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planeman

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Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress Taiwan



Note: Completely amateur web based research. Illustrations by me unless otherwise stated. Because of the research nature, there may be inaccuracies in some details or views. Feedback and corrections very welcome. I’d particularly like to thank Sean O’Connor and certain unnamed individuals for sharing their excellent knowledge and analysis. This essay hopefully complements Sean’s research piece HERE.

I understand that some readers may be uncomfortable with the degree of detail in certain aspects of this essay. I must stress that this is public-source info that pales into insignificance against what mainland China must know already. This amounts to just joining the dots and applying some guesswork to fill the gaps. For an equivalent piece on Chinese air defences go HERE


SCOPE: This is not exhaustive. I’ll concentrate on Taiwan’s air defences. A Taiwan-China matchup and scenario analysis may follow in a separate piece. At the moment Taiwan-China relations are on a relatively stable footing but the pendulum swings every few years as politicians come and go; China remains a very real threat in the eyes of many in Taiwanese military and observers abroad.

Contents

1. Long Range SAMs
1.1 Patriot
1.2 Tien Kung
1.3 Tien Kung III
1.4 Hawk

2. ROCAF Short range SAMs
2.1 Skyguard
2.2 Antelope
2.3 Antelope future state
2.4 Other

3. ROC Army/Marines air defences
3.1 Avenger
3.2 Chaparral
3.3 Dual mount Stinger

4. ROCAF fighters
4.1 Mirage 2000-5
4.2 F-16
4.3 F-CK-1
4.4 F-5

5. Radar and electronic warfare network
5.1 Hawkeye
5.2 Pave Paws
5.3 Other

6. ROCAF in the context of Chinese Air Force (PLAAF)

7. ROCN as air defence

planeman

1. Long range SAM systems


1.1 Patriot
Taiwan purchased three batteries of PAC-2 Patriot in the 1990s. These have been upgraded to PAC-2GEM/T standard and are being further upgraded to PAC-3 standard which involves various sensor and command enhancements and the inclusion of the PAC-3 missile for anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defence. The PAC-3 system retains the enhanced long range PAC-2GEM/T missiles to engage aircraft. An additional 3-4 batteries of PAC-3 standard Patriot are also reportedly being purchased.

Even today the PAC-2GEM system provides modest ABM defence for Taipei.



There are four known fixed sites although only three batteries are in service and all are deployed defending the capital Taipei:


Although the above image is valid as the theoretical coverage of the Patriot system, in reality the LPARs are deployed facing predetermined directions and the engagement zoine of the system is best seen as a 120 degree wedge. In the below image Sean O’Conner has mapped these wedges on Google Earth:




The PAC-3 missile is a lot smaller than the older Patriots which allows 4 missiles to be carried in a single ‘can’, i.e. 16 per launcher instead of 4. With the PAC-3s deployed at existing Patriot sites, Taipei’s air defences look like this:


Patriot Sites on Google Earth





And finally the unoccupied site. This was possibly built in anticipation of more Patriot batteries, or as an alternative location of one of them. It is probable that Patriot and/or Tien Kung units deploy through here and that one of the new Patriot batteries will occupy the site. Sean O’Connor has deduced that this was once a Nike SAM site. The Nike system was decommissioned in the mid 1990s.




1.2 Tien Kung SAM
The Tien Kung system was developed by Taiwan with US assistance. The system closely resembles and is comparable to, if generally inferior to, Patriot. Nonetheless this is a highly capable system.

Initially Tien Kung was developed in two versions. The first, Tien Kung I had a 70km range and used semi-active radar guidance. The second type, which took longer to develop used an active radar terminal guidance and was fitted with a booster for extend range, of about 160km. The two stage missile was launched from an elevating single round platform launcher:


Both versions used the very modern Chang Bei phased array radar built with assistance of Locheed Martin and approximating the AN/MPQ-53 radar of the Patriot system. Tien Kung I used a continuous wave illumination radar for guidance similar to Hawk. Unusually for a modern SAM system Tien Kung is deployed in hardened underground silos to improve survivability against the mainland Chinese air force (PLAAF). As China develops ever more accurate bombs and ballistic missiles these sites become less survivable however. The underground complex is perhaps a hang-over from the Nike missile system Taiwan used, and Tien Kung I could fairly be described as a mix of Nike, Hawk and Patriot influences.

