.

Given that Topol mobile launchers (i.e. DF-31A) are obviously the way to go, and that there is no technological impediment to making them, I suspect that China is already well on its way to deploying them. Strategic weapons are so secretive as a matter of policy that western estimates of Chinese forces are barely more than guesses. So take that into account when you read "figures" for Chinese nuclear forces.

These mobile launchers alone would be a guaranteed second-strike if numbered sufficiently. During the Cold War, China aimed for several hundred nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence against the Soviet Union. Now, it likely will aim for the same number, but with longer range vehicles to deter the US. I think 300 would be a good number.

Nuclear submarines are always important, but I admit China's nuke sub technology is really far behind. Which makes mobile launchers doubly important.... which reinforces my previous point, the leadership has been modernizing them at a far faster pace than western observers have direct evidence for.


One last point, hair-trigger alerts are dangerous for obvious reasons.

Andrew

Thanks for your responses! Obviously the Cold War scenario which one poster has already mentioned comes to mind.

Let's assume that China managed to get on the same level with the United
States with regards to the number of deployable nuclear missiles/bombs (land-based ICBMs, SSBN, bombers) within the next 10 years.

How would this impact on the global balance of power? Would this alter the US' behaviour in the Far East? Would this "freeze" the whole geopolitical configuration at some point (skirmishes between "allies" of each party at the periphery but no clash between the US and China itself)? Would China be able to be more assertive?

Does it matter that the US is "in decline"?
The problem I see coming up is that China won't achieve a parity in nuclear weapons in the near to mid-term future and that therefore, the possibility of a "freezing" of the situation, of the confrontation becoming a cold one, diminishes. The problem becomes more acute as the US will over time become more aware of its declining (economic) position. While it is true that the US benefits of cutting edge technolodgy in crucial areas, this can't negate the fact that in the long run the superior economy wins. Hence, there is a certain "window of opportunity" during which the US will try to contain and might indeed attempt to fatally cripple China's rise to global dominance.

The first step for the US is to dictate the terms and deny potentially threatining powers access to crucial resources, particularly oil. This process has already begun with the invasion of Iraq, I would say, and we may see more interventions. This may be reason why China is desperatly trying to settle contracts with Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran and Russia. Some commentators have compared China's position with that of Japan prior to WWII. Indeed, the US would welcome if a frustrated China attacked first. With its domestic economic situation having become increasingly unsustainable and the military having suffered cutbacks, the obvious thing for the US will be to deploy nuclear weapons. This applies even more so if it has the impression that the fall-out of Chinese nuclear counter-strike is controllable or "acceptable".
Of course, I have not factored in the Russians, here. The continuing existence of a credible Russian nuclear threat is - in conjunction with the rise of China - a reason why I think that the US will itself seek to expand its stockpile of deployable nuclear weapons.

The bottom line: I see this discussion as a purely geopolitical/military one. I am not in favour of or against any particular country.

with kind regards
Andrew

renmin

The advantage of mobile launchers is its ability to move, there for it would never be at the same place making it hard to track. 400 a month, impossible, China's nuclear weapons rate is only a bit more than 600 warheads!

Typhoon

Please, next time when you read someting, remember where you read it, provide us with the link or URL.

See the following link for DIA July 1999 report "A Primer on the Future Threat, the Decades Ahead 1999-2020" (Secret/No Forn).

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/Primer.pdf

DIA estimates are: Chinese has 40-45 ICBM in 1999, and estimated 180-220 ICBM in 2020. They defined ICBM as having at least 1800 km range (that is CSS-3/CSS-5, or DF-3/DF-5).

DIA is Defence Intelligence Agency, in case you don't know yet.

Enjoy, kiddo!

Typhoon

Here is an article in "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" in May/June 2005 issue, wrote by Jeffrey Lewis. He said it very clear, don't believe any hype that China is aggressively building up its nuclear forces.

http://www.thebulletin.org/article.p..._ofn=mj05lewis

Dr. Jeff Lewis is a reputable expert on Chinese military. He has a highly respected blog:

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/?s=about

Very worthwhile to visit.