The Tien Kung system underwent a protracted development during which time US exported better solid-fuel rocket technology to Taiwan allowing far better motors to be used. For Tien Kung I this meant extending the range to 100km but for Tien Kung II this means getting rids of the twin-stage approach and yet still achieving an impressive 200km range, exceeding even the patriot. The resulting Tien Kung II missile is only slightly longer than Tien Kung I and can use the same mobile launchers which closely resemble those of the Patriot:




Tien Kung I mobile launcher being shown to the public:


There are 6 fixed sites, reportedly with Tien Kung II missiles although it appears probable that some Tien Kung I rounds are also employed. The fixed sites provide substantial coverage. Theoretical ranges:

As per the Patriot the circular engagement zones are somewhat unrealistic, especially given that the fixed Tien Kung’s ‘Chang Bei’ radars are mounted on the sides of cliffs giving a truly fixed field of view. Like the Patriot’s radar the ChangBei can scan 120 degrees (ie. 60 degrees left of facing, 60 right). Because we know the exact locations of these radars and their direction of facing we can construct this relatively accurate map of engagement zones. Again this is provided thanks to Sean O’Connor:

Note that Sean has not included the northern battery on Dongyin islands due to lack of imagery. The Dongyin battery is reportedly twice as large as the mainland sites suggesting about 160 SAMs, and has at least two Chang Bei radars. Some of those SAMs may have been converted into surface-surface missiles but I’ll save that for another Bluffer’s guide.



Index of Tien Kung fixed sites:
1. Launch Site: 24.162652°, 120.570064° CLICK HERE
1. Radar: 24.151087°, 120.572159° CLICK HERE
2. Launch Site: 23.665208°, 119.556592° CLICK HERE
2. Radar: 23.673099°, 119.580772° CLICK HERE
3. Launch Site: 22.853564°, 120.319457° CLICK HERE
3. Radar: 22.855944°, 120.344672° CLICK HERE
4. Launch Site: 22.514889°, 120.367083° CLICK HERE
4. Radar: 22.528169°, 120.377637° CLICK HERE
5. Launch Site: 25.234794°, 121.450850° CLICK HERE
5. Radar: 25.234124°, 121.491402° CLICK HERE
6. Exact location TBC: 26.368308°, 120.488974° CLICK HERE

Example Fixed site (courtesy Sean O’Connor) and radar:




1.3 Tien Kung III

The third version of Tien Kung is based on the Tien Kung II but with enhanced anti-ballistic missile capability. Tien Kung II is already credited with an ABM capability similar to Patriot PAC-3GEM but the TK-III will be closer in capability to PAC-3. It is not clear of the future of this system given US’ agreement to supply Patriot PAC-3 missiles but it if it enters service it will provide Tien-Kung batteries with a multi-tier integrated response capability. Tien Kung III was also shown on a new launcher although the overall layout is very similar to the Tien Kung and patriot systems with a slant-launch quadruple box on a turntable mounted on a towed trailer.

One curious aspect of TK-III is that the airframe is the same as the 200km TK-II missile, so relative to PAC-3 this system may have far greater range and/or altitude engagements of equivalent incoming targets.


1.4 Hawk

Now the oldest SAM system in ROCAF service, the Hawk remains a credible defence against most PLAAF aircraft and constitutes a second line of defence behind the longer ranged and more potent Patriots and Tien Kung SAM systems.


Taiwan has 13 fixed site Hawk batteries covering the western side of the main Island and Penghu island offshore:

Some of these may be replaced by Patriot and Tien Kung SAM systems in the near future but Hawk is likely to remain a key component of ROCAF air defences for some time.

planeman

2. ROCAF Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD)
The air force (ROCAF) operates several systems as point defence of air bases. The main system is Skyguard although this is to be replaced by the more capable indigenous Antelope system.




2.1 Skyguard


The Swiss developed Oerlikon-Contraves (now Rheinmetall) Skyguard system is an integrated air defence system synonymous with the 4km range Oerlikon *** series twin 35mm anti-aircraft gun. Like several other countries Taiwan also adds SAMs to the mix in the form of the US developed Sparrow SAM which has a range of about 18km. The Sparrow is basically the same as the air-launched Sparrow missile but with folding fins and, due to its ground launch and weaker radars, a significantly shorter range.
Although the 35mm guns are still very potent, the version of Skyguard operated is essentially a 1980s system which is also operated by Taiwan’s prime adversary, mainland China. That being said, even as late as 2002 new Skyguard positions were still being built.

Skyguard is a fully mobile system but is commonly deployed in prepared positions with elevated radar and firing positions. Most sites have two firing positions (verses the theoretical maximum of four) although several sites have a third larger firing position further away, seemingly specifically for Sparrow. These third launch positions have a larger pad than the regular firing positions although Sparrow can operate from the standard pad. It is probable that these third launch pads were added on later and that Sparrow is often deployed on non-elevated positions because the engagement characteristics of the missile do not require the elevated position in most scenarios.



Although the Sparrow has a range of about 18km initial engagement is likely limited to about 15km if Skyguard’s tracking radar is relied upon. Each Sparrow launcher does have its own illumination radar to guide the missile, four of which are carried per mount. Sparrow is essentially a 1970s SAM system and is increasingly obsolete.

Sites found on Google Earth

planeman

List of site coordinates (cut and paste into Google Earth or click link to open in Google Maps):
24.288594°, 120.629102° CLICK HERE
24.258428°, 120.640198° CLICK HERE
24.243697°, 120.631322° CLICK HERE
24.236918°, 120.608540° CLICK HERE
24.823001°, 120.932547° CLICK HERE
24.833191°, 120.940796° CLICK HERE
25.091480°, 121.538794° CLICK HERE
25.072710°, 121.583939° CLICK HERE
24.037918°, 121.622356° CLICK HERE
24.023595°, 121.631470° CLICK HERE
24.045975°, 121.594751° CLICK HERE
24.011207°, 121.584938° CLICK HERE
23.482993°, 120.385123° CLICK HERE
23.474694°, 120.408202° CLICK HERE
23.442842°, 120.412289° CLICK HERE
23.443713°, 120.384219° CLICK HERE
22.789511°, 121.168096° CLICK HERE
22.808566°, 121.187565° CLICK HERE
25.068335°, 121.204745° CLICK HERE
25.063470°, 121.256021° CLICK HERE
25.100676°, 121.218625° CLICK HERE




2.2 Antelope

The Antelope system is based on the Skyguard but integrates locally produced weapons, primarily the Singaporean designed AOS L-70 40mm AAA gun and Tien Chien I infra-red guided missile. An across-the-board upgrade over the Skyguard, Antelope has greater detection ranges and can control twice as many fire units.

Antelope uses the CS/MPQ-78 radar which is almost identical in appearance to the Skyguard, combining a search radar with a fire control radar and IR/Laser tracking and range finding equipment. Initial test units used a towed trailer almost identical to that of Skyguard but more recent units use a stand-alone radar which can be dismounted from a truck.


The AOS L-70 uses the Bofor’s L-70 40mm AAA as the basis but has much more modern fire control with an on-mount EO sight. The gun itself is similar in performance to the Oerlikon 35mm AAA already in use for Skyguard.


The Tien Chien I is an infra-red guided missile similar in appearance and capability to AIM-9P/L model Sidewinders. Although similar in concept to the Chaparral system, Tien Chien is a quantum leap in lethality over that system. Although Tien Chien I is significantly shorter ranged than Sparrow it is all the same a lethality improvement and its fire-and-forget nature allows simpler crew operation.