Enjoy, kiddo!

Andrew

Thanks Typhoon for this info.

IDonT

US has enough Nukes to wipe out the planet many times over. Nuking every square inch of China is not a question of if the US could, but if the US should in light of the consequences.
Just looking at the US SSBN fleet and you will see the amount of nuke power the US possess.
US has 14 remaining Ohio class nukes, each armed with 24 trident missiles, each carrying 12 MIRV warheads with a yield of up to 700 kilo tons.

Norad headquarters is under a mountain, sorrounded by bedrock close to mile thick. The US leadership does not believe this would suvive a direct nuclear hit by Russian nukes. That is the reason why they have the "doomsday" plane. I'm not saying the US can guarantee distruction of those missiles, but they are not as survivable as an SSBN.

Andrew

Thanks to Typhoon I've come across the following article which seems to deal precisely the sort of questions I have raised:

http://www.thebulletin.org/article.p..._ofn=mj05lewis

The ambiguous arsenal

...

Dangerous incentives

[I]So, let's review: China deploys just 30 ICBMs, kept unfueled and without warheads, and another 50-100 MRBMs, sitting unarmed in their garrisons. Conventional wisdom suggests this posture is vulnerable and invites preemptive attack during a crisis. This minimal arsenal is clearly a matter of choice: China stopped fissile material production in 1990 and has long had the capacity to produce a much larger number of ballistic missiles. [15] The simplest explanation for this choice is that the Chinese leadership worries less about its vulnerability to a disarming first strike than the costs of an arms race or what some Second Artillery officer might do with a fully armed nuclear weapon. In a strange way, Beijing placed more faith in Washington and Moscow than in its own military officers.

Washington has never reciprocated that trust. Instead, the United States has embarked on a major transformation of its strategic forces that is, in part, driven by concern about the modernization of China's strategic forces. President Bill Clinton reportedly directed U.S. Strategic Command in 1998 to include plans for strikes against China in the U.S. nuclear weapons targeting plan. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified China as one of seven countries "that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency" with nuclear weapons. [16]

Chinese strategic forces are increasingly supplanting Russia as the primary benchmark for determining the size and capabilities of U.S. strategic forces--at least in administration rhetoric. China's nuclear arsenal is reflected in the 2001 NPR in two ways. First, the review recommends reducing the 6,000 deployed U.S. nuclear weapons to no less than 1,700-2,200. In response to criticism that these cuts didn't go low enough, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that further reductions might encourage China to attempt what he termed a "sprint to parity"--a rapid increase in nuclear forces to reach numerical parity with the United States. [17]

Second, the 2001 NPR recommends the addition of ballistic missile defenses and non-nuclear strike capabilities to help improve the ability of the United States to extend nuclear deterrence to its allies. [18] Here too, concern over China's arsenal lurked in the background. Shortly before he was nominated as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy (with responsibility for overseeing the NPR), Keith Payne argued that the United States, in a crisis with China over Taiwan, must possess the capability to disarm China with a first strike if U.S. deterrence is to be credible. Despite overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority, he has argued, "China's leadership may not be susceptible to U.S. deterrence threats, regardless of their severity, largely because denying Taiwan independence would be a near-absolute goal for Chinese leaders." Thus, the United States "would have to make blatantly clear its will and capability to defeat Chinese conventional and [weapons of mass destruction] attacks against Taiwan and against its own power projection forces." [19]

Yet, if the United States were truly interested in discouraging a Chinese sprint to parity or the development of a Chinese ballistic missile force that could undertake coercive operations, the president would disavow the vision for nuclear forces outlined in the NPR. The Chinese leadership chose their arsenal in part on the belief that the United States would not be foolish enough to use nuclear weapons against China in a conflict. By asserting that Washington may be that foolish, and by attempting to exploit the weaknesses inherent in China's decision to rely on a small vulnerable force, the NPR creates incentives for Beijing to increase the size, readiness, and usability of its nuclear forces.

...