Early test units of Tien Chien are usually photographed on the back of a Hummer but production units use a light truck. This is possibly due to the limited supply of Hummers for the air force.


Sites on Google Earth/Maps:
24.266864°, 120.614891° CLICK HERE
22.789511°, 121.168096° CLICK HERE



2.3 Antelope Future State

Taiwan is working on more advanced components for the Antelope system although reliable reports of progress are limited and operational deployment is likely to be years away. The main enhancements are likely to be:
1. Use of a phased array radar, probably MPQ-90 to greatly improve detection and tracking range, and number of simultaneous engagements
2. Integration of the SAM version of the Tien Chien II active-radar missile. This is generally equivalent to surface launcher AMRAAM. Range is often quoted as 40km but I think 20km is more plausible. This will also make Antelope a potential replacement for the Hawks which are being withdrawn.
3. Control of twice as many fire units (16).
4. Integration of the army’s Avenger SAM system which uses Stinger missiles.

planeman

2.4 Other ROCAF SHORAD

In addition to Skyguard and Antelope, ROCAF deploys a large number of AAA, mainly 40mm Bofors and the indigenous T-82 20mm AAA. It is probable that some WW2 era quad .50 cal machine gun mounts also remain although these were to be replaced by the T-82s.


ROCAF also converted some Vulcan 20mm gatling guns from retired F-104 Starfighter jets into AAA but these are not reported to be in active service. The exact number available is unlikely to be very many but could theoretically be as many as 250 if every available F-104 plus spare gun were cannibalized. The gun mount does not appear to have any sophisticated aiming devices and can be regarded as an inferior brother to the standard M168 Vulcan AAA which is itself obsolete. The gun is nonetheless an awesome piece of kit:



A common theme is the placement of AAA on rooftops. Most of the buildings used have an access ramp which in some cases may allow medium guns like L-70 40mm and Oerlikon 35mm to be mounted, but light AAA like the T-82 is probably more common. Where medium AAA can be found outside of the Skyguard sites, it tends to be in batteries of 4 or 6 whereas the rooftop positions tend to be just two. Systems often appear mixed, in part because of the peacetime deployment and training needs of ROCAF air defence units. Some sites also appear to have Tien Chien I units but this is almost impossible to confirm on Google Earth at this time.
[img]http://i44.tinypic.com/118fxqg.jpg img]

We won’t exhaustively show all AAA sites we’ve found on Google Earth but here are a handful:













3. ROC Army/Marines air defences

All medium and long range air defences are now under control of the Air Force. The ROC army does maintain point air defences in common with armies the world over. The main systems are Chaparral and Stinger.

3.1 Avenger
The Avenger system was developed by US to replace the Chaparral and can be described as two quad-packs of Stinger missiles and a .50cal machine gun as backup, mounted on the back of a Hummer. The gunner sits between the missiles peering through a sloping windshield much like on the equivalent Russian SA-13 Gopher system.

Stinger has a range of about 10km although typical engagements will be far shorter.

Taiwanese officials confirmed that Avenger is deployed around Taipei to defend the city. This is surprising area air-defence is more typically the role of the air force who deploy Patriot and Tien Kung SAMs around Taipei, plus Hawk and Skyguard with AAA. Avenger is a formidable system in its own right but it is wholly unsuited to defending a city against likely means off attack. One explanation may be that Avenger is not deployed to defend against Chinese military attack but against terrorist attack by means of hijacked jets although the Patriot and other ROCAF defences already more than adequately cover that. An alternative interpretation may be that the army is playing a political game and wants the positive press/influence of being seen to be defending the capital against air attack.

3.2 Chaparral
Chaparral is a 1970s US system based on the AIM-9 Sidewinder with a range of about 6km. Sighting, situational awareness and reaction time are relatively primitive and the system is of limited use against fast jet targets.

Like US, ROC has adopted the famous Stinger short range SAM to replace Chaparral. Chaparral remains in service and in 2002 the ‘J’ model missile was integrated, along with the Lockheed Martin’s LAADS (Low Altitude Air Defense System) radar.

3.3 Dual Mount Stinger
Taiwan adopted a twin Stinger pedestal mount. This can be placed on the ground, or in the back of a truck and offers greater readiness than standard shoulder-launched deployments of the same missile.

planeman

4. Air Force air defence fighters

ROCAF operates a large fleet of over 380 fast jet fighters backed up by AEW aircraft. That’s comparable to ‘major’ European air forces and the aircraft are of a generally similar standard. There are four main fighter types in service and it’s hard to say which is the premier type – they all have their merits.


These are deployed at a number of air bases:






4.1 Mirage-2000-5
An impressive French designed fighter this is deployed mainly as an ‘interceptor’ – i.e. a fast reaction air combat type which emphasizes long range interception of inbound threats and engagement beyond visual range. For this it can carry four MICA-EM active radar guided missiles. These are generally equivalent to the AMRAAM but trade range for agility and are generally more lethal at dog fighting ranges also. These are complemented by the Matra Magic-II infrared guided missile.

The Mirages are based at Hsinchu on the West of the island.

24.818056°, 120.939515° CLICK HERE

There are rumours of retiring the Mirages, either on the pretext of unnecessary expense, or because France is not a trusted arms supplier (a sentiment somewhat justified after the ROC frigate scandal). Doing so would be militarily irresponsible however as the Mirages are arguably the most capable fighters in ROCAF service and have many years of credible service ahead of them.



4.2 F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
Taiwan’s F-16s have recently received AMRAAM missiles vastly increasing their lethality. The type is based at Chiai in the West of the island and Hualien in the East.



Chiai: 23.461669°, 120.392764° CLICK HERE



Hualien: 24.037918°, 121.622356° CLICK HERE

4.3 F-CK-1 Ching Kuo
Originally called the IDF (Indigenous Defence Fighter), the F-CK-1 was developed by Taiwan at a time when US had blocked sales of the F-16 and F-20 Tigershark fighters to Taiwan. The type is therefore the local alternative and uses Taiwanese missiles in the form of Tien Chien II active-radar guided missiles, comparable to early models of AMRAAM, and Tien Chien I infrared guided short range missiles comparable to AIM-9L Sidewinder.

A recent upgrade program has added conformal fuel tanks and enhance electronics but is not as extensive as the originally planned upgrade. The new fighter, called F-CK-1C (‘D’ for two-seater),can now carry 4 Tien Chien II missiles in normal combat configuration.



Makung: 23.567693°, 119.629112° CLICK HERE



Tainan: 22.963654°, 120.202196° CLICK HERE



Note: Ching Chuan Kang is widely regarded as ROCAF’s main air base and a large number of combat aircraft can be seen on Google Earth. Many of them are not F-CK-1s but F-5s.
Ching Chuan Kang: 24.264590°, 120.625302° CLICK HERE


4.4 F-5E/F Tiger II
The oldest fighter type still in service, these are also the least capable and do not have radar guided missiles.



I counted a total 37 F-5s in the open in the latest Google Earth imagery of Taitung:

Taitung: 22.789511°, 121.168096° CLICK HERE



5. Radar and electronic warfare network

5.1 Hawkeye
The fighter force is supported by a fleet of 6 E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

Left to right: Mirage 2000, F-16, E-2T Hawkeye, F-CK-1, F-5E.


The first four Hawkeyes were delivered as E-2T standard and the last two in a separate order as ‘Hawkeye 2000’ standard aircraft. The aircraft are based at Pingtung air base along with numbers transport and patrol aircraft.
Pingtung: 22.695447°, 120.470209° CLICK HERE <find the E-2 taking off in satellite view.

5.2 Pave Paws
Taiwan is reportedly in the process of deploying a “Pave Paws” phased array radar which should be operational later this year. The exact model is not consistently reported but it may be a refurbished ex-US system. The radar will be primarily used for missile early warning and may be integrated to the US’ early warning network.
US example:

Reported site: 24.497890°, 121.071454° CLICK HERE


5.3 Long Range radar and EW sites
The main radar in use is the Lockheed Martin AN/FPS-117 long range L-Band radar which has a 300km range. Taiwan has 7 of these plus 4 road-mobile versions (AN/TPS-117).


Example radar sites:

24.656872°, 120.781975° CLICK HERE




The fixed sites are complemented by mobile radars, both associated with SAM units and part of the high-level air defence network. Noteworthy among the types in service are the AN/TPS-117 (4 units) and AN/TPS-75V.

planeman

6. ROCAF in the context of Chinese Air Force (PLAAF)

Note posted here due to forum rules. Go HERE to see






7. Navy as air defence

The Navy (ROCN) is quite sizable by international standards with 20 frigates and 4 destroyers, plus submarines and numerous corvettes, missile boats and other craft. 16 of the Frigates and the 4 destroyers are equipped with area-air-defence missiles.

I’m going to be deliberately brief on the topic of the ROCN as I may want to do a more in-depth Taiwanese straits scenario based article at some point and ROCN versus PLAN (China’s Navy) would be key to that. So here I am only looking at ROCN from the perspective of the air defences they can provide the island.

The Kidd class destroyers are by far the most potent, armed with 66 165km ranged SM-2 Block IIIA Standard missiles. Although the Kidd class does not poses the AEGIS system, they are nonetheless potent air defence assets.

The 16 other area-defence capable frigates are the 8 Oliver Hazard Perry type (about 40 missiles each) and 8 modified Knox class (just 10 missiles each) both of which carry the shorter ranged and far less potent Standard SM-1 missile. This system is verging on obsolescence.

Firstly if we consider the maximum footprint the ROCN could deploy we see that their air defence assets are sufficient to deploy a wall of overlapping missile engagement envelopes completely surrounding the main Island:


That is not how these assets would be deployed if conflict erupted however and the real air defence envelope would be much smaller, perhaps more like this with two major surface groups north and south of the main island poised to counter-attack but staying out of the initial cross-straits missile onslaught, and other groups of Frigates deployed in anti-submarine tasks in the deeper water to the east of the island, or as missile boat ‘leaders’ in the straits:

The point of the image is not to discuss ROCN tactics, but simply to illustrate that when you deploy warships closer together you end up covering far less airspace.

Although there is talk of deploying Tien Chien II and Tien Kung II SAMs on ROCN warships neither of these two plans seem to be bearing fruit. Certainly at the time of writing the air defences are still reliant on the older SM-1 and less integrated SM-2 Standard missiles. Taiwan had attempted to purchase AEGIS warships but US managed to get them to buy the less capable but attractively priced Kidds class instead.



End.

kliu0

I remember Taiwan couldn't buy the AEGIS warships mainly because of its price. It was very expensive upfront cost and to maintain. Rumours are that the Navy may begin to press for AEGIS ships, as the warships they have are beginning to age. But that be after the MND frees up more resources and after some progress on new submarines supposedly after the restructuring (end of conscription, cutting down of the absurdly big amount of generals)

BTW, very good article. Keep up the great work!

Finn McCool

What is your opinion of the survivability of the ROCAF's air defense systems in the event of a shooting war? Obviously all those TKs and PACs are capable but the arrangement that they are in (on the hillsides, in silos, etc) seem to be a bit vulnerable. For example I can envision one cluster munition armed ballistic missile (or any large cluster munition for that matter) taking out the entire battery of Patriots in one of the hillside batteries.

__________________
Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.
-Winston Churchill

planeman

Yes agreed. ROC has all the obvious options, like redeploying etc. But given PRC's recent PGM developments, including ever more accurate ballistic missiles and JDAM type bombs, the viability of those sorts of installation are becoming less every year - they were built at a time when PRC had very few precision weapons and few aircraft to deliver them - now they have an abundance, not just air-launched but also submarine and land launched. The Patriot and TK can theoretically shoot down the missiles targeting them, but this seems a tall order in reality and would expend a lot of valuable missiles.

Getting something like SkyShield or more likely C-RAM (Land Phalanx) would improve survivability, at least against cruise missiles, MRLS and air-launched PGMs. Ballistic missiles would still be a real pain and as for nukes...

The hardened TK batteries would be more survivable, at least in respect to near misses. But their fixed radars are extremely vulnerable.


In 1940 Germany spent weeks bombing British radar site with virtually no success at all. By 1944 however the British had developed aircraft and tactics (rocket armed Typhoon fighters) that could take out German coastal radar sites almost at will - in fact they deliberately left some intact to help in the deception leading up to D-Day. Fast forward to 2009 and we see that a large portion of Taiwan's early warning network is fixed site, and that even mobile radars are routinely deployed in fixed sites. They may provide minutes early warning to the first raids but they wouldn't survive the night, after which Taiwan would be fighting almost blind I think. Taiwan could try to repay the favour (there are similar large radar sites on the Chinese side) but China could replace radars far easier - to put that in perspective, we know that Taiwan has a grand total of 4 TPS-117 mobile radars. That doesn't afford for attrition.

The_Zergling

Excellent article. I took the liberty of correcting some directional errors (such as airbase locations), but overall there's very little to fault.

I think the survivability issue is a big one, and not one simply limited to SAMs. The Air Force also has problems with runway and hangar usability as it's likely that quite a few PLA ballistic missiles will get through regardless of the extensive SAM network. This is why 2nd strike survivability is so important, and definitely a place where more investment is required. (hardening of runways and shelters, for example) I don't think there's really much you can do about the vulnerability of hillside batteries, though, as there are practical reasons to have SAMs located close to each other to make it easier to coordinate.

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Finn McCool

Taiwan just has a real problem with the fact that based on its strategic situation it has to deal with certain limitations, one of them being a massive Chinese first strike that they will have had a long time to plan. I think right now the best solutions for Taiwan are investing in hardening their runways and aircraft shelters and creating decoys, and getting their hands on more (and mobile) radars. All of these things wouldn't be too difficult, as hardening facilities doesn't require foreign involvement and wouldn't inspire much political debate. Radars would be more difficult, but again they aren't exactly big attention getting items so it might be easier to import some than, say, F-16s.

Personally I think that given its situation Taiwan has done a fairly good job of creating a SAM network but they would still sustain heavy losses to all of their AD assets in a Chinese first strike. There is safety in numbers, and the PAC 3s and further TK-II batteries will help. However I think that Taiwan should transition towards a more asymmetric strategy overall; a part of that is an emphasis on mobile SAM systems.

__________________
Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.
-Winston Churchill

planeman

Well it's interesting that Raytheon hasn't done more to improve separation of Patriot battery components. The MBDA SAMP/T (land version of Aster 30) can separate the components by up to 4km! Separation causes its own operational challenges but if that's the cost of survivability then it seems a reasonable avenue of development.

In Taiwan's case they could lay comms cables to pre-arranged locations and therefore separate the components by hundreds of KM in extreme cases. Imagine flying over Penghu where the radars have been knocked out, and a radar on the main island acquires you from 50km in front of you, it launches a SAM which is a node in its distributed network... that SAM is on Penghu and right beneath you! I don't get why SAM systems aren't built that way but hey I'm an amateur! Line of sight laser comms, virtually un-jammable, could also be used up to several miles. Attach the dishes to masts in the forest etc.

PanAsian

Thanks for the post Planeman, it's great just like the Fortress China post.

It's interesting to note that the Taiwan ROC Navy's AA capabilities clearly outmatch anything the PLAN has, including the newest 051C, 052C, and 054.

Given the small geographic area involved and being on the defensive, the influence of land-based AA is probably to the Taiwan ROC's tactical advantage.

optionsss

Can you elaborate a little bit.
I think for its size, the navy has done a good job maintain a credible air defense, but to say they have outmatched anything PLAN has, is a little over confident